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PARTI
THE EVOLUTION OF 
PUBLIC INTERVENTION

CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
SUMMARY: 1.1. Introduction. 1.2. Public 
Intervention and the General Interest. 1.2. The 
General Interest in Liberalised Markets.
1.1. INTRODUCTION.
1. Transformations in the telecom sector. During the last two decades, 
the telecommunications sector has undergone a major transformation. 
Technology has evolved dramatically forcing the operators to re-formulate 
their services and to rebuild their networks. Digitalisation has allowed 
convergence with the audio-visual sector and with informatics, in such a way 
that dozens of new services have appeared, and the traditional ones have been 
definitively transformed. Digitalisation, together with the invention of new 
transmission techniques, such as satellites and fibre optics, has increased the 
bandwidth, and has forced the operators to renew their networks. These 
innovations have affected the way most citizens live and work.
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Technological progress has transformed the telecommunications 
services and networks and, at the same time has been one of the main reasons 
for the transformation of the market structure and of the instruments of public 
intervention in the telecommunications sector. The influence of the new 
political order, the lack of public funding for the big investments necessary for 
the development of modem networks, the need of capital to re-balance the 
State accounts, or the influence of institutions such as the European Union have 
also determined the evolution from national public monopolies to open 
competition between private operators. Public authorities are retreating from 
the direct provision of the telecommunications services, privatising their 
networks. At the same time, exclusive rights for the provision of such services 
are being eliminated, opening the markets to new operators. This is a common 
trend in most of the sectors in which public authorities monopolised the 
provision of goods or services, but the telecommunications sector, due to its 
dynamism, has been one of the first ones to undergo these radical 
transformations.
Liberalisation, at the same time, is eliminating the instruments of public 
intervention used traditionally in Europe, due to the fact that the public 
monopoly is substituted by a competitive market in which even public 
ownership of one of the operators, if maintained by public authorities, does not 
allow it to control the market as before. Since these reforms do not exclude 
public intervention, new mechanism s have to be defined in order for the public 
authorities to ensure the satisfaction of the general interest The purpose of the 
following chapters is to develop the knowledge of these new mechanisms, and 
their interaction with mechanisms already present but traditionally not applied 
to the sector, such as the rules on competition.
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1.2. PUBLIC INTERVENTION AND THE GENERAL INTEREST.
2. The notion of the general interest. A traditional subject of political 
philosophy has been the notion of the general interest, its relation with the 
individual interests, and the role of the public authorities in the defence of such 
general interest. Two main philosophical as well as political traditions can be 
identified.1
On the one hand, what could be called the common interest tradition, 
accepts and promotes the harmonic interaction of individual interests for the 
definition and defence of the general interest. The role of the public authorities 
would be to provide formal channels for the harmonic definition of the 
common interest, in order to avoid the illegitimate imposition of a particular 
private interest.2
On the other hand, the public interest tradition transcends the intrinsically 
negative private interests, and attributes to public authorities the role of 
defining and protecting the general interest from the illegitimate private 
interests.3
Early precedents of both traditions in relation to the defence of the general 
interest can be found in the feudal structure of the European societies, both in 
England and in the continent. The different political evolution of the UK (and
1 See RANGEON* F. (1986): “I  'idéologie de l'intérêt généra?', Economica, Paris.
2 This philosophical tradition has been built by authors such as Locke, Adam Smith or Stuart Mill, and 
can be traced in early philosophers such as Aristotle. See for instance, Aristotle: “77 est imposible 
qu *elle [la cité] soit heureuse toute entiere si la plus part de ses elements à défaut de tous, ou du moins 
certains d'entre eux no possèdent pas le bonheur”, ARISTOTLE, La politique, H, 5, 1264 b 17.
3 Authors such as Hobbes, Montesquieu and Rousseau have led this approach, that also has ancient 
precedents such as the writings of Plato. See for instance Plato: “£ 'art politique véeritable ne doit pas 
se soucier de Vintérêt particullier, mais de l'intérêt public”, PLATO, Lois, IV, 875, a.
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later the US) and the continent influenced the pre-eminence of one model over 
the other.4
In the UK centralisation of power was limited by the survival of medieval 
institutions. Private actors were not excluded from the general interest 
activities, and early precedents developed into the generalised provision of 
services of general interest by private operators. Public intervention was not 
excluded, as a derogatory regime was allowed to impose special obligations on 
private operators subject to judiciary control. Such a tradition was received in 
the US, where political power was highly de-concentrated (both vertically, due 
to the federal structure, and horizontally, due to the strict system of balance of 
powers), and even weak in the frontier territory.
Public intervention in defence of the general interest adopted indirect 
mechanisms in order to control the activities of the private operators. By the 
beginning of the 20th century a whole model of indirect intervention through 
the definition by independent specialised agencies of specific legal obligations 
to be imposed on the private operators for the fulfilment of the general interest 
was established. An interesting particularity was what has been called the 
“unbundling” of the general interest,5 as the independent agencies were usually 
assumed to be competent for the evaluation of very precise aspects of the 
general interest in a particular sector, independently of other considerations. At 
the same time, instruments such as the antitrust rules were introduced to avoid 
the concentration of private economic power, as it was understood that such 
power was a menace for everyone’s freedom.
In parallel, in those countries where power tended to be concentrated in 
the hands of an absolute Monarch, private operators tended to be excluded
4 See AMATO, G. and LAUDATI, L. (1999): “When the Economy is Affected with a Public Interest
The protection of Public Interest and Regulation of Economic Activities”, in “The Anticompetitive 
Impact o f Regulation”.
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from general interest activities, and early precedents of public provision of 
public services developed into the general rule. This was the case particularly 
in France, where the 1789 Revolution strengthened this process. Public 
administration centralised the decision-making process as regards the public 
interest, excluding private actors.
By the beginning of the 20th century, public service became the 
legitimising title and the limit to public intervention and Administrative Law, 
in such a way that private operators were excluded from the provision of public 
services. The consideration of the general interest requirements was 
concentrated in the public administration in such a way that different aspects 
were considered simultaneously. The interventionist model nevertheless did not 
eliminate the mutual interference between public political power and private 
economic power, and the joint consideration of different public interests 
reduced the transparency of the process.
3. Public intervention models. Public intervention is closely linked to 
the notion of general interest. As it has been pointed out, two different 
conceptions of this notion have traditionally been opposed to each other, and as 
a consequence, two different models of public intervention for the defence of 
the general interest have coexisted.
.On the one hand, the general interest can be perceived as the interest of 
the collectivity, different and incompatible with private interests, which have to 
be excluded from the definition of the public interest. The direct provision by 
the public authorities of the goods and services considered of general interest, 
and therefore, the exclusion of private actors in these sectors, is based on this 
notion of general interest.
5 Ibid.
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Direct intervention usually excludes the effectivity of the free market 
mechanisms for example through the granting of exclusive rights and therefore 
the creation of monopolies. The same effect can be reached through 
interventions which introduce different elements that modify in such a way the 
development of commercial transactions, for example fixing prices and 
quantities of production of a certain product, that free market mechanisms are 
substantially denaturalised. This kind of intervention can be named as market 
substitutive intervention.
On the other hand, the general interest can be perceived as the result of 
the fair combination of all citizens’ private interests. Even if the common 
interest would be superior to the private interests, the later should be 
considered legitimate and even necessary for the correct formation of the 
common interest. Departing from this point, public intervention for the defence 
of the general interest understood as the common interest is mainly devoted to 
the control of private actions in order to ensure that private interest are fairly 
combined, and no private interest is imposed on the community.
Indirect public intervention is generally based on this notion of general 
interest. The role of public authorities is to ensure the fair combination of 
private interests in the market This has been the traditional model of public 
intervention in the USA, where the provision of goods and services of general 
interest was entrusted to private operators, controlled by public authorities 
through the imposition of legal obligations.
This kind of public intervention has the objective of complementing the 
free market mechanisms for the fulfilment of different objectives not ensured 
by the market, or even for the protection of the market itself. Public 
intervention relies on the efficiency of free market mechanisms and limits itself 
to introduce new elements which according to the internal logic of the supply 
and demand mechanisms, will lead to the fulfilment of the different objectives.
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This kind of public intervention can be named market complementative 
intervention.
4. Market substitutive intervention. Market substitutive intervention 
models, characterised by the elimination or denaturalisation of the supply and 
demand mechanisms of the free market economy, can have two origins. On the 
one hand, public intervention can have its origin in a conscious strategy. Public 
authorities can impose this kind of intervention due to the lack of confidence in 
the free market. This lack of confidence can have political reasons. Public 
authorities can consider that some activities and sectors are of particular 
importance for the security or well-being of the citizens, in such a way that it is 
not appropriate to leave to private actors the price fixing and wealth 
distribution according to the free market mechanisms.
The lack of confidence can also have economic reasons. There are cases 
in which competition between different actors for the provision of a particular 
good or a service is not efficient. The theory of the natural monopoly is the best 
example. Economic theory sustains that there are markets where a monopoly is 
the most efficient market structure, since economies of scale are so important, 
that the main producer will always have lower prices, and therefore, the 
tendency to become the only producer. Public authorities can define a legal 
monopoly to avoid useless competition in such markets, or even exclude 
private activity in such markets and provide directly the service, in order to 
avoid abuses by the private monopolist.
The conscious strategy to eliminate or denaturalise free market 
mechanisms can derive not so much from a lack of confidence in such 
mechanisms, but from pressure from different groups hoping to achieve their 
own private goals.
On the other hand, substitutive intervention can have its origin in a 
political decision to complement the market that, without desiring such an
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effect, modifies in such a stand the free market mechanisms that they are 
denaturalised.
Substitutive intervention has been the traditional model of public 
intervention in the telecommunications sector. Even if originally there was 
limited competition in most of the national markets, it was eliminated in 
virtually all the States. European and Latin American states opted for the 
monopolisation of the sector and the direct provision of the services by public 
administration, excluding any intervention of the free market mechanisms. 
Prices were fixed by public authorities so that the service would facilitate an 
income to the budget, and the expansion of the networks was dependent on the 
public funding availability and the political priority granted to the sector at a 
particular stage. Public monopolies were created in most of the nations due to 
political reasons. The influence of the existing structures for post and telegraph 
services, the military uses of the te lecom m u n ications, and the desire to control 
a facility with an obvious effect on society recommended the elim ination  of 
private actors in the sector and the provision of the services directly by the 
public authorities.6
In the US, competition was common for a long period, but by the 
beginning of the century the most important company (the Bell System) 
managed to convince the American public authorities to allow the 
monopolisation of the market by a private company subject to regulatory 
control by an independent agency. In this case, the interest of a powerful 
company managed to create a public intervention that avoided the interaction 
of the free market mechanisms. The Bell System became substantially the sole 
provider of telecommunications service in the US. Market mechanisms were 
denaturalise by public intervention obstructing new operators’ access to the
6 Vide infra Chapter 3. Nationalisation and Liberalisation of the European Telecoms Markets.
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market, and by public price fixing ensuring a fair return to the monopolists’ 
investments.7
As a result, free market mechanisms were eliminated from the 
telecommunications sector in most of the world, and a substitutive public 
intervention was introduced to rule it. This intervention seems to have 
responded rather to private interests or to a philosophy of public intervention 
than to arguments such as the existence of a natural monopoly, or the benefits 
of a monopoly for the achievement of a universal network, that were only 
introduced at a latter stage, when public intervention was being challenged.
5. Market complementative intervention. Market complementative 
intervention by public authorities is based in the general confidence in the 
interaction between private operators in the market for the satisfaction of the 
general interest. This kind of intervention is directed to the protection of the 
market mechanisms themselves, or to the introduction of elements that, 
following the demand/supply mechanisms, will ensure the fulfilment of some 
objectives defined by the public authorities.
This intervention can be based in the existence of some market failures, 
such as the existence of externalities that can be dealt with through the 
introduction of some elements that force the market to take them into account. 
Political reasons or the defence of private parties’ interest can impose the 
achievement of certain objectives foreign to the market. For example, it can be 
convenient to lower the price of a good or a service, or ensure that all the 
citizens have access to it. This can be achieved through mechanisms 
complementary to the market that do not obstruct its functioning.
Complementative intervention is subsidiary, in the sense that, in 
principle, it only takes place when the market itself is not enough for the
7 Vide infra Chapter 2. Regulation and Deregulation of the US Telecoms Markets.
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achievement of a particular result. Public administrations introduce very 
concrete obligations or prohibitions, very often applied to particular cases.
The reform of the telecommunications sector that has taken place in the 
last decades in most of the countries of the world, is heading towards the 
creation of competitive markets in the sector, and the substitution of public 
control of the sector, by the control exercised by the free market mechanisms. 
The most important element of the reform has been the elimination of the 
exclusive rights, and the opening of the market to new actors. This reform has 
usually been accompanied by the privatisation of the facilities that were in 
hands of the public administrations. The elimination of the monopolies and the 
privatisation of the public operators, nevertheless, do not entail the elimination 
of public intervention in the sector, but it certainly requires a modification of 
the traditional intervention mechanisms in Europe. Market substitutive 
intervention is being replaced by market complementative intervention, forcing 
public authorities to define new instruments compatible with the market.
1.3. THE GENERAL INTEREST IN LIBERALISED MARKETS.
6. Public intervention in liberalised markets. During the last decades, 
the role of public authorities in the economy has been questioned. Market 
substitutive intervention has been heavily criticised for its lack of efficiency 
and its tendency to diverge from the objectives originally planned. According 
to these views, public authorities with limited information and a broad range of 
interest to defend, cannot ensure an efficient intervention. For these reasons, 
market substitutive intervention is disappearing, giving place to competitive 
markets, where public intervention is limited to complementative actions. The 
telecommunications sector has led this process of reform all over the world.
The transition from market substitutive intervention to competitive 
markets with complementative intervention is, nevertheless, complicated.
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Different factors, including the presence of the traditional monopolist, 
complicate the development of competitive structures, which do not usually 
appear in a short period of time. This is particularly the case in those industries 
characterised by their high barriers to entry (for example the network industries 
such as telecommunications, energy, transportation etc.) due to the amount of 
the investment needed, the existence of economies of scale or other reasons.
These difficulties create a transitory period in which traditional market 
substitutive instruments have been eliminated and thus, cannot impose controls 
to avoid abuses and, at the same time, the lack of effective competition makes 
impossible the control exercised by the free market mechanisms, in such a way 
that private actors, especially the incumbent, might enjoy a private monopoly 
subject to no control. This lack of control can result in the operator abusing of 
its suppliers and clients, and, furthermore, in practices aimed to the elimination 
of the new operators accessing the market. This is particularly dangerous, 
because it could obstruct the development of competitive structures in such a 
way that the private uncontrolled monopoly could extend in time its position.
In response to this new situation, a transitory intervention might be 
necessary. The role of this intervention would be, first of all to control the 
behaviour of the private actors in the market, in order to impose the necessary 
obligations and prohibitions to avoid the abuses that the lack of competition 
allows. This is an intervention that has a lot of instruments in common with the 
lightest kinds of substitutive intervention, but it is of a different nature, since 
these instruments should not obstruct the development of the necessary 
competition in the market.
At the same time, most of the States have opted for a more 
interventionist approach, and taking into account that some kind of intervention 
is needed in order to avoid abuses during the transition to effective 
competition. This intervention could in parallel foster the development of such 
competition. Public intervention, which should not obstruct the development of
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competitive structures, could even facilitate that development. The main 
instrument of this intervention has been the development of asymmetric 
obligations, lighter on the new entrants and heavier on the incumbent.
This asymmetry allows for the satisfaction of both objectives of the 
public intervention during the transition period. Firstly, it allows the abuses 
derived from the excessive market power of the operators with significant 
market power to be controlled. It is not necessary to impose these obligations to 
the new comers, because their weak position makes it impossible for them to 
commit these abuses. Secondly, the existence of a lighter regulation should 
allow new comers to grow bigger and faster in a shorter period of time and in 
such a way that they will be able to impose market pressure on the incumbents.
This kind of intervention is particularly complex. First of all, in the 
European case it requires a major reform of the instruments and institutions of 
intervention. Secondly, a delicate balance is required so that public intervention 
facilitates the development of competition without encouraging the entrance of 
inefficient operators.
The telecommunications sector has, once again, led the apparition of this 
new kind of intervention. The existence of important barriers to entries due to 
the investments required for the development of telecommunications networks, 
the importance of the network externality, and the existence of enormous 
economies of scale, inhibit new comers’ access to the market and their 
development into effective competitors. The former monopolies enjoy strong 
dominance in a market difficult to control with the general instruments.
7. Instruments of public intervention. Demonopolisation and 
privatisation have eliminated the most important instruments of public 
intervention in some sectors, including the telecommunications sector. Direct 
intervention of public authorities is being substituted by free market 
mechanisms, but these reforms do not modify the fact that these sectors are
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characterised by a general interest in the efficient and economic provision of 
the services, due to the role of basic industries, fundamental for the 
development of general economic activity, and their effect on the general 
population’s standards of living. For these reasons the control by the public 
authorities is recommended for the satisfaction of the general interest as well as 
the intervention in those cases in which the free market mechanisms do not 
ensure such objectives. Public intervention, therefore, is subsidiary and 
complementative of the market forces.
In the framework of the liberalised markets, there are two main general 
horizontal instruments of public intervention. On the one hand, there are the 
rules on competition, which protect the competitive structure of the market so 
that free market mechanisms can effectively control the activity in the market 
of all the actors. On the other hand, we find the rules on consumer protection, 
introduced in order to protect consumers against the abuses of the product and 
service providers. A third instrument of public intervention is sector specific 
regulation. This instrument provides specific tools for public intervention in 
order to complement the free market mechanisms and the horizontal 
instruments of intervention.
Competition Law provides a public intervention instrument for the 
protection of free market mechanisms. This is particularly important in the de­
monopolised sectors where competitive structures are developing and therefore 
are very weak. A strict application of the rules on competition in these sectors 
will allow the developing of competitive structures and avoid some of the 
abuses derived from the market power of the incumbents. The special situation 
of these markets can require at times a special application of these rules, but 
this adaptation should not modify the basic principles of the norms.
The general rules on consumer protection impose on operators various 
obligations aimed at obstructing abusive behaviours caused by the contractual 
asym m etry  between large corporations with their thousands or millions of
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clients, and individual citizens. Such rules can provide efficient mechanisms of 
protection against the abuses of the incumbent operators in a period in which 
no effective constraints are imposed by a non-existing competition in the 
market. Nevertheless, consumer protection rules do not provide mechanisms to 
foster the elimination of the market power, and therefore they seem insufficient 
to protect consumers’ interest in the long run.8
Sector specific regulation has a double role in the liberalised sectors. On 
the one hand, it is the right ambit for public intervention in the direct defence of 
the general interest. Once the public authorities define an objective of general 
interest, it is their obligation to check whether market mechanisms are enough 
for the satisfaction of such objective. If this is not the case, complementative 
measures should be introduced without obstructing the functioning of the 
market. This complementary intervention can be temporary, but on occasions 
market failure can be consistent and require a permanent intervention of the 
public authorities. This public intervention should not obstruct competition, 
and, in the transitory phase to effective competition could even introduce some 
asymmetries to facilitate such transition.
On the other hand, sector specific regulation can be introduced in de­
monopolised sectors during the transitory phase towards effective competition 
with the. intention of accelerating such transition and, at the same time, 
avoiding the abuses that the lack of competition allows to those operators with 
significant market power.
8. Competition Law in the telecommunications sector. Traditionally, 
competition Law plaid a very limited role in sectors where public authorities 
defined exclusive rights for the provision of services of general interest. This
8 The study of the consumer protection rules in the telecommunications sector and the interaction with 
the other instruments of intervention is outside of die scope of this thesis, which is focused on the 
interrelation between the rules on competition and sector specific regulations. Some references to these 
rules will, nevertheless, be introduced in die following pages.
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was the case not only in the European Union but also in the US. The situation 
changed drastically and different reasons carried to the application of 
competition Law to these sectors, and specifically to the telecommunications 
sector. This put an end to the exclusive rights in the European Union and the 
US. Even if the role of competition Law in the de-monopolisation of the sector 
was relevant, it was neither the only factor nor the sole instrument. What is 
clear is that the rules on competition have been increasingly important and, for 
sure, will play a fundamental role in the following years.
The coexistence, in the European Union of Community and national 
legislation on competition Law means that different institutions apply different, 
even if similar rules. This introduces an element of confusion in the application 
of competition Law in the telecommunications sector. Nevertheless, the I 
existence of this double level facilitates a very interesting mechanism such as 
the application of competition Law not only to private companies and even 
public companies, as in many States, but also the application of competition 
Law directly to public authorities that adopt measures whose effect is contrary 
to the rules on competition defined in the Treaty. These interesting mechanisms 
have allowed the liberalisation in Europe and, at the same time, introduce an 
element of pressure for the Member States in the process of transition to 
effective competition. —
Although the application of competition Law might have been one of the 
legal instruments which has allowed the elimination of exclusive rights in the 
sector, and even if competition Law has an important role in avoiding 
agreements and unilateral actions that restrict competition, the role of 
competition Law in recently monopolised markets is necessarily limited. In 
these markets where no effective competition exists due to the existence in the 
recent past of a legal monopoly and the weakness of the new comers, 
competition Law can obstruct the anticompetitive behaviour of the incumbent 
with the objective of prolonging its dom inant position or even eliminating the
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existing competition. But it has to be affirmed that competition Law does not 
have the instruments to create competition in those markets where it does not 
exist. Competition Law was designed for the protection of competition, but not 
for the creation of such competition. Furthermore, the rules on competition are 
not the bestinstrument to govern markets with failures that limit the level of 
effectiveness of competition.
9. Sector specific regulation in the telecommunications sector. It has
been pointed that competition Law may not ensure the satisfaction of all the 
general interests in the telecommunications sector. It is for this reason that 
sector specific legislation has been passed and specific institutions have been 
created in most of the States where the sector is being liberalised.
Sector specific regulation has two major objectives. On the one hand 
asymmetric legislation has been passed for the promotion of competition. 
Particularly important is the regulation of interconnection, as well as the 
regulation of prices. On the other hand, legislation has been passed for the 
direct defence of certain interests, such as the universality of the basic 
telecommunications services, the efficient management of scarce resources, 
and the definition of obligatory basic quality standards. In the European Union, 
most of this legislation has its origin in Community Directives.
Specific institutions have been created in most of the Member States for 
the application of the new legislation. Most of these institutions have adopted 
the form of independent com m issions following the model of the independent 
regulatory authorities of the US. These commissions create problems of 
constitutionality in most of the Member States, due precisely to their 
independence from the executive power and, indirectly from the legislative.
Sector specific regulation is a concentrated and continuous control of a 
specific economic sector through the imposition of legal obligations on the 
private actors in the sector. Even if there are certain general obligation to do or
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not to do, this kind of public intervention is characterised by the adaptation of 
the general principles to each actor in the market, in such a way that a very 
specialised and independent institution is necessary for the development of the 
intervention. Specific obligations are defined originally in the title of access to 
the market. Other obligations can be defined as and when necessary.
10. Conflicts and balances. Competition Law and sector specific 
regulation are the two main types of public intervention in the 
telecommunications market, and are developed by different institutions at a 
national level as well as different services of the European Commission at a 
Community level. Conflicts between the different institutions and the different 
levels of intervention are inevitable. Those conflicts are not limited to the 
exercise of power between different institutions, but are conflicts which reflect 
the tension between different kinds of public intervention.
Sector specific regulation requires the conceptualisation and 
materialisation of public intervention mechanisms for the direct defence of the 
general interest, in particular mechanisms devoted to ensuring that basic 
telecommunications services are offered at an affordable price to all citizens, 
independently of their location in rural areas. Community Directives have 
defined a universal service scheme for the most fundamental services. The 
fulfilment of the general interest, which is the objective of this scheme, is the 
provision of basic services to all the population without introducing obstacles 
to the development of competition in the sector. Member States are obliged to 
comply with the obligations in the Directives, and regular mechanisms will 
apply in case Member States do not implement these obligations in the right 
way.
Nevertheless, schemes that are supposed to be subsidiary, 
complementative, and compatible with effective competition in the market, can 
be developed in such a way as to obstruct competition. In this case, sector
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specific regulation for the direct satisfaction of the general interest can conflict 
with the rules on competition defined in the European Community Treaty.
Even if Community competition Law, specifically Articles 81 and 82 of 
the EC Treaty (former Articles 85 and 86), was established to prevent 
anticompetitive measures adopted by undertakings, different mechanisms allow 
the Commission to obstruct public measures with anticompetitive effects. 
Article 86 EC Treaty (former Article 90) and the effet utile doctrine allow the 
Commission to initiate procedures against regulatory measures of the Member 
States with anticompetitive effects. In such a way, the Commission can 
obstruct universal schemes that unnecessarily distort the competitive process.
As I argue later, intervention for the promotion of competition tries to 
complement market mechanisms, imposing upon the incumbents the pressure 
that effective competition would impose, plus a little more in order to modify 
the balance existing in the market These obligations are closely connected to 
the obligations imposed by competition Law and a certain correlation can be 
observed. The point is that sector specific regulation advances the line of 
intervention with respect to competition Law, in order not only to protect 
competition but also to promote it. Since competition Law is insufficient, 
sector specific regulation has been adopted temporarily to obtain these 
objectives.
In principle, sector specific regulation for the promotion of competition j 
imposes ex ante the obligations that competition Law could impose ex post. In 
this way, the abuses that the extraordinary market power of the incumbent 
makes more probable, are avoided before they take place. Sector specific 
regulation also avoids the cumbersome procedures and problems of proving 
certain abuses. At the same time, sector specific legislation imposes certain'' 
obligation outside of the scope of the rules on competition. These are
34
Chapter 1. Introduction.
particularly those obligations that impose tougher asymmetric conditions not 
only for the protection of competition but for its promotion.
The key is to avoid the application of competition Law in those issues 
related to the promotion of competition for which the rules on defence of 
competition were not created. This could denaturalise them and create 
distortions in their application to other sectors. At the same time, the 
application of sector specific regulation for the promotion of competition 
should be restricted to those markets where effective competition is lacking, 
thus avoiding the over-regulation of those markets with a certain degree of 
competition.
The purpose of these pages is to shed some light on the relation between 
sector specific regulation and competition Law. Departing from their evolution 
and the study of their characteristics, strengths and limitations, I will examine 
how both instruments of public intervention complement and counterbalance 
each other.
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CHAPTER 2 
REGULATION AND DEREGULATION OF THE US 
TELECOMS MARKETS
SUMMARY: 2.1. The Origins and Evolution o f 
Economic regulation. 2.2. Origins and Evolution 
o f Antitrust. 2.3. The Process o f Deregulation.
2.4. Public Intervention in the US Tele­
communications Markets. 2.5. Conclusions.
2.1. THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC REGULATION.
11. Early precedents of the regulatory intervention. It is of great 
interest to trace the origins and evolution of both of regulation and antitrust. 
Both instruments of public intervention appeared as political responses to the 
challenges faced in the US due to industrialisation in the 19th century, but have 
their roots in early Common Law.
I. The Evolution of Public Intervention.
Between the 13th and 14th centuries, a new institution appeared, the 
“common calling”,9 a category of professionals and craftsmen that provided 
their services for the general public as a business. In feudal England, this kind 
of activity was an object of suspicion, and for this reason was subjected to a 
strict legal regime. On the one hand, a special liability regime was imposed.10 
On the other hand, special obligations were also imposed on them, such as the 
provision of their services to everyone requesting it under reasonable 
circumstances, the obligation to provide the service adequately and, after the 
Black Death of 1348, the obligation to provide their services for a reasonable 
price.11
Economic growth and change in the social structure of society led to the 
popularisation of "common callings”. By the seventeenth century, professionals 
offering their services to the general public were common. At the same time, 
the general assumption of liability of the provider of a service was extended to 
every contract In this way, suspicion, as well as the legal difference that 
separated the legal regime of the private from the "common calling" 
disappeared, and with them, the special obligations to charge a reasonable rate
9 This institution was object of a number of studies at the beginning of the century, when the first 
regulatory agencies were created For the development of the concept of "common calling" and 
"common carrier*, and their connected obligations, see ADLER, E. (1914): ‘‘Business Jurisprudence”, 
in Harvard Law Review, voL 28, pp. 135-162; BURDICK, C. (1911): “The Origin of the Peculiar 
Duties of Public Service Companies”, in Columbia Law Review, vol. 11, pp. 514-531, 616-638, and 
743-764; McALLISTER, B. (1930): “Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest”, in 
Harvard Law Review, voL 43, pp. 759-791; STONE, A. (1991): “Public Service Liberalism. 
Telecommunications and Transitions in Public Policy ", Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ; and 
WYMAN, B. (1904): “The Law of the Public callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem”, in Harvard 
Law Review, voL 17, no. 3, pp. 156-173, and no. 4, pp. 217-247.
10 In medieval England contracts between individuals for the provision of services did not include the 
liability of the provider in case of damages to the other party’s property, unless a particular clause 
(called assumpsit) was included in the contract. In the case where the provider was a “common 
calling”, the assumption of liability was automatic, without the introduction of the liability clause in the 
contract Ibid. WYMAN (1904), p. 157.
11 The obligation was defined in the 1439 Statute of Labourers, vide STONE (1991), p. 20 {supra 
footnote 9).
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and to serve all. There were nevertheless, two exceptions: "common carriers'"2 
and "common inn-keepers".13 These "common callings" maintained the 
obligation to serve all, to serve in a sound manner, and to charge reasonable 
rates. The historical origin of the obligations was replaced by public utility 
reasons, being assimilated somehow to the activity of a public officer, whose 
charge was to serve the general interest. As stated by the Courts, the “common 
carrier” “has made Profession of a Trade which is for the Public Good, and has 
thereby exposed and vested an interest of himself in all the King’s Subjects that 
will emply him in the Way of his Trade”.14 It is because of this reason that all 
three obligations were maintained. This was the first precedent of how private 
persons, subject to some obligations, could provide services of general interest 
for the community.
12. 19th century developments. During the nineteenth century new 
'technologies appeared and developed. Railroads, water, energy and 
telecommunications became necessary for economic development as well as 
for raising the standard of living. These activities were soon considered of 
general interest. The United States led the invention and development of these 
infrastructures, and therefore was the first country which had to define a public 
policy in order to ensure the satisfaction of the general interest. Such policy, as 
it will be shown was based on the English tradition of the common carrier.
From an early stage, certain behaviour of the providers of the new 
services started to damage the interests of various strong groups. Particularly 
important was the Granger movement. The grangers of the Mid-West of the US 
required public intervention against the abuses of the monopolists in charge of 
transportation systems (such as railroads and channels) and warehouses,
12 Persons offering to the general public the service of transportation of people or goods, whether in 
land or water.
13 Persons offering the service of accommodation to the general public.
14 Lane v. Cotton, 1701, vide BURDICK (1911), p. 520 (supra footnote 9).
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indispensable for the commercialisation of their products. The strong position 
of this group required some action by the public authorities.
There were several reasons why the direct provision of the services by the 
public authorities was not considered. Firstly, there was a long tradition of 
private persons providing public services in the United States. This did not only 
include the figure of the "common carrier" but also the incorporation of private 
companies for the provision of services of general interest.15 The second reason 
for the non nationalisation of the industries of general interest was the political 
structure of the US. The separation of powers both at a horizontal and vertical 
levels made more difficult the intervention of public authorities in the public 
service sectors. Lastly, the weak public presence in the frontier territory made 
direct public intervention impossible.
The lack of appropriate instruments for achieving public intervention 
forced Legislators and Judges to define new mechanisms. A first line of case- 
law tried to impose on all the network industries, the regime defined for the 
“common carrier”, based on the content of the activity: transportation. This line 
was useful for some industries, such as telecommunications,16 but was more 
difficult for others,17 and absolutely impossible for several which did not have 
the characteristics of a "common carrier".1* These decisions were based on a
15 In the 19th century the granting of charters of incorporation to private persons for the provision of 
services of general interest such as hospitals, schools, roads and even the creation of frontier villages 
was common. Incorporation would later be granted for the development of business which promoted 
general welfare (banks, insurance, manufacture) and at the last stage, became the most common 
instrument of business organisation. See SEAVOY, R. (1982): “’The Origins o f the American Business 
Corporation, 1784-1855'’, Greenwood Press, Westport
16 “A telephonic system is simply a system for the transmission of intelligence and news. It is, perhaps, 
in a limited sense, and yet in a strict sense, a common carrier”, Missouri v. Bell Telephone Company, 
(1885) 23 Fed. 539, vide BURDICK (1911), p. 622 (supra footnote 9).
17 Pipe lines of gas were considered a common carrier, even if the owner only transported his own gas. 
The service was not provided to the general public, but was considered a common carrier in Prairie Oil 
A Gas Company v. United States, 204, Fed. 798.
'* “it became necessary to convert into a common carrier an activity which was not of that character 
under any accepted definition of the term“, vide ADLER (1914), p. 143 (supra footnote 9).
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misunderstanding. The special regime of the “common calling” did not derive 
from the activity of transportation, but from its nature of “trade, which is for 
the public good”.19
13. Economic regulation by the States. Economic regulation was 
initiated by the State Legislators with the approval of the Judiciary. The answer 
of the State Legislators to the pressure given by the Grangers was the adoption 
of legal measures imposing obligations upon the private operators active in the 
new technology markets, particularly with regard to limits on tariffs. Such 
legislative measures were challenged before the Courts.
The first case on this subject that came to the Supreme Court of the 
United States was Munn v. Illinois. The Illinois constitution defined grain 
warehouses as a public service. In 1870, the State legislature passed a statute 
fixing certain obligations applying to warehouses in Chicago, the main one 
being the obligation to fix permanent rates for one year, publish them and apply 
them to all their clients without discriminations. The Supreme Court upheld the 
statute: "Looking to the common law, from whence came the right which the 
Constitution protects, we find that when private property is ‘affected with a 
public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only’. Lord Chief Justice Hale said 
this more than two hundred years ago.20 [...] Property does become clothed with 
a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and 
affect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a 
use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an 
interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the 
common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may
19 Lane v. Cotton, vide BURDICK (1911), p. 520 (supra footnote 9).
20 In McALLISTER, B. (1930): “Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest”, in Harvard 
Law Review, vol. 43, pp. 159-191, it is demonstrated that those were not the exact words of Justice 
Hale. English law was not so clear on the subject, but the precedent of die "common earner" was, 
nevertheless in that line.
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withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains the 
use, he must submit to the control".21
In Munn v. Illinois two requirements were defined for the public 
intervention: general interest, and concentration in the sector. It was only at a 
later stage that the case law was refined.22 In Nebbia v. New York the Supreme 
Court clearly identified the legitimising title for public intervention: “The use 
of private property and the making of private contracts are, as a general rule, 
free from governmental interference; but they are subject to public regulation 
when public need requires. [...] To say that property is “clothed with a public 
interest”, or an industry is “affected with a public interest”, means that the 
property or the industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for the public 
good”.23
Public intervention by the State Legislators was legitimised with the 
approval by the Supreme Court. The Granger movement not only forced the 
adoption of State legislation, but it also forced the adoption of a federal statue, 
the Interstate Commerce Act.24
14. Early regulatory agencies. Economic regulation can be defined as 
the intervention of public authorities in economic activity, usually by 
specialised independent agencies, through the imposition of specific legal 
obligations on individual private operators, for the fulfilment of the general
21 M utui v . Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, (1876).
22 Munn v. Illinois was the first important ruling by the Supreme Court on the field, but was followed 
by others, such as Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892), or Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U.S. 391 
(1894).
23 “a State is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public 
welfare”, Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), pp. 523, 525, and 537.
24 Interstate Commerce Act, February 4 1887.
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interest. Different models of regulation can be identified according to the scope 
and effects of the legal obligations imposed on the private operators.25
Some of the public service industries were very complex, and the 
definition of the adequate quality of their services, or the reasonableness of 
their prices, was extremely complicated, and could only be checked by a 
permanent organisation. At the same time, such decisions had a high political 
content that Courts were not always prepared to face.26 The effective provision 
of the services of general interest required a clear definition of the activities 
"clothed with a public interest", and a decided enforcement of the obligations 
vested on the private companies providing those services.
By the end of the 19th century, a new intellectual and political movement, 
the Progressives, launched a debate on the improvement of public policies via 
the introduction of expertise in the administration and the creation of 
independent specialised agencies for the regulation of the markets.27 In this 
way, public intervention for the protection of powerless consumers would at 
the same time promote a better exploitation of resources. The adoption of the 
Sherman Act in 1890 can be identified with this movement2*
The creation of the State Public Utilities Commissions between the 19th 
and the 20th centuries was the result of the convergence of different interest. 
Firstly, the utopie movement of the Progressives had developed a theory about 
public intervention through independent agencies. Secondly, political leaders at
25 See REAGAN, M. (1987): “Regulation: The Politics o f Policy”, Little Brown, Boston, pp. 17-18.
26 "I think the proper course is to recognise that a State legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do 
unless it is restrained by some express prohibition in the Constitution of the United States or of the 
State [...] Courts should be careful not to extend such prohibitions beyond their obvious meaning by 
reading into them conceptions of public policy that the particular Court may happen to entertain". 
Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in 273 U.S. 418, 445-47 (1927), vide McALLISTER (1930), 
pp. 159-171 (supra footnote 9). If Justice Holmes considers the risks in the control by Courts of the 
public service obligations imposed by legislators to public service providers, a fortiori the definition by 
the Courts of the public service obligations was inadequate.
27 See HORWTTZ, R. (1989): “The Irony o f Regulatory Reform", Oxford University Press, New York.
23 Vide infra Chapter 22. Origins and Evolution of Antitrust
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State level adopted this ideology as an instrument to initiate political careers at 
a federal level. Lastly, the industry agreed with the creation of the State
P
agencies, as it expected that they would be easier to control than the local 
governments that were already introducing heavy constraints on the operators.^.. 
The first states to create such independent agencies were Wisconsin and New 
York. Between 1905 and 1915 over 30 states created their regulatory agency.
The movement of the creation of the regulatory agencies expanded to the 
federal level. The first agency was the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
created mostly for the regulation of the railway transportation activities. The 
compromise that made the Act possible,30 and the negative attitude of the 
Supreme Court,31 made “that Commission a useless body for all practical 
purposes”,32 but the reforms introduce by the Hepburn Act33 in 1906 and the 
Mann-Elkins Act34 of 1910 strengthened its position. The Federal Trade 
Commission was created in 1914.3S
Early regulation by Legislators and the Judiciary was aimed of controlling 
companies with significant market power, in order to avoid abuses of such 
power. Public intervention was limited to that which was complimentary to the 
market.
15. Entry-and-price regulatory agencies. The second wave of the 
creation of regulatory agencies was the New Deal in the 1930’s. The depth of
29 See ANDERSON, D. (1980): “State Regulation of Electric Utilities”, in "The Politics of 
Regulation ", J. Wilson, Basic Books, New York.
30 See SCHWATZ, B. (1973): “The Economic Regulation o f Business and Trade. A Legislative History 
o f U.S. Regulatory Agencies”, Schwatz, New York, p. 18.
31 In the Maximum Rate Case 167 U.S. 479 (1897), the Supreme Court denied the competence of the 
Commission for maximum prices fixing.
32 Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in the case ICC v. Alabama Midland R. Co. 168 U.S. 144 
(1897).
33 Hepburn Act, June 29 1906.
34 Mann-Elkins Act, June 18 1910.
35 Federal Trade Commission Act, September 26 1914.
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the recession obliged public authorities to reformulate their policies, and to 
propose a greater public intervention in economic activity. In this way, five out 
of the big seven regulatory commissions were created: the Federal Power 
Commission (1930), the Federal Communications Commission (1934), the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (1934), the National Labour Relations 
Board (1935), and the Civil Aeronautics Board (1938).
Entry-and-price regulation, imposed by the big regulatory agencies during 
the Depression and the New Deal, substituted market mechanisms with the 
legal rights and obligations imposed by the agencies upon the private operators. 
On the one hand, in order to ensure stability (and also to protect the existing 
operators), entry into the market was restricted. A certificate of public 
convenience and necessity, granted by the regulatory authority, was required 
for the provision of the service. At the same time, the former obligations of the 
English common calling were imposed upon the monopolists. The obligation to 
serve all who apply for the service forced the regulated industry to provide 
their services also in rural areas, and to build capacity ahead of demand, in 
order to ensure the provision of the service in exceptional cases. The obligation 
to render a sound service was specified in the minimum quality and security 
obligations. The obligations to serve all the consumers on equal terms 
prevented discriminations.
On the other hand, the regulatory commissions controlled prices. The old 
abstract obligation of the common calling to charge only a just and reasonable 
price, became a concentrated control by the regulatory agency. The agency 
tried to establish an equilibrium between the control of prices in order to avoid 
abuses by the monopolist, and the right of the monopolist to non confiscatory 
rates, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.36 The fair rate of return of the
36 Sec PHILLIPS, C. (1993): “The Regulation of Public Utilities. Theory and Practice”, Public Utilities 
Reports, Arlington.
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monopolist’s investments became the central axis of the regulatory 
intervention.
The monopolisation of the markets and the price-fixing by the regulatory 
agencies substituted free market mechanisms with the bargaining mechanisms 
between the regulator and the regulated industry in the definition of services, 
prices and qualities.
16. Social regulatory agencies. The last period of creation of regulatory 
agencies was the period between 1965 and 1977, with the Great Society 
program of President Johnson. This was the period of the civil rights 
movement, the Vietnam War, and the movements in defence of minorities, 
consumers and the environment. The regulatory agencies created during this 
period were essentially contrary to the industry’s interests, since they often 
introduced the consideration of externalities and the social effects of economic 
activity. The Equal Opportunity Commission (1965), the Environmental 
Protection Agency (1970) and the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(1972) were created in this period, when, direct participation of citizens and 
consumers in the administrative procedure of most of the regulatory agencies 
was also introduced.”
Most of the social regulation, introduced in the 1960s, had the traditional 
aim of solving market failures, in particular the introduction of social rights and 
externalities into the economic debate. Civil rights, labour rights, and 
environmental considerations were protected through the imposition of 
particular obligations on private operators active in the market. Such 
intervention, nevertheless, did not aim at substituting the market, but rather was 
seen as a complement to it
37 See, as an example, United Church o f Christ v. FCC 359 F. 2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) and Scenic 
Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F 2d 608 (2nd Cir. 1965).
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2.2. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ANTITRUST.
17. Early precedents of antitrust. As in the development of regulatory 
intervention, the roots of antitrust can be found in ancient English Common 
Law.3* It is obvious that medieval England was not characterised by the 
existence of a free market economy,39 but there are some interesting precedents 
of the main principles of antitrust.
Firstly, an aversion for monopolies can be identified. The Statute o f 
Monopolies of 1623, declared that “all monopolies heretofore or hereafter to be 
granted to any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate for the sole 
buying, selling, making, working or using any thing within this realm, or other 
monopolies, are and shall be utterly void and of no effect and in no way to be 
put into execution”.40
Secondly, the principle of freedom of entrance to the market was 
repeatedly stated. In the Schoolmasters’ Case, in 1410, the right of a new 
schoolmaster to initiate activities in a town were two masters were already 
providing the service was defended, even if it caused some form of economic 
damage to the existing providers of the service.41 Thirdly, in the Salt Makers o f 
Droitwich Case of 1758 the Court sustained that collusive agreements, and in 
particular “price-fixing agreements, were of bad consequence and ought to be
38 See FOX, E. (1990): “The Sherman Antitrust Act and the World-Let Freedom Ring”, in Antitrust 
Law Journal, vol. 59, no. 1, p. 109-118.
39 The strong presence of the guilds, for example is a prove of the feudalistic structure of such society. 
Nevertheless, action against the guilds was undertaken earlier than in continental Europe.
40 See HANDLER, M. (1960): “Cases and Other Materials on Trade Regulation”, The Foundation 
Press, Brookling, pp. 46-47, as well as pp. 44-46, for a reference to The Case of Monopolies, where the 
Court of King’s Bench, in 1602, considered void a exclusive right granted by the Queen Elisabeth for 
the import and production of playing cards. Chief Justice Popham considered not only that monopolies 
damaged those traders that exercise the trade, but also consumers, since monopolies nsed prices, 
and lowered quality. For these reasons, monopoly was contrary to the Common Law.
41 Ibid. HANDLER (1960), pp. 12-13.
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discountenanced”.42 Finally, the definition of reasonable restrictions for the 
protection of competition was accepted in Mitchel v. Reynolds, in 1711.43
18. The Sherman Act- During the last decades of the 19th century there 
was a strong tendency towards large-scale corporate concentration, particularly 
in such new industries as oil and railroads, but also in more traditional markets 
such as cotton and sugar. The corporate legislation that prohibited one 
corporation from holding stakes in another corporation was by-passed in order 
to allow corporate consolidation through the use of the Common Law 
institution of the trust.44 Even if the evolution of corporate legislation would 
later eliminate such prohibition, the word antitrust would remain as a reference 
for those public and private movements which were contrary to economic 
concentration.
The initial antitrust movement was led by the agrarian populists, the 
Grangers,45 against the concentration and anticompetitive practices of the 
railroad and water channel companies.46 A second stage in this movement saw 
the urban middle classes, the main supporters of the Progressives,47 take the 
lead on the opposition to corporate concentration. Just as the American political 
tradition was diffident of the concentration of power concentration, the
42 The agreement between salt makers to fix a minimum price for their product under an economic 
penalty was considered contrary to the Common Law, ibid. HANDLER (1960), p. 137.
43 In a case where the leaser of a bake house had broken the compromise not to compete in such 
business, the Court considered that such IrinH of compromises would be void if imposed, excessive or if 
it would result in a monopoly, ibid HANDLER (1960), pp. 105-106.
44 Individual shareholders of die consolidating corporations tendered their stock to trustees in exchange 
for trust certificates. The resulting trust was not incorporated and hence was thought to be immune 
from the limitations of corporation law, see HOVENKAMP, H. (1990): “Antitrust Policy, Federalism, 
and the Theory of the Firm: An Historical Perspective”, in Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 79-
81.
45 LET WIN (1926): “Congress and the Shermann Antitrust Law: 1887-1890”, in University o f Chicago 
Law Review, vol. 23, p. 223.
44 This was also the origin of the regulatory intervention in these sectors, vide supra Chapter 2.1. 
Origins and Evolution of Economic Regulation.
47 Vide the role of the Progressive movement in die creation of regulatory agencies supra Chapter 2.1. 
Origins and Evolution of Economic Regulation.
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concentration of private economic power raised concerns, and public 
intervention was demanded to avoid such concentration.4* As a result, fourteen 
States inserted antitrust provisions in their State Constitutions before the 
enactment of the Sherman Act on July 2, 1890.49
The Sherman Act tried to clarify the Common Law principle of illegal 
combinations in restraint of trade, at the very same time that limitations on the 
unilateral monopolisation of the markets were introduced.50 According to the 
majority doctrine, the main reason given for the approval of such legislation 
was that it would control of the damaging effects of the concentration of 
economic power.51
19. The evolution of antitrust. The first two decades of enforcement of 
the Sherman Act were characterised by confusion and lack of sense of 
direction. The broad language of the Sherman Act did not provide a clear 
indication for Courts to apply such provisions. The initial literal interpretation 
of the Act by Courts prohibited “every contract [...] in restraint of trade”, in 
such a way that any contract or agreement which introduced any kind of
44 See MELLON, D. (1991): “The Sennann Act and the Balance of Power”, in The political Economy o f 
the Sherman Act: The First Hundred Years, T. Sullivan, Oxford, pp.85-115.
49 See MAY, J. (1987): “Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional and 
Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918”, in University o f Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 
135, no. 3, p. 499.
50 “Section 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint 
of trade or commerce among die several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. 
Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy shall 
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanour.
Section 2. Every person who shall monopolise, or attempt to monopolize or combine or conspire with 
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states, 
or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanour”.
51 "The popular mind is agitated with problems that may disturb social order, and among them nothing 
is more threatening that the inequality of condition, of wealth, and opportunity that has grown within a 
single generation out of the concentration of capital into vast combinations to control production and 
trade and to break down competition”, opening speech of Senator Sherman in the Congress debate of 
the bill, in CAREY, R. (1989): “The Sherman Act: What Did Congress Intend?”, in The Antitrust 
Bulletin, vol. 34, no. 2, p. 344. See also AMATO, G. (1997): “Antitrust and the Bounds o f Power. The 
dilemma o f liberal democracy in the history o f the markef’, Hart Publishing, Oxford.
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restriction to trade, even if positive for competition, or any merger would be 
contrary to the Sherman Act.52
A new phase was opened by the Supreme Court when it stated that the 
Sherman Act had only meant to forbid unreasonable restraints of trade.53 The 
introduction of the Rule of Reason required the analysis of the economic 
consequences of the restraints of trade, but the lack of economic skills of the 
Courts produced intuitive and speculative analysis of such consequences.54 
Over time, Courts adopted some of the basic principles of the industrial 
organisation theory in order to analyse market structures. Notions such as 
oligopoly, barriers to entry, predatory pricing and so on became common in 
antitrust judgements. A limited number of restrictions, were nevertheless 
generally considered per se a restraint of trade, as was the case for price-fixing.
20. The Chicago School on antitrust. By the end of the 50’s, a group of 
scholars based in the University of Chicago, started to develop studies based on 
the application of price theory to some antitrust issues such as tie-in, resale 
price maintenance or predatory pricing. Their results showed that some of the 
most traditional antitrust categories were incompatible with economic theory.55 
The initial criticism gave place to a whole new theory on antitrust. The point of 
departure was the clarification of the scope of the antitrust legislation. 
According to the Chicago School the only purpose of antitrust legislation was 
to promote consumer welfare.54 A sound analysis of the effects of behaviours
52 See GELLHORN, Ernest (1986): “Climbing the Antitrust Staircase”, in The Antitrust Bulletin, voL 
31, no. 2, pp. 342-343.
53 Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 1911.
54 PERTT'Z (1989): “The “Rule of Reason” in Antitrust Law: Property Logic in Restraint of 
Competition”, in Hastings Law Journal, voL 40, p. 285.
55 See POSNER, R. (1979): “The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis”, in University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, voL 127, pp. 159-182.
56 In a somehow voluntaristic study, it was even sustained that consumer welfare was the only goal of 
Congressmen when the Sherman Act was passed in 1890, see BORK, R. (1966): “Legislative Intent 
and the Policy of the Sherman Act”, in The Journal of Law and Economics, voL 9, p. 7 and BORK, R. 
(1978): “The Antitrust Paradox. A Policy at War with Itself \ Basic Books, p. 20.
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scrutinised according to the price theory would show that most of the practices 
considered in the past to be restrictive of trade would not have such an effect, at 
least in the mid-term. The most radical scholars even pleaded for the 
elimination of antitrust intervention.
The Chicago School analysis on antitrust has deeply influenced the 
principles as well as the instruments of antitrust intervention. Consumer 
welfare has been recognised as the main goal of antitrust, and economic 
analysis has increased its role in the lawyers’ and Courts’ approach to antitrust 
cases. Nevertheless, ideological debates on the soundness of antitrust have been 
substituted by debates focused on the technical issues, in part due to the 
renovated trend of business concentration.
2.3. THE PROCESS OF DEREGULATION.
21. The Chicago School. In the 1960s, the group of scholars of the 
University of Chicago extended the scope of their research method from 
antitrust to other kinds of public intervention, particularly to regulation by 
independent agencies. In their articles in The Journal o f Law and Economics, 
Coase,57 Stingier, Posner, Demsetz and other academics, challenged the 
common wisdom and affirmed that public intervention was often inefficient, 
and that it had a tendency to defend not the general interest but the interest of 
powerful groups, particularly the interest of the regulated industry.
Firstly, price fixing by the regulatory authorities was accused of being 
inefficient. This kind of intervention obstructed the definition of prices by 
regular market mechanisms, and at the same time was incapable of imposing an 
effective control on the regulated industry due, amongst other factors, to the
57 One of the seminal articles was COASE, R. (1960): "The Problem of Social Cost”, in The Journal of 
Law & Economics, vol. 3, p. 1-44.
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asymmetric distribution of information in favour of the industry.51 According to 
the traditional normative theory, price regulation by the regulatory commission 
was supposed to limit the benefits of the regulated industry to a “fair return” of 
the capital invested. In practice, this mechanism on the one hand protected the 
industry, since the fair return was ensured by tariffs increases even in those 
cases where cost increases would be caused by inefficient management. On the 
other hand, the price fixing mechanism did not impose an effective control.59 It 
has been demonstrated that an overcapitalisation (an investment ahead of 
demand), would ensure an automatic increase of the “fair return” (Averch- 
Johnson effect).40
Furthermore, the regulatory intervention was accused of favouring private 
interests, rather than the general interest as traditionally considered.41 The new 
study approach assumed that the relationship between the regulatory authorities 
and the regulated industry would not be free of the rational pressures emanating 
from industry to use public intervention for the fulfilment of their desires. The 
analysis of different regulatory authorities42 proved that even if originally 
created to pursue general interest objectives, the authorities often were 
“captured” by the regulated industry, and often they became “a device for
5* BAUMOL, W. (1970): “Reasonable Rules for Rate Regulation”, in “The Crisis o f the Regulatory 
Commissions”, J. Wilson, Basic Books, New York, p. 188.
59 This was the case for example of the regulatory intervention in the power sector, see STIGLER, G. 
and FRIED LAND, C. (1971): “What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity”, in The 
Journal o f Law & Economics, voL 5, p. 11.
60 As was said by Stigler in his seminal article “price control is essential to achieve more than 
competitive rates of return”, STIGLER, G. (1971): ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation”, in Bell 
Journal o f Economics and Management Science, voL 2, no. 1, p. 6.
61 “As a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its 
benefits”, ibid STIGLER (1971), p. 3.
62 The studies included the FCC: COASE, R  (1959): “The Federal Communications Commission”, in 
The Journal o f Law <Sc Economics, vol. 2, pp. 1-40.
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transferring income to well-organised groups if the groups will return the 
favour with votes and contributions to politicians”.63
As it will be shown64, for decades, the FCC confirmed the analysis of the 
Chicago School according to which “every industry that has enough political 
power to utilise the State will seek to control entry. In addition, the regulatory 
policy will often be so fashioned as to retard the rate of growth of new firms”.65
22. Alliance of interest against public intervention. After decades of 
economic prosperity after World War II, economic growth in the US had 
stabilised by the end of the 1960s, and had given place in the 1970s to an 
economic crisis, with very low growth and high inflation.
<" The economic situation of the regulated industry was threatened for the 
first time since the introduction of the regulatory intervention. The participation 
of consumers and citi2ens in the activity of the regulatory commissions66 
obstructed the tariff modifications necessary to adjust tariffs to the rising costs 
brought about by inflation. As a result, the benefits of the regulated industry 
declined (phenomenon which is referred to as “regulatory lag”). The regulated 
industry adopted a negative approach against the regulatory intervention that 
had traditionally benefited the industry. The regulated industry, making use of 
the intellectual arguments developed by the Chicago School in the precedent 
decade, connected the economic crisis to the excessive intervention of the 
public authorities in the economy, and initiated a debate on the role of public 
authorities in economic activity.
In parallel, price regulation had often created cross-subsidies between 
different services of the same sector. After decades of such a policy, important
63 JOSCOW, P. and NOLL, R. (1981): “Regulation in Theory and Practice: an Overview”, in “Studies 
in Public Regulation ", G. Fromm, MIT Press, New York.
64 Vide infra 2.4.2. The Regulated Monopoly (1921-1969).
65 Vide STIGLER (1971), p. 5 {supra footnote 60).
66 Vide supra Chapter 2.1. Origins and Evolution of Economic Regulation.
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divergences between costs and tariffs emerged, and as a direct result, certain 
categories of consumers were forced to finance services for other categories. 
When the criticism of regulation reached a certain volume, these groups joined 
the anti-regulatory party and tried to eliminate regulation.
The early criticism of public intervention initiated by the Chicago School 
not only influenced the regulated industry, it also influenced politicians in 
search for policies to fight the economic crisis. The reduction of inefficient 
public intervention became the main proposal of the conservative sectors led by 
Ronald Reagan, for the superation of the economic crisis. In this way, an 
alliance between conservative politicians, the regulated industry, and certain 
groups of consumers, with the intellectual arguments of the Chicago School, 
forced the deregulation of the American economic activity.
23. Deregulation. Deregulation does not necessarily mean elimination of 
the regulatory intervention. Rather, it means a relaxation of the obligations 
imposed on the private operators by the regulatory agencies for the fulfilment 
k of the general interest. Deregulation affected all kinds of public intervention, 
from social regulation, to antitrust, but the most affected was the price-and- 
entry regulation.
Conservative administrations such as the Reagan’s one, reduced the 
budget of most of the regulatory commissions, obstructed their decision­
making process, and imposed a cost-benefit analyses of all the regulatory 
measures. The effect on social regulation was a relaxation of the obligations 
imposed on the industry, but not an elimination of this kind of intervention, nor 
a structural modification of the intervention instruments.
The effects on price-and-entry regulation were more profound The 
regulatory agencies created during the New Deal substituted the free market 
mechanisms by rate regulation and the limitation of market entry through 
restrictions in license granting. The regulatory reform did not eliminate the
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regulatory agencies nor significantly modified their procedures or the nature of 
the intervention instruments, but it did deeply modify the principles of 
regulatory intervention. Restrictions to market entry were eliminated and rate 
regulation questioned. Market substitutive intervention gave place to a market 
complementative intervention, in which demand and supply mechanisms in a 
market without entry restrictions would rule private activity in the sector, with 
a mere subsidiary intervention to solve certain market failures.
The new regulatory approach is not necessarily simpler. As a matter of 
fact, market complementative regulation, and particularly the introduction of 
schemes for the promotion of competition, has probably increased the 
complexity of public intervention. This seems almost necessary, since the 
tendency towards conflict in a market with an unlimited number of economic 
operators in competition with a former monopolist with significant market 
power is bigger than in a market were only three main forces: the monopolist, 
the regulator and the consumers, interact.
Even if the institutional framework and the basic nature of the regulatory 
intervention as an indirect intervention are maintained, the deregulation process 
has substantially modified the principles and the instruments of public 
intervention by regulatory agencies in general interest sectors. This reform has 
to be taken into account in any attempt to adopt the regulatory model in the 
European Union.
2.4. PUBLIC INTERVENTION IN THE US TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
SECTOR.
2.4.1. Origins and Free Competition ¡n the US Telecoms Markets 
(1876-1921).
24. Patent monopoly in the telephone market (1876-1894). On
February 17, 1876, two patent requests were filed, claiming the benefits for the
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invention of the telephone. Alexander Graham Bell filed his patent request two 
hours before Elisha Gray. This was the origin of a dispute, which took place 
mainly in Court, and ended with the final recognition of Bell’s patent and the 
exit of the market by the competitor.*7 As a result, until 1894 the Bell 
Telephone Company enjoyed an exclusivity for the exploitation of the 
invention.®
Once Bell’s monopoly was firmly established, the growth in the 
development of the network was reduced due to the high tariffs, the poor 
quality of the service, and the focus of the company in the major commercial 
centres of the country, with very little attention to small towns and rural areas.® 
The Bell Telephone Company adopted a new structure. AT&T was created to 
be the head of the Bell System, to define its strategies and provide the long 
distance service. Horizontally, the System was formed by regional operators 
providers of local telephony services, financed by local capitalists that would 
give an important share (from 35% to 50%) of the companies to AT&T for the 
granting of the license to operate. Vertically, the Bell System was integrated by 
the Bell Telephone Laboratories, that would become the leading R&D centre of 
the world, and Western Electric, in charge of manufacturing terminal and 
switching equipment.
25. *Full competition in the telephone market (1894-1907). When the 
main patents expired, thousands of newcomers entered the market.70 The first
47 For the dispute vide STONE (1991), pp. 54-62 (supra footnote 9f.
68 As stated by the President of the company in 1880 “with a through occupation of the principal cities 
and towns by our licensees, the ownership of die broad patents covering the use of the speaking 
telephone, and the control of nearly all the inventions for die apparatus necessary to the telephone 
business which have yet been made, the danger of competition with our business from new comers 
seems small" AMERICAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY (1880), Annual Report.
* See TOSIELI.O, R. (1979): “The Birth and Early Years of the Bell Telephone System, 1876-1880", 
Amo Press, New York.
70 By 1902 there were over 9,000 “independent providers”, of which around 3,000 were commercial 
providers, 1,000 mutualistic companies, and 5,000 providers of services to a few dozens of grangers, 
FISHER, C. (1987): “The Revolution in Rural Telephony”, in Journal of Social History, vol. 21, p. 6.
it
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stage involved the new comers offering their services in areas not covered by 
the Bell System, but as early as 1895 they started to run exchanges in towns 
served by the Bell System.71 The Bell System initially obstructed the entrance 
of new comers through patent litigation based on the hundreds of minor patents 
controlled by the System, even if the main patents had already expired, while 
high prices and poor service were maintained.72
The strategy was modified when the “independents” started to compete 
directly with Bell’s exchanges. At that point, the prices of the Bell System were 
reduced (even if only in those exchanges were direct competition was 
suffered), sometimes maybe under cost,73 even if, in general, they were 
maintained at a higher level than the “independent’s” prices and did not enter 
in price wars. In parallel, the Bell System initiated a strategy of development of 
their networks ahead of demand, in order to avoid the competitors’ dominance 
in those areas.74
Furthermore, the Bell System implemented a strategy to obstruct the 
development of the new comers. Interconnection was refused, in such a way 
that the new comers’ clients could not connect with the long distance network 
of AT&T, nor communicate with the Bell System’s clients in their towns. At 
the same time, Western Union refused to sell equipment to the new comers. 
Furthermore, the three main cities of the country, New York, Chicago and
71 See WIENHAUS, C. and OETTINGER, A. (1988): “Behind die Telephone Debates", Ablex 
Publishing, Norwwod NJ, pp. 7-8.
72 See NIX, J. and GABEL, D. (1993): “AT&T’s Strategic Response to Competition: Why not Pre­
empt Entry?”, in The Journal of Economic History, voL 53, no. 2, pp. 377-387.
73 See WEIMAN, D. and LEVIN, R. (1994): “Preying for Monopoly? The Case of Southern Bell 
Telephone Company, 1894-1912”, in Journal of Political Economy, vol. 102, no. 1, pp. 110-114.
74 According to a Southern Bell representative “We have scraped along for the past ten years, building 
exchanges and toll lines that we ought not have constructed except for the purpose of causing die 
service to be more valuable than that of our adversary”, in Telephony, January 30 1909, in MUELLER, 
M. (1993): “Universal Service in Telephone History”, in Telecommunications Policy, vol. 17, no. 5, p. 
360.
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Boston, refused to grant licenses for the construction of new telephone 
networks, maintaining the monopoly of the Bell System.
The result of the fierce competition was a significant reduction of prices, 
both of the services and of the terminal equipment,75 an impressive expansion 
of the services,76 particularly in rural areas,77 and the loss by the Bell System of 
half of the market share by 1907.7* The Bell System’s refusal to allow 
interconnection created uncomfortable situations, since some users were forced 
to contract with more than one company in order to reach all the telephone 
users in their towns.
26. Monopolisation by the Bell System (1907-1921). Price reduction 
and development of the network ahead of demand, forced the Bell System to 
accept the control by a new capitalist, J.P. Morgan, who imposed in 1907 the 
return to the Presidency of AT&T of Theodore Vail and a change in the 
strategy of the company. The new strategy was to eliminate competition from 
the telephony market.
The first element of the new strategy was the acquisition of competitors.79 
This measure allowed the Bell System to develop its network without building,
75 See GABEL, R. (1969): “The Early Competitive Era in Telephone Communication, 1893-1920”, in 
Law and Contemporary Problems, spring, pp. 343-346.
76 From 270,000 lines in 1894 to 6,100,000 lines in 1907, See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 
COMMISSION (1939): “Investigation of the Telephone Industry in the United States”, US 
Government Printing Office, Washington DC, p. 151.
77 In 1912 38% of the telephone lines were installed in rural areas, and in 1920, the telephone 
penetration rate was higher in rural areas, 39%, than in urban areas, 35%, vide FISHER (1987), p. 8 
(supra footnote 70).
78 See LEBOIS, L. (1983): “Genèse et croissance des telecommunications”, Masson, Paris, p. 317.
79 “Most Independents still felt very intensely over what they described as the ‘Bell taint’ and bitterly
fought purchases of Independent properties and Bell wire connections. This, of course, did not deter the 
Bell people from buying any plant they desired and could get And they picked up a good many of 
them, due to different reasons. Sometimes the owners had failed to make the profits they had believed 
were in the business; sometimes they were offered such a handsome bonus on their investment that 
they could not resist; in other cases, cut rate warfare exhausted their resources and forced a sale”, see 
MACMEAL, H. (1934): uThe Story of Independent Telephony”, Independent Pioner Telephone 
Association, Chicago, p. 172.
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and at the same time to eliminate competition from the market.*0 The Bell 
System not only acquired competitors in the telephony market, but it also 
acquired potential competitors like the telegraph monopoly, Western Union, in 
1913.
A second element of the new strategy was to ensure a monopoly on the 
long distance network.81 AT&T started to negotiate exclusive interconnection 
agreements with some of the “independents” in order to avoid the creation of 
an alternative long distance network. The acquisition of Western Union had the 
same objective. Furthermore, the Bell System actively obstructed any attempt 
to create an alternative network. In 1901, a new competitor managed to control 
11% of the lines in the US. In order to develop the network it needed major 
financial support. Although it was provided by the American Ice Company, at 
the end of the day, the American Ice Company turned out to be working for the 
Bell System, which ensured the failure of the project.*2 This was not the only 
occasion in which the Bell System intervened to ensure its monopolistic 
position in the long distance market.*3
The ultimate strategy for the monopolisation of the telephony market by 
the Bell System was the introduction of regulation. Firstly, the Bell System 
considered that regulation at a State or federal level could be more easily 
“captured” than at the local government level where obligations were already
*° Acquisitions not only eliminated competition from the operator acquired, but also from neighbouring 
operators which could not connect anymore with these networks and remained therefore isolated.
11 “I take it that it is extremely important that we should control the whole toll line system of 
intercommunication throughout the country. This system is destined, in my opinion, to be very much 
more important in the future that it was in the past. Such lines may be regarded as the nerves of our 
whole system. We need no fear the opposition in a single place provided we control the means of 
communication with other places”. Letter from G. Leverett, of the legal staff of AT&T, to F. Fish, 
president of AT&T, in 1902, in LANGDALE, J. (1978): “The Growth of Long-distance Telephony in 
the Bell System: 1875-1907, in Journal of Historical Geography, vol.4, no. 2, p. 148.
82 See BROCK, G. (1981): “The Telecommunications Industry. The Dynamics of Market Structure”, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 119-120.
53 JJ*. Morgan forced some bankers to retire from an operation financing the creation of a long distance 
competitor, vide GABEL (1969), p. 350 (supra footnote 75).
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being imposed on the telecommunications operators. This was the experience 
with the State regulatory authorities and with the Interstate Commerce 
Commission.84
The Bell System initiated a campaign promoting public intervention in the 
market to ensure the integration of the market, that is, the creation of a single 
interconnected network. Since the Bell System refused to interconnect their 
network with the independent networks,85 the only way to ensure the unification 
of the service was the elimination of competition and the creation of a 
monopoly under the control of the public authorities.86
At the same time, the important market share of the Bell System,87 and the 
acquisition of competitors policy, risked provoking the intervention of the 
antitrust authorities. The Bell System considered that the institution of another 
type of public intervention in the market, like regulation by independent 
agencies, would prevent the application of the rules on antitrust, as it was the 
case for example in 1913, when the Attorney General asked for the intervention
84 The Mann-Elkins Act, June 18, 1910, expanded the competencies of the Intersate Commerce 
Commission to the telecommunications sector. Nevertheless, the ICC, only undertook four minor 
actions in the sector, always acting on the basis of complaints, vide GABEL (1969), pp. 537-538 
(supra footnote 75).
83 Mr. Vail sustained that compulsory interconnection would be a legally approved confiscation of 
property, AT&T (1910), Annual Report, pp. 44-46.
u The Bell System’s strategy was openly defined in its Annual Reports: “It is not believed that this 
[integration of the service] can be accomplished by separately controlled or distinct systems nor that 
there can be competition in the accepted sense of competition. It is believed that all this can be 
achieved to a reasonable satisfaction of the public with its acquiescence, under such control and 
regulation as will afford the public much better service at less cost than any competition or 
government-owned monopoly could permanently afford.” AT&T (1910) Annual Report, p. 23. “It is 
contended that if there is to be no competition, there should be public control. It is not believed that 
there is any serious objection to such control, provided it is independent, intelligent, considerate, 
thorough and just, recognising, as does the Interstate Commerce Commission”, AT&T (1907) Annual 
Report, p. 18. “This, “supervision" should stop at “control” and “regulation” and not “manage”, 
“operate” nor dictate what the management or operation should be [...] here is to be state control and 
regulation, there should also be state protection, protection to a corporation striving to serve the whole 
community [...] from aggressive competition which covers only that part which is profitable”. AT&T 
(1910) Annual Report, p. 32-33.
87 The market share of the Bell Sytem in 1912 was 59%, and reached 79% taking into account the 
exclusive agreements with some of the independents, vide GABEL (1969), p. 352 (supra footnote 75), 
and STONE (1991), p. 188 (supra footnote 9).
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of the Interstate Commerce Commission, instead of the initiation of an antitrust 
procedure, for the acquisition of certain “independents” in Chicago.
2.4.2. The Regulated Monopoly (1921-1969).
27. General. The Bell System strategy to promote regulatory intervention 
in order to facilitate the monopolisation of the telecommunications sector 
reached its success in 1921 when the Willis-Graham Act was adopted. This 
legislation allowed telephone operators to acquire any competitor with only the 
approval of the ICC and the exclusion of the antitrust authorities. This meant 
the acceptance of the principle that regulation was a sufficient control of the 
market, even in such a concentrated market as telephony.
In 1934 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was created, 
merging the regulatory activities in the telecommunications and 
radio/television sectors. The new authority, with the powers granted by the 
1934 Telecommunications Act, enforced the entry-and-price regulation model 
common in the New Deal period. The first action of the new commission was 
to launch a deep investigation of the sector.*8 The most important lines of action 
of the FCC in the telecommunications sector were, firstly, the conscious 
imposition of limitations to market entry through restrictions in the granting of 
licenses, and secondly, the development of a cross-subsidy scheme in order to 
reduce-the cost of the local communications and increase the tariffs of the long 
distance communications.
28. The creation of conditions for deregulation. The quarter of a 
century that followed the creation of the FCC allowed the full implementation 
of the entry-and-price regulatory model in the telecommunications sector. 
There were two important features of the regulatory model in the 
telecommunications sector which favoured the future deregulation of the
** Federal Communications Commission (1939): “Investigation of the Telephone Industry in the United 
States ", US Government Printing Office, Washington DC.
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sector, as they created groups of actors interested in the reform of the sector 
Firstly, the Consent Decree of 1956, which restricted AT&T’s activities to the 
hard-core of telecommunications, and secondly, the separation procedures, 
which provoked an increasing divergence between costs and prices,.
29. The 1956 Consent Decree. The investigation of the 
telecommunications markets launched by the FCC after its creation, already 
showed some signs of abusive behaviour by the Bell System in relation to 
prices of telecommunications equipment®9 However, due to the eruption of 
World War II, and the important role of the Bell System, and particularly its 
manufacturing division Western Electric, in the conflict, no immediate action 
was undertaken.
Once the war was over, in 1949, the Justice Department filed a complaint 
requiring the court to divest Western Electric from the Bell System. The 
conservative Administration of Eisenhower terminated the suit with a 1956 
Consent Decree. It did not force divestiture, but forced Western Electric to 
license its patents and to manufacture telephony equipment exclusively, and 
forced the Bell System to provide only the kind of services subject to 
regulatory control by the FCC.90
At that time, the 1956 Consent Decree was considered a victory for the 
Bell System, since the limitations to operate exclusively in the regulated 
telecommunications market did not seem particularly restrictive, especially in a 
period of impressive growth of the telecommunications market.91
49 The Report stated that Western Electric’s prices bear no reasonable relation to the cost of 
manufacture, and has an appreciable influence on the cost of the telephone service, Federal 
Communications Commission (1939): “Investigation of the Telephone Industry in the United States”, 
US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, pp. 579-589.
90 US v. Western Electric Co., CA No. 17-49, Final judgement, 1956 Trade cas. (D.NJ. 1956).
91 See TEMIN, P. (1987): “The Fall of the Bell System. A Study in Prices and Politics”, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, p. 15.
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30. Cross-subsidiarisation. The second important feature was the 
implementation of the separations policy. Market structure and the vertical 
distribution of political power in the US, provoked a conflict over whether 
local loop costs should be borne exclusively by the local operator or partially 
allocated to the long-distance operator.92 The Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone 
Company judgement put an end to this a conflict. In its ruling it stated that “it is 
obvious that, unless an apportionment is made, the intrastate service to which 
the exchange property is allocated will bear an undue burden - to what extent is 
a matter of controversy”.93
The controversy on the extent of the allocation of costs to the long­
distance operator was solved in 1943 with the approval of the Separations 
Manual, by a joint board of federal and State regulators. The Separation 
Manual initially fixed that the proportion of costs allocated to long-distance 
operators would be the same as the proportion of minutes of usage of the local- 
loop for long distance communications (at that moment 3%)94. The Bell System 
accepted such compromise, which mostly provoked a minor internal cost 
accounting modification, since they controlled most of the long-distance and 
local-loop facilities. Over time, the percentage of costs allocated to the long­
distance operator increased,95 and as a result, divergence between costs and
92 Two different conceptions on the allocation of die local loop costs were in conflict According to the 
board-to-board conception, local loop costs (the costs of the “last mile”) should be borne by local 
operators and ruled by state regulatory commissions, while according to the station-to-station 
conception, a portion of die local loop costs should be attributed to the long-distance operator, since 
long-distance communications took profit of the “last mile” to initiate and terminate communications, 
and in parallel, the FCC should intervene in the regulation of such costs.
93 Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone C o 282 U.S. 1930.
94 See CRANDALL, R. (1991): “After the Break Up. U.S. Telecommunications in a More Competitive 
Era”, The Brookings Institutions, Washington D.C., p. 24.
95 As the usage of long-distance increased, the percentage of costs allocated to long-distance also 
increased. Nevertheless, the increase was substantially higher due to the tendency of the State 
Regulatory Commissions (allied in the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commission, 
NARUC) to lower local tariffs through the allocation of costs to long-distance operators. This tendency 
was favoured by the reduction of long-distance communications (due to technologic progress) and by 
the fact that the tendency increased the Bell System benefits since the FCC rates of return were usually 
higher than the state regulators. According to WYNNS, P. (1984): “The Changing Telephone Industry: 
Access Charges, Universal Service and Local Rates”, Congressional Budget Office, Washington D.C,
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prices increased. This divergence was reinforced by the policy of uniform 
geographic rates, cross-subsidiarisation from urban to rural areas, and from 
business to residential users.
31. First measures of reform. The first fissure in the regulated monopoly 
system appeared when large telecommunications users for example TV 
stations, disadvantaged by cross-subsidies from long-distance to local 
telephony, required licenses from the FCC for the establishment of private 
communications systems with point-to-point microwave links. Small 
manufacturers (such as Motorola) were also interested in the apparition of 
alternative clients to the Bell System, supplied by its subsidiary Western 
Electric. The FCC in its Above 890 decision, opted for the allocation of 
frequencies to such users.96 AT&T launched a new tariff scheme with large 
discounts, called Telpak, that tried to eliminate the incentive for the 
construction of private systems. The possible predatory and anticompetitive 
character of AT&T’s response to the establishment of private communications 
systems forced public intervention97 and created distrust for the regulated 
monopolist.
Different decisions affected also the Bell System’s position in the 
terminal equipment markets. In 1956 a Court of Appeal rejected a FCC 
decision that approved the Bell System refusal to allow the attachment to the 
telephone of a plastic mechanical device that enabled more private 
conversations (Hush-A-Phone).* This precedent probably put pressure on the 
FCC to rule against the Bell System on a similar case related to a more
p. 10, by 1984 the percentage of costs allocated to long-distance was around 27%, while the percentage 
of long-distance usage was around 8%.
96 FCC, Report and Order, FCC Docket 11866, “Above 890 Me”, July 1959, 27 FCC 359.
97 Motorola filed a complaint before the FCC. After fifteen years of proceedings, the FCC considered 
that Telpak tariffs were contrary to the 1934 Telecommunications Act because they were 
discriminatory, predatory and therefore illegal, see BROCK, G. (1981): “The Telecommunications 
Industry. The dynamics of Market Structure” t Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 208-210.
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important electric device to provide mobile links with the fixed network, the 
Carterfone, in such a way as to enable users to provide their own terminal 
equipment, as long as it would not harm the network."
2.4.3. Deregulation of the US Telecom Markets (1969-2000).
32. The reform of the US telecom markets. It can be argued that the 
origin of the deregulation of the telecommunications markets has been the very 
same success of the entry-and-prices regulatory model imposed by the 1934 
Telecommunications Act. On the one hand, such a regulatory model forced the 
monopolist to concentrate its activities in the hard core of the telephony 
activity.100 If initially this restriction did not seem to impose a real constraint on 
the monopolist, in the long term it produced decisive pressure from companies 
grown in competitive neighbouring markets to open also the 
telecommunications markets to competition. On the other hand, the success of 
the entry-and-price regulation allowed the development of a market structure 
characterised by the existence of important cross-subsidies and other 
imbalanced situations, which provided arguments and support for the gradual 
opening of the markets to new operators.
Its complexity, long duration, the initial lack of a clear alternative model, 
and the limited influence of foreign models has characterised the process of 
reform of the US telecommunications markets. From 1934 to 1969 the 
conditions that would later facilitate the transformations had developed up to a 
certain degree due to of pressure from the antitrust authorities. As a result, 
limited reforms were introduced, more with the aim of providing solutions to
98 Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F. 2d 266 (D.C. Cir.) 1956.
99 In the matter of Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 FCC 2d 420 
(1968), see HORWITZ, R. (1989): "The Irony of Regulatory Reform. The Deregulation of American 
Telecommunications”, Oxford university Press, New York, pp. 230-231.
100 This was necessary in order to avoid conflicts with the antitrust authorities. Furthermore, die 
monopolist had to devote all its resources to match the extraordinary growth of die demand for the 
telephony service.
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specific conflicts than of reforming the sector according to a conscious plan. 
Such measures, nevertheless, created new markets and led to a first period of 
reforms, from 1969 to 1996. At this point, the dominant conservative positions 
in favour of deregulation, together with pressure from the new actors in the 
sector and from the groups damaged by the regulatory unbalances, forced a 
major reform, this time aimed at eliminating traditional regulation for 
significant market segments, and at forcing the monopolist to divestiture in 
order to create a new market structure compatible with competition.
The last period of the process of reform, from 1996 onwards, extended the 
reform to these segments previously exempted- mainly the local telephony 
markets- and implemented the full deregulation of the telecommunications 
markets.
33. The first deregulation wave (1969-1996). By the end of the 1960s 
and the beginning of the 1970s new management had control over the Common 
Carrier Bureau of the FCC. The influence of the Chicago School doctrines and 
the conservative political positions on deregulation, as well as pressures from 
large telecommunications users and companies trying to access the 
telecommunications markets, led to the adoption of a conscious strategy to 
deregulate the market, to eliminate the most invasive entry-and-rate regulation 
and to open significant segments of the telecommunications markets to 
competition. The abusive behaviour of AT&T in response to the introduction of 
competition led to an antitrust procedure that finished with the divestiture of 
the Bell System in 1984.
34. Competition in telecommunications services. In 1969, the FCC, in a 
4 to 3 vote, approved an application by MCI, a small under-financed company, 
to build a microwave system between Chicago and Saint Louis. The decision 
was the beginning of the end of the entry-and-price regulation, since the 
application was not for a private system, as in the Above 890 decision, but for
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system providing long-distance services to the public in competition with 
AT&T. In response to the flow of applications, the FCC published the 
Specialized Common Carriers decision,101 which accepted the introduction of 
competition in specialised services,102 despite the allegations and lobbying of 
the Common Carriers.103 In 1975 MCI initiated the provision of a new service, 
Execunet, which substantially competed with the common long-distance 
activities of AT&T. The FCC ordered MCI to eliminate such a non licensed 
service, however the Court of Appeals reversed this order,104 thus allowing MCI 
and the rest of specialised carriers to compete in all the long-distance 
telecommunications markets.105 During the 1970’s other value-added services 
were opened to competition.
35. AT&T’s divestiture. A new antitrust suit106 against the attempts to 
monopolise the telecommunications markets was launched by the Justice 
Department in 1974. The Bell System was accused of conspiring to monopolise 
various telecommunications markets. Initially the suit was focused on the 
anticompetitive effects of the vertical integration of the System, and the
101 “Competitive pressure may encourage beneficial changes in AT&T’s services and charges in the 
specialised field and stimulate counter innovation or the more rapid introduction of new technology”, 
In the Matter of Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration of Applications to Provide 
Specialised Common Carrier Services in the Domestic Public Point-to-Pomt Microwave Radio Service 
and Proposed Amendments to parts 21,43, and 61 of the Commission’s Rules, 29 FCC 2d 870 (1971).
102 This kind of communications were increasingly important, since they match the demand of reliable 
communications by the computer industry. The convergence between computers and 
telecommunications forced the FCC to determine rules identifying the' border line between 
telecommunications regulated activities and non-regulated computer activities, particularly important, 
since the 1956 Consent Decree restricted the Bell System activities to the telecommunications sector.
103 Common carrier argued that such licenses would take profit of the cross-subsidiarization for the 
development of universal service, ‘screaming’ the market. On this issue, see BROCK, W. and EVANS, 
D. (1983): “Cream-skimming”, in uBreaking Up Bell. Essays on Industrial Organization and 
Regulation”, North-Holland, New York, pp. 61-94.
i°4 M^ he ultimate test of industry structure in the communications common earner field must be the 
public interest, not the private financial interest of those who have until now enjoyed the fruits of de 
facto monopoly”, MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F. 2d 356 (D.C. Cir 1977), p. 380.
105 See CURIEN, N. and GENSOLLEN, M. (1992): “Economie des telecommunications”, Economica, 
Paris, pp. 170-171.
106 See the important role of antitrust in the deregulation of the telecommunications industry in 
BAKER, D. and BEVERLY, B. (1983): 44Antitrust and Communications Deregulation”, in The 
Antitrust Bulletin, vol. 28, pp. 1-38.
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abusive behaviour of Western Electric. It proceed quite slowly. In a second 
stage, the anticompetitive response of the Bell System to competition in the 
long-distance communications markets accelerated the procedure.
After the Execunet decision the Bell System had two main strategies. On 
the one hand, AT&T significantly reduced its private lines rates in the high 
density lines, (Hi-Lo scheme), in order to face competition from new comers.107 
This brought about accusations of predatory pricing from competitors. On the 
other hand, the local monopolist, vertically integrated in the Bell System, firstly 
refused interconnection for the provision of the Execunet service, and when the 
Court of Appeals mandated to provide such interconnection, the Bell System 
filed a tariff scheme, ENFIA, which intended to impose specialised carriers 
charges equal to those required to AT&T for local interconnection, in order to 
avoid the “screaming” of the market.1“
Pressure from the long antitrust process (which menaced to enforce the 
divestiture of Western Electric), and from the new political conservative 
Presidency (in favour of deregulation and competition), forced the Bell System 
to reach an agreement with the Justice Department. On January 8, 1982 the 
settlement of the case was announced. The vertical integration between AT&T 
(the long-distance provider), Western Electric (the manufacturer), and the Bell 
Laboratories (the R-r-D subsidiary) was respected, and such a group would be 
released from the restrictions defined in the 1956 Consent Decree. The price to 
pay by the Bell System was to renounce to the horizontal integration with the 
local operating companies, which would form seven different companies,
1C7*In this way, an exception to die traditional principle of national averaging was introduced, see 
TEMEN, P. (1987): “The Fall of the Bell System. A Study in Prices and Politics”, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, p. 77.
10S An agreement was reached to reduce such charges, but only temporary.
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subject to the traditional entry-and-price regulation. Judge Green finally 
accepted the agreement on August 24.109
The agreement entered into force in 1984. The country was divided into 
163 Local Access and Transport Areas (LATA), intra-LATA services would be 
exclusively provided by Local Exchange Carriers (mostly by the seven Baby 
Bells, but also by some independent companies still present in the market) 
under entry-and-price regulation. Inter-LATA and international services would 
be provided by Interexchange Carriers (AT&T, MCI and others) under 
competition. Interexchange carriers could not provide intra-LATA services, 
while the Baby Bells could not provide inter-LATA services nor manufacture 
equipment. In order to make the new framework sustainable, the principle of 
equal access to the Baby Bells’ local networks (Open Network Architecture 
and Comparable Efficient Interconnection) was enforced, and access charges 
for the termination of inter-LATA and international communications were 
established.
36. The second deregulation wave (1996-1999). On February 1998, 
President Clinton signed the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which extended 
deregulation also to the local markets. The entry-and-price regulation 
maintained in the local markets was eliminated. Interexchange earners and any 
other operator would be able to establish networks and provide local services. 
At the same time, the elimination of the restrictions imposed by the 1982 
Modified Final Judgement on the Baby Bells was foreseen. The Baby Bells 
would be able to manufacture equipment, and more important, would be able to 
provide inter-LATA services. The Baby Bells would be able to provide inter- 
LATA service outside their regions from the first moment, but for the provision 
of such services in the regions where they had enjoyed exclusivity, entrance to 
the long-distance market was connected to the evolution of competition in the
109 US v. AT&T, CA No. 82-0192 (DJD.C.), Modification of Final Judgement, August 24, 1982, vide
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local-loop, in such a way that authorisations would only be granted by the FCC 
if a series of conditions proving the existence of competition were met.110
2.5. CONCLUSIONS.
37. Final. It has been shown that both antitrust and sector specific 
regulation by independent agencies appeared at the same time and as a political 
response to the pressures imposed by the economic structures generated by 
industrialisation in the 19th century.
Whilst in Europe the most relevant of the new economic activities were 
monopolised by public authorities, in the US such activities were undertaken 
by private entities. Nevertheless, the first mover advantage, the economies of 
scale of the network industries and the strategy of many of the entities led to 
the monopolisation of the markets by private entities.
Both antitrust and sector specific economic regulation appeared as public 
intervention mechanisms of an indirect nature. Their scope was to control the 
economic power of private entities for the common benefit. Nevertheless, the 
evolution of both instruments of public intervention during the 20th century is 
prove of the risks of over-regulation.
Antitrust, due to the lack of economic analysis, became an obstacle to 
economic efficiency and consumer welfare. Sector specific regulation often 
became a mechanism for the protection of the interests of the regulated 
industry.
TEMIN (1987), Chapter VII (supra footnote 107).
110 See KRATTENMAKER, T. (1996): “The Telecommunications Act of 1996”, in Federal 
Communications Law Journal, voL 29, p. 1; SCHWARTZ, M. (1999): “Conditioning the Bell’s Entry 
into Long Distance: Anticompetitive Regulation or Promoting Competition?”, in “The anticompetitive 
Impact o f Regulation”.
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The deregulatory movement has managed to replace the market 
substitutive intervention by a market complementative intervention. Free 
market mechanisms are not to be negleted but merely complemented in those 
cases in which a cost-benefit analysis proves that a market failure exists.
This evolution does not require a structural reform of the institutional 
regulatory framework, nor the introduction of new regulatory instruments. On 
the contrary, the long-lasting regulatory tradition only requires adjustments 
with regard to the objectives of such intervention. Competition in the market is 
to be protected and complemented, but not substituted.

CHAPTER 3
NATIONALISATION AND LIBERALISATION OF THE 
EUROPEAN TELECOMS MARKETS
SUMMARY: 3.1. Evolution and the nature of 
public intervention in Europe. 3.2. Competition 
Law in Europe. 3.3. The process o f
liberalisation. 3.4. Public intervention in 
European telecommunications. 3.5. Conclusions.
3.1. EVOLUTION AND THE NATURE OF PUBLIC INTERVENTION IN 
EUROPE.
3.1.1. Precedents of the service public model.
38. Early precedents. The earliest precedents of the service public model 
in Europe are to be found in structures that developed at the end of the Middle 
Ages. Certain structures and institutions that aççeaied in. the feudal rural areas,
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and mainly in towns, influenced by the utilitas publica doctrine, drew some of 
the characters of the future notion of service public,m
In the feudal countryside certain structures appeared that had some 
characteristics in common with today’s service public notion. The banalités 
seigneuriales, such as mills or bridges, were provided by the Lord to his 
vassals, who had the obligation to use and pay for them as long as the Lord 
could ensure the continued and equal provision of the service. If the Lord could 
not provide the service under such conditions, vassals had the right to obtain 
the service from a different provider. Continuity and equality in the provision 
are two of the main characteristics of the service public notion.
Urban development by the end of the Middle Ages led to the appearance 
of activities which were of common interest for the neighbours of the town. 
Activities such as the maintenance of the walls, the cleaning of the streets or 
the organisation of the market, were services of general interest provided by the 
local government. Services such as the butcher’s or schooling were also 
provided by the local government under an exclusive right.112 The provision of 
these services required a special legal regime, distinct from civil law.
Both precedents of the service public notion were affected by the doctrine 
of the utilitas publica, received from Roman Law by the 13 th century. The 
rescued doctrine legitimised the supremacy of the general interest over the 
private interest.
39. Absolute monarchies. Direct precedents of the service public notion 
only appeared with the strengthening of the monarch’s power. It is for this
1,1 This section follows the historical research of JOURDAN, P. (1987): “La formation du concept de 
service public”, in Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et a ¡’Étranger, pp. 89- 
118; MESCHERIAKOFF, A. S. (1991): “Droit des services publics”, Presses Universitaires de France, 
Paris, preliminary chapter; and the brilliant book by MESTRE, J. L. (1985): “Introduction historique 
au droit administratif française”, PUF, Paris.
m Ibid. MESTRE (1985).
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reason that the concept of service public is particularly strong in those 
European countries where absolute monarchies and a strong centralised power 
developed (or in those countries where this philosophy had a strong influence, 
such as Belgium and Italy).
The postal system in France is a highly interesting example. In 1464 King 
Louis XI decided to create a postal service for the improvement of the 
efficiency of the new administration of the kingdom. The postal service was 
used to connect the administrators all around the country. It was, then, a service 
created by the King to improve his administration. Only in exceptional cases 
was the service opened to private use by the general public. It was only in the 
17th century, due to the success of the service, and the need of revenues for the 
Crown, that the postal monopoly was declared open to the public.
Together with the post, the Crown provided other services. By the 
eighteenth century there was a set of what was known in France as “services du 
public”. These services had three main characteristics. Firstly, they were 
provided by the public authority (the Crown). Secondly, they were offered to 
the general public, and not to a particular category. Thirdly, they were not ruled 
by Private Law, but by Public Law. These services, (post, bridges etc.) had as 
their main goal getting revenues for the Crown by charging the public for the 
provision of a service of general interest
A parallel development during the age of absolute monarchies, was the 
expansion of local monopolies for the provision of services of general interest. 
A good example is the creation by the local government of Marignane (France), 
in 1655, of a communal baker with a monopoly right, in order to ensure the 
continued provision of bread at a reasonable price.113
113 Vide JOURDAN (1987),p. 103 (supra footnote 111).
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40. Effects of the Revolution. The precedents of service public were not 
significantly altered by the French Revolution.114 The three main pillars already 
settled (provision by a public authority, of a service of public interest to the 
general public, under the rule of public law), had to adapt to the new political 
structures, but were not significantly modified
First of all, the important change in the nature and principles ruling the 
exercise of public power legitimated its exercise and therefore strengthened it. 
The Monarch was substituted by the State, and democracy was introduced in 
the way decisions were taken. Secondly, subjects became citizens and in this 
way the role of the public authority as a provider of services to the citizen was 
also strengthened. Services were not provided to individuals considered as 
users, as economic units, but to citizens, as political units. The third pillar of 
the notion of public service, that of Public Law rule, was also strengthened by 
the Revolution, that made definitive the separation between Public and Private 
Law. This separation was not so clear within an absolute monarchy, in which 
the person of the Monarch personified both realities.
The conclusion is that the Revolution only strengthened a substratum 
which was already existent, since on the one hand, the notion of service public 
was not one of the main elements of the revolutionary theory, and on the other 
hand, the political reforms introduced by the Revolution only strengthened the 
characteristics of the service public precedents.
4 1 .19th century developments. The role of the State as the provider of 
services of general interest was kept limited for most of the 19th century. On 
the one hand, the State provided the public services inherited from the ancient 
regime, and on the other created a number of new ones, as a response to the 
development of new technologies. The liberal State inherited structures from
114 Vide MESCHERIAKOFF (1991), (supra footnote 111).
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the ancient regime, such as revenue monopolies (post, tobacco etc.), alongside 
other public services, but these were not the main functions of the State, whose 
fundamental scope was to guarantee the liberty of the citizens. The role of the 
liberal State was to keep peace and public order, so that liberty of the citizens 
would not be menaced. When technological and economic progress made 
possible the creation and development of new products and services which 
became of general interest, public security recommended, in some cases, State 
intervention in the field.
As public services increased, they became a more and more important 
activity of the State. Eventually, together with the police activities, they 
became the essence of its activity. This evolution was pushed by the socialist 
movements that were bom in the second half of the 19th century, which 
accelerated the evolution from the State as police to the State as provider of 
services. This evolution was determined by the traditional link between the 
concept of public authority and Public law to the provision of services of 
general interest. But these principles at the same time, were re-enforced by the 
new situation, and the link between public interest and public authority became 
even stronger. Socialism was particularly strong at a local level, and one of its 
main lines of action was the creation of local monopolies in the general interest 
sectors.115 This action had strong ideological motivations, but also historical 
precedents, so was not as difficult to enforce at a local level as it was at the 
State level.
3.1.2. The service public model.
42. The Ecole de Burdeaux. By the beginning of the 20th century, there 
was an important evolution in the notion of service public. Jurisprudencial as 
well of doctrinal evolution enhanced the role of the service public notion as
113 See BIENVENU, J. J. and RICHER, L (1982): “Le socialism municipal a-t-il existé?”, in Revue 
Historique de Droit Français et étranger, no. 64, pp. 205-223.
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criterion of attribution of competence to the administrative tribunals and, at a 
later stage, to the centre of Administrative Law, as it became the legithnisation 
of public action as well as its limit. This movement took place in France, but it 
had effects in the rest of the continent, mainly in the Mediterranean States.
The origins of the changes in the role of the notion the service public are 
to be found in the in the Arret Blanco judgement by the Tribunal des Conflits in 
1873.116 The fundamental purpose of the Tribunal des conflits, was to define the 
field of competence of the administrative tribunals. This was a delicate issue 
that needed a clear response, which so far had not been found. The judgement 
stated that “la règle de notre droit public [...] place dans le domain naturel de 
la compétence administrative toute les formées contre l'État à raison des 
services publics”w. In this way, public service became the criterion for the 
attribution of competence of the administrative tribunals.
The point of departure of the new theory was the traditional doctrine of 
the separation between the State as public power, and the State as private 
person. After this common assumption, the arret declared that the State as 
public power was “chargé d ’assurer la marche des divers services 
administratifs'” The tribunal drew a necessary link between the State and the 
provision of public services, in such a way that the provision of public service 
would necessarily be in the hands of a public administration, that would do so 
in the exercise of its public power {puissance public). The Tribunal not only 
made this assumption, but also established such a strong link between both 
notions, that public service became the reason of the attribution of competence 
for the administrative tribunals.
n< Vide MESCHERIAKOFF (1991), p. 32 {supra footnote 111).
117 Arret Blanco, D 1873 m, 153. 
u* Arret Blanco, D 1873 m, 17.
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Public service as the criterion of the attribution of competence was 
successful, but it was ignored by the doctrine for thirty years. It was Leon 
Duguit and the Ecole de Bourdeaux, who took the notion of public service as 
being central to the theoretical construction of Administrative Law and 
developed it to its final extremes. For Duguit the service public was both an 
objective reality the necessary activity of the Government in order to achieve 
the solidarité social (this social solidarity was the centre of the discourse, a 
concept difficult to define, a characteristic construction of the philosophy of the 
end of the last century), and also an abstract notion, that had no material 
content, in the sense that it had to be defined for each society, according to its 
own notion of solidarité social.119
This notion of public service was to become the centre of the concept of 
State. “Z, ’État n 'est pas [...] une puissance qui commande, une souveraineté; il 
est une cooperation de services publics organisés et contrôlés par des 
gouvernants”.™ Public service became the legitimising notion of the power of 
the State, its foundation and its limit. As it was said by Gaston Jèze, one of the 
main academics of the Ecole de Bordeaux, “le service public est la pierre 
angulaire du droit administratif'.m  By 1920, in France, the notion of public 
service was necessarily linked to the State, and was to become the “pierre 
angulaire” of Administrative Law, the criterion of attribution of competence 
for administrative tribunals, and the legitimisation of the power of the State.
43. First crisis and resurrection. Three elements defined the concept of 
public service in 1920. Firstly, the service was to be provided by a public
115 “/ou/e activité dont l ’accomplissement doit etre assure, réglé et contrôlé par les gouvernants, parce
que l'accomplissement de cette activité est indispensable à la réalisation et au developement de
l'interdépendance social, et qu 'elle est de tal nature qu 'elle en puet etre réalisé complètement que par
l’intervention de la force gouvernante”, DUGUTT, L. (1928): “Traité de droit constitutionnel", vol. H,
Ancienne Librairie Fontemomg & Cie., Paris, p. 61.
120 Ibid. DUGUIT (1928) p. 59.
121 In AUBY, J.M. and DUCOS-ADER, R. (1973): “Grands services publics et enterprises nationales”, 
two volumes, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, vol. 1, p. 25.
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authority. Secondly, it was to be ruled by Public Law. Thirdly, its function was 
to ensure the provision of a service of general interest. The crises of the concept 
of public service started in the 20's, when new structures appeared, and on the 
one hand, it was provided by public authorities under Private Law, or, on the 
other hand, private persons, started to provide public services. The content of 
the service public notion was emptied, and the concept entered into crisis.
The first crisis of the concept of service public was the provision of 
services of general interest by public authorities, but under the legal regime of 
Private Law, instead of following Public Law. The first sign of this novelty 
appeared as early as 1903, with the arret Terrier. In this case the Tribunal des 
Conflits stated that "il peut se faire que Vadministration tout en agisant non 
comme personne privee mais comme personne publique, dans l'interet d'un 
service public proprement dit, n'invoque pas le benefice de sa situation de 
personne publique et se place volontairement dans les conditions du public, 
soit en passant un des ces contracts de droit commun [...] soit en effectuant une 
de ces operations courantes que les particuliers font journellement" .m  This 
was a clear change in the jurisprudence of the Court, a complete break from the 
arret Blanco doctrine. This case was followed by others,123 but it is only in 
1921, with the arret Bac d'Eloka, that the provision of public services by public 
authorities under Private Law, became widely accepted. The difference 
between services public administratives and services publics industriels et 
commercaux was then developed.
The second crisis was the “privatisation” not only of the legal regime but 
also of the provider of the service. This meant that either a public authority or a 
private person, under concession, license or other mechanisms, could provide a 
service of general interest. This was a very slow evolution, which increased its
122 Arret Terrier, D 1904 m, p. 66, vide in MESCHERIAKOFF (1991), p. 37 (supra footnote 111).
123 Arret Compagnie d'Assurances Le Soleil D 1912 EH, p. 89, for instance.
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importance as time passed. These cases became very common by the 1920s and 
1930s, when public authorities decided to diversify the structures of the 
numerous public services in order to improve their quality by adapting them to 
their function. The provision of public services by private persons involved 
different structures. However a common element was the definition of strict 
mechanisms of control by the public authorities of the activities of private 
persons. The act of concession was always linked to the imposition of 
obligations, as well as the grant of privileges, in order to ensure the provision 
of the service. The content of the obligations depended on the particular 
characteristics • of the service. General rules were never developed on the 
matter.
As a result of this process of “privatisation” of the notion of service
public, two out of the three original elements of the notion were relativised.
t
The last element, that of general interest was the vaguest. The notion of public 
service lost its content and entered into a crisis.
With the development of the welfare state, the expression service public 
again became of common use. The doctrine had major problems in defining its 
content, but politicians and trade unionists amongst others, used the term 
frequently. This process of the recuperation of the term service public was 
observed with curiosity by researchers, who referred to it as a “lazare juridic”.
The role of the notion of public service as the centre of Administrative 
Law, or its use as the criterion for the attribution of competence to 
administrative tribunals is a French specificity. Nevertheless, it has had a major 
impact in all the States that shared a common legal culture, such as Belgium, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal or Spain.
3.1.3. The notion of service public.
44. Elements of the notion of service public. It is extremely difficult to 
define the content of the concept of service public. There are several reasons
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for this. First, the concept had a different content in every nation.124 The second 
is that, historically, the role of the notion has also evolved within every 
country, having different contents along history, as it has been seen in the 
French case. The result has been a very wide notion, with a very diffuse 
meaning. Researchers have often refused to offer a definition.125 Even if a 
definition has not been reached, researchers have analysed the elements that are 
relevant of the concept of public service, and agreement has been reached in 
the definition of two main elements.
The first element that most researchers have recognised as the essence of 
the notion of service public, is that the sector is “reserved” to public authorities, 
in such a way that private persons can only participate in the sector if a 
concession is granted.127 As has been shown, this organic element of the notion 
of public service has suffered a deep transformation. From the necessary direct 
provision12* to the current regime of concessions, which in certain cases 
supposes a very light control on the private providers of the service “reserved” 
to the State.
124 See CEEP (1995): “Europe, concurrence et service public”, Masson, Paris, pp. 109-176 for a 
comparative analysis of die notion in Italy, France, the Netherlands and Spain.
125 For instance: “le concept de service public est sature de significations multiples qui se superposent, 
s'entrecroisent, renvoient les unes aux autres et entre lesquelles le glissement est constanf \  
CHEVALLIER, J. (1987): “Le service public'\ PUF, Paris, p. 3.
126 See for instance two recent definitions: “le service public désigne une activité d'intérêt général 
(element fondamental qui illustre le caractere materiel et finaliste de la notion), prise en charge par 
une personne publique (élément réducteur qui en atteste le caractère organique); cette prise en charge 
est perceptible à certain indice'*f in TRUCHET, D. (1982): “Label de service public et statut du service 
public”, Actualité Juridique, Droit Administrative, no. 120 January, p. 428, and “maîtrise publique 
assumée par la puissance publique selon différentes modalités (tutelle, maîtrise d'ouvrage, 
réglementation, tarification, financement), en response aux spécificités et au caracter d'intérêt général 
de la mission', this last definition was offered by the French government in its proposal for an 
European Cart of public service, 1993.
127 This is particularly clear in the Spanish notion of service public, whose main element is the 
publicarlo or declaration of reserve of the activity for the public authorities, understood almost as an 
appropiation of the activity, see GARRIDO FALLA, F. (1994): UE1 concepto de servicio público en 
derecho español”, in Revista de Administración Pública, vol. 135, pp. 7-35.
l2S The preamble of the French Constitution of 1946, which is considered a part of the current 
constitution, states: “tout bien, toute enterprise, dont Vexplotation a au acquiert les characters d'un 
service public national ou d'un monopole défait doit devenir propriété de la collectivité
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Secondly, as in the case of the US, the concept of public service requires 
the existence of a general interest. This material element of the notion of pubic 
service is, nevertheless very vague. The definition of what is to be considered 
the general interest is in the hands of the legislature, and it is for this reason that 
the notion of public service has a strong political character.129
As a result of its evolution during this century, both elements of the 
notion of public service have suffered a process of dilution and public service 
has become, according to certain researchers, a mere “label”,130 a myth with a 
high political content but very little legal consequences. Service public has 
become a common expression with a diffuse content, which is useful to 
legitimise any public intervention.
45. Service public principles. It has always been considered that the 
mere presence of the State, when directly providing the service, would ensure 
the satisfaction of the public needs. It was never considered necessary to 
develop a set of obligations connected to the notion of service public. Instead 
of obligations, researchers developed a set of principles that were to rule the 
provision of public services by public authorities. Jurisprudence was later 
developed adopting these general principles. These principles were adapted 
from general principles of constitutional law, to the particular case of the public 
services that, in any case, were considered a sector of Public Law. These 
principles are known as the lois de Rolland.
129 “la notion de service public est éminemment politique", in BELLOUBET-FRIER, N. (1994). 
“Service public et droit communautaire”, in L \Actualité juridique- Droit administratif 20 April 1994, 
pp. 270-285, Paris, p. 270.
130 “il n'y a pas de notion du service public; le mot recouvre des realités juridiques variables selon les 
besoins propres du “locuteur” [...] anotre avis, cést un label accordé a une activité, [...] apparait 
comme un mythe qui, d’une part legitime [...] L ’action public, et d ’autre part, croisé avec Videe de 
puissance publicque, fonde Videohgie du droit administrative actueV\ in TRUCHET, D. (1982): 
“Label de service public et statut du service public”, Actualité Juridique, Droit Administrative y no. 120 
January, p. 430.
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Equality was the first of these principles governing the provision of public 
services. This principle had an obvious constitutional origin. Equality in the 
provision of public services, had the same meaning as in constitutional law. It 
supposed the same treatment in equal situations. This general principle of law 
has been applied by the French Conseil d ’État.111
Continuity is also a traditional principle in the provision of public 
services. If a service is considered of general interest, it is because it is 
considered of basic importance for the community, and therefore, there is the 
need to ensure its continuity. This principle has been enforced by the French 
Conseil d ’Êtat in cases of strike in public services.132
Adaptation is the last traditional principle. This principle tries to ensure 
the satisfaction of the basic needs. Only the transformation across time, 
adapting the provision of the service to the new conditions can ensure the 
satisfaction of public needs.
As it has been said, the principles of public service are general principles 
of law which apply to the common activity of the administration and obviously 
apply also when the administration is providing a public service. The question 
is whether these principles apply also to the provision of public services by 
public authorities under private law and indirectly by private persons. The 
concession of a public service is usually accompanied by a definition of the 
obligations and privileges parallel to the concession, however no general 
obligation has been developed.
131 For instance CJE. February 1, 1985, Union departamentale des consommateurs de Paris, in which 
the charge of a lower price for electricity in towns nearby a nuclear plant, was considered contrary to 
the principle of equality in the provision of public services.
132 For instance, CJE. July 15, 1979 in a case related to broadcast service.
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3.2. COMPETITION LAW IN EUROPE.
46. General. European competition Law does not have such a long 
tradition as antitrust in the US.133 If antitrust has its earlier precedents in English 
Common Law and is intrinsically connected with the American political and 
legal tradition, competition Law appeared in Europe, and particularly in 
Germany, after World War II, as a reaction to the excesses produced by the 
local political tradition.134
The German model of industrialisation, which was followed in other 
European nations was coherent with the interventionist political tradition and 
granted a primary role to the public authorities as well as a close connection 
between those authorities and the leading industry groups. Particularly 
interesting was the favourable approach to private cartels as a mechanism of 
control of an economic sector by the public authorities. According to a 
significant portion of the political and economic commentators, such 
connections facilitated the rise of the Nazi movement in Germany and the 
subsequent dramatic events.
A small group of academics at the University of Freiburg witnessed the 
process of decadence of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Nazism, and 
reflected on the negative effects of the restriction of competition in the market, 
the concentration of private economic power, and its connections with political 
power. The result was the formation of a coherent body of doctrines evolving 
around the role of the State in economic activity, and in particular the need to 
ensure the effectiveness of competition mechanisms in order to avoid the 
concentration of private economic power and the mutual interference between 
private economic power and public political power. Thanks to the compatibility
133 Vide supra Chapter 2.2. The Origins and Evolution of Antitrust
134 See AMATO, G. (1997): “Antitrust and the Bounds of Power. The dilemma of liberal democracy in 
the history of the markef', Hart Publishing, Oxford, p. 40.
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of their principles with the ideology of the occupant forces, the Freiburger 
Ordoliberalen School135 acquired a prominent intellectual and political position 
under the American occupation following the end of the war,. As a result, the 
first Competition Act of the continent was adopted in Germany in 1957.
The intellectual principles of the Freiburger Ordoliberalen School saw 
some diffusion among academist in some European nations. Nevertheless, the 
most important effect of the School throughout the Continent was the adoption 
of the principles of competition and the definition of antitrust provisions in the 
European Economic Community Treaty. This was due to the position of the 
German authorities in the negotiations for the drafting of the Treaty.
Despite the initial restraints on competition policy imposed by the 
political traditions of the Member States and the existence of important 
exceptions in the Treaty to the mechanisms of free competition in the market, 
competition rules “proved to be as magic boxes, capable of expanding their 
content, where initially conceived in a much more limited context”.134
Competition policy benefited from the political impulse towards the 
integration of the markets, due to the fact that it provided a powerful instrument 
against barriers to such integration.137 In this way, competition policy has 
effectively become one of the most important policies of the European Union, 
and competition acts have been adopted in all the Member States.
133 See GERBER, D. (1994): “Constitutionaliziiig the Economy: German Neo-Liberalism, Comparative 
Law and die ‘New’ Europe”, in The American Journal of Comparative Law, voL 42, no, 1, pp. 25-84.
136 Vide AMATO (1997), p. 43 (supra footnote 134).
137 See EHLERMANN, C. D. (1992): “The Contribution of EC Competition Policy to the Single 
Market”, in Common Market Law Review, vol. 29, p. 257.
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3.3. THE PROCESS OF LIBERALISATION.
3.3.1. Liberalisation, de-monopolisation, privatisation and 
competition.
47. Criticisms arrive in Europe. American criticisms about the 
excessive public intervention in the economic activity also reached Europe.138 
Public monopolies were accused of inefficiency, poor service, high prices and 
of obstructing the competitiveness of the European economy. At the same time, 
most of the arguments made against regulatory intervention could be extended 
to public monopolies, which also had a strong tendency to be captured by 
managers, politicians and trade unions, and were difficult to control and to co­
ordinate by Parliaments and the Judiciary.139 European societies never reached a 
wide consensus on the option of desestalisation, as happened in the USA.
It was in the UK that public intervention was first considered an obstacle 
to economic growth, and privatisation and de-monopolisation were first 
undertaken.140 In the 1990s it has been widely shared, also in the Continent, that 
public monopolies in the general interest sectors were inefficient, and public 
interest could be protected through less restrictive instruments.
An important element in the process of the reform of public intervention 
in the European economy has been the role of the European Union institutions. 
Firstly, the process of market integration forces the gradual elimination of 
national monopolies, as they automatically divide the market along national 
borders. Furthermore, the process of political integration promoted the 
substitution of national direct intervention by indirect intervention designed at a
131 Vide supra Chapter 2.3. The Process of Deregulation.
139 See MAJONE, G. (1995): “Regulating Europe”, Routledge, London, p. 18, and MAJONE, G. 
(1996): “La Communauté européenne: un Etat régulateur”, Montchrestien, Paris, p. 18.
140 See SWANN, D. (1988): “The Retreat of the State. Deregulation and Privatisation in the UK and 
US”, Harvester-Wheatsheaf, London.
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Community level. Since Community structures are weak, in the sense that they 
lack not only political power but also the infrastructure to develop a direct 
intervention in all the Union, Community institutions have opted for the 
development of an indirect control of economic activity through regulatory 
techniques, which eliminates the need of national direct intervention.
48. Liberalisation. The process of the substitution of the traditional 
service public direct intervention through national public monopolies, by 
competition in the free market between an unlimited number of private 
companies under indirect intervention by the public authorities, can be 
denominated as the liberalisation of the European markets.141
This process includes three different but connected processes. On the one 
hand, public authorities have de-monopolised the markets, putting an end to the 
exclusive or special rights that restricted market access to other operators. On 
the other hand, public authorities have privatised the assets used for the direct 
provision of the services, in what has been named a process of privatisation. 
Lastly, different regulatory schemes have been often introduced in order to 
facilitate the transition from monopoly to effective competition.
The process of liberalisation of the European economy has been more 
complicated than the process of deregulation in the United States. The first 
reason is that liberalisation is in contradiction with some of the most 
established dogmas of the European political tradition, particularly with the 
philosophy of the direct defence of the public interest by the public authorities 
as mechanisms to elevate public action over the private interests. Secondly,
141 Some authors use the term deregulation to denominate the European process of reform of public 
intervention in the economic activity. We do not completely agree, since we prefer to keep the term 
“deregulation” for die American process of reform of their traditional regulatory intervention model. 
The term “deregulation” <*an lead to confusion since the elimination of public monopolies does not 
imply a reduction of public intervention but a modification in the mechanisms that can even make the 
intervention more complicated. That is why a significant number of researchers preferred die terms “rc- 
regulation” or even “neo-regulation”.
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liberalisation is incompatible with the traditional model of public intervention 
the service public, and its main mechanisms, the public monopoly. As a result, 
a completely new model of public intervention, based on indirect intervention 
compatible with the free market mechanisms has to be established, and new 
institutions and mechanisms have to be defined.
3.3.2. Renewal of the service public concept.
49. The defendants of the notion of service public. Challenges to the 
notion of service public have been rebuted by a conjunction of forces. Firstly, 
academic research, mostly in France, has been developed, trying, on the one 
side, to renew the notion of service public in order to improve its internal 
coherence and its economic efficiency and, on the other side, criticising the 
position of the Community institutions.142 The French Conseil d'État, for 
instance, in the Rapport Public of 1994,143 developed a strong defence of the 
notion of service public. A deep renouvement was advised in order to face 
criticisms about the economic performance and the political control of the 
public monopolies. Secondly, powerful public monopolies are also intervening 
in the debate, for instance through the Centre Européen des Entreprise à 
Participation Publique (CEEP).'44 Lastly, some Member States, led by 
France,145 made proposals, even for a reform in the Treaties.14*
142 See three dossiers with contributioiis from different authors published in the last years: W_AA 
(1994): “Service public, service universel”, in Reseaux, vol. 66, pp. 1-178; W_AA (1995): “Le service 
public et la construction communautaire” in Revue Française de Droit Administratif, voL 11, no. 2 pp. 
291-342, and no. 3, pp. 449-503; and W_AA. (1996): “Services d’intérêt economic général”, in 
L'Actualité Juridique. Droit Administratif, vol. 52, no. 3, pp. 171-191.
143 CONSEIL D’ÉTAT {1995): “Service public, services publics: déclin ou renouvement?” in Rapport 
Public 1994, Etudes et Documents du Conseil d’État, no. 46, La Documentation Française, Paris.
144 CEEP made an ambitious proposal for the reform of the Treaty, with die creation of a new chapter in 
title V, and a new article devoted to the defence of service public, in CENTRE EUROPEEN DES 
ENTREPRISES À PARTICIPATION PUBLIQUE (1995): “Europe, Concurrence et Service Public”, 
Masson, Paris.
143 During its presidency in 1993, the French republic presented a memorandum to the Commission 
with the proposal of elaborating an European Charter of die public services.
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Arguments obviously are varied, but a common line of defence can be 
found. On the one hand, there has been an effort to renew the notion of service 
public, making it more acceptable for jurists, economists and consumers. On 
the other hand there is a critic to the position of Community institutions.
50. Renewal of the notion of service public. The first movement of the 
defendants of the service public, led by the Conseil d'Etat, has been to review 
the concept of service public and the principles attached to it, in order to face 
criticisms about the lack of coherence of the concept, about the lack of 
efficiency and about its implicit political accountability.
On the one hand, the concept of service public has been redefined in order 
to face the criticisms of lack of internal coherence of the concept. The initial 
position has been the distinction between service public and a series of 
institutions that, in the past, have been necessarily linked to the notion: 
monopoly, public property, péréquation, fonction public, or public domain. 
This is only a distinction, in the sense that these are mechanisms compatible 
but not necessarily linked with the notion of service public. The following step 
has been to redefine the concept of service public. If the strict notion of public 
service required the direct intervention of a public authority, under a public law 
regime, the broader notion requires only some kind of public intervention, 
added to the regular control of economic activity by the State. According to the 
Conseil d'État and most of the doctrine, “il en saurait y  avoir service public 
sans mâitrise ou régulation publique et plus précisément sans mise en oeuvre 
de procédés de régulation autres que ceux qui sont normalment à la disposition 
de la puissance public [...] dans ses rapports avec le tout-venant des acteurs 
économ iquesPublic intervention could go from an exclusive right granted to
l4< See MONTERO PASCUAL, J. J. (1997): “I monopoli nazionali pubblici in un mercato unico 
concorrenziale. Evoluzione e riforma delTart 90 del Trattato”, in Rivista Italiana di Diritto Pubblico 
Comunitario, voi 7, no. 3-4, pp. 663-672.
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a public undertaking, to a mere license regime and a light control of the 
activities of the private undertakings in the sector.
On the other hand, in order to face criticisms of inefficiency and “public 
failure”, the traditional principles ruling the public intervention, (equality, 
adaptation, and continuity) have been strengthened, and new principles have 
been introduced (neutrality, participation, transparency, responsibility, 
simplicity and accessibility). Adaptation and continuity should improve the 
economic efficiency. Equality, transparency and participation would improve 
the situation of the citizen/consumer before the providers of the services, while 
transparency and responsibility would avoid the “capture” by politicians and 
managers.
3.3.3. Service public and Community Law.
51. The intervention of the Community institutions. Article 86 (former 
Article 90) of the European Community Treaty is the key provision defining 
the balance between the interest of further integrating the European markets, 
and the interest to maintain Member States’ rights to create national public 
monopolies.147 Originally, the mere existence of national public monopolies 
was not forbidden, but for the first time, limits to the exercise of the exclusive 
rights were imposed on the States. Article 86 presupposed the legality of the 
existence of the exclusive rights, and even if the exercise would be contrary to 
some provision of the Treaty, Article 86(2) provided an special regime 
allowing restrictions to movement and competition within the common market, 
if necessary to ensure the provision of services of general interest. The approval 
of the Single European Act altered the balance of interests, strengthening the 
goal of reaching a single market, bringing about an evolution in the approach of
147 See BLUM, F. and LOGUE, A. (1998): “State Monopolies Under EC Law", Wiley, Chichester.
91
I. The Evolution of Public Intervention.
the European Commission and the European Court of Justice towards national 
public monopolies.14*
Commission decisions149 and directives150 passed through the Article 86(3) 
procedure (which allowed the Commission to pass directives without the 
intervention of the other community institutions), and relevant judgements of 
the Court151 in the late 1980s beginning of the 1990s, extended the 
incompatibility with the Treaty from the exercise to the existence of the 
exclusive rights granted by a public authority. Community institutions 
commenced to judge the mere grant of the exclusive and special rights,152 and 
declared some of them contrary to the Treaty (whether to provisions defending 
the four freedoms or to provisions defending competition). Not only the 
application of Community Law was strengthened, but the provision in Article 
86(2), from an special regime passed to be an exception, to be applied 
restrictively.153 In such a way, the exception would only apply when the
148 Vide MONTERO PASCUAL (1997), pp. 663-668 {supra footnote 146).
145 Commission decision of 22 June 1987, OJ 1985 L 194/28 and Commission Decision of 20 
December 1989, OJ 1990 L 10/47, are only some examples.
150 Commission Directive 88/301/EEC, of 16 May 1988, OJ 1989 L 131/73 and Commission Directive 
90/388/EEC, of 28 June 1990, OJ 1990 L 192/9, die telecommunications directives, declared contrary 
to the Treaty the telecommunications terminals and telecommunications services monopolies.
151 Case 202/88, France v. Commission, [1991] ECR 1-1223, of 19 March, Case 41/90, Klaus Hofner 
and Friz Elser v. Macroton GmbH, [1991] ECR 1-1979, of 23 April, Case 260/89, ERT v. DimotiH, 
[1991] ECR 1-2925, of 18 June, Case 179/90, Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova v. Siderúrgica 
Gabrielli, [1991] ECR 1-5889, of 10 December, Case 18/88, RTT v. GB-Inno-BM, [1991] ECR 1-5941, 
of 13 December and Joined cases 271, 281 and 289/90, Spain v. Commission, [1992] ECR I- 5833, of 
17 December.
152 The “unavoidable abuse” doctrine was elaborated in order to declared incompatible with the Treaty 
the mere existence of the monopolies, see EHLERMANN, C. D. (1993): “Managing Monopolies: The 
Role of the State in Controlling Market Dominance in the European Community”, in European 
Competition Law Review, voL 14, no. 2, pp. 61-69.
153 For a negative vision of this process see DE LA QUADRA-SAJLCEDO, T. (1995): uLiberalización 
de las telecomunicaciones, servicio público y constitución económica europea”, Centro de Estudios 
Constitucionales, Madrid.
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application of Community Law would make impossible the provision of the 
service of general economic interest, and not only obstruct it.154
52. Confrontation. Defendants of the notion of service public did not 
accept the interference of Community institutions in the Decisions of Member 
States with regard to their intervention in the economy. Instead of adapting the 
notion of service public to the constraints of Community Law (as the Conseil 
d ’Etat had done with regard to the criticism in respect to internal coherence and 
economic efficiency), most of them have pled, unsuccessfully, for the 
elimination of those constraints, whether it be through a change in the 
application of Article 90, or through a reform of the Treaty having the same 
effect.135
Service public interventions are necessary, they claim, to ensure the goals 
of the general interest, because market mechanisms do not take into account 
some of these goals. This public intervention might be contrary to a Treaty 
whose values are competition and freedom of movement, but necessary to 
maintain social cohesion. As a result, exceptions for the application of the 
competition and freedom of movement principles need to be provided.156
53. Le dernier crisis du service public. It is the very same root of the 
notion of service public, as it has been defined by the Conseil d ’Etat,157 which is 
in conflict with Community Law. The essence of the service public notion
154 The most recent judgements of the Court might have altered the strict application of the exception in 
article 90(2), nevertheless, it has to be taken into account that those were cases decided under article 
177, and in sectors were community action has not introduced regulation in the sector. See Case 
320/91, Regie des Postes v. Paul Corbeau, [1993] ECR 1-2533, of 19 May; and Commune de Almelo 
and others v. Energiebedrijf Usselmij, [1994] ECR 1-1477, of 27 ApriL
135 Most of the reforms suggested tended, through different mechanisms to strenght the value of public 
intervention in defence of the general interest There was a proposal by the CEEP to annex a Charter of 
Public Service to the Treaty, as well as to reform the actual provisions ruling the issue, adding, for 
instance, a new article 94B, with a concrete provision defending service public. The Amsterdam Treaty 
has not adopted any of these solutions, but merely the option proposed by the Commission.
156 The minutes of the European Parliament sitting of Wednesday 4 September 1996, on the issue 
perfectly reflect the ideological conflict in Europe.
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relies on the almost omnimodous power of the State to define a special legal 
regime for certain activities, excluding the regular development of the activity 
by private operators under Private Law, at the same time that special powers 
are ensured to the public authorities. It is for the State to decide the level of 
interference, which ranges from the monopolisation of the activity, to the 
lightest control of the private actors’ activity. Traditionally, the only limitation 
to the State in this respect was the very devaluated constitutional right to free 
enterprise.
The apparition of a new supra-national entity, the European Community, 
with its own legal order characterised by its supremacy over national laws, 
introduced a new and fundamental limitation to the power of the State. 
Furthermore, the fundamental scope of the European Community is the 
integration of the European nations, particularly the integration of the different 
national markets. In this respect, public restriction to private economic activity 
tends to obstruct market integration, and for this reason, they are in principle 
contrary to one of the fundamental pillars of the Community legal order.
Community institutions have fundamentally declared the incompatibility 
of the granting of exclusive rights in certain sectors, one of the traditional 
mechanisms of public intervention, with the EC Treaty. The very same notion 
of service public has not been expressly declared incompatible with 
Community Law. Nevertheless, the introduction of the judgement on the power 
of the State to exclude any activity from the regular Private Law regime, makes 
the almost omnimodous title of intervention incompatible with the EC Treaty.
The creation of a strict legal limit to the power of the State to exclude an 
activity from the general regime of competition in the market, modifies the 
centre of interest in the study of public intervention in the economic activity.
157 Vide CONSEIL D’ÉTAT(1995) (supra footnote 143).
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The centre moves from the legislative declaration of a service as service 
public,154 to the specific legal regime imposed to a service considered of general 
interest, due to the necessary evaluation of its compatibility with the 
Community legal order. As a result, the category of service public should be 
replaced by different categories of public intervention, according to their 
principles, mechanisms and institutions. This does not mean that all the service 
public legal regime should be eliminated. On the contrary, the traditional 
principles defined for the category are still in place for many of the public 
intervention institutions, as well as the many of the principles recently defined 
by the administarativist doctrine. Nevertheless, the object of research should be 
focused on the specific public intervention regimes, particularly in those 
regimes recently created, such as the mechanisms for the indirect defence of the 
general interest in liberalised sectors.1SS
3.4. PUBLIC INTERVENTION IN EUROPEAN TELECOMS.
3.4.1. Origins of the telecommunications markets in Europe (1876- 
1900).
54. Telegraphy. The structure of the European telecommunications 
industry in its earlier era160 was highly influenced by the decisions adopted for 
the management of the first telecommunications device, the telegraph. In the
158 This is particularly clear in relation to the Spanish notion of servicio publico, which main element is 
the publicado, vide GARRIDO FALLA (1994) (supra footnote 127).
159 See MONTERO, J. J. and BROKELMANN, H. (1999): “ Telecomunicaciones y televisión. La 
nueva regulación en España”, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, pp, 46-48.
160 The following pages on the evolution of public intervention in the European telecommunications 
sector will be mostly centred in the French case, the one that more clearly reflects the principles behind 
such intervention, but references to the British, German and Spanish experiences will be continuous. In 
the necessarily superficial review of such evolution, we intend to avoid a normative approach, and even 
at the risk of providing a simplistic image, we intend to show the contradictions between the discourse 
of the public monopolies against de-monopolisation, based on the need of the public monopolies in 
order to guarantee the provision of services of general interest, and die historical role of such 
monopolies in their national markets.
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UK the exploitation of the activity was initially in hands of private 
undertakings. It was only thirty years after the installation of the first 
commercial line that the network was nationalised.
In France and in Germany the provision of the service had been 
monopolised from the beginning by the public authorities. Furthermore, the 
first lines were built for the exclusive use of governmental departments, mostly 
the military in Prussia and the Ministere de VInterieur in France. It was only at 
a second stage that the telegraph lines in the hands of the State were 
commercially exploited.141 In 1852 (thirteen years after the installation of the 
first line in Europe) it was stated that the telegraph in the continent “was more a 
weapon in the hands of Government than a means of promoting social and 
commercial communication for the community”.1“
55. Telephony. When Bell’s invention was introduced into Europe, most 
of the national Governments decided to include such service under the 
exclusive right for the provision of the telegraphy service. In Germany, the Post 
and Telegraph Administration monopolised the service from its origins and no 
private activity in the sector was never allowed.143 In France, in 1879 the 
Ministry of Posts and Telegraph adopted a decree granting the concession of 
the right to provide telephone service, to a private company.164 This meant that 
telephony was included in the monopoly enjoyed by the Post and Telegraph 
administration, but at the same time showed the will of the Administration not 
to operate the service, unless at that moment. In the UK the extension of the 
exclusive right from telegraphy to telephony was challenged in Court by
141 Vide BROCK, G. (1981): "The Telecommunications Industry. The Dynamics of Market Structure”, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, for the history of telegraphy in the leading European States.
162 E. Highton in “The Electric Telegraph”, quotation from FOREMAN-PECK, J. and MIT .1 .WARD, R. 
(1994): “Public and Private Ownership of British Industry, 1820-1990”, Claredon Press, Oxford.
163 See LIBOIS, L. J. (1983): “Genèse et criossance des telecommunications", Masson, Paris, pp. 268- 
272.
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private operators who desired to operate the service. Courts finally recognised 
the Post Office exclusive right.145
From its very origin the strategy of the public authorities was to control 
the development of the industry, even if it could not be done through the direct 
exploitation of the networks, due to the financial problems of the State.
During 1880’s the main characteristic of the sector in Europe was 
confusion. Most of the national Governments granted licensees to private 
operators for the exploitation of the service, but under restrictive conditions.146 
At the same time, the Post and Telegraph Administrations started to invest for 
the development mostly of long distance network. The risk of nationalisation 
following the German model was always present. As a result, the development 
of the network under such difficult conditions was very poor. Prices were very 
high because private operators were pushed to be interested in the immediate 
recovering its investment rather than in developing a long-term policy of 
construction of a network. This led to dissatisfaction of the public with private 
telephone operators. At the same time, public authorities lacked the financial 
resources to build a comprehensive network, “their whole attitude seemed to 
have been dictated by the one purpose to evade the risk of introducing the new 
service by shifting the responsibility to private promoters. At the same time 
they protected themselves against unexpected success by making the term of 
the franchise short”.167
164 See BAKIS, H. (1987): “Formation et développement du réseau téléphonique français”, in 
L'Information Historique, vol. 49, p. 31.31-43
165 See ROBERTSON J. (1947): “The Story of the Telephone", Pitman & Sons, London.
146 For tibe French case vide BAKIS (1987), (supra footnote 164); for the Spanish case see OTERO 
CARVAJAL, L. (1993): “El teléfono. El nacimiento de un nuevo medio de comunicación. 1877-1936”, 
in “Las comunicaciones en la construcción del Estado moderno en España 1700-1936”, MOTMA, 
Madrid.
167 HOLCOME, A.N. (1911): “Public Ownership of the Telephones in the Continent of Europe”, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.
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3.4.2. Public monopolies (1900-1987).
56. General. Around the turn of the century most of the European States 
opted for the German model of the monopolisation of the telecommunications 
activity by the Post administration and the nationalisation of the private 
operators active in their national markets.16® The French nationalisation is 
particularly interesting, as it shows the reasons behind such decision. In 1889 
the Chambre des Députés, following the Report presented by the Député 
Cochery supporting the governmental law proposition, decided to nationalise 
the telephony network with a strong parlamentary majority.
M. G. Cochery (son of the 1878-1884 Post and Telegraph Minister) was 
the Depute in charge of presenting the report of the Parliamentary Commission 
about the Proposition of the government to nationalise the telephone company. 
According to this report there were three reasons for the nationalisation. Firstly, 
the Commission considered that granting a long concession to a private 
undertaking, in a technologic sector in fast development would mean
A
"s ’exposer ou bien à aliener des droits naturellement réservés à l ’Etat, à 
abandoner une partie des attributions dont il en peut se dépuiller, ou bien à 
interdire au public l ’usage des progrès réalisés”.'** This is the basic reason for 
the monopolisation. The telecommunications sector was of strategic 
importance, and for these reason it was reserved for the State, not because it 
had to offer an efficient service to the citizens, but because it was a strategic 
sector in which the private interest could not defend the interest of the
161 This was die case in the UK, where the sector was nationalised in 1911, vide supra footnote 165, 
ROBERTSON (1947), pp. 1-89. There were, nevertheless, some exceptions, such as the Spanish case, 
monopolisation of the sector took place on ly in 1924 and die monopoly was not ensured to the public 
authorities but to a private company controlled by the foreign operator, ITT, vide OTERO CARVAJAL 
(1993), (supra footnote 166).
169 See the Report to the Chamber from the Parlamentary Commission studying the law proposition on 
die nationalisation of the telephone industry Commission, in BUREAU INTERNATIONAL DES 
ADMINISTRATIONS TÉLÉGRAPHIQUES (1889): “Les Telephones en France”, Journal 
Télégraphique, vol. 13, no. 7, p. 143.
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collectivity. Secondly, it was maintained that telephony was competing with 
the public monopoly of telegraphy, and in order to defend this service, 
telephony would have to be integrated in the public monopoly. Third, the report 
argues that there are “inconvénients politiques et d ’ordre public”,170 reinforcing 
that it is the very same conception of the State, as superior point in which 
private interests are confronted and the public interest defined.
At that moment the telephony market did not have a natural monopoly 
structure, since the switching had strong diseconomies of scale, so the natural 
monopoly argument was not the cause of the nationalisation. Neither public 
service arguments justified the nationalisation. It was the conception of the role 
of the State as superior arbiter of the private interest, defendant of the public 
interest, together with some practical considerations on the future of the 
telegraph monopoly, that forced the State to monopolise the 
telecommunications market, but not the public service nature of the sector.
57. The public monopoly before World War II. The French post, the 
telegraph and the telephone industries were, after 1889, controlled by a national 
public monopoly in the hands of the Post, Telegraph and Telephone Ministry. 
Nationalisation did not bring an improvement of the conditions offered to the 
users. The main problem was that the State did not consider 
telecommunications a priority. As a result the public monopoly disposed of 
very little finance for the development of the network. Public intervention not 
only did not improve the service, but also produced some criticisms on the way 
it was managed. The Cochery family was accused of the absolute domination 
of the sector by the École polytechnique,m Problems of capture by the ellite 
were frequent since that time.
170 Ibid. BUREAU INTERNATIONAL DES ADMINISTRATIONS TÉLÉGRAPHIQUES (1889), p. 
143.
171 Vide LIBOIS (1983), p. 211 (supra footnote 163).
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From 1889 to 1892, all network extensions were financed by local 
authorities and users, who were required to provide finance for the works, 
being the payments returned later.172 This system {avances remboursables) was 
maintained until World War I for the extension of the network in rural areas, in 
violation of the service public principle of equality. The renewal and extension 
of the telephone network was difficult to finance and as a result the extension 
was much slower than in the USA,173 and the quality minimal. Direct funding 
by the State budget was later introduced, but telecommunications were never a 
priority, causing a chronic under development of the French network. The 
monopolist policy in rural areas was especially contrary to the principles of 
service public. Whilst in the competitive American market, 39% of the farms 
had a telephone in 1920,174 the French monopolist required local authorities and 
users to finance the extension of the network to rural areas.
In the beginning of the 1920s the extension and the quality of the French 
telephone network were so poor, that people started to demand the elimination 
of the public monopoly. In 1922, the sous-secretaire d ’Êtat aux Postes et 
Telegraphe recognised that the user “résume son mécontent dans cette 
invective: si l ’État est incapable d ’exploiter le téléphone, qu ’ilpasse la main à 
l ’industrie privée”.175
The clear conclusion is that during the first fifty years of its existence, the 
telecommunications monopoly did not follow the most basic principles of the 
service public.
172 Vide BAKIS (1987), p 33, (supra footnote 164).
173 In 1910 the number of telephone station in France was eight times less than in the USA, and slightly 
lower than the European average. See CHAPUIS, R. (1982): u100 Years of Telephone Switching (1878- 
1978)”, North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, p. 139.
174 Vide supra Chapter 2.4.1. Origins and Free Competition in the US Telecoms Markets (1876-1921).
175 See T TROTS (1983), p. 70 for tins and other references to the request of privatisation of the 
telephone industry.
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58. The monopoly after World War II. The situation did not change 
after the war. The first step was the creation of the Commissariat General du 
Plan in 1946, charged with the responsibility of developing a plan of 
investments for the reconstruction and modernisation of the economy and the 
infrastructures. Within this framework was created the Commission de 
modernisation des telecommunications. Nevertheless, the telecommunications 
did not benefit of the public investments in the four first plans. As it was stated: 
“Pendant les quatre premiers plans, on a rejette volontairement dans Vombre 
d ’autres secteurs, car on a estimé qu’il y avait des choses plus urgentes a 
faire’V76 This meant that, again, French telecommunications services lagged 
behind their competitors.177
It is only by the end of the 1960s with the fifth and definitely with the 
sixth and seventh plans, that telecommunications became a priority and 
massive investments were developed in the sector. It is during this period that 
universalisation became an objective of the public monopoly, even if it was a 
long-term one. Investments led to a multiplication of telephone penetration and 
the automatisation of the network (the two main objectives of the plans), 
catching up with the European neighbours, even if always remaining behind the 
USA.17*
It is only at this late stage, more than eighty years after the creation of the 
monopoly, that some of the principles of service public started to be applied to 
the sector, and certain mechanisms were introduced to achieve universality. 
The main mechanism was cross-subsidiarisation. It is only at this point that a 
conscious policy of differentiation of prices in order to improve penetration 
was implemented. This policy, nevertheless, just strengthened an existent
176 M. Guena, Minister of the PIT, in LIBOIS (1983), p. 257.
177 See NOAM, E. (1992): “Telecommunications in Europe”, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 141.
m See TUNSTALL, J. and PALMER, M. (1990): “Liberating Communications. Policy-Making in 
France and Britain”, NCC, Oxford, p. 147.
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!3 Cadency. Technological evolution had been reducing long distance services 
costs dramatically, while the reduction had minor influence in the local service. 
The maintenance of the price structure naturally produced a divergence from 
costs, creating a cross-subsidy from long distance to local calls. The option of 
cross subsidising was just the result of “leaving things as they were”, since no 
serious research on costs was undertaken, and regular adaptation from prices to 
costs would have been impossible.
3.4.3. Liberalisation of the telecoms markets (1987-1998).
59. Reasons of the liberalisation. By the 1980s the importance of the 
telecommunications sector in economic life became evident, not only because 
of its own weight but also because of its effect on the competitiveness of many 
other sectors. In an advanced economy, information is the most valuable good 
and having effective systems to handle and transport it became a basic 
necessity and an indispensable tool for competing in a global market.
The fundamental force of change in the world of telecommunications has 
been technological evolution. Digitalisation and the development of new carrier 
techniques (satellite and optical fibres) allowed the convergence of the sectors 
of telecommunications, computers and multimedia, and an explosion of new 
services. National monopolies were not efficient in responding to the new 
demands'of the market, particularly high tech, very specialised demand. R&D 
has become very expensive, in such a way that wide markets are necessary to 
ensure the profitability of the investments.
At a European level, the need for wider markets, faster introduction of 
new services and renewal of the network, was observed by the Community 
institutions as a good opportunity to implement the integration of the markets 
also in the provision of services of general interest
The technological evolution and the construction of the European single 
market, together with new political trends in the US and other parts of the
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world in favour of less State intervention in the economic activity, have been 
the forces that have produced the reform of the telecommunications sector.
60. The liberalisation process. The process of reform of the European 
telecommunications sector has been led by the European Community 
authorities, and in particular by the European Commission.179
The process of reform comprised three parallel processes. Firstly, there 
has been a process of privatisation of the public provider of 
telecommunications sector.1®0 This was simple in the Spanish case, since the 
traditional monopolist had always been a private company with a minority 
share in hands of the State, and one of the principal financing mechanisms was 
the selling of new stocks. The first Member State which modified the legal 
status of the telecommunications service provider was the UK in 1981. The 
telecommunications assets of the Post Office were transferred to a new 
nationalised corporation, British Telecom, which would later be privatised.1®1 
Similar procedures were followed in most of the Member States.
Particular difficulties were faced in France, where the political tradition 
and the strength of the trade unions complicated the process and obstructed the 
lost of control of the company by the State. Privatisations were the result of the 
process of transformation of the role of the public authorities in the 
telecommunications industry. They also provided an income source for 
Member States in a period of tight budgets due to the evaluation of the deficit
179 For a general overview of such process see ALABAU MUNOZ, A. (1998): “La Unión Europea y su 
Política de Telecomunicaciones. En el camino hacia la Sociedad de la Información”, Fundación Airtel 
Móvil, Madrid; BLANDIN-OBERNESSER, A. (1986): “Le régime juridique communautaire des 
service de telecommunications”, Annand Colin, Paris; and MOSTESHAR, S. (1993): “European 
Community Telecommunications Regulation", Graham & Trotman, London.
180 See CABY, L. and STEINFEELD, C. (1994): “Trends in the Liberalisation of European 
Telecommunications: Community Harmonization and National Divergence”, in Telecommunications in 
Transition. Policies, Services and technologies in the European Community, SAGE, London, p. 45.
1,1 See HAJRPER, J. (1997): “Monopoly and Competition in British Communications. The Past, the 
Present and the Future", Pinter, London, pp. 137-156.
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criteria for the Economic and Monetary Union foreseen in the Maastricht 
Treaty.
Secondly, a Commission-led de-monopolisation process abolished the 
exclusive and special rights granted by the Member States to their national 
champions. The de-monopolisation process took place in two phases. The 
initial phase finished in 1992 with the exclusive rights in the 
telecommunications terminal equipment and in the value-added services. The 
second phase extended the abolition to all the exclusive rights in the sector, 
including voice telephony and infrastructures for 1 January 1998. Member 
States in general did not oppose the process itself, but the mechanisms 
employed by the Commission, particularly the Article 86(3) directives, were 
the object of challenges before the European Court of Justice, which always 
upheld the Commission’s position. Most of the Member States considered the 
reform of the telecommunications markets structures and the introduction of 
competition in such markets inevitable. The Community action avoided the 
confrontation of Member States with national trade unions and national 
monopolies and the high political costs such conflicts could produce.
The last element in the process of reform was the introduction of a 
harmonised regulatory framework for the transition from monopoly to effective 
competition. Different Community directives drawn the basic lines for such 
transition on issues of high relevance such as interconnection and market 
access, numbering, rights of way, frequency management and universal service.
61. The first de-monopolisation wave (1977-1992). By the end of 1977 
the European Commission created a working group in order to initiate sectorial 
studies on telecommunications. The first results of such activities was the 
publication of a Commission Communications to the Council,1*2 with the
,<z COM(8Q) 422 final Recommendations on Telecommunications, Brussels, 1 September 1980.
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proposal to adopt four Recommendations in order to contribute to the 
developing of a Community-wide market for the European telecommunications 
equipment industry. The Council did not immediately adopt any 
Recommendation on the subject, but the Commission continued issuing 
Communications mostly related to the need of reforming the European 
telecommunications equipment industry. Throughout the first half of the 80’s 
the Commission, and later the European Parliament and also the Council 
published different documents related to standard harmonisation in the sector, 
public procurement and research.
The adoption of the 1985 White Paper on the Completion of the Internal 
Market, and the reforms introduced by the Single European Act, provided the 
necessary political support for the Commission to launch a wider debate on the 
reform of the sector.183 In November 1987 the fundamental Green Paper on the 
Development of a Common Market of Telecommunications Services and 
Terminals1*4 was published. This Communications analysed the transformation 
of the European telecommunications markets, and launched some proposals in 
order to develop European-wide markets that would allow the European to 
become more competitive.1“ In consideration of the broad consensus perceived 
by the Commission on its proposals, the Commission announced its intention to 
pursue a “rapid full opening of the terminal equipment market to 
competition”1*4 through the publication of a Directive under Article 90(3) EC
183 See the effects of the Single Market in the telecommunications markets in BOSSARD 
CONSULTANTS (1998): “Telecommunications: Liberalised Services”, The Single Market Review, 
European Commission, Luxembourg.
184 COM(87) 290 final Towards a European Dynamic Economy, Green Paper on the Development of a 
Common Market of Telecommunications Services and Materials, Brussels 18 November 1987.
143 See SCHERER, J. (1993): ‘Telecommunications Law and Policy of the European Union”, in 
Telecommunications Laws in Europe, Kluwer, London, pp. 1-28.
xu COM(88) 48 final Towards a Competitive Community-wide Telecommunications market in 1992. 
Implementing the Green paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications 
Services and Equipment. State of Discussion and Proposals by die Commission, Brussels 9 February 
1988, p. 16.
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Treaty, as well as its intention to reach a “progressive opening of the 
telecommunications services market to competition from 1989 onwards”1*7, 
with the exception of the provision and operation of network infrastructure and, 
at that stage, of voice telephony service. In parallel, a series of indispensable 
complementary measures were defined, including the submission of an Article 
100(a) Directive proposal in relation to the Open Network Provision.1“
As announced, in May 1988 the Commission adopted Directive 
88/301/EEC on Competition in the Markets in Telecommunications Terminal 
Equipment,1*9 which declared the exclusive and special rights in relation with 
the import and marketing of telecommunications terminal equipment, including 
receive-only satellite stations incompatible with the EC Treaty. The use of the 
procedure foreseen in Article 86(3) EC Treaty190, which allows the European 
Commission to adopt Decisions and Directives in order to put an end to an 
infringement of Article 86 EC Treaty, without the intervention of the Council 
or the European Parliament, created an important institutional conflict in the 
European Community. Some Member States challenged the Directive before 
the European Court of Justice, which upheld the Commission’s position.191
187 Ibid. COM(88) 48 final, p. 17.
IS* Ibid COM(88) 48 final, p. 23.
m Commission Directive 88/301/EEC, of 16 May 1988, on Competition in the Markets in 
Télécommunications Terminal Equipment, OJ 1988 L 131/73.
190 Article 86 EC Treaty, and in particular its third indent, had raised some academic debate after the 
adoption of the Treaty. For instance, a Congress of the Ligue International contre la Concorrence 
Deloyale had taken place in Brussels on 5 March 1963, on the “Concurrence entre secteur public et 
secteur prive dans la CEE. L’article 90 du Traité de Rome. The issue was raised when the Commission 
adopted the first Article 90(3) Directive in 1980, Directive 80/723/EEC in relation to transparency on 
financial relations between Member States and public undertakings, amended through the same 
procedure by Directive 85/413/EEC. The Directive was challenged under the European Court of Justice 
which upheld the Commission’s Directive, C-188/80 to C-190/80, France, Italy, UK, Ireland v. 
European Commission, [1982] ECR 2545.
191 “Article 90(3) of the Treaty empowers the Commission to specify in general terms the obligations 
arising under Article 90(1) by adopting Directives. The Commission exercises that power where, 
without talcing into consideration the particular situation existing in the various Member States, it 
defines in concrete terms the obligations imposed on them under the Treaty”, C-202/88, France v. 
European Commission, [1991] ECR 1-1223. In the words of die Commission “Article 90(3) does not 
give legislative or quasi-legislative powers. The Commission has no power to create new substantive
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The announced adoption by the Commission of the Services Directive 
was blocked by the institutional conflict raised by the Terminals Directive. The 
Council refused to collaborate with the Commission for the adoption of the 
harmonising directive on Open Network Provision that necessarily had to 
accompany the liberalising directive on services. It was only by the end of 1989 
that a political agreement was reached between the Council and the 
Commission,”2 and several months later, on the very same day both Directive 
90/388/EEC and Directive 90/387/EEC were adopted. Directive 90/388/EEC, 
on Competition in the Markets for Telecommunications Services193 was adopted 
according to the Article 86(3) procedure.194 It declared incompatible with the 
Treaty the exclusive and special rights granted by the Member States for the 
provision of telecommunications services, with the exception of basic 
telecommunications services such as voice telephony and telex, as well as 
mobile radiotelephony, paging and satellite services.195 Directive 90/387/EEC, 
on the Establishment of the Internal Market for Telecommunications Services196 
was adopted through the Article 100(a) procedure and defined the basic lines in 
relation to network access for the provision of the liberalised services.
obligations for Member States , or for State enterprises, under Article 90. The Commission can only 
specify the implications of the existing Treaty rules, and set up procedures for making sure that existing 
obligations on Member States are complied with”, European Commission’s XXIV Report on 
Competition Policy (1994), point 215.
192 An overall compromise was reached, according to which the Council would un-block the Open 
Network Provision Directive and die Commission would colaborate closer with the Member States in 
the adoption of the Article 86(3) Directives, see Press Release 10479/89 on the 1375th Council meeting 
on telecommunications, held in Brussels on 7 December 1989.
193 Commission Directive 90/388/EEC, of 28 June 1990, on Competition in the Markets for 
Telecommunications Services, OJ 1990 L 192/10.
194 Once again, title Directive was challenged before the European Court of Justice, and this institution 
upheld the Commission position, C-271/90, C-281/90 and C-289/90, Spain, Belgium, Italy v. European 
Commission, [1992] ECR 1.5833.
195 Ibid. Directive 90/388/EEC, Article 1(1) and Article 2(1).
196 Council Directive 90/387/EEC, of 28 June 1990, on the Establishment of die Internal Market for 
Telecommunications Services through the Implementation of the Open Network Provision (ONP), OJ 
1990 L 192/1.
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62. De-monopolisation of mobile and satellite communications. The
Commission excluded mobile radiotelephony, paging and satellite services 
from Directive 90/388/EEC because it was considered that these services 
required a special regime. Therefore, specific consultation procedures were 
undertaken before liberalising such services.
In 1990 the Commission published the Green Paper on Satellite 
Communications,197 and proposed the full liberalisation of the earth segment, 
including receive only equipment, transmit/receive terminals and hub stations, 
unrestricted access to space segment capacity, subject to an equitable licensing 
procedure. The Council approved such principles,19® and both the Terminal 
Directive and the Services Directive were amended in order to include satellite 
terminal equipment and services by Directive 94/46/EC,199 adopted according to 
the Article 86(3) procedure.
The consultation procedure on the field of mobile communications was 
opened in 1994 with the publication of the Green Paper on Mobile and Personal 
Communications.200 The Commission provided an analysis of the sector, and 
proposed the abolition of the remaining exclusive and special rights related to 
such activities, as well as the removal of all the restrictions related to the 
development of networks and interconnection for the provision of such 
services.. The Council expressed its agreement with the Commission
197 COM(90) 490 final, Towards Europe-wide Systems and Services. Green Paper on a Common 
Approach in the Field of Satellite Communications in the European Community, Brussels, 20 
November 1990.
m Council Resolution of 19 December 1991, on the Development of the Common Market for Satellite 
Communications Sendees and Equipment, OJ 1992 C 8/1.
199 Commission Directive 94/46/EC, of 13 October 1994, amending Directive 88/301/EEC and 
Directive 90/388/EEC in particular with Regard to Satellite Communications, OJ 1994 L 268/15.
200 COM(94) 145 fiTialt Towards the Personal Communications Environment Green Paper on a 
Common Approach in the Field of Mobile and personal Communications in the European Union, 
Brussels, 27 April 1994.
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proposal,201 and the Commission adopted Directive 96/2/EC,202 a new Article 
86(3) Directive which amended Directive 90/388/EEC, including mobile 
services among the liberalised sendees and fixing some basic rules on 
licensing, spectrum management, infrastructures and interconnection.
63. The second de-monopolisation wave (1992-1998). Article 10 of 
Directive 90/388/EEC foresaw an overall assessment of the situation in the 
telecommunications sector by 1992, in order to evaluate the effect of the 
liberalisation of value-added services. The result was the 1992 Review,203 in 
which the Commission concluded that “the lack of trans-european structures 
and the special and exclusive rights in substantial parts of the Community have 
led to a situation where major bottlenecks to telecommunications development 
in the Community continue to exist”.204 The Commission resumed the policy 
options in four scenarios. Firstly, the liberalisation process could be frozen and 
the status quo maintained. Secondly, bottlenecks could be overcome through 
the introduction of extensive regulation on tariffs and investments. Thirdly, the 
Commission proposed the option of liberalising all voice telephony services. 
Lastly, a partial liberalisation of voice telephony, including only international 
services was proposed.
After public consultation the Commission made public that “there is a 
broad consensus about the inevitability of full liberalisation (Option 3, which 
includes Option 4) before the end of the decade [...] providing special 
arrangements and additional transitional periods for peripheral regions and
201 Council Resolution of 29 June 1995, on the further development of mobile and personal 
communications in the European Union, OJ 1995 C 188/3.
202 Commission Directive 96/2/EC, of 16 January 1996, Amending Directive 90/388/EEC with Regard 
to Mobile and personal Communications, OJ 1996 L 20/59.
203 SEC(92) 1048 final, The 1992 Review of the Situation in the Telecommunications Service Sector, 
Brusels, 21 October 1992.
204 Ibid. SEC(92) final, p. 18.
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smaller networks”.205 As a consequence, the Commission proposed the date of 1 
January 1998 for the liberalisation of voice telephony services, with an up to 
five years derogation for some Member States. The Council expressed its 
support for the liberalisation of voice telephony services before this date.20*
By 1993, the only exclusive rights that had not been challenged by the 
Commission were the ones related to the telecommunications infrastructures, 
the hard-core of the national monopolies. The Commission considered that 
particularly strong political support would be necessary for the abolition of 
such rights. The regular strategy employed in the past of launching a public 
consultation in order to get the support of the actors interested in the 
liberalisation (the equipment industry, potential new entrants, business users, 
etc.), in order to force the Council to accept an Article 90(3) Directive, was 
considered insufficient. The Commission inserted the new liberalising objective 
in the framework of the new political priority after the completion of the Single 
market in 1992: competitiveness and employment.207 The Commission managed 
to link the full liberalisation of the telecommunications sector to the political 
agenda of the European Council, which adopted in 1994 the principles of the 
highly ideological ‘Bangemann Report’ which recommended Member States 
“to accelerate the ongoing process of liberalisation of the telecom sector by
opening up to competition infrastructures and services still in the monopoly
20*area .
205 COM(93) 159 final Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
Consultation on the Review of the Situation in the Telecommunications Services Sector, Brussels, 28 
April 1993, p. 33.
206 Council Resolution of 22 July 1993, on the Review of the Situation in the Telecommunications 
Sector and the Need for Further Development in that Market, OJ 1993 C 213/1.
207 The European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993 invited the commission to defines a medium 
term strategy for growth and employment, and as a result, the Commission published COM(93) 700, 
White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment: the Challenges and Ways Forward into the 
21st Century, Brussels, 5 December 1993.
208 Europe and the Global Information society. Recommendations to the European Council, Brussels, 
26 May 1994, p. 7.
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Once the political support for the full liberalisation was achieved, the 
Commission published the Green Paper on the Liberalisation of 
Telecommunications Infrastructure,209 which proposed the full liberalisation of 
the telecommunications sector, including all services and infrastructures for 1 
January 1998. The Council accepted the principles and the timetable,210 and the 
Commission adopted firstly an Article 86(3) Directive for the early 
liberalisation of alternative infrastructures (Directive 95/51/EC211), and finally 
Directive 96/19/EC, the Full Competition Directive.212
64. From de-monopolisation to effective competition. The process of 
reform of the European telecommunications sector was not completed with the 
privatisation of the public operators and the de-monopolisation of the markets. 
Due to the powerful dominance by the incumbents, it has been considered 
necessary to introduce different transitional mechanisms for the promotion of 
effective competition in the telecommunications markets. Most of these 
mechanisms have been defined at a Community level through harmonising 
directives adopted through the Article 100a procedure. In this respect, of 
particular interest are the Licensing Directive 97/13/EC,213 the Interconnection
209 The first part of the Green Paper, fixing the liberalisation schedules, was published by the end of 
1994, COM(94) 440 final. Green Paper on the Liberalisation of telecommunications Infrastructure and 
Cable Television Networks. Part I: Principles and Timetable, Brussels, 25 October 1994. The second 
part, with the reflection on the effects of such measure, was published in 1995, COM(94) 682, Green 
Paper on the Liberalisation of telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks. Part 
II: A Common Approach to the Provision of Infrastructure for Telecommunications in the European 
Union, Brussels, 25 January 1995.
210 Council Resolution of 22 December 1994, on the Principles and Time-table for the Liberalisation of 
Telecommunications Infrastructures, OJ 1994 C 379/4.
211 Commission Directive 95/51/EC, of 18 October 1995, Amending Directive 90/388/EEC with 
Regard to the Abolition of the Restrictions on the Use of Cable Television Networks for the Provision 
of Already Liberalised Telecommunications Services, OJ 1995 L 256/49.
212 Commission Directive 96/19/EC, of 13 March 1996, amending Directive 90/388/EEC with Regard 
to the Implementation of Full Competition in Telecommunications markets, OJ 1996 L 74/13.
213 Directive 97/13/EC, of the European Parliament and the Council, of 10 April 1997, on a Common 
Framework for General Authorisation and Individual Licenses in the Field of Telecommunications 
Services, OJ 1997 L 117/15.
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Directive 97/33/EC,214 and the Voice Telephony Directive 98/10/EC.215 The 
process of reform of the European telecommunications sector will only be 
completed once effective competition rules the provision of 
telecommunications services in all the Member States.216
3.5. CONCLUSIONS.
65. Final. By the end of 19th century a well-established tradition of direct 
public intervention existed in most of continental Europe. Early medieval 
precedents, strengthened by absolute monarchies and reshaped by liberal 
revolutions led to the monopolisation by the public authorities of the network 
industries which appeared during the industrial revolution. This was the case of 
te lecom m u n ications.
The telegraphy and telephony markets were nationalised not because of 
their natural monopoly structure or for the protection of user’s rights. These 
activities were monopolised by the State as a result of their relevance for public 
security and economic activity in general. It was considered a risk to leave the 
management of such a relevant activity to private entities.
Technological development, the inefficiency of the public monopolies, 
the pressure of entities such as the European Union, the influence of 
conservative political ideals and the example of the US challenged the very 
same existence of the telecommunications public monopolies.
214 Directive 97/33/EC, of the European Parliament and the Council, of 30 June 1997, on 
Interconnection in Telecommunications with Regard to Ensuring Universal Service and Interoperability 
through Application of the Principles of the Open Network Provision (ONP), OJ 1997 L 199/32.
215 Directive 98/10/EC, of the European Parliament and the Council, of 26 February 1998, on the 
Application of Open Network Provision (ONP) to Voice Telephony and on Universal Service for 
Telecommunications in a Competitive Environment, OJ 1998, L 101/24.
216 See SCOTT, C. (1996): “Current Issues in EC Telecommunications Law”, in The Future o f EC 
Telecommunications Law, Bundesanzeiger, Koln, pp. 21-40.
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The reform faced important obstacles. The elimination of the monopolies 
not only affected different interests (trade unions, elites in control of the 
monopolies etc.). It even required a major transformation of the model of 
public intervention in the economic activity.
The elimination of public monopolies required the introduction of new 
indirect instruments of intervention, new mechanisms, and even new 
institutions.

PART II
INTERVENTION IN LIBERALISED MARKETS

CHAPTER 4
A NEW MODEL OF PUBLIC INTERVENTION IN EUROPE.
SUMMARY: 4.1. The Need o f Public
Intervention. 4.2. Instruments o f Public
Intervention. 4.3. The New Morel: Transplant or 
Convergence? 4.4. Conclusions.
4.1. THE NEED OF PUBLIC INTERVENTION.
66. The process of liberalisation. As it was described in Chapter 3,217 in 
the early 90s the decision to fully eliminate public national monopolies in the 
European telecommunications markets was adopted. De-monopolisation was 
the initial measure of a profound reform of the sector that would substitute the 
direct provision of the telecommunications services by the public authorities 
with the provision of such services by private operators.
217 Vide supra Chapter 3. Nationalisation and Liberalisation of European Telecoms Markets.
EL Intervention in Liberalised Markets.
Consumer satisfaction would no longer be pursued through the direct 
intervention by the public authorities, but through the mechanisms of supply 
and demand in a competitive market. The process of liberalisation, thus, can be 
understood as the substitution of the guarantee of the direct presence of the 
State by the discipline imposed on private operators by competition in the 
market, but always with consumer welfare as an objective.
Effective competition became at that stage the fundamental requirement 
for the success of the process of reforming the sector. If the traditional 
intervention of the State would not be substituted by the discipline imposed by 
effective competition, operators would have no incentive to meet the users’ 
demands and their welfare would, therefore, not be ensured. The lack of 
effective competition would entail the failure of the whole process of reform of 
the telecommunications sector.
67. De-monopolisation and the general interest De-monopolisation has 
been the initial measure of the process of reform of the European 
telecommunications markets. De-monopolisation has usually been 
accompanied by the privatisation of the assets that were in hands of the 
national authorities, even if such process a has not been imposed by the 
European institutions.218
Nevertheless, it has been widely accepted that the process of liberalisation 
does not finish with de-monopolisation and privatisation. On the contrary, the 
e lim in a tion of the exclusive rights is only the first step, the simplest step, in the 
process of the transformation of the te lecom m u n ica tions sector, from a public 
driven activity to a competition driven one. The process of reform of the
211 Privatisation was often considered a parallel element to de-monopolisation in die process of 
liberalisation. In the new environment, competition was supposed to drive the sector, and public 
ownership would not only obstruct the emergence of competition but also would not ensure a powerful 
instrument for the public authorities as no discrimination in favour of the public operator would be 
accepted. Nevertheless, a significant amount of Member States have not completely privatised the 
public operator (including France and Germany).
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European telecommunications markets will work if and only if public 
monopolies are replaced by effective competition.219
68. Obstacles to competition. The transition from national public 
monopolies to effective competition, nevertheless, faced some obstacles which 
could obstruct or at least complicate the emergence of the necessary discipline 
of the telecommunications markets.
Some of those obstacles derived from the abusive behaviour of the former 
monopolists. The long-lasting exclusive rights enjoyed by the incumbents 
ensured an almost absolute dominance of the telecommunications markets for 
the former monopolists. They could abuse such market power and develop 
practices which exclude new comers from the telecommunications markets. 
Practices such as refusals to deal, predatory pricing, exclusionary 
discriminations or tying can create significant barriers to entry and even 
exclude new operators from the market.
Nevertheless, the structure of some segments of the market, together with 
the very same presence of the former monopolists constituted the most 
significant obstacle in the telecommunications markets. The character of 
network industry introduces an element of differentiation in the 
telecommunication industries and other public utilities. On the one hand, the 
well-known network externality effect obstacled the development of new 
networks, as the value of a network for a user is directly related to the 
extension of its coverage. On the other hand, network industries present 
significant economies of scale and scope.
The control by the former monopolist over the only existing universal 
public te lecom m u n ications network allowed him to benefit from the economies
219 This view is widely shared. See for instance BAER, W. (1997): “The Role o f the Competition 
Agency in Regulatory Reform”, OECD, Paris, p. 22.
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of scale and scope and from the network externality effect. In market segments 
where such benefits are relevant, only in the case new comers can share these 
benefits with the incumbent, unless for a transitional period, there will be a 
chance for effective competition to emerge.
Public monopolies could not be substituted by “ruthless, Darwinian, free- 
market competition that doesn’t require the regulators to do anything but attend 
the funerals”.220 The main reason is that such funerals would probably be 
organised for the new comers trying to access a market characterised by the 
high barriers to entry, originated, among other reasons, by the high sunk costs 
for the construction of alternative networks, the significant economies of scale 
and the network externality effect. Furthermore, the lack of competition would 
allow the private monopolist to impose abusive conditions for the obtention of 
monopoly rents, what would lead at the long run, to the funeral of the very 
same public authorities who did not conclude the process of transition to 
effective competition.
69. Universal service. At the same time, the most important argument of 
the forces opposing the elimination of the exclusive rights in the 
telecommunications markets was that the introduction of competition in such 
sector would put an end to the cross-subsidies between different market 
segments. Such cross-subsidies allowed the provision of those services 
considered of particular relevance, at a price under cost, as well as the 
provision of all services in all the national territory at the same price, 
independently of the higher costs of the provision in particular areas such as 
rural or scarcely populated areas. It was obvious that the elimination of 
exclusive rights would allow new comers to profit from the unbalanced price 
structure through the exploitation of those services provided by the incumbent
220 Position maintained in the US by Representative E. J. Markey, see PIRAINO, T. (1997): “A 
Proposed Antitrust Analysis of Telecommunications Joint Ventures”, in Wisconsin Law Review, voL 
1997, no. 4, pp. 639-704.
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at a price clearly above cost in order to finance other services, “screaming” the 
market. As a result, the incumbent would have to face such competition 
through the re-balancing of tariffs, adjusting prices to costs, and through the 
elimination of the provision of non-profitable services, such in the case of rural 
and isolated areas, or low-usage clients.
Most of the defendants of the liberalisation process argued that 
competition would enhance efficiency and therefore a reduction of costs and a 
reduction of prices. Nevertheless, it was clear that network competition would 
take years to develop and during such a period, the former monopolists might 
be tempted to obtain some monopoly rents in those market segments firmly 
controlled, which necessarily coincide with the market which already have 
suffered price increases due to the process of re-balancing.
At the same time, it was evident that competition, even promoting 
efficiency, would never be able to ensure the provision of telecommunications 
services under cost, as was traditionally the case for high-cost areas and low- 
use clients. Even with the reduction of costs attributed to the introduction of 
competition, the affordability of the telecommunications services for all the 
citizens would not automatically be ensured by the de-monopolisation of the 
sector, or even by effective competition in the sector.
70. Options. Different policies could be considered in order to overcome 
the obstacles for the emergence of effective competition. The States involved in 
a process of liberalisation of the telecommunications markets could rely on 
market forces to overcome them, divest the monopolist in order to reduce its 
market power, or introduce behavioural mechanisms directed to reduce 
obstacles to competition.
Firstly, public authorities could consider that existing barriers to entry did 
not impede the emergence of competition in the telecommunications markets 
and to leave to market forces the development of the most effective solutions to
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overcome them. As a matter of fact, it was claimed that technological progress 
had not only eliminated the natural monopoly character of the market but also 
most of the traditional barriers to entry, as new technologies could provide 
more efficient network solution than those traditionally implemented by the 
incumbent. As a result, new comers could be in an even better position than the 
incumbents, as they would not suffer dead weights as an obsolete network, an 
excessive expensive working force or even a brand associated to inefficiency. 
The existing mechanisms provided by the existing rules on competition would 
be enough to prevent the conventional exclusionary practices implemented by 
the incumbent, just as in any other economic sector.
This was the option adopted in some of the leading experiences of 
liberalisation, particularly in New Zealand. In this country the process of 
reform was limited to the elimination of the exclusive right traditionally 
enjoyed by the incumbent For the rest no specific mechanism of public 
intervention was foreseen, and only the regular mechanisms envisaged by the 
local rules on competition were at the disposal of the new comers in order to 
defend their interest against the potential anticompetitive actions of the former 
monopolists.
Secondly, public authorities could consider the possibility to reduce the 
market power of the incumbent through a structural intervention, that is, 
through the divestiture of the former monopolist In such a way, the 
asymmetric structure of the market could be eliminated. Such an intervention 
would diminish the potential risks derived from the vertical integration of the 
incumbent particularly the risk of blocking the emergence of competition in 
the more dynamic service markets through the exercise of market power in the 
infrastructures markets. This strategy was followed in the US at the beginning
122
Chapter 4. A New Model of Public Intervention.
of the 1980s, with the divestiture of the Bell System,221 and at a latter stage in 
Japan.222
This option was never seriously consider in Europe due to the relatively 
small size of the European operators in relation to their American and Japanese 
counterparts. The divestiture of all the European operators would have 
extremely fragmented the European market, and would have favoured entrance 
in the market of the financially more solid American operators. Furthermore, 
the elimination of the vertical integration, even if would have eliminated the 
risk of extension of market distortions, would have not eliminated the existing 
failures in some market segments.
The final option was to develop a framework for public intervention for 
the promotion of competition in the liberalised sectors which, based in the 
respect for the position of the former monopolist, would introduce mechanisms 
to reduce the obstacles to competition. This was the option finally adopted in 
Europe, as well as in most of the States involved in a liberalising process.
71. The European strategy. There was widespread consensus in Europe 
about the need not to eliminate public intervention in the telecommunications 
sector but to replace national public monopolies with new instruments in grade 
to make possible the promotion of competition and the satisfaction of the 
general interest
On the one hand, it was considered that public intervention was necessary 
in order to promote the emergence of effective competition in the 
telecommunications markets. Barriers to entry to the telecommunications 
markets, and particularly to the network segments, are of particular relevance. 
Network markets are characterised by the existence of important economies of
221 Vide supra Chapter 2.4.3. Deregulation of die US Telecoms Markets (1969-2000).
123
EL Intervention in Liberalised Markets.
scale as well as by the predominance of sunk costs. These facts, together with 
the dominant presence of the former monopolists, make entry into the network 
markets particularly complicated.
Public intervention can promote and facilitate market entrance as well as 
the development of effective competition not only in the services markets 
(what was facilitated by the unbalanced tariff structure) and in the network 
markets, and objective hitherto indispensable for the creation of a competitive 
environment in the sector. Nevertheless, it has to be taken into account that the 
emergence of effective competition is not dependent upon a mere political 
decision, as was the case with de-monopolisation. It is for the undertakings to 
enter the market and offer an alternative to the incumbent. Public authorities 
can promote such actions, but cannot impose them.
On the other hand, despite the political option in favour of competition 
as the driving mechanism for the telecommunications sector as the best model 
to promote the satisfaction of the general interest in the sector, it was 
considered that in some cases immediate public intervention would be 
necessary in order to defend immediately the general interest.
Firstly, in the period of transition from monopoly to competition, the 
incumbents would be free from competitive constraints in significant market 
segments as relevant as the local loop. In order to obstruct the exploitation of 
such market power against consumers, public action was considered to be 
necessary. Furthermore, due to the very same structure of some 
telecommunication markets, monopoly could be substituted by a collusive 
oligopoly in which effective competition would be missing.
222 See TANAKA, E. (1997): “The Status of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT)”, in 
Telecommunications Policy, voL 21, no. 2, pp. 85-99.
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Secondly, there are general interest objectives that are out of the scope 
of the market, as they are not necessarily among the results of competition. The 
provision of services below costs in order to ensure the affordability of the 
services considered indispensable for the participation in a democratic society, 
for instance, cannot be ensured by the market even once effective competition 
emerges. It is for these reasons that immediate public intervention is considered 
necessary for the protection of the general interest.
4.2. INSTRUMENTS OF PUBLIC INTERVENTION.
4.2.1. Instrument for Indirect Intervention.
72. Instruments. Even if it was widely belived that public intervention 
was necessary in order to complement the market mechanisms, particularly in 
the period of transition to competition, the elimination of the traditional 
mechanism of public intervention in the telecommunications markets (the 
public monopoly) required the implementation of new mechanisms that would 
allow the indirect intervention of public authorities.
Competition Law appeared as the first instrument of public intervention in 
a de-monopolised env iron m ent. C om m unity  competition Law had plaid a 
decisive role in the de-monopolisation, and provided mechanisms for the 
control of market power, the main issue after the elimination of the legal 
monopolies.
Nevertheless, the rules on competition face some limitations. On the one 
hand, no particular mechanism is envisaged for dominant positions originated 
by a exclusive right considered incompatible with the EC Treaty, and as a 
result the general regime defined in Article 82 EC Treaty has to be applied. 
This regime is based on the respect to the dominant position obtained through 
growth in the market thanks to efficiency, and the imposition of behavioural
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limitations in order to avoid abuses directed to the exploitation of dominance in 
respect to consumers, and to avoid exclusionary practices devoted to the 
maintenance of the dominance or even its increase.
On the other hand, European competition authorities, particularly at a 
Community level, did not have the resources to closely monitor the market 
during the exceptional period of transition from monopoly to competition . At 
the same time, antitrust procedures are long and cumbersome, and did not seem 
fitted to solve the issues arisen due to the reform of the sector timely and in an 
efficient way.
The European tradition of direct intervention in the economic activity has 
produced an underdevelopment of the instruments of indirect intervention. The 
American model of regulatory intervention has provided some useful insights 
about the possible mechanisms of intervention as well as about the risks of 
such mechanisms. Nevertheless, the attention to the American regulatory 
model does not mean an automatic transplant of such a model, but rather an 
adaptation of some of the regulatory mechanisms to the administrative 
traditions of the different Member States.
The European authorities have designed a model of asymmetric, sector 
specific regulation, characterised by the national authorities imposing specific 
legal obligations on the operators according to their position in the market in 
order to protect the general interest. The obligations generally defined by the 
Community and national Legislators are specified for each operator. This is a 
very flexible instrument that allows public authorities to facilitate market 
access to new comers as well as their development, at the same time that the 
specific treatment of market dominance allows for the obstruction of 
exploitative behaviours contrary to consumers’ interests and to profit from the 
dominant situation in order to ensure the universality of certain services.
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4.2.2. Competition Law.
73. Nature. Competition Law was only adopted in Europe after World 
War II.223 The European Economic Community Treaty defined as a 
fundamental principle of the new entity, the necessity to defend and promote 
competition in the European Common Market, and adopted substantive 
provisions which declared as incompatible with the Treaty the adoption of 
restrictive agreements, the abuse of dominant positions, and certain State aids. 
Even if some European countries adopted laws on competition before the 
adoption of the EEC Treaty, it was only at a latter stage, and as a consequence 
of the influence of the EC, that all the Member States enacted laws on 
competition, usually following closely the Community model.224
Competition Law,225 both at a Community and at a national level, is 
applied to most economic activities, in such a way that no particular rules exist 
for the telecommunications sector. Competition Law is, therefore, a horizontal 
instrument of intervention.
The rules on competition provide an instrument of indirect intervention 
 ^ for the protection of the general interest. Firstly, it is an indirect intervention in 
the sense that public authorities do not intervene directly for the satisfaction of 
the general interest through the provision of a good or a service, but through 
the imposition of legal obligations on the actors active in the market.
Secondly, the intervention is indirect in the sense that the rules on
^competition do not immediately protect the interest of consumers, but rather
223 Vide supra Chapter 3.2. Competition Law in Europe.
224 See LAUDATI, L. (1998): “Impact of Community Competition Law on Member States 
Competition Law”, in Competition Policies in Europe, edited by S. Martin, Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 
381^10.
225 For an overview of Community Competition Law see, for instance, BELLAMY and CHILD (1993): 
“Common Market Law of Competition”, Sweet and Maxwell, London, and KORAH, Valentine (1994): 
“An Introductory Guide to E.C. Competition Law and Practice”, Sweet & Maxwell, London.
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protect the structure that makes possible the satisfaction of such interest. The | 
purpose of the rules on competition is to protect competition.226 The basic 
assumption underlining this set of rules is that competition imposes an effective 
pressure on companies to improve their products and lower their costs. In any 
case, these rules do not protect competition for competition’s sake. The 
ultimate objective is to ensure that consumers benefit from the lower costs in 
the form of low prices and from the development of new products fitted for^ 
their needs.
The main mechanism of intervention is the prohibition, in abstract, of 
certain behaviours that might affect the competitive process and reduce 
competition in the market, in such a way that the constraints imposed on 
competition would disappear and companies would be able to maximise their 
benefits at the expenses of consumers. The fundamental feature of the rules on 
competition is their proscriptive character, as they prohibit certain behaviours 
rather than impose positive obligations on economic entities.
Competition authorities can intervene both ex post (in order to obstruct 
collusion and abuses of dominance) and ex ante (mergers), but in both cases 
evaluate the effects towards the future of the pertinent behaviour in the relevant 
market.
74.* Competition Law and de-monopolisation. The most decisive 
application of the rules on competition in the telecommunications sector took 
place when the Commission, upheld by the Court, adopted the Article 86(3) 
(former Article 90) Directives227 which declared contrary to Article 82 (former 
Article 86) EC Treaty (among other provisions of the Treaty) the exclusive
226 See EHLERMANN, C. D. and LAUDATI. L. ED. (1998): “European Competition Law Annual 
1997. Objectives o f Competition Law”, Hart
227 Vide supra Chapter 3.4.3. Liberalisation of the Telecoms Markets (1987-1998). For a in-depth 
analysis see LAROUCHE, P. (2000): “Competition law and Regulation in European 
telecommunications”, Hart, Oxford, pp. 37-111.
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rights granted in relation to telecommunications terminal equipment228 and 
telecommunications services.229 According to the Community institutions, 
“exclusive rights granted for the provision of telecommunications services are 
also incompatible with Article 90(1) of the Treaty, in conjunction with Article 
86 [...] since their grant amounts to the reinforcement or the extension of a 
dominant position or necessarily leads to other abuses of such position”.230
At the same time, the regular application of Community competition Law 
has also been used by the Commission to foster the liberalisation of the sector. 
It is commonly accepted, for instance, that the agreement of Germany to the 
approval of Directive 95/51/EC, the Alternative Infrastructures Directive, was 
facilitated by the threat of the Commission to block the Atlas joint venture 
(fundamental for the international strategy of the German national champion, 
DT). In the same way, the acceleration of the de-monopolisation of the sector 
in Spain was facilitated by the threat of the Commission to block the 
participation of Telefonica in Unisource.231
The relevance of the rules on competition in the European liberalisation 
process should not be misunderstood. The action of the Commission was based 
on Article 86(3) of the EC Treaty. This provision is more related to the
m  “The exclusive right to import and market terminal equipment must therefore be regarded as 
incompatible with article 86 in conjunction with article 3, and the grant or maintenance of such rights 
by a Member State is prohibited under Article 90(1)”, Commission Directive 88/301/EEC, of 16 May 
1988, on competition in the markets in telecommunications terminal equipment, OJ 1988 L 131/73, 
recital 13. The ECJ upheld the use of the Article 90(3) procedure, “Article 90(3) of the Treaty 
empowers the Commission to specify in general terms, by adopting directives, the obligations imposed 
on the Member States by Article 90(1) as regards public undertakings and undertakings to which they 
have granted special or exclusive rights”, C-202/88, France v. Commission, [1991] ECR 1-1223, 
paragraph 1.
229 “The exclusive rights to telecommunications services granted to public undertakings or undertakings 
to which Member States have granted special or exclusive rights for the provision of the network are 
incompatible with article 90(1) in conjunction with Article 86”, Commission Directive 90/388/EEC, of 
28 June 1990, on competition in the markets for telecommunications services, OJ 1990 L 192/10, 
paragraph 17.
230 Commission Directive 96/19/EC, of 13 march 1996, amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to 
die implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets, OJ 1996 L 74/13.
231 Vide LAROUCHE (2000) (supra footnote 227).
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effectivity of the Community legal framework that to the antitrust rules 
themselves. Therefore, the role of the rules on competition as a mechanism to 
open markets should not be over emphasised. As an example, even if antitrust 
played an important role in the deregulation of the US market, it was the 
Legislator, together with the FCC, who finally completed the reform of the 
market.
75. Competition Law after de-monopolisation. If Community 
competition Law played an important role in the de-monopolisation of the 
European telecommunications markets, even more important is the role of both 
Community and national rules on competition once the exclusive rights on the 
sector have been eliminated.
The Commission has already adopted a significant number of Decisions 
applying competition Law to the telecommunications sector.232 Collusive 
practices such as market sharing and price fixing are particularly likely in the 
telecommunications markets due to their oligopolistic tendency. Market 
sharing is favoured, on the one hand by the traditional existence of national 
monopolies, which, after de-monopolisation might be tempted to collude 
among them in order to mutually agree the exclusion of entrance in each 
other’s traditional geographic markets. On the other hand, market sharing is 
probable, in respect of product markets. Price fixing is also a risk in an 
oligopolistic market, where price wars might, in the long run, damage all 
competitors.233
232 Sec TEMPLE LANG, J. (1997): “Media, Multimedia and European Community Antitrust Law", 
24th Antitrust Conference of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, and MONTERO PACUAL, J. J. 
and SOUTO SOUBRIER, L. (1998): “De la desmonopolización a la competencia efectiva. Aplicación 
de la normativa antitrust comunitaria y española en el sector de las telecomunicaciones”, in Boletín 
Uttinoamericano de Competencia, no. 4, pp. 83-104.
233 The Commission already observed the existence of price fixing agreements in the framework of the 
CEPT, see XX Report on Competition Policy, 1990, paragraphs 56 and 57.
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Particularly important have been the Decisions in relation to strategic 
alliances. The Commission has adopted a positive position towards strategic 
alliances if they are created in order to provide global services,234 in order to 
create alternative providers,235 or in order to develop new services if important 
investments with significant risks are involved.236 On the contrary, the 
Commission has adopted a negative position if the strategic alliance 
(particularly if it is concentrative) has the objective of reinforcing the position 
of the incumbent operators in their geographical markets, through the extension 
of their position to neighbouring markets, or through the control of 
bottlenecks.237
4.2.3 Economic Regulation.
76. A new model of public intervention in Europe. The process of the 
reform of the te lecom m unications sector in Europe has eliminated the 
traditional instrument of public intervention, the public monopoly. It has been 
proven that the rules on competition, even if they have an important role to 
play in the sector, face decisive limitations. A different instrument of 
intervention was needed in order to govern the transition from monopoly to 
competition.
234 Such was the case of BTIMCI, Global One, or Unisource, see as an example Commission Decision 
96/546/EC, of 17 M y 1996, Atlas, OJ 1996 L 239/23.
235 The Commission has generally accepted horizontal concentrative agreements for the creation of 
alternative operators or for the entrance of operators active in other geographical markets in new 
markets. As an example, Commission Decision 94/922/EC, of 9 November 1997, AmeritechlTele 
Danmark, OJ 1998 L 25/18. The n m  position has been adopted by die Commission in respect to 
vertical concentrative operations for the creation of alternative operators to the incumbent
236 An example of this approach was the Commission Decision 97/39/EC, of 18 December 1996, 
Iridium, OJ 1997 L 16/87, where the Commission considered that the co-operative joint venture for the 
creation of a global network of low-orbit satellites for the provision of universal mobile 
communications was not even contrary to article 85.1 EC Treaty.
237 Commission Decision 96/117/EC, of 19 July 1996, Nordic Satellite Distribution, OJ 1996 L 53/20, 
paragraph 164. The best example of this policy was the Commission Decision 94/922/CE, of 9 
November 1994, MSG Media Service, OJ 1994 L 362/1, where the Commission blocked a 
concentrative joint venture between ¡Deutsche Telekom, Bertelsmann and Kirsch in order to create a 
platform for the provision of digital television.
131
II. Intervention in Liberalised Markets.
The model adopted by the European authorities has been the so-called 
economic regulation.238 Economic regulation, can be defined as the continuous 
and concentrated control of the market by public authorities through the 
imposition of legal obligations on the private operators, according to their 
position in the market, in adaptation of the abstract obligations defined by the 
Legislator, with the objective to ensure the adaptation of the functioning of the 
markets to the general interest objectives.239
Economic regulation is a public intervention instrument of an indirect 
nature since public authorities do not directly provide any product or service to 
the citizens, but merely impose obligations on private actors in order to 
guarantee that they satisfy the needs of the citizens.
Economic regulation can be adapted to very different situations and can 
be used for the implementation of very different policies, as the American 
experience proves.240 Regulatory m echan ism s have been established in Europe 
after the de-monopolisation of the markets in order to complete the 
liberalisation process, promoting the emergence of competition and ensuring 
the immediate protection of the general interest. This regulatory intervention is 
far away from the American price-and-entry regulatory experience, which 
obstructed competition, and is closer to the more recent American regulatory
231 Studies on economic regulation are quite numerous in the US as well as in the UK. In continental  ^
Europe its is of great interest the study of ARIÑO, G. (1993): “Economía y  Estado”, Marcial Pons, 
Madrid; and MARTINEZ LÓPEZ-MUÑIZ (1997): “La nueva regulación económica en España”, en 
“El nuevo servicio público”, Marcial Pons, Madrid, pp. 185-269. French doctrine has not paid 
particular attention to this new phenomenum, but some points have been raised in CHEVALIER, J. 
(1995): “Les autorités administratives indépendentes et la régulation des marches”, in Justices, no. 1, 
pp. 81-90.
239 In a broad sense, competition Law could be considered an example of economic regulation. In this 
pages, nevertheless, we distinguised it from the sector specific regulation which is being developed in 
Europe. The reason is that competition Law is a very precise mechanisms of regulation, as only very 
specific obligations are imposed on market players and, furthermore, such obligations are mostly of a 
negative nature, that is prohibitions. Economic regulation is very broad and comprises negative as well 
as positive obligations.
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models after the process of de-regulation. In the European model, regulation
complements and promotes competition.
Economic regulation is flexible in relation to the purposes of the 
intervention. Regulatory obligations may have the purpose of ensuring the 
effectivity of the constraints imposed by competition, but can go further, and 
promote the emergence of competition,241 or introduce obligations with the 
purpose of the immediate protection of the general interest.
Regulation is also flexible in relation to the mechanisms and timing of 
intervention. Regulation is implemented through the definition of obligations 
imposed on the operators in the market. Such obligations can be of a 
proscriptive nature, but also of a prescriptive one. At the same time, regulatory 
obligations adapting the abstract legal obligations to the specific situation of an 
undertaking can be imposed by ex ante, in order to introduce legal certainty, 
but can also be imposed when a conflict arises, or when the situation in the 
market is modified.
As a consequence, economic regulation is a good complement to the rules 
on competition. Regulation is broader in its scope. While the rules on 
competition protect a very focused interest (the competitive character of the 
market), economic regulation can be used to protect a wider ambit of interests. 
Regulation can be adapted to a specific market, while the rules on competition 
I are horizontally applied. Regulatory obligations are broader as not only can
proscribe, but also prescribe behaviours. Finally, regulatory obligations can be
240 For an overview of the most representative regulatory models in the US, the price-and-entry 
regulation, social regulation etc., vide supra Chapter 2.1. Origins and Evolution of Economic 
Regulation.
241 See some reflections in HANCHER, L. (1990): “Regulating for Competition. Government, Law and 
the Pharmaceutical Industry in the UK and Francey\  Claredon Press, Oxford.
imposed ex ante or ex post.
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It is clear that regulation provides a broad range of intervention 
mechanisms, and this is precisely its main risk. This kind of intervention can 
lead to arbitraness and over-regulation.
77. Regulatory mechanisms. In order for regulation to be successful, 
effective mechanisms for the imposition of obligations on the operators have to 
be defined. The American experience provides useful information on the 
benefits and risks of different mechanisms. But in any case, such mechanisms 
have to be adapted to the European administrative experience, and more 
particularly to the administrative system of each Member State.
Community directives have defined the objectives of regulatory 
intervention, as well as the basic lines of the administrative mechanisms that 
should be used to guarantee the effectiveness of the public intervention. It is for 
Member States to implement such principles and adapt them to their national 
characteristics. The framework defined by the Community authorities covers a 
varied number of regulatory mechanisms.
The starting point of the regulatory intervention is the definition of 
m echan ism s devoted to ensure the flow of information from the regulated 
industry to the regulatory authorities. Such mechanisms are necessary in order 
to reduce as much as possible the information asymmetry which favours the 
actors active in the market against  the public authorities, which can only have 
an indirect knowledge of the market conditions. In such a way, different 
obligations have been designed in order to ensure the flow of clear and precise 
information from the market to the regulatory authorities.242
The fundamental regulatory mechanism is the definition ex ante of 
obligations imposed on different categories of operators. Regulatory
242 Just as examples can be identified the obligations in relation to cost accounting imposed by 
Directive 97/33/EC, and the conditions in relation to the communications of information by the 
operators envisaged in Directive 97/13/EC.
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authorities, taking advantage of their close control on the market evolution, can 
adapt the basic obligations defined by the Legislator to specific categories of 
operators. Such intervention introduces transparency and legal certainty. 
Nevertheless, the exercise of quasi-normative activities by bodies such as the 
regulatory authorities, which often are exempted of direct control by the 
national Parliaments, creates problems of constitutionality in a significant 
number of Member States.243
J~~ At the same time, regulatory obligations can be imposed on specific 
operators. Such is the case of the imposition of conditions on the operators at 
the moment of the granting of the license or authorisation to access the 
market.244 This kind of intervention has been particularly popular among 
Member States since it closely resembles the figure of the concession, one of 
the traditional mechanisms of service public intervention.
The Community authorities were fully aware that these mechanisms of 
intervention involved risks of foreclosure, and for these reason adopted 
Directive 97/13/EC, which reinforced freedom for market access as one of the 
leading principles of the process of reform of the sector.245 Member States 
could impose conditions on operators for the granting of the title to access the 
market, but this condition should always be proportionate and non- 
discriminatory, as market access was not a right granted by the public 
authorities anymore, but a pre-existing right merely recognised and controlled 
by the public authorities.
243 The most representative case is the French. The most relevant decisions of the ART have to be 
homologated by the Ministry, in order to avoid the problems reflected in the decision of the Conseil 
d’État n 88-248 DC of 17 January 1989. See LASSERRE, B. (1997): “L’Autorité de régulation des 
télécommunications”, in L ’Actualité Juridique-Droit Administratif, vol. 53, no. 3, pp. 224-228.
244 Directive 97/13/EC states that “conditions attached to authorisations are necessary in order to attain 
public interest objectives to the benefit of telecommunications users”, paragraph 4.
241 “General authorisations and individual licensing systems should provide for the lightest possible 
regulation
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Regulatory authorities can also impose specific obligations on the single 
operators after the granting of the license to operate. This possibility is foreseen 
by Community Directives in relation to the resolution of conflicts between 
operators, in particular in interconnection and market access conflicts.246
Regulatory authorities solve such conflicts through the specification of 
the obligations imposed on each operator. Furthermore, regulatory authorities 
can impose specific obligations on single operators after the granting of the 
license and without the involvement of the operator in a specific conflict with 
another operator. This is the clearest case of regulatory intervention, and the 
one that is more distant from the administrative traditions of most of the 
Member States. The adaptation of the rules on the modification of the 
conditions of a concession title does not seem the most appropriate decision for 
the introduction of such possibility, as it would introduce provisions on the 
maintenance of the financial stability of the operator. On the contrary, most of 
the regulatory authorities have been assigned the possibility of adopting 
measures ex post. This mechanism should be developed, carefully, but with 
resolution.
78. Regulation and Administrative Law. Regulatory intervention has 
not only promoted the establishment of sector-specific independent 
authorities247, but also requires the adaptation of the existing administrative 
procedures and possibly even the review of the notion of administrative act248
With regards to the rules on administrative procedures, it seems 
necessary to strengthen the mechanisms that allow the reduction of formalisms
146 See in particular Directive 97/33/EC.
247 Vide infra Chapter 6. Institutional Framework.
248 We follow in these lines the research in ARIÑO ORTIZ, G. (1997): “Sobre el significado actual de 
la noción de servicio publico y su régimen jurídico. (Hacia un nuevo modelo de regulación)”, in “EZ 
nuevo servicio público”, Marcial Pons, Madrid, pp. 49-54; and MARTINEZ LÓPEZ-MUÑIZ (vide 
supra footnote 238).
136
Chapter 4. A New Model of Public Intervention.
and therefore, the simplification of the procedure. Nevertheless, it has to be 
taken into account that the principle of legality should always be respected. As 
a result, transparency and accountability have to be guaranteed at every stage 
of the procedure, and the motivation of every decision of the regulator has to be 
complete and convincing. Existing mechanisms such as the conventional 
conclusion of the procedure might provide a solution for the necessary 
flexibility required by regulatory intervention.
With regard to the very same administrative acts, the adaptation of the 
content of the obligations established in the legislation to the specific position 
of each operator entail a substantial degree of discretionality which might 
challenge the traditional nature of such acts. Discretionality might be 
incompatible with the traditional principle of legality of the administrative act. 
Regulation challenges the traditional distinctions between powers in such a 
way that regulatory acts concentrate characteristics which seem closer to
|
; judicial acts or even to legislative acts. The lack of administrative review that 
characterises independent authorities, and the limited judicial review (it can 
only compensate damages, but it cannot restore the situation in the market) 
strengthen the problem. Once again, transparency and accountability seem to 
provide the only solution.249
79. Regulating telecoms. There are two characteristics of the regulatory 
model that make it suitable for the European situation. Firstly, the regulatory 
model of public intervention can be compatibilised with competition in the 
market, the force designed by the European authorities for the driving of the 
sector. The imposition of obligations on the operators active in the market does 
not necessarily obstruct the regular functioning of the free market mechanisms 
of demand and supply, in such a way that public intervention can complement
249 See EBERLEEN, B. (1998): “Regulating Public utilities in Europe: Mapping the Problem”, EUI 
Working Papers, RSC no. 98/42, Florence
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the market, which has been decided to be the basic mechanism for governing 
the sector. However, in order for public regulatory intervention not to obstruct 
the competitive mechanisms, particular knowledge and attention by the public 
authorities is required.
Secondly, the regulatory model allows public authorities to face the 
problem of the strong dominance of the former monopolists, through the 
adaptation of the conditions defined for the provision of the 
telecommunications services to the specific situation of each operator. The new 
legislation on telecommunications defined at a Community level and 
implemented by the Member States allows public authorities to adapt the 
abstract and general obligations and conditions for the provision of services to 
the specific situation of each single operator, and in particular to the operators 
enjoying market power thanks to an exclusive right declared incompatible with 
the EC Treaty.250
The asymmetric distribution of obligations among the operators active in 
the market allows public authorities to face the problems raised by 
liberalisation, problems that cannot be efficiently managed by Competition 
Law. Such distribution has favoured the denomination of asymmetric 
regulation251 to the regulatory model that is being implemented in Europe 
(which by the way, is not substantially different to the model applied in the 
US).
230 Directive 97/13/EC declares that “Member States should therefore be allowed to impose specific 
conditions on undertakings providing public telecommunications networks and telecommunications 
services by virtue of their market power”, paragraph 14.
251 See BENZONI and SVIDER (1994): ‘Departing from monopoly: asymmetries, competition 
dynamics and regulatory policy”, in “Asymmetric Deregulation. The Dynamics of Telecommunications 
Policy in Europe and the United States”, Noam and Pogorel eds, Ablex, Norwood; and PERRUCCI, A. 
and CTMATORIBUS, M. (1997): “Competition, convergence and asymmetry in telecommunications 
regulation”, in Telecommunications Policy, voL 21, no. 6, pp. 493-512.
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The asymmetric distribution of obligations between the operators 
according to their market position can be used to promote entrance and 
development of new competitors and, in this way, the apparition of effective 
competition in the market. This is the case of the regulatory obligations in 
relation to network interconnection and access defined in the Community 
Directives, implemented by the national legislations and enforced by the 
national regulatory authorities.
At the same time, the special obligations imposed on operators with 
significant market power can be used to avoid the risk of exploitative abusive 
behaviour by the incumbents in the period of transition to competition, a risk 
which does not exist in the case of new operators, at the same time that the 
imposition of stricter obligation on operators with significant market power 
allows public authorities to take advantage, for the general interest, of the 
comprehensive and solid presence of the former monopolists, in order to 
implement general interest policies. Such is the strategy established in the 
Community Directives and, again, implemented by the NRAs.
4.3. THE NEW MODEL: TRANSPLANT OR CONVERGENCE?
8.0. Towards indirect complementative public intervention in Europe.
Telecommunications reforms do not only affect market structure, but also 
public intervention mechanisms, both in the US and Europe. Market 
substitutive intervention is being eliminated, giving place to competition and a 
market complementative intervention of an indirect nature. That is, public 
authorities do not try to eliminate the market mechanisms. On the contrary, 
they build their intervention on such mechanisms not through their 
participation in the market, but through the imposition of legal obligations on 
the private actors active in the liberalised market.
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f  This reform is simpler in the US where there is a long tradition of indirect 
f intervention in the economic activity. It does not mean that no reform has been 
undertaken in the US. It is obvious that the telecoms sector has suffered a 
major evolution. Nevertheless, such evolution has focused on the transition 
from market substitutive intervention, that is, public intervention devoted to 
impose on the monopolist the pressures suffered by a company in a perfectly 
competitive market, to effective competition.
The point is that such a reform has not required the creation of new 
institutions nor the implementation of new instruments for regulatory 
intervention. The FCC and the state PUCs, together with traditional antitrust 
authorities, no matter how controversial, conform a institutional framework in 
grade to face the challenges of the new market structure. Along the same lines, 
the traditional regulatory mechanisms, such as licensing, the imposition of legal 
obligations to the actors on the market, etc., can be used to implement the new 
policies.
In Europe, on the contrary, the reform is more complicated, because the 
same problems of elimination of monopolies and promotion of competition are 
faced but, in addition, direct intervention has to be substituted by indirect 
mechanisms, which require the creation of institutions and new legal 
instruments.
The reform of the public intervention instruments, institutions and 
mechanisms in the telecommunications sector might be a step in the process of 
convergence of the two approaches we have differentiated with regard to public 
intervention in defence of the general interest.
On the one hand, the increasing complexity of modem society is 
strengthening the tendency to create specific frameworks for the protection of 
specific public interests. A general tendency in Europe to “unbundle” the 
different public interest in order to create specific institutions for the evaluation
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' of the different general interests has been identified. If a specific framework is 
created for the protection of a public interest, the risk of such interest being 
dismissed as a result of political interference between different and conflicting 
/ interests is reduced. The examples of public intervention for the protection of 
workers and for the ruling of urban expansion demonstrate that this is an 
“indigenous” tendency that cannot be directly linked to an American 
influence.252
The continuous technological progress has multiplied the products and 
services offered in the market, the options available for consumers. At the same 
time, the economic structure of the market is increasingly complex, with very 
strong information asymmetries and uncertainties. In this framework, the 
ability of public authorities to control all the variables in order to effectively 
protect the general interest is heavily suspected, and a tendency can be 
perceived for European public authorities to, and market mechanisms seem 
more adequate for the selection of new technologies and services.
The reform of the telecommunications sector is a very good example of 
this trend. When telecommunications meant basically telephony, a single and 
standard service with a clearly defined technology, a public monopoly could 
take the option to introduce it in the market When technological progress 
completely reforms the market, introducing new products and services, with 
different quality standards and prices, and a high degree of uncertainty, it 
seems that consumers are better suited for the selection of technologies and 
services through the free market mechanisms, than a monopolist.
As a result, the creation of laws and institutions specifically devoted to 
the protection of a particular value of general interest such as the emergence of
252 See AMATO, G. and LAUDAH, L. (1999): “When the Economy is Affected with a Public Interest 
The protection of Public Interest and Regulation of Economic Activities”, in "The Anticompetitive 
Impact o f Regulation”, and the examples of workers protection, regional development, or urban 
development.
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competition in monopolised sectors like telecoms, can be framed in a more 
general and indigenous tendency.
^  At the same time, the process of the reform of the sector, characterised by 
the confrontation of different private interest (the monopolist, the business 
I users, the residential users, the equipment manufacturers, the trade unions, 
etc.), is a good example of how neglecting the relevance of such forces, and the 
confusion introduced by the consideration of secondary aspects of general 
interest (influence on inflation or unemployment, for instance) in the decision­
making process leads to a lack of transparency and, at the end of the day, 
democracy.
jef J
The regulatory model provides more transparency in the decision-making 
process, since it is based in the ^ iaditional combination of private interests 
through the political process, and therefore, allows accountability, 
responsibility and participation. This is particularly important in societies of 
^increasing complexity.
On the other hand, the process of the convergence of the models of public 
intervention can be recognised in the adoption by the American regulators of 
very focused but heavily interventionist measures. Schemes such as universal 
sendee in te lecom m unications confirm the derogatory nature of the public 
intervention. At the same time, formal requirements such as due process and 
judicial review has been strengthened. Both features confirm the derogatory 
nature of public intervention as it has been always been perceived in Europe.
4.4. CONCLUSIONS.
81. Final. The elimination of public monopolies not only in the 
telecommunications sector but in many other economic activities eliminates as
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well the more traditional instrument of public intervention in economic activity 
in Europe.
De-monopolisation and privatisation, nevertheless, do not eliminate the 
relevance of telecommunications and other network industries for the general 
well-being and the economic development of modem societies. At the same 
time, the transition from monopoly to effective competition in network 
industries faces major challenges which, it is commonly understood, require 
some kind of public intervention to foster such evolution.
As a consequence, it has been necessary to direct market substitutive 
intervention using new instruments of public intervention compatible with the 
competition in the market yet still fully effective.
From this perspective, the rules on competition provided mechanisms to 
ensure consumer welfare as well as the protection of the competitive character 
of the markets. However, such rules do not seem fitted to ensure the 
satisfaction of those general interest objectives which go further than the mere 
efficiency in the provision of products or services. At the same time, the rules 
on competition have been designed to protect competition, but not to create it
As a consequence, other instruments of public intervention were needed 
Economic regulation was the answer. Economic regulation can be understood 
as the continuous and concentrated control of the market by public authorities 
through the imposition of legal obligations on the private operators, according 
to their position in the market, in adaptation of the abstract obligations defined 
by the Legislator, with the objective of ensuring the adaptation of the 
functioning of the markets to the general interest objectives.
This scheme should not be understood as a mere transplant from the 
American economic regulation. It is possible to identify tendencies towards this 
model which are indigenous to Europe. In any case, it is clear that the
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American regulatory experience can provide very useful insights about the 
possibilities, risks and failures of this instrument of public intervention.
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COMPETITION LAW v. REGULATION?
SUMMARY: 5.1. Introduction. 5.2. The Limits o f 
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5.5. Conclusions.
5.1. INTRODUCTION.
82. Antitrust v. regulation? Both competition Law and economic 
regulation have always been, at least in theory, instruments of public 
intervention for the promotion of the general interest. In the words of an 
American Judge “regulation and antitrust typically aim at similar goals -i.e., 
low and economically efficient prices, innovation, and efficient production 
methods- but they seek to achieve these goals in very different ways”.213
253 Town o f Concord v. Boston Edison Co. 915 F.2d 17,22 (1st Cir 1990).
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As a matter of fact, it has been shown that both instruments appeared in 
the US during the same period as part of an attempt to face the challenges 
created by the development of problematic market structures which had their 
origin in the industrial revolution. While the rules on competition provided 
mechanisms for the restoration of the competitive structure of such markets, 
economic regulation was introduced in order to provide the public authorities 
with mechanisms for the im m ediate protection of the general interest, in 
substitution of the disciplinary role of competition.
In Europe, at that stage, neither the mechanisms of competition Law nor 
economic regulation were introduced for the correction of those failures in the 
markets created by the industrial revolution. On the contrary, public authorities 
monopolised the direct provision of the services and in such a way pursued the 
satisfaction of the general interest
The process of liberalisation of the markets, which substantially consists 
in the substitution of direct public intervention by the discipline imposed by 
competition in the market as the leading mechanisms of satisfaction of the 
general interest, has eliminated the traditional instrument of intervention in the 
European public utilities. European authorities have started to apply to these 
| sectors the rules on competition which had already been introduced for the 
protection of the competitive structure of the non nationalised markets, and 
have adopted some of the traditional mechanisms developed in the US for the
/
regulation of the public utilities.
The crucial point is that nowadays, after the general acceptance of the free 
market mechanisms as being better suited for the satisfaction of the general 
interest, both instruments of public intervention pursue the satisfaction of the 
general interest. Competition Law and now also economic regulation have 
become instruments of the public policy of liberalisation. At the same time, 
regulation m ain ta in s  a subsidiary role for the solution of market failures.
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Nevertheless, such a role is limited to objectively justified cases and has to be 
compatible in any event with competition, the leading mechanism of 
organisation of the telecommunications sector.
83. A complicated but fruitful co-existence. The relationship between 
competition Law and regulation in the telecommunications sector is 
complicated for a number of reasons. First is due to the uncertainties that 
accompany both instruments of public intervention. On the one hand, 
competition Law does not have a long tradition in some of the Member States 
and, furthermore, experience on the application of competition Law to 
industries in process of liberalisation is reduced. On the other hand, regulation 
is a new instrument of public intervention in most of the European States, 
particularly in those related to the French administrative tradition. As a result, 
the role of regulatory authorities and the nature of regulatory mechanisms are 
not completely clear for all the actors involved in the market.
It is widely believed that sector specific regulation provides a more \ 
powerful instrument for public intervention, an instrument that might be 
necessary to ensure the effectiveness of public intervention. At the same time, 
it is understood that such kind of intervention might be excessively intrusive 
and might even obstruct the development of effective competition. A general 
consensus on the need of regulation exists in Europe. Divergences arise at the 
point when the extent of such intervention, both in relation to the issues that 
should be covered by it, and on the temporal duration of the transitory 
mechanisms, has to be defined254.
84. The US and the EU experiences. The relation between both kinds of 
public intervention instruments in the framework of the European reform of the
254 For an early study on the European framework see HERGUERA, L and STHEMANN, O. (1997): 
“Regulation anH Competition Policy in the EU Telecommunications Industry”, in Communications & 
Strategies, vol. 26, no 2, pp. 141-163.
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r  telecommunications sector cannot be understood without a clear distinction 
between the European and the American experience.
While in the US there was a long tradition of regulation as an exception to 
the application of antitrust, in Europe economic regulation has been perceived 
basically (even if not solely) as an instrument for the liberalisation of the 
market. As a consequence, economic regulation has not been an exception to 
' competition Law but a complement to it, in such a way, that the fundamental 
reason for conflict is the similarity and the confusion between both instruments, 
rather than the disparity in their goals.
85. Evolution in the US. In the US, sector specific regulation has 
traditionally be considered a potential exception for the application of the 
antitrust rules. For these were situations in which it was considered that the 
mechanisms of free competition would not ensure the fulfilment of the general 
interest It used to be common wisdom that antitrust was supposed to protect 
competition and regulation was to restrict price competition and competitive 
entry, in such a way that both instruments were considered different and even 
antithetic.“5
Traditionally, regulation was used as a defence in antitrust suits. On the 
one hand pervasive regulation could exclude the application of antitrust to a 
particular activity. On the other hand, sector specific regulation could 
supersede the antitrust law and create an exemption. Finally, even in those 
cases in which regulation would not create an antitrust exemption, regulatory 
obligations in relation to price and entry might have the effect of negating the
255 See for a very descriptive analyses LOEVINGER, L. (1965): “Regulation and Competition as 
Alternatives”, in The Antitrust Bulletin, voL 10, pp. 101-140; and JOSKOW, P. (1985): “Mixing 
Regulatory and Antitrust Policies in the Electric Power Industry: The Price Squeeze and retail market 
Competition”, in Antitrust and. Regulation. Essays in Memory of John J. McGowan, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA, p. 173.
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presence of monopoly power.256 This was the case of the telecommunications 
sector, where the will of excluding the application of the antitrust rules was one 
of the leading factors for the emergence of the sectorial regulatory 
framework.257
This view has evolved, as antitrust has been applied to regulated 
industries and, mostly, as regulation has evolved allowing competition to rule 
regulated markets.258 It is only after the deregulation movement that the 
traditional regulatory mechanisms are considered as tools for the opposite 
process of elimination of restrictions and the promotion of competition.
The relation between antitrust and regulation in the US is determined not 
only by the political evolution in respect to the role of public authorities in the 
economic activity, but also by the position of the rules on competition and on 
regulatory intervention in the constitutional framework of sources of Law. It is 
important to note that the Sherman Act has the same normative value as the 
statues regulating specific sectors, in such a way that the federal Legislator can 
exclude the application of the antitrust rules to specific activities, whether 
through express statutory provision, on whether through an implied repeal.259 In 
this way, there is no major legal obstacle to the introduction of exceptions to 
the application of the antitrust rules, as long as such exceptions are clearly 
established by the federal Legislator.
The relation between the federal antitrust Legislation and the state 
regulatory actions is necessarily more complicated, due to the fact that issues
256 See HJELMFELT, D. (1985): "Antitrust and Regulated Industries", John Wiley, New York, p. 268.
257 Vide supra Chapter 2.4. Public Intervention in the US Telecommunications Sector.
258 See KAUPER, T. (1974): “An Overview”, Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 43, p. 295; STELZER, M. 
(1971): “Antitrust and Regulatory Policies: An Introduction and Overview”, in The Antitrust Bulletin, 
vol. 16, p. 671.
259 “When Congress by subsequent legislation establishes a regulatory regime over an area of 
commercial activity, the antitrust laws will not be displaced unless it appears that the antitrust and
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related to federalism arise. According to the state action doctrine, founded on in 
Parker v. Brown,™ states can exclude the application of federal antitrust law as 
long as the state does not unduly burden interstate commerce,261 what is ensured 
in those cases where the state acts in the traditional government functions and 
when state actions do not irreconcilably conflict with the per se violations of 
the Sherman Act. The state action doctrine has evolved as so to include 
exclusively acts that reflect the sovereign position of the state, understood as 
Legislator actions, excluding decisions adopted by subordinate state actors such 
as municipalities or the regulatory agencies.262
86. Situation in Europe. The European situation is widely different. On 
the one hand, after the de-monopolisation and the privatisation of the 
te lecom m u n ications sector, the regulatory framework has been introduced in 
order to favour the development of competition. Regulatory obligations in 
Europe are definitely connected to the promotion of competition in liberalised 
markets rather than to the exemption to the application of the rules on 
competition as was the traditional case in the US.263
On the other hand, the relationship between competition Law and sector 
specific regulation is decisively influenced by the supremacy of the rules on 
competition defined in the EC Treaty. Under the effet outil doctrine, defined by 
the ECJ,. Member States cannot “enact measures enabling private undertakings 
to escape from the constraints imposed by Articles 85 to 94 of the Treaty [now 
81 to 90]”.264 As a result, “under Community Law national authorities,
regulatory provisions are plainly repugnant”, City of Lafayette v. Lousiana Power & Light, 435 U.S. 
389, 398 (1978).
240 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
261 AREEDA, P. (1981): “Antitrust Immunity for ‘State Action’ After Lafayette”, in Harvard Law 
Review, p. 435.
262 SHENEFIELD, J. (1982): “The Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine and die New Federalism of
Antitrust”, in Antitrust Law Journal, voL 51, p. 337-347.
264 Case 13/1977, GB-Inno-BMZA TAB, 1977 ECR 2115, paragraph 34.
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including regulatory authorities and competition authorities, have a duty not to 
approve any practice or agreement contrary to Community competition law”. 
“If a NRA were to require terms which were contrary to the competition rules 
[...] the Member States itself would be in breach of Article 3(g) and Article 5 of 
the Treaty, and therefore subject to challenge by the Commission under Article 
169”.265 The application of the exception defined in Article 86(2) EC Treaty 
was excluded by the Commission Directives upheld by the ECJ, and only a 
modification in the market conditions would allow the application of the 
exception in the telecommunications markets.
^ As a result, the relevant differences between the American and the 'I
I European environments prevent a simple transplantation of the institutions and 
I instruments of indirect public intervention and the balance that exists between 
 ^them.
5.2. THE LIMITS OF ANTITRUST.
5.2.1. Introduction.
87. De-monopolisation was not enough. The process of the liberalisation 
of European telecommunications markets entails the substitution of public 
leadership in the development of the sector by a demand-driven leadership 
through the traditional m echanism s of competition in the market.
It is evident that the first step in the process of the liberalisation of 
European telecoms was the elimination of the special and exclusive rights. It 
has been studied how the Commission pursued such goal through a step-by-
265 See Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector. Framework, relevant markets and principles, OJ 1998 C 265/2, paragraphs 
13 and 61. The application of an Article 169 procedure in such cases has been upheld by the Court in 
Case C-35/96, Commission v. Italy, 1998.
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step strategy. It is equally clear that the mere elimination of special and 
exclusive rights was only the first measure in the liberalisation of the markets. 
That process would only be completed upon the emergence of effective 
pressures on all the market players to satisfy consumers’ demand.
It is obvious that the entrance to the market of new comers, and the 
emergence of effective competition among these new comers and the 
incumbents, could not be directly guaranteed by public authorities. 
Nevertheless, those authorities did have some options. Firstly, they could avoid 
any intervention, expecting private entities to enter the market and succeed in 
challenging the monopolistic position of the incumbent. Secondly, they could 
foster the emergence of competition by levelling the playing field in favour of 
the new comers.“6
It was always clear that a structural intervention in favour of the new 
comers such as the break-up of the incumbents was excluded. Nevertheless, it 
was commonly agreed that some kind of public intervention would be 
necessary in order to accelerate the transition from a public monopoly to a 
competition-driven market. Otherwise, public monopolies could be substituted 
by private monopolies with no effective pressure to satisfy consumers’ 
demands.
There was no doubt that the major obstacle to competition was the 
presence of the incumbents. Since no structural measure was undertaken, the 
former legal monopolists enjoyed the control of the only universal 
telecommunications network in each Member State, a facility which would it 
take years to duplicate despite the availability of new technologies. 
Furthermore, the incumbents benefited from a 100% market share in all the 
formerly monopolised service markets (from fixed telephony to value-added
266 See Teligen Ltd (2000): “Study on Market Entry Issues in EU Telecommunications Markets after 
1st January 1998", European Commission, Brussels.
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services). As a consequence, they benefited from the relevant economies of 
scale and scope, as well as from the well-known network externality effect. 
The brand-recognition, financial capability and political power of the 
incumbents strengthened the position of the former monopolists the very day 
their exclusive rights were lifted.
The disconnection between costs and prices of the incumbent, which 
allowed new comers to dispose of attractive margins in some market segments. 
At the same time, new comers, unlike the incumbent, did not face the burden of 
inherited, out-dated technologies or inefficient structures. All of this allowed 
new comers to enter the market and establish themselves, but never to put 
effective pressure on the incumbents in the more important market segments: 
infrastructures and the fixed telephony service.
The incumbents controlled the public fixed telephony network, the only 
universal telecommunications network available at that moment. Such control 
was particularly relevant as regards the access network, the so-called “last 
kilometre”, due to the technical and economic difficulties to duplicate such an 
infrastructure in a short period of time. The control of the public fixed 
telephony network by the incumbent was perceived as the main barrier to entry, 
and as a consequence, the efforts of the public authorities were focused on the 
development of mechanisms that would eliminate such barrier.
5.2.2. Antitrust and Market Power.
88. Market dominance. The point of departure of European antitrust 
with regard to market power is the notion of market dominance. Market 
dominance is defined by the ECJ as the “position of economic strength enjoyed 
by an undertaking which enables it to hinder the maintenance of effective 
competition on the relevant market by allowing it to behave to an appreciable
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extent independently of its competitors and customers and ultimately of 
consumers”.“7
The telecommunications incumbents enjoyed dominant positions for 
decades thanks to the exclusive rights granted by the relevant public 
authorities.268 As it has been put by the Commission “the mere ending of legal 
monopolies does not put an end to dominance. Indeed, [...] the development of 
effective competition from alternative network providers with adequate 
capacity and geographic reach will take time”.269 Furthermore, the significant 
dominance of the former monopolies in the infrastructure markets might be 
extended to a number of vertically related markets, as it puts them “in a 
situation comparable to that of holding a dom in an t position on the markets in 
question as a whole”.270
It is interesting to note that Community competition Law distinguishes 
different regimes for undertakings with market power according to its origin.
89. Article 82. On the one hand, dominance can have its origin in the 
efficiency of the undertaking and its growth in the market through competition. 
In such cases, the regime established in Article 82 EC Treaty (former 86) is 
applied. According to this provision, as it has been interpreted by the ECJ, this 
kind of market dominance is not prohibited, nor even recriminated. In the 
words of"the ECJ “a finding that an undertaking has a dominant position is not 
in itself a recrimination but simply means that [...] the undertaking concerned
267 Case 322/81, Michelin v. Commission, [1983] ECR 2461.
268 An undertaking with a exclusive right in a substantial part of the common market can be considered 
to enjoy a dominant position, Case 311/84, CBEM/CLT, [1985] ECR 3261.
269 Vide Access Notice, paragraph 64 (supra footnote 265).
270 Case C-333/94 P, Tetra Pack International v. Commission, [1996] ECR 1-5951.
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has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine 
undistorted competition on the common market”.271
Thus, the Treaty (as well as the national legislations) does not provide 
mechanisms to modify the market structure, that is, the dominance itself. On 
the contrary, it merely provides mechanisms to obstruct certain behaviours of 
the dominant undertakings. Competition authorities only intervene against 
behaviours contrary to Article 82 ex post, in order to ascertain the 
anticompetitive character of such behaviour and to impose the correspondent 
sanction.
90. Merger Regulation. Before the adoption of the Merger Regulation 
in 1990, concentrations with anticompetitive effects could only be blocked 
under Article 82 EC Treaty when they supposed the strengthening of a 
dominant position, but not when dominance was the result of the 
concentration.272 The adoption of the Merger Regulation modified the approach 
to market power when it was the result of a merger or acquisition.
In this case, the Community policy is now to control the market structure 
and to obstruct the concentrations that would “create or strengthen a dominant 
position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly 
impeded in the common market or a substantial part of it”.273 If dominant 
positions due to efficiency in the market are respected by Article 82 EC Treaty, 
dominant positions due to operations foreign to the regular functioning of the 
market are blocked by the competition authorities.
271 Case 322/81, Michelin v. Commission, [1983] ECR 3461.
272 “The strengthening of the dominant position of an undertaking may be an abuse and prohibited 
under Article 86 of the Treaty, regardless of the means and procedure by which it is achieved”, Case 
6/72, Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commission, [1973] ECR 215, paragraph 27.
273 Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation.
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The rules on concentrations allow the European Commission to adopt an 
ex ante decision based on the effects of the concentration upon market 
structure.
91. Article 86. Finally, market dominance can be the result, of the 
exclusive or special right granted by a public authority for the provision of a 
service of general economic activity. The special or exclusive rights are 
scrutinised by the Commission with the powers granted by Article 86 (former 
Article 90), and only accepted if the restriction to competition is necessary for 
the fulfilment of the general economic interest.
The point is that, when the exclusive rights are considered incompatible 
with the Treaty and therefore eliminated, the linked dominance cannot be 
eliminated by the competition authorities, despite its ‘illegitimate’ origins. The 
somehow ‘illegitimate’ dominance enjoyed by the former monopolists can be 
compared with the dominance reached through mergers and acquisitions, in the 
sense that both are linked not to the growth in the market, but to actions foreign 
to the competitive process. The difference in the legal regime of both 
dominance is that a particular mechanism to control market structure was 
adopted in the case of concentrations, while in the case of de-monopolisations 
no particular mechanism exist, in such a way that no structural intervention can 
be adopted with the m echanism s provided by the rules on competition.
As a result, market dominance originated by exclusive rights granted by 
public authorities, even if declared contrary to the Treaty, is subject to the 
general regime defined by Article 82 EC Treaty for the firms that reached such 
position through growth in the market The former monopolies enjoy the 
positive attitude towards efficiency and the respect for the dominance reached 
thanks to it, which defines the Article, 82 regime. The result is that their 
dominance is respected, and competition Law only provides ex post 
mechanisms for the control of their abusive behaviour.
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5.2.3. Antitrust and the Promotion of Competition.
92. Exclusionary behaviour by the incumbents. The already long 
tradition of application of the rules on competition has identified a number of 
categories of behaviours with anticompetitive effects. Predatory pricing, 
refusals to deal, and other exclusionary practices can be implemented by the 
incumbents in order to hinder the growth of competition in the 
telecommunications markets. Competition authorities have mechanisms to 
obstruct such practices and .even to impose penalties to the undertakings which 
implement them. As a matter of fact, both Community and national 
competition authorities have already intervened in order to elim inate 
exclusionary behaviours by dominant undertakings in the telecommunications 
markets and in some cases very significant fines have been imposed.
Nevertheless, the application of the competition rules on exclusionary 
practices might not always be as efficient as required by the exceptional 
situation created by the de-monopolisation of the telecommunications markets. 
The cumbersome procedures under both the national and the Community 
competition authorities might not effectively reduce the potential barriers 
introduced by the incumbents, as the ex post application of such rules might 
arrive too late, once the new comer has been excluded from the market
93. Structural obstacles to competition. The European rules on 
competition proscribe behaviours of the incumbents directed to obstruct the 
emergence of competition in the liberalised market (exclusionary practices). 
Nevertheless, such rules do not provide mechanisms to modify the market 
structure inherited from decades of the monopolisation of the market by public 
authorities. The rules on competition do not provide mechanisms which 
actively promote entry to the market by new comers by the elimination of those 
barriers to entry which are not connected to the incumbents behaviour.
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The existence of two important obstacles to competition in the 
telecommunications industry as well as in most network industries has been 
widely recognised. A first structural obstacle is the network externality effect. 
A network increases its value as it increases the units connected tcTthe network. 
A network which only connects one unit has a value of zero. A network that 
connects all the existing points has the maximum potential value. As a 
consequence, a small network without universal coverage developed by a new 
comer will rarely be able to compete with the universal network of the former 
monopolies. This leads to a winner-takes-it all result in network industries.
The second structural obstacle is the existence of important economies of 
. Traditionally, it was considered that such economies reached the totality 
of the investment, in such a way that the sector had an unavoidable tendency 
towards monopolisation by one undertaking. The telecommunications market 
was considered a natural monopoly. Technological development and the 
apparition of new infrastructures (satellite, fibre etc.) and services (i.e. IP 
telephony) has changed dramatically the structure of the sector which is not 
considered anymore a natural monopoly. In any case, it is evident that 
economies of scale are still present in the telecommunications markets. 
Economies of scale might not be relevant with regard to most 
telecommunications services markets. In relation to networks, it seems that for 
most market segments economies of scale do not reach the whole investment as 
they become exhausted at an early stage. As a consequence, there is some 
scope for competition, even if in many cases restricted to a limited number of 
companies.
These structural obstacles are reinforced by the dominant presence of the 
former monopolies. As no structural measure was adopted by the public 
authorities, the former monopolies enjoyed a 100% market share in most 
telecommunications markets right after de-monopolisation. As a matter of fact,
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such market share has not decreased significantly in important markets such as 
the local loop or the local telephony service.
As a consequence, the most important obstacle to competition in the 
telecommunications sector after de-monopolisation would be not the behaviour 
of the former monopolies itself, but the market power they would have enjoyed 
as a consequence of being the sole beneficiary of the network externality effect 
and the economies of scale derived from their universal network.
Even if competition Law provides the mechanisms for the obstruction of 
the behaviours which might reinforce or extend the dominant position of the 
incumbents, competition Law does not provide specific mechanisms to treat 
market dominance based on an exclusive right that has been eliminated because ,^ 
of its incompatibility with the Treaty. Even if the apparition of a competitive 
environment is a fundamental element of the process of reform of the 
telecommunications markets, competition Law lacks mechanisms to reduce the" 
'barriers to entry derived from the network externality effect and the economies 
of scale. —•
Former monopolists receive the treatment designed for the undertakings 
that acquired a dominant position as the result of growth through competition 
thanks to their efficiency, a treatment based on the respect of the dominant 
position and devoted merely to the obstruction of the abuses of such 
dominance.
Competition authorities might be tempted to expand the application of the 
rules on abusive behaviour so as to cover the cases under evaluation. It might 
even be the case that certain cases are on the border line of the case-law with 
regard to the abuse of a dominant position, as it is not always simple to 
distinguish between the effects of the behaviour of the undertaking and the 
effects of the mere structure of the market
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Such temptations, even if they might result in the solution of sector 
specific problems, entail important risks of de-naturalisation of the rules on 
competition and the extension of the precedent to other areas where they might 
have dangerous results. It is for this reason that the competition rules on 
abusive behaviour should not be applied for the reduction of barriers to entry 
derived from the mere market power of the former monopolists.274
5.2.4. Antitrust and Exploitative Practices.
94. Exploitative abuses. As special and exclusive rights were eliminated, 
the problem was not only to foster the emergence of competition, but also to 
ensure that in the transitory period, the incumbents would not try to obtain 
monopoly rents from consumers.
Initially, European antitrust was only concerned with practices directed at 
obtaining monopoly rents from consumers. It was sustained that Community 
competition Law had opted for a differentiation in respect to American antitrust 
law, not through the persecution of the attempts to monopolise, but through the 
abuses of the monopolistic position, without considering the origins of such 
dominance.
American antitrust lawyers always criticised the notion of exploitative 
abuses. It has been stated that it “has not an entirely antitrust connotation”.275 
They were right, as the notion of exploitative abuses does not protect the 
competitive process which is considered to foster consumer welfare, but tries to 
ensure consumer welfare through the control of the behaviour of the dominant 
company. This is something that is closer to the American regulatory tradition.
274 Vide infra Chapter 10. Conclusions: From Regulation to Competition?
275 RAHL, Statement in International Aspects Of Antitrust, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 2d Sess, Part. 1, 385 
(1966), in JOLIET, R. ( 1970): “Monopolization and Abuse o f Dominant Position. A Comparative Study 
o f the American and European Approaches to the Control o f Economic Power'', Martmus Nijhoff, Den 
Hague, p. 247.
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As a consequence, it can be said that the European rules on competition 
had a strong regulatory flavour, as their focus was not on proscribing the 
monopolisation of the market (as in the US) but in prescribing behaviours in 
markets with distortions originated by the market power of dominant firm s . In 
Europe the lack of regulatory tradition, rules and institutions may have forced 
antitrust authorities to adopt a regulatory approach that could not be 
implemented by non-existent regulatory institutions.
Such an approach, however, has always introduced difficulties for the 
application of the notion of exploitative abuses. Antitrust authorities do not 
have the resources to follow closely the evolution of every singe market in 
order to individuate whether a particular price or condition is fair for the 
consumer. It is not very clear either what are the criteria to be used in order to 
evaluate the fairness of contracting conditions. Furthermore, the rules on 
competition only allow for the proscription of contracting conditions, but never 
for the prescription of them that would be necessary in order to immediately 
ensure consumer welfare.276
It was only after the intervention of the ECJ in the 70’s through 
judgements such in the Continental Can and Hoffinan-La Roche cases that the 
anti-competitive role of such provision was confirmed.277 Exclusionary 
practices devoted to obstruct or exclude the development of competition in the 
dominated market were also considered contrary to Article 82 EC Treaty.
As a matter of fact, due to the influence of the Chicago School and the 
introduction of economic reasoning in the antitrust decisions, the tendency in
276 “The Commission stated in 1975 that measures to halt the abuse of dominant positions cannot be 
converted into systematic monitoring of prices. In proceedings against abuse consisting of charging 
excessively high prices, it is difficult to tell whether in any given case an abusive price has been set for 
there is no objective way of establishing exacdy what price covers costs plus a reasonable profit 
margin”, Fifth Report on Competition policy (1975), point 3.
277 TEMPLE LANG, J. (1979): “Monopolisation and the Definition of ‘Abuse’ of a Dominant Position 
under Article 86 EEC Treaty”, in Common Market Law Review, voL 16, pp. 245-364.
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the last decades has been to focus the intervention of the antitrust authorities in 
the obstruction of exclusionary practices and to reduce intervention against 
exploitative practices, even if the wording of Article 82 makes direct references 
to exploitative practices which have to be prosecuted by the European antitrust 
authorities.
The risk of the obtention of monopoly rents was particularly high in the 
telecommunications markets after de-monopolisation as telecommunications 
former monopolists enjoyed a pervasive market power in important market 
segments. They could impose abusive contractual conditions on providers and 
clients, in relation to quality, or impose low prices on providers and excessive 
prices on clients. The very same risk existed before the de-monopolisation, but 
it was considered that the public nature of the monopolist would ensure fairness 
in the contractual relations with the monopolist.271
In any case, and despite the evolution of European antitrust, the EC 
Treaty as well as many national legislations still provide legal mechanisms to 
proscribe abusive behaviours.279 Community authorities have made clear that 
even if the implementation of the exploitative abuses notion, in particular 
against excessive prices, is extremely complicated in the telecommunications 
market due to the difficulty in defining cots,2*0 they will not hesitate to apply 
Article 82 when necessary.2*1
271 Nevertheless, the fairness was only ensured politically, in such a way that providers and clients of
the monopolist did not dispose of juridic instruments to enforce such fairness.
279 Even if the proof of the abusive character of a condition, for instance a price, is not simple, there are 
precedents in Community Competition Law of prices considered excessive and, therefore, null. See for 
instance ECJ C-226/84, British Leyland v. Commission, ECR [1986] 3263.
280 Vide infra Chapter 9.2.3. Compulsory Access.
2,1 As has been stated by two relevant Commission officials, ‘The Commission itself never aspired to 
use Article 86 EC Treaty in order to act as a price setting authority. [...] however, it has also become 
clear that the Commission will make full use of its powers under Article 86”, HAAG, M. and KLOTZ, 
R. (1998): “Commission Practice Concerning Excessive Pricing in Telecommunications”, in 
Competition Policy Newsletter, voL 4, no. 2, pp. 35-38.
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5.2.5. Conclusion: The Regulatory Tendency of European Antitrust.
95. Conclusion. The market power of the telecommunications
incumbents was so pervasive after de-monopolisation that it was commonly 
understood that the rules on competition were not enough to ensure consumer 
welfare. Even the Commission recognised that “Community Competition rules 
are not sufficient to remedy all of the various problems in the
telecommunications sector”.212
As it has been described, the rules on competition basically proscribe 
behaviours that might reduce the pressures of effective competition and 
therefore damage consumers. As regards undertakings with significant market 
power, the rules on competition prohibit behaviours directed to maintain or 
expand the market power of the dominant firm. Such rules cannot ensure that a 
company without the pressure of competition respects consumers welfare, and 
certainly, they are not designed to put an end to the dominant position. The 
main reason is that an active intervention through prescriptive obligations 
would be necessary to ensure such objectives, and antitrust does not provide 
such a possibility.
96. The regulatory tendency. The European rules on competition,
particularly those against abuse of dominant position, present a strong
regulatory tendency. Article 82 EC Treaty, as originally interpreted after the 
adoption of the Treaty, entails an approach to market power which somehow 
abandons the American approach to antitrust in order to get closer to the 
regulatory intervention which had developed in the US by the end of last 
century.
282 Vide Access Notice, paragraph 14 (supra footnote 265).
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Article 82 EC Treaty and its national counterparts do not outlaw dominant 
positions. These provisions obstruct the abuse of such dominance through the 
prohibition of certain behaviours that would objectively entail such an abuse.
Originally, the attention of the competition authorities was solely focused 
on those abuses with exploitative effects. In this way, effects such as excessive 
pricing, the imposition of unfair trading conditions or discriminations were 
forbidden. Fairness in the trading activities of the dominant undertakings was 
the key of the public intervention. Little attention was paid to the competitive 
process or even to the competitive structure of the market.
In this way, the rules on competition allowed public authorities not to 
control the competitive character of the market, but to ensure the fairness of the 
behaviour of the strongest companies, that is, to regulate market power.
The evolution of European competition Law introduced firstly the 
proscription of exclusionary practices. Secondly, the attention was shifted from 
fairness to efficiency and consumer welfare. In this way, the European rules on 
competition evolved towards a more orthodox approach directed to protect 
competition as a dynamic process and the beneficial effects for consumers of 
effective competition. The European rules on competition, particularly after the 
influence of the Chicago School, had abandoned the regulatory approach and 
strengthened the features that characterised traditionally American antitrust.
Nevertheless, the permanence in the Treaty of provisions which allow a 
quasi regulatory intervention by competition authorities, and the will of these 
authorities to apply the rules on competition in liberalised markets in order to 
solve the specific conflicts derived from the reform of such markets entail the 
risk of a return to the regulatory origins of European antitrust
Furthermore, and despite the intrinsic limitations of the rules on 
competition, the Commission has tried to make use of such a set of rules firstly 
to foster the de-monopolisation of the sector, and secondly, to modify the
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structure of the market by reducing the structural obstacles faced by new 
comers to the telecommunications markets.
5.3. REGULATION COMPLEMENTS ANTITRUST.
5.3.1. Regulation for the Promotion of Competition.
97. The role of regulation. It was a common assumption in Europe that 
the rules on competition were not sufficient to ensure the emergence of 
effective competition in the European liberalised telecommunications markets, 
and that new instruments of intervention had to be established in order to 
provide mechanisms for the implementation of the policy to actively promote 
the emergence of such competition.
Economic regulation, the traditional instrument of indirect intervention in 
the US, provided an interesting model, and many of the mechanisms which had 
been developed in that country were transplanted in order to conform an 
instrument for indirect intervention in liberalised markets. The mechanisms of 
concentrated control of the market and imposition of specific legal obligations 
on the private actors in order to satisfy the general interest were particularly 
well-suited for the telecommunications markets, as they allowed for the 
imposition of different obligations upon the undertakings depending on their 
position in the market.
While the rules on competition proscribe exclusionary behaviours by the 
incumbents, regulatory obligations can not only proscribe certain behaviours, 
but also prescribe measures which on the one hand ensure that no exclusion 
will take place, whilst on the other, go further in reducing the obstacles derived 
from the market structure.
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It is important to underline that in Europe, regulation has as its main goal 
the promotion of competition. The situation, therefore, is quite different from 
the American experience, where regulation has usually been perceived as an 
obstacle to competition and only recently regulation has become another 
instrument for the promotion of competition in the traditionally regulated 
markets.
98. Regulation follows antitrust European public authorities had a wide 
choice of regulatory strategies for the liberalised telecommunications markets. 
It is interesting to note that the regulatory framework finally adopted respects 
the same basic principle in which the competition rules on abuse of dominant 
position are based: the special responsibility of the operator which enjoys 
market power. Furthermore, many of the regulatory instruments (the notion of 
operators with significant market power, SMP, for instance) and obligations 
(pricing policy, network access etc.) follow closely the existing antitrust model.
It could be said that sector specific regulation for the promotion of 
competition departs from the rules on competition, extends its principles, and 
completes it, providing more effective mechanisms for the obtention of similar
goals.2*3 Nevertheless, it should be always understood that there are important
Kdifferences in scope and mechanisms of intervention between both instruments 
! i m 9 ___
if public intervention. The regulatory framework designed by the European uthorities goes a step further than the rules on competition. It introduces 
obligations directed to reduce the incumbent’s market power through 
m echan ism s which force them to share with the new comers some of the
33 The heavy influence of Competition Law on telecommunications regulation has been pointed out in 
FORRESTER, L (2000): ** Achieving and safeguarding conditions for fair and efficient competition” 
in aEuropean Competition Law Annual 1998. Regulating Communications Markets”, Ehlermann and 
Gossling Ed., Hart, pp. 585-614.
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benefits derived from such power, based on the assumption that somehow, such 
power has an ‘illegitimate origin’.
99. Significant market power. Just as the notion of dominance delimits 
the application of the Article 82 EC Treaty, the regulatory category of 
operators with significant market power has been introduced in the Community 
Directives in order to delimit the ambit of the application of regulatory 
obligations. Article 4(3) of Directive 97/33/EC establishes that an operator 
“shall be presumed to have significant market power when it has a share of 
more than 25% of a particular telecommunications market”.284
Important differences exist between both notions. The most obvious one 
is that the notion of operator with significant market power is far less exigent 
than the notion of dominance. As a matter of fact a market share of 25% would 
only in extreme cases be qualified as dominance under Article 82 EC Treaty.2*5 
It is not simple to justify such a reduction of the requirement, as the asymmetry 
is supposed to be introduced in order to reduce the burden for the new comers 
of the barriers to entry derived from the presence of the former monopolies. 
The application of the regulatory obligations defined for the operators with 
significant market power to a new comer which reaches such a position thanks 
to the efficient provision of its services seems contrary to the very same 
principles of the regulatory framework. A possible explanation for such
284 Article 4(3) of Directive 97/33/EC allows NRAs to include in the category operators with a lower 
market share, as well as to exclude operators that exceed it, according to objective criteria defined in 
this provision and in paragraph 6 of the preamble, criteria that, on the one hand resemble in a large 
extend the criteria, for the attribution of market dominance (turnover relative to the size of the market, 
access to financial resources, experience etc.), and on the other, include particularities of die 
telecommunications markets (as in the case of the control of the means to access end-users).
285 It is commonly shares that a market share under 30% would not imply a dominant position if not 
accompanied with very exceptional market circumstances, BELLAMY & CHILD (1993): 44Common 
Market Law of Competition”, Sweet & Maxwell, London, p. 604. Nevertheless, in the words of die 
Commission “a dominant position cannot even be ruled out in respect of market shares between 20% 
and 40%”, X Report on Competition Policy, 1980, point 150.
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inclusion is the intention to provide regulatory mechanisms of intervention 
similar to the antitrust figure of collective dominance.
There is a procedural difference between both notions. While dominance 
is determined ex post for a specific conflict, SMP is determined ex ante in order 
to subject an operator to a series of regulatory obligations. As a result, the 
definition of the relevant markets has to be done in abstract, without reference 
to a specific conflict or behaviour. The abstract nature of the definition of the 
market requires defining wide markets in order to cover all the possibilities 
towards the future. On the contrary, the definition of the relevant market in 
Competition Law is done ex post for a specific case, in such a way that the 
definition of the relevant market can be adapted to the specific conditions of 
the case and a very reduced market can be defined.
These two formal differences allow identifying the more important 
difference between both notions. Market dominance is a more objective 
criterion. The competition authorities merely certify that a particular 
undertaking enjoys a significant degree of market power in a particular product 
and geographic market which allows it to behave independently from 
competitors and consumers (that is, without the constraints of competition), 
which in turn allows it to develop certain practices which could damage the 
very same competitive process and, therefore, consumers. Significant market 
power, on the contrary, is a subjective classification according to certain agreed 
criteria. It is not such market power that really creates an obstacle to 
competition. On the contrary, market power is merely used as a criterion to 
impose regulatory obligations. Such obligations are not directly derived from 
the risks originated by market power, but from the market structure in which 
such power is held. This is the weakness of the notion of operator with 
significant market power, as will be demonstrated in the following pages.
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100. Regulatory intervention. Most of the regulatory mechanisms are 
closely linked to the antitrust mechanisms of intervention. The leading example 
is the regulation on network access. It is not difficult to see the evolution from 
the antitrust essential facilities doctrine to the Open Network Provision 
framework.2*4 Similar examples can be identified with regard to pricing policy 
(not only between competitors but also for final consumers) and in particular 
with regard to minimum and maximum prices.
It is possible to identify how the regulatory framework departs from the 
rules on competition and extends its reach in two lines. On the one hand, the 
regulatory framework provides more effective mechanisms of intervention in 
order to obstruct practices that could damage competition as well as final 
consumers. The ex post antitrust intervention is complemented with an ex ante 
regulatory intervention with the same goals and very similar objectives and 
even content. On the other hand, the regulatory framework goes a step further 
and introduces obligations that would not usually be included under the 
antitrust regime, or in any case would be on the borderline of the antitrust rules.
This further step is usually related to the specific market structure of the 
sector and the will of public authorities to allow new comers to overcome the 
difficulties created by economies of scale and the network externality effect. 
This is. particularly the case of the regulatory framework on network access.
5.3.2. Regulation for the Immediate Protection of the General 
Interest.
101. Regulation and the exploitative abuses. Regulatory mechanisms 
have an important role to play in order to ensure the satisfaction of the general 
interest in the liberalised telecommunications markets. Regulatory intervention 
might be necessary to impose on the operators obligations for the immediate
286 Vide infra Chapter 9. Sector Specific Regulation on Network Access.
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protection of the general interest. Such obligations seem necessary during the 
transitory period to effective competition, since the risk of exploitative abuses 
by the incumbents is particularly high.
During the transition period from monopoly to effective competition, the 
former monopolies enjoy such a strong dominance in particular markets, that 
they can be tempted to obtain monopoly rents, rents which might be useful to 
obstruct the development of competition in more dynamic market segments. 
Competition Law provides mechanisms to avoid such exploitative abuses of 
dominant position, but these mechanisms are not fully effective,2*7 particularly 
in a situation where there is a tendency for these abuses to be more common, as 
is the case of recently liberalised telecommunications markets.
The fact that competition rules can only be applied ex post reduces their 
efficacity, particularly if the effective application of such solutions requires a 
long period of time. Competition authorities cannot spend their limited 
resources in a comprehensive control of the price and quality conditions of the 
services provided by the former monopolies, and neither can spend their 
resources in endless procedures each time a consumer considers that prices 
charged by the operator are excessive.
Most of the national regulatory authorities have at their disposition 
mechanisms of intervention aimed at avoiding exploitative abuses in the 
transition period to effective competition. Firstly, NRAs use mechanisms to 
impose on the former monopolists the obligation to communicate the relevant 
information in relation to tariffs and quality of their services according to 
objective standards. The transm ission of this information to the consumers, at 
the same time as the creation of standard contracts, with the obligatory 
inclusion of clauses related to quality standards and pricing devoted to the
37 Vide supra Chapter 8.4. The Limitations of the Essential Facilities Doctrine.
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introduction of transparency in the provision of the services by the former 
monopolies might be sufficient for the protection of the final users.
In case such preventive mechanisms are not enough, NRAs can impose 
the maximum prices, or even fixed prices, as well as specific obligations in 
relation to the quality standards of the services provided by those operators 
with a significant market power.
102. A new model of protection of the general interest. A very 
important result of the process of reform is the imposition by the Community 
authorities of legal obligations on the Member States to guarantee the 
satisfaction of certain general interest objectives. The particular structure of the 
European Union has facilitated, for the first time, the transformation of the 
traditional political responsibility on the provision of services of general 
interest, by a legal responsibility, as Community directives on 
telecommunications define specific obligations for the Member States.2“
Member States have, thus, the legal obligation to ensure the fulfilment of 
certain objective of general interest. At the same time, Member States can 
define other objectives of general interest not included in the Community 
Directives. One of the leading principles of the new model of public 
intervention for the protection of competition is subsidiarity. The reform of the 
sector is based on the confidence in the market for the ruling of the 
telecommunications markets. Since public intervention can obstruct the regular 
functioning of the market mechanisms, it has to be restricted, in the sense that 
public authorities should only intervene in case competition in title market 
cannot ensure the satisfaction of the general interest.239
as Just as an example, see Article 3 of Directive 98/10/EC “Member States shall ensure that the 
services set out in Chapter are made available to all users in their territory, independent of 
geographical location, anH1 in light of specific national conditions, at an affordable price”.
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The regulatory model imposed by the Community authorities for the 
Member States’ intervention for the immediate protection of the general 
interest is based on the indirect intervention of the public authorities. The 
national public authorities define and impose on the private operators in the 
market the necessary obligations in order to ensure the satisfaction of the 
general interest. Two are the main consequences of this policy. On the one 
hand, clarity is introduced in the system, as the general interest is not anymore 
a vague and diffuse principle which legitimise any public action. Given that 
specific obligations have to be imposed on the operators, the new model 
requires the definition of the general interest and its implications.250 On the 
other hand, the obligations imposed on the providers of the service create 
parallel rights on the consumers, who finally can identify the services and 
conditions of the provision of such services which are considered of general 
interest, and, furthermore, dispose of mechanisms for the enforcement of such 
obligations.
103. New mechanisms of protection of the general interest. The
asymmetric regulation model provides mechanisms of public intervention for 
the immediate protection of the general interest. Such mechanisms have to be 
compatible with the competitive structure of the market, and at the same time 
effective. Such mechanisms are always based on the imposition of specific 
obligations on the operators in the market, with a particular preference for the 
operators with significant market power.
Public authorities can impose on the operators obligations to provide 
services which they would not provide under regular circumstances due to the 
lack of economic incentives. On the same way, obligations in relation to the
290 In those cases in which public services were not directly provided by the public authorities but by 
private operators under concession rights, the specification of legal obligations imposed on the 
concessionaire was also common. Nevertheless, die particular relation between the public authority and
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conditions of the provision can be imposed, for instance on relation to quality 
(minimum quality) or price (maximum price or even a fixed price). In this way, 
public authorities can ensure, for instance, that every citizen has access to those 
services considered indispensable, at an affordable price and with the 
appropriate quality standards.
The asymmetry in the imposition of obligations in relation to the 
immediate satisfaction of the general interest can promote the development of 
competition on the market. At the same time such a asymmetry can ensure the 
effectivity of the general interest defence, as the operators with a stronger 
position (comprehensive presence in all the territory, more experience etc.) are 
in a better position to ensure the fulfilment of the general interest objectives.
5.3.3. The Risk of Over-Regulation.
104. Weakness of the regulatory structure. The main weakness of the 
European regulatory framework is that it is based on the classification of an 
operator under the category of SMP according to its market share when this is 
not the reason for the imposition of regulatory obligations. The regulatory 
framework is really imposed due to the existence of market failures deriving 
from the long lasting exclusive rights, from the tendency of the market to 
monopolisation, or from both reasons at a time. The problem is that market 
share and therefore SMP does not reflect the existence of market distortions, 
but merely the existence of at least one operator with an important market 
share.
As a result, the same regulatory framework is imposed independently of 
the reason why the holding has a market share of more than 25%. Such a 
market share can be the result of fierce competition that has eroded most of the
the concessionaire (often a monopolist) did not traditionally introduce a lot of transparency in the 
relationship.
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market share of the incumbent, but equally includes a higher market share of an 
efficient operator, or an incumbent that maintains an almost absolute control of 
a market due to the structural obstacles to competition originated by economies 
of scale or the lack of demand.
Such a scheme has not created major concerns in the period following the 
de-monopolisation. Market distortions were present in almost every segment of 
the telecommunications markets as a consequence of the long lasting exclusive 
rights of the incumbents. The potential distortions of the regulatory policy were 
overcome by the beneficial effects of the emergence of competition.
Nevertheless, as the markets have evolved, and effective competition 
emerges in some market segments but not in others, or at least not at the same 
speed, the regulatory scheme, and in particular the SMP category in which it is 
based, might start to distort the telecommunications markets. Once new comers 
have accessed the different telecommunications markets, it is important to 
review the effects of such a scheme.
It is possible to identify markets where important market failures exist 
independently of the presence of the former monopolist. It is clear that in some 
markets there is limited scope for competition or even no room at all. This 
seems to be the case of some access markets, particularly in rural areas.
105. The risk of over-regulation. The leading principle established by 
the Community authorities in relation to regulation is subsidiarity, in the sense 
that public intervention has to be restricted to those occasions in which it is 
necessary. As a result, regular market mechanisms are trusted also for the 
development of the effective competition in the telecommunications markets, 
and regulatory intervention is devoted, primarily, to complement such 
m ech an ism s, by the introduction of elements directed to impose on operators 
with significant market power, the pressure that competition would impose on 
them. When these m ech an ism s are not sufficient, more aggressive mechanisms
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are introduced, aimed at substituting the market by the imposition of the results 
that would be reached by competition in the market.
It is important to note that this kind of intervention has a transitional 
character. Once competition has emerged, this intervention should disappear. 
The obligations imposed for the reduction of barriers to entry once competition 
has emerged in the telecommunications markets is established by Community 
Directive 97/33/EC,291 and Directive 97/51/EC.292
Intervention by public authorities in economic activity, and in general in 
the exercise of public power, reveal tendencies that go against the transitional 
character of the regulation for the promotion of competition and might 
complicate its elimination in the future. The result could be the future over- 
regulation of competitive markets and the distortion of competition by the 
maintenance of asymmetric regulation. The tendency of public intervention 
mechanisms to expand to include more elements of the activity subject to 
public intervention and to neighbouring activities has been studied. Secondly, 
the phenomenon of regulatory capture might complicate the elimination of 
regulation given that those groups benefited by the asymmetry will certainly 
lobby for the maintenance of such rules.
It is for this reason that some Member States have introduced specific 
provision in their telecommunications legislation in order to facilitate the 
elimination of transitional regulatory obligations. Such is the case of Germany
291 “When effective competition is achieved in the market, the Com petition rules of the Treaty will in 
principle be sufficient to monitor fair competition ex-post so that the need for this Directive will be 
reconsidered, with the exception of the provisions on universal service and the settlement of disputes”, 
paragraph 25 Directive 97/33/EC.
292 “Until an effective competitive environment is achieved, there is a need for the regulatory 
supervision of tariffs for leased lines with a view to ensuring cost orientation and transparency in 
accordance with the principle of proportionality, where it is appropriate to allow the requirements for 
cost orientation and transparency in specific markets to be set aside where no organisation has 
significant market power or where effective competition ensures that tariffs for leased lines are 
reasonable”, paragraph 15 Directive 97/51/EC.
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or the Netherlands, where a so called “sunset clause” has been introduced 
according to which the evolution of the telecommunications markets will be 
regularly scrutinised after a certain date, so that when a satisfactory degree of 
competition has emerged, the decision to eliminate transitional regulation can 
be easily adopted.
The rules on competition, and particularly those established in the EC 
Treaty might play an important role for the elimination of the negative effects 
of over-regulation. They have built in mechanisms for the evaluation of the 
competitive structure of markets that allow for the evaluation of whether 
effective competition has emerged in a de-monopolised market. Therefore, 
such mechanisms might allow defining the point in time in which transitory 
regulation for the promotion of competition is not necessary anymore.
Furthermore, the mechanisms for the control of State measures with 
anticompetitive effects allow Community authorities to overrule regulatory 
obligations with such an effect. Regulatory authorities are subject to significant 
pressures both from political authorities and from the regulated industry. At the 
same time, in markets with a complicated structure, regulatory authorities 
might just miss their point and introduce obligations, which not only do not 
foster competition but actively obstruct it. Competition Law has mechanisms to 
counterbalance such anticompetitive intervention.
106. Limitations of regulation. The most important limitation for 
regulatory intervention in the telecommunications markets is the respect for the 
free market m echan ism s. The reform of the telecommunications sector has 
substituted direct public intervention by free market mechanisms as the main 
instrument ruling the sector. Regulatory intervention by the public authorities 
should not obstruct the regular functioning of such mechanisms, since such 
obstruction would im pa ir the functioning of the fundamental mechanisms of 
organisation in the sector.
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As it was observed earlier, one of the characteristics of regulatory 
intervention which was conclusive to its adoption in the field of 
telecommunications was its capacity to be developed in a competitive market 
without obstructing its regular functioning. This does not mean, nevertheless, 
that such compatibility is an intrinsic characteristic of regulatory intervention, 
as the American experience of regulation of the sector shows. It is for this 
reason that particular attention has to be devoted to the effects on the market of 
regulatory obligations imposed on the operators.
It is important to note at this point that Community authorities use 
mechanisms to outlaw regulatory interventions of the national authorities 
which obstruct competition in the liberalised markets. These are the same 
mechanisms which were used to abolish the exclusive rights granted for the 
exploitation of the telecommunications services and infrastructures. On the one 
hand, Community Directives, and particularly telecommunications harmonising 
Directives exclude certain regulatory measures of the Member States because 
of their obstructing nature. Article 169 EC Treaty could be used by Community 
authorities in order to abolish such actions. On the other hand, Community 
authorities can make use of Article 90 and of Articles 85 and 86 in relation to 
Article 5 EC Treaty in order to obstruct state measures with anticompetitive 
effects.
More concretely, regulatory intervention should not be unproportionate or 
discriminatory.293 Obligations imposed on operators active in the markets 
should not be unproportionate, in the sense that the obligations imposed on 
them should not create such a burden as to obstruct their regular functioning. 
C onnected  to this limitation are the restrictions on public action imposed for
293 Community Directives make continuous references to the limitations of State action. The main 
example can be found in the licenses Directive, where it is stated that “any conditions attached to 
authorisations should be objectively justified in relation to the service concerned and should be non- 
discriminatory, proportionate and transparent”, paragraph 10 Directive 97/13/EC.
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the respect of private property that exclude confiscatory measures. 
Discrimination is an important risk in the exercise of asymmetric regulation. 
The asymmetries in the obligations imposed on the operators according to their 
position in the market should be objectively justified, and should not impede a 
balanced competition in the market.
5.3.4. The Case of Price Control.
107. Anticompetitive pricing. Public intervention in relation to 
anticompetitive pricing provides a good model for the study of the interrelation 
between competition Law and economic regulation with regard to exclusionary 
practices by former monopolies.
The introduction of competition in the European telecommunications 
markets is forcing the former monopolists to reduce their prices in order to 
meet the competitive pressure of the new operators. Nevertheless, there is the 
risk that the pricing policy of the incumbents is not merely designed to meet 
competition but to eliminate it through die abuse of their market power. The 
incumbents can implement a policy of cross-subsidisation from those markets 
in which competition emerges slower (the local loop, for instance) to those 
markets in which competition is emerging faster (as long-distance telephony), 
in such a way that they can offer prices below costs which can exclude smaller 
competitors from the market.294 This is especially possible if the incumbents 
maintain legal or factual monopolies in neighbouring markets. This behaviour 
is denominated predatory pricing.
In the US there has been a long debate on the application of the rules on 
competition for the obstruction of predatory pricing, steaming from an erratic
294 LARSON & KOVACIC (1990): “Predatory Pricing Safeguards in Telecommunications Regulation: 
Removing Impediments to Competition”, in Saint Louis University Law Journal, vol. 35, no. 1, p. 1.
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case law295. The traditional position, fixed by Axeeda and Turner296, was that a 
price is predatory, and therefore contrary to the Sherman Act, if it is under the 
average variable cost. Nevertheless, subsequent literature and case-law297 have 
toned down such position, as it has been demonstrated that it is possible to 
obtain exclusionary effects with prices over a certain level and that prices 
which fall under that level for short period of time might have an economic 
justification. The most radical literature has even suggested that there is no 
economic base for predatory pricing.
In the UE, from the ECJ judgement in A K Z O it is considered that a 
price is predatory, and therefore, prohibited by Article 82 EC Treaty, if it is 
below the average variable costs. Prices above such a level but below the 
average total costs (which include both variable and fixed costs) might also be 
prohibited if no objective economic justification can be proposed.
A number of European incumbents have been accused of breaching the 
competition Law prohibition of predatory pricing. Deutsche Telekom (DT) was 
accused before the European Commission for this reason at the beginning of
1996. DT finally retired the proposed pricing scheme, but Commission 
authorities made clear that “hasta que la liberalización completa sea 
conseguida, la Comisión debe prestar una atención particular a los efectos y 
motivaciones de las reformas tarifarias”.299
295 GOMEZ SEGADE (1997): “Precios predatorios y derecho antitrust, Marciai Pons, Madrid.
296 AREEDA & TURNER (1975): “Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act”, in Harvard Law Review, vol. 88, pp. 697-733.
297 Fundamental was Matsushita Electronic Industry Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S 574 (1986). 
For the subsequent evolution see AUSTIN, Page (1990): “Predatory Pricing Law since Matsushita”, in 
Antitrust Law Journal, voL 58, pp. 895-911.
298 Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie v. Commission, ECR [1991[ 2259.
299 SCHAUB, A. (1996): “Competition Policy in the Telecoms Sector”, in Competition Policy 
Newsletter, vol. 2, no. 1, p. 6.
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Also in Spain Telefónica was accused of predatory pricing by British 
Telecom (BT). The Servicio de Defensa de la Competencia considered that 
Telefónica had incurred in such practices as regards the market of leased lines. 
The Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia finally considered that the 
Servicio had not provided enough evidence as to impose a penalty, but 
recognised that the dominant position of Telefónica, its financial capacity and 
the particular structure of recently liberalised markets could make it 
economically beneficial for the incumbent to engage in such a behaviour.500 
Similar problems have been faced in the Netherlands and in Israel.
Competition Law, nevertheless, does not provide the only mechanisms to 
control such behaviour. Due to the particular characteristics of the 
telecommunications markets in the period of transition to effective competition, 
most Member States have defined price control mechanisms of a regulatory 
character. For instance, in Spain, national Legislation bestows on the 
Government, advised by the NRA, the power to control the prices of the 
operators (particularly of those with significant market power) through 
previously approved mechanisms or even through the definition of minimum 
prices of fixed prices. In this way, price schemes are controlled before they are 
implemented.301
As a result, in Spain, as in many other Member States, both mechanisms 
of intervention coexist. This coexistence was brought about by the need to 
effectively obstruct a behaviour which could seriously damage new comers. 
The long antitrust procedures might not be efficient enough in a period of 
transition in which market structure favours this kind of behaviour, and, at the
300 Resolution of the Tribunal de Defensa de ¡a Competencia, Case 412/1997, BT v TELEFÓNICA.
301 In Spain even specific provisions have been introduced as regards the advertising of price schemes 
before they are approved, see MONTERO & BROKELMANN (1999): "Telecomunicaciones y 
televisión. La nueva regulación en España”, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia.
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same time, it is not always simple to prove the existence of such an abusive 
practice.
However, regulatory intervention is prone to capture and to over extend 
the application of such intervention even after the disparition of the situation 
which gave rise to the creation of the regulatory mechanisms. For all these 
reasons, a counterbalanced intervention of the regulatory and the competition 
authorities can have beneficial effects.
Different reasons can take a regulator to accept prices which might have 
exclusionary effects. The review of their decisions by the competition 
authorities (national if granted such power, or Community authorities under the 
effet outil doctrine) might provide an efficient mechanisms to solve the 
problem. The case of DT’s 1996 price scheme might be a good example of the 
positive effects of this counterbalanced approach. At the same time, 
competition authorities are in a good position to measure the need for such 
intervention as effective competition emerges in the telecommunications 
markets.
Both policies also face common problems. The main one is the difficulty 
in determining the cost of a particular cost in a network industry like 
telecommunications. Both competition authorities and regulatory authorities 
base their intervention with regard to prices on the relationship between prices 
and costs. The theoretical and practical difficulties in the determining costs 
advisees the collaboration between all the institutions for the development of 
efficient cost-determination systems.302
302 Vide infra Chapter 9.2.3. Compulsory Access.
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5.4. FROM REGULATION TO COMPETITION?
5.4.1. Public Intervention in Oligopolistic Markets.
108. From de-monopolisation to effective competition. It has been 
stated the scope of the liberalisation process has been the substitution of public 
monopolies through the pressure of effective competition on all market players. 
Public intervention was considered necessary in order to facilitate the 
emergence of effective competition, as otherwise there was the risk of creating 
private monopolies.
An analysis of the 1998 regulatory framework proves that public 
intervention for the promotion of the emergence of competition in the market 
was focused on the incumbents, and in particular in the management of their 
public telephony networks.
Public intervention was concentrated on the incumbents since they were 
initially the only operators with market power. These operators not only had 
the control of the only existing universal telecommunications network, but a 
market share in most service markets close to a 100%. The asymmetrical 
regulation created by the 1998 regulatory framework imposed obligations 
almost exclusively on the incumbents, as they were the only operator with 
widespread market power.
At the same time, the 1998 regulatory framework focused on those 
product markets which were more relevant at the moment the directives were 
adopted. As a result, only a limited number of telecommunications markets 
were considered, mostly public telephony network and services and leased 
lines. As a matter of fact, new markets such as mobile communications 
networks and services received very little attention. The reasons might be that 
these markets were not subject to exclusive and special rights, and also because 
their importance was not fully understood.
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The 1998 regulatory framework not only focused on a very limited range 
of product markets and operators, it was not flexible with regard to the 
extension to new markets.
As a matter of fact, it was thought that the regulatory framework was of a 
transitory nature. As the market power of the incumbent would diminish as a 
result of the competition by new comers, the regulatory framework should be 
eliminated. The Directives did not include specific phase-out provisions, but 
defined clearly this principle.
The more traditional telecommunications markets (voice telephony and 
leased lines) have witnessed the entrance of new comers and a sign ificant 
diminution of the incumbents market share in many market segments 
(backbone circuits and long distance telephony), even if local telephony and 
access lines have remained largely under the control of the incumbents.
In any case, and in particular with regard to network competition, it is 
possible to identify a tendency towards a not fully competitive market 
structure. The significant barriers to entry, the relevance of sunk costs, the 
economies of scale and scope etc. have limited market entrance and therefore 
given rise to a very concentrated market. Many markets are adopting a 
oligopolistic structure with a clear tendency for collusion.
109. New markets. As some competition has started to emerge in the 
traditional voice telephony markets, the telecommunications markets have 
witnessed the increasing relevance of new telecommunications networks and 
services. The most relevant case is, certainly, the wireless telephony markets. 
Examples are the digital TV networks, the CP networks and in general the 
Internet services.
For the most part, these markets have evolved in a liberalised 
env ironm ent in which special or exclusive right did not exist or had little 
relevance. Nevertheless, experience shows that such an evolution has not
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always led to the emergence of effective competition. The aforementioned 
characteristics of network industries, and the identified principle of “winner 
takes it all” leads often to concentrated markets with a very rigid competition. 
The mobile telephony network market is probably the best example of the 
tendency of network industries to oligopolistic market structures. Digital TV 
networks, no matter whether by satellite, cable or terrestrial, also prove this 
tendency.
110. Oligopolistic markets. It is possible to argue that a significant share 
of both traditional and new telecommunications markets are adopting an 
oligopolistic structure. Actually, it was possible to foresee such an evolution of 
the telephony networks and other telecommunications market. Furthermore, 
this structure is not necessarily negative. Economic science proves that in 
theory, effective competition is possible not only in concentrated markets but 
even in duopoly markets.
The Bertrand price competition model proves that duopolists will 
experience effective pressures to price at marginal costs levels as whichever 
firm that offers the lower price in the market will monopolise the market. 
However, economic theory shows also that this equilibrium is only possible if 
su n k  costs are literally zero. In case there are sunk costs, not matter how small, 
such costs become a barrier to entry and leads to competition to enter the 
market first. Since effective competition would lead prices to marginal costs, 
sunk costs would not be recovered, so the first comer achieves the protection of 
such a barrier to entry.
A similar problem is faced in oligopolistic markets. Competition is 
perfectly possible in theory, but the relevance of sunk costs in network 
industries, the homogeneous character of telecommunications services, and the 
low contestability of network markets (particularly if there is a physical barrier 
to entry as in mobile com m u n ications) are obstacles to competition. As a
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matter of fact, competition in oligopoly markets with high sunk costs can only 
take place at the expense of the duplication of sunk costs. Such an equilibrium 
is reachable in repeated non-co-operative games given that the very same 
experience of market players makes the threat of a price war credible for all the 
players. Since cheating in the game involves a temporal gain in profits 
followed by a long-term loss, no firm ever wants to cheat if losses are bigger 
than gains. As a result, such a credible threat can enforce perfectly collusive 
outcomes for as long as technology does not evolve.
111. Concerted practices. The European rules on competition provide 
two different mechanisms against tacit co-ordination between oligopolists. 
Such co-ordination can be considered a concerted practice under Article 81 EC 
Treaty (or the correspondent national provision) or it can be considered an 
abuse of a collective dominance under Article 82.
Article 81 (former Article 85) prohibits “any agreement [...] or conceited 
practice [...] which has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition”. It is clear that Article 81 out-laws explicit 
agreements between oligopolists to reduce output and increase prices. The 
problem usually faced by competition authorities is to prove the existence of 
such explicit agreements. After decades of antitrust enforcement in Europe, 
companies are fully aware of the need not to produce any evidence which can 
be used by competition authorities to prove collusion. In this way, no written 
record of the agreement is produced, internal memoranda and even records of 
meetings between competitors are also avoided. Companies have become 
increasingly sophisticated as regards the mechanisms used to exchange 
information and to reach agreements.
Furthermore, in oligopolistic markets with a strong tendency towards tacit 
co-ordination (repeated game, price transparency etc.) it is not usually 
necessary to hold meetings in order to reach explicit agreements. Concerted
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practices are usually enough to avoid the pressures of competition.303 As it was 
put by the Commission “where related conduct by the parties did not result 
from an agreement that could be proved that conduct could nevertheless be 
viewed as constituting a concerted practice”.304 In repeated games, companies 
can just co-ordinate their behaviour as the game develops. Price transparency 
allows companies to adapt their behaviour to the competitors strategy. 
Companies can launch signals to their competitors and through these signals 
co-ordinate their strategies.
It is not simple for competition authorities to prove the existence of a 
concerted practice. Very little documentary evidence can be found in order to 
prove the existence of concerted practices (internal memoranda, for instance) 
but, once again, European companies have learnt not to produce or to eliminate 
such evidence. As a result, competition authorities can only rely on market 
analysis in order to prove, firstly, the existence of connection between the 
strategies of the competitors (even if it is clear that in markets with fierce 
competition companies react to competitors behaviours), and secondly the 
anticompetitive results of the connection in the companies strategies (reduction 
of output against consumer welfare, for instance).
It is clear that such economic analyses are highly sophisticated. The 
elaboration of such analyses requires significant resources which competition 
authorities do not always have at their disposal. At the same time, in case they 
are challenged, such analyses have to be backed by Courts which do not 
usually have the ability to judge them. As a consequence, competition 
authorities have been reluctant to rely exclusively on such analyses and usually
303 See ALESE, F. (1999): "The Economic theory of Non-Collusive oligopoly and the Concept of 
concerted practice Under Article 81”, in European Competition Law Review, no. 7, pp. 379-383; and 
JONES, A. (1993): “Woodpulp: Concerted practice and/or conscious Parallelism?”, in European 
Competition Law Review, p. 273.
304 Polypropylene, Commission Decision 85/398/EEC [1986] OJ L 230/1, para. 4.
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require some evidence or at least some strong presumptions in order to 
intervene against concerted practices.305
Even in those cases in which competition authorities have managed to 
identify collusive behaviours in oligopolistic markets and have fined the 
companies involved, such intervention does not ensure the end of such 
behaviours. The very same tendency of the markets has often lead to new 
collusive behaviours, of a more sophisticated nature, as companies have 
improved their ability to hide their strategies as a result of the intervention in 
the past of the competition authorities. As a matter of fact, competition 
authorities have concentrated most of their intervention in oligopolistic markets 
such as pharmaceuticals, concrete etc. but cannot claim to be fully effective.
Article 81 EC Treaty, thus, has not been an effective mechanism to 
obstruct the anticompetitive effects of concerted practices in oligopolistic 
markets.
112. Collective dominance. The European rules on competition provide a 
second instrument of intervention against anticompetitive behaviours in 
oligopolistic markets. Article 82 EC Treaty outlaws “any abuse by one of more 
undertakings of a dominant position”.306
The lim ita tions of Article 81 EC Treaty were always evident and as a 
consequence in the early 70s the Commission undertook the first attempts to 
make use of Article 82 against anticompetitive behaviours in oligopolistic
305 Vide ALESE (1999), p. 383 (supra footnote 303).
306 See BRIONES, 1995): “Oligopolistic Dominance: is there a Common Approach in Different 
Jurisdictions?”, in European Competition Law Review, p. 334; CAFFARRA, C. and KUHN, K. U. 
(1999): “Joint Dominance: The CFI Judgement on Gencor/Lonrho”, in European Competition Law 
Review, no. 7, pp. 355-359; KORAH, V. (1999): “Gencor v. commission: Collective Dominance”, in 
European Competition Law Review, no. 6, pp. 337-341; VENTT, 1998): “Two Steps Forward and No 
Steps back: Economic Analysis anri Oligopolistic Dominance after Kali und Salz”, in Common Market 
Law Review, voL 35, p. 1101; WfflSH, R. (2000): “Collective Dominance”, in “Liber Amicorumfor 
Lord Sfynn”, vol. 1; and WINKLER and HANSEN (1993): “Collective Dominance under die EC 
Merger Control Regulation”, in Common Market Law Review, vol. 30, p. 787.
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markets.307 Nevertheless, the ECJ adopted a negative view against this trend, 
and in Hoffman-La Roche stated: “A dominant position must also be 
distinguished from parallel courses of conduct which are peculiar to oligopolies 
in that in an oligopoly the courses of conduct interact, while in the case of an 
undertaking occupying a dominant position the conduct of the undertaking 
which derives profits from that position is to a great extent determined 
unilaterally”.308 The Commission refrained then to make use of this strand.
Nevertheless, by the end of the 90’s, the Commission made a new attempt 
to make use of Article 82 against anticompetitive oligopolies.309 In this 
occasion, the CFI adopted a more positive attitude: “There is nothing, in 
principle, to prevent two or more independent economic entities from being, on 
a specific market, united by such economic links that, by virtue of that fact, 
together they hold a dominant position vis-à-vis the other operators on the same 
market.”
Even if the CFI backed the possibility for two or more companies to enjoy 
a collective dominant position, the paragraph just quoted was interpreted in the 
sense that a particular economic link between the companies would be required 
in order apply Article 82. The CFI did not specify what kind of economic link. 
It proposed some examples (as intellectual property licences) but it did not 
clarify whether the mere oligopolistic structure of the market would be 
considered a sufficient economic link between the competitors. This doubt has 
not been further clarified by the CFI nor the ECJ.310
307 See for instance COM(1975) 675, “Report on the Behaviour of the Oil Companies during the period 
from October 1973 to March 1974”, 10.12.1975; Sugar Cartel, Commission ¡Decision 73/109/EEC OJ 
[1973] L 140/17.
308 See Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission [1979] ECR 461, para. 39.
309 Italian Flat Glass, Commission Decision 89/93/EEC OJ [1989] L 33/40.
310 Case C-393/92, Almelo v. NV Energiebedrif Ijssebnij [1994] ECR 1-1477; Case C-96/94, Centro 
Servizi Spediporto Sri v. SpedizioniMaritime del Golfo Sri, [1995] ECR 1-2883.
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The Commission, in any case, went forward and adopted a series of 
decisions based on the collective dominance doctrine.311 Furthermore, the 
Commission’s position as regards the nature of the economic links which 
should create the collective dominance was clarified in the Access Notice: It is 
a sufficient economic link if there is the kind of interdependence which often 
comes about in oligopolistic situations. There does not seem to be any reason in 
law or in economic theory to require any other economic link between jointly 
dominant companies”.312
The doubts were cleared by the CFI in Gencor v. Commission. In this 
judgement, the CFI clearly stated that in its Judgement in the Flat Glass case, 
the Court referred to links of a structural nature only by way of example and 
did not lay down that such links must exist in order for a finding of collective 
dominance to be made”. “Furthermore, there is no reason whatsoever in legal 
or economic terms to exclude from the notion of economic links the 
relationship of interdependence existing between the parties to a tight oligopoly 
within which, in a market with the appropriate characteristics, in particular in 
terms of market concentration, transparency and produce homogeneity, those 
parties are in a position to anticipate one another’s behaviour and are therefore 
strongly encouraged to align their conduct on the market, in particular in such a 
way as to maximise their joint profits by restricting production with a view to 
increasing prices. In such a context, each trader is aware that highly 
competitive action on its part designed to increase its market share (for 
example a price cut) would provoke identical action by the others, so that it
311 French-West African Shipowners’ Committees, Commission Decision 92/262/EEC OJ [1992] L 
134/1; Cewal, Commission Decision 93/82/EEC OJ [1993] L 34/2: Port of Rodby, Commission 
Decision 94/119/EC OJ [1994] L 55/52; and Irish Sugar, Commission Decision 97/624/EC OJ [1997] 
L 258/1.
3,2 Vide Access Notice, para. 79 (supra footnote 265).
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would derive no benefit from its initiative. All the traders would thus be 
affected by the reduction in price levels”.313
This Judgement was followed by a number of relevant Commission 
decisions such as Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand,314 and Aitours/first 
Choice.3l5 It is important to point that all these cases resulted from the 
application of the Merger Regulation and not as a result of the application of 
Article 82.
It might not be simple to expand the application of the case-law on 
collective dominance from merger cases to Article 82 cases, particularly to 
exploitative abuses.316 It has already been shown that the rules on competition 
are particularly strict against market power when such a situation would be 
reached by a merger. It is not clear if a similarly strict approach could be 
developed by the competition authorities against collective dominance 
positions already present in the market.
In particular, it is not clear whether the Commission could impose a price 
reduction based on the findings that, without any collusion, not even parallel 
behaviour, merely as a result of the very same market structure, collectively 
dominant undertakings are imposing excessive prices. It seems clear that in 
case there is collusion or concerted practices, actions have to be brought based 
on Article 81 and not Article 82. If this is not the case, the Commission would 
have to intervene in order to impose a price different from the price derived 
from the rational behaviour of market players. Once more, the Commission 
would adopt a regulatory approach. More clear is the possibility for the
313 Gencor v. Commission, Case T-102/96 [1999] ECR 4, para. 273 and 277.
314 Price Waterhouse/Coopers &. Lybrand, Case IV/M. 938 OJ [1997] L 50/27.
3li Aitours/First Choice, Case IV/M. 1524.
3,4 Vide WHISH (2000), (supra footnote 306).
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competition authorities to proscribe exclusionary practices by collectively 
dominant players.
113. Antitrust and collective dominance in telecoms. It has been 
shown that many telecommunications markets, particularly network markets 
both traditional and newer, have a strong tendency to adopt an oligopolistic 
structure with tacit co-ordination. Some fundamental features of 
telecommunications markets (concentration, price transparency, relevance of 
sunk costs, relevance of barriers to entry etc.). As a matter of fact, the 
Commission has recognised this tendency in the Access Notice,317 as even 
interconnection agreements might create economic links which would facilitate 
collusion.
Experience proves that the rules on competition have never been effective 
in order to exclude distortions in collusive oligopolies. The new collective 
dominance approach to collusive dominance might provide some sharper tools 
for intervention, but such intervention risks denaturalising antitrust and once 
more strengthening its regulatory tendency.
114. Economic regulation and collective dominance. The Commission 
seems aware of this risk and for this reason might have decided to complement 
antitrust with sector specific instruments. As a result of the 99 Review, the 
Commission has recognised that sector specific regulation is still necessary, as 
effective competition might not emerge in all the telecommunications markets, 
and competition law remedies m igh t  not be sufficient to address the 
problems.31*
317 Vide Access Notice para. 79 {supra footnote 265).
318 See COM(2000) 393, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, of 12.07.2000, 
para 21.
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As the Commission proposes to extend the antitrust dominance test to the 
regulatory arena, it has proposed to impose the regulatory framework not only 
on those operators individually holding a dominant position (mostly the 
incumbents) but also on operators jointly holding such position: “An 
undertaking shall be deemed to have significant market power if, either 
individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a position of economic strength 
affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of 
competitors, customers and ultimately consumers”.319
We have already pointed to the problems raised for the use of the antitrust 
dominance category in the regulatory field. The transplant of the collective 
dominance test to this field might entail further problems. The Commission 
proposes to raise the thresholds for intervention from a mere 25% market share 
to an antitrust dominance test. The collective dominance doctrine is suppose to 
allow the regulatory authorities to intervene in oligopolistic markets without a 
clear market leader. The problem is that in case the European Courts change 
their tendency and dismiss the collective dominance doctrine, and the 
weaknesses of the doctrine does not make this impossible, public intervention 
both antitrust and regulatory, would be impossible despite the evident 
distortions in the market.
5.4.2. Regulation and the General Interest.
115. General interest objectives outside of the scope of the market.
Competition Law can promote the efficiency in the market, but it is clear that 
certain general interest objectives fixed by public authorities are outside of the 
reach of the operators active in the market. The provision of certain basic
319 Ibid. Article 13(2).
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services at an affordable price, for instance, might require the definition of 
prices below cost.
Even if competitive structures reinforced by a strict application of the 
rules on competition, can promote efficiency and lower costs, after a certain 
limit, another instrument of public intervention (public subsidies, the creation 
of a fund for the financing of the provision of the service below cost etc.) will 
be required for the fulfilment of the general interest objective.
116. Regulation and other general interest objectives. Even in case 
liberalisation produces an increase in the efficiency of the telecommunications 
operators, reduces prices and ameliorates the quality of the telecommunications 
services, as pled by the defendants of the process of reform of the sector, it is 
widely recognised that some objectives of general interest will, in all 
likelihood, not be ensured by the mere interaction of the mechanisms of supply 
and demand in a competitive market. There are general interest values that are 
out of the scope of the market. It does not mean that such objectives are 
incompatible with the market, but rather, that they are not necessarily among 
the results of effective competition. In these cases, the application of 
competition Law does not ensure either the satisfaction of the general interest, 
since such an instrument only protects the market mechanisms and cannot 
guarantee the fulfilment of objectives foreign to the market’s logic.
Community authorities and in general the defendants of the process of 
liberalisation have been accused of scorning the satisfaction of general interests 
outside the scope of the market, as well as of eliminating all the elements of 
solidarity that have traditionally ruled the provision by the national monopolies 
of the public utilities in Europe. Nevertheless, it has to be argued that the 
reform of the te lecom m unications legislation has not eliminated all the 
instruments of public intervention in the defence of the general interest but has 
merely substituted the traditional direct intervention instruments, incompatible
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with the new competitive structure, with new instruments of indirect public 
intervention. This substitution has facilitated the transformation of the political 
responsibility of the public authorities in the provision of the services of 
general interest, in legal responsibilities bestowed in the private providers of 
the services, but also in the public authorities, in such a way that for the first 
time, citizens have the legal right to enforce the satisfaction of the general 
interest.
The obligations imposed on the operators should not obstruct the regular 
functioning of the competitive mechanisms of the market. At the same time, the 
obligation imposed on the operators cannot create for them an excessive 
economic burden, as this would amount to an illegitimate confiscation. As a 
result, mechanisms of distribution of the economic burden of the obligations 
imposed on the operators have been defined at a Community level, among 
them the Universal Service Fund.320
5.5. CONCLUSIONS.
117. Final. When it was decided to de-monopolise European 
telecommunications markets, it was commonly understood that public 
intervention would be necessary in order to facilitate the transition from public 
monopolies to effective competition.
The rules on competition proscribed the behaviour of incumbents trying 
to prevent the emergence of competition, and at the same time, provided some 
instruments to proscribe exploitative abuses by the incumbents. Nevertheless, it 
was understood that the rules on competition would not be enough to foster 
competition and ensure the satisfaction of the general interest.
320 Vide infra 93. Regulating Access by Consumers.
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On the one hand, the European rules on competition were designed to 
defend existing competition and to eliminate behavioural obstacles to the 
emergence of new competition in the market. Nevertheless, such rules are not 
fitted to reduce or eliminate the structural obstacles to competition derived 
from the very same presence in the telecommunications markets of the 
incumbents. These operators benefit from the economies of scale and network 
externality effects which characterise network industries.
At the same time, even if the antitrust rules can guarantee the orientation 
of prices to costs and some cost reduction as a result of the constraints of 
competition, it is clear that these rules can never guarantee the provision of 
services below costs in order to fulfill general interest objective.
As a result of the limitations faced by antitrust, sector specific regulation 
was introduced by European authorities. Such regulation was focused, on the 
one hand on access to the incumbents’ more traditional telephony networks and 
leased lines. This intervention was considered transitory, as it was supposed to 
disappear with the emergence of effective competition. On the other hand, 
obligations on universal service were introduced.
Nevertheless, the tendency to collusive oligopolistic market structures 
both in the more traditional markets (telephony networks) and in new markets 
(mobile communications, digital TV networks) might entail the necessity of 
maintaining certain regulatory obligations on operators enjoying market power, 
whether exclusively or jointly with other competitors. This intervention is 
certainly subsidiary. If competition emerges, it should be eliminated, but this 
might not be the case, as market failures might be of a permanent or at least 
stable nature.
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CHAPTER 6 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
SUMMARY: 6.1. Introduction. 6.2. Concentrated 
Structures. 6.3. Dual Structures. 6.4. 
Conclusions.
6.1. INTRODUCTION.
6.1.1. Competition and Regulatory Authorities.
118. General. The existence of two main instruments of public 
intervention in de-monopolised markets has determined the institutional 
framework for public intervention in de-monopolised markets.321 In most of the 
industrialised States, specialised institutions (National Competition Authorities 
NCAs) enforce the general rules on competition even if in connection with
321 For an analysis on the influence of the institutional framework in the liberalisation process see 
SCOTT, C. (1996): Institutional Competition and Co-ordination in the Process of Telecommunications 
Liberalisation”, in “International Regulatory Competition and Co-ordination”, Claredon Press, Oxford, 
pp. 381-413.
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other national institutions (as the judiciary or regional authorities in federal 
states) and with supra-national institutions in the case of the Member States of 
the European Union. At the same time, the liberalisation of the 
telecommunications markets has fostered the creation of sector specific 
institutions in many States where such institution did not exist before. The 
structure, legal status and competencies of such National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs) are very varied.
The distribution of competencies between the competition authorities and 
the regulatory authorities is complicated by the fact that most of the NRAs 
have as an explicit or implicit goal the promotion of competition in the 
telecommunications markets. Even if most of the NRAs are not competent to 
enforce the rules on competition, some of the NRAs have interpreted in a very 
broad sense the competencies they enjoy for the promotion of competition, and 
this has created conflicts with the competition authorities.
The competition between different authorities for the provision of the best 
solutions for the actors in the market can have interesting beneficial effects, as 
long as the distribution of competencies between the institutions is clear and 
the authorities involved in such competition are not tempted to pass certain 
basic limits in order to obtain “clients”.
The problem of the incompatibility of policies is also important. Even if 
the NRAs have as their main objective the promotion of competition, in some 
cases they might be tempted to adopt their own strategy to reach such an 
objective, through the over-regulation of the markets. Furthermore, they can 
even adopt anticompetitive measures (for example in relation to universal 
service).
The most radical solution for such conflicts has been to avoid the creation 
of two different institutions, and the concentration of both the antitrust and the 
regulatory powers in a single institution. In such a way, antitrust authorities
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have been granted regulatory powers in de-monopolised markets for example 
in Australia. Contrariously, it has been a common request by the regulatory 
authorities to enjoy an exclusive application the rules on competition in the 
regulated sector, excluding the intervention of the national competition 
authority in such markets.
In those cases in which two different institutions intervene in the de­
monopolised markets, it has been common to establish a static distribution of 
competencies, and to leave for the institutions to reach an equilibrium through 
confrontation and informal agreements. Nevertheless there are interesting 
examples of more dynamic approaches which try to create formal and 
transparent mechanisms of co-ordination between the competition and the 
regulatory authorities for the definition of the borderline between both kinds of 
intervention.
119. Competition authorities. The institutional framework for the 
application of competition Law in Europe has a more solid tradition than the 
regulatory institutional framework. This does not mean, however, that such a 
framework is characterised by its clarity and simplicity. The framework is 
complicated by the coexistence of two sets of rules: on the one hand the 
C om m unity  competition Law, and on the other the national competition Law 
(usually designed following the structure of Community competition Law), and 
the necessary co-ordination between both the sets of rules and the institutions 
which apply them.
Community competition Law is centrally applied by Directorate General 
IV of the European Commission. At the same time, some of the rules contained 
in the EC Treaty are directly applicable and therefore can be applied by the 
national judiciary. Even more, some Member States have empowered the
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national competition authorities to apply Community competition Law.322 
Regulation 17/62 creates some mechanisms of co-ordination between the 
Community and the national competition authorities, and the trend is towards i 
the de-centralisation of the application of the Community rules on 
competition.323 Such a trend coexists with the proposal for the creation of an 
independent agency (a European Cartel Office) in charge of the application of 
European competition Law, in the framework of the European Union, in order 
to increase the efficiency of it application and to reduce political interference.324
Over the decades, member States have all developed their own set of rules 
on competition and in parallel have established specific institutions for the 
application of such rules (and in some cases also of the Community rules on 
competition). National competition authorities (NCAs) have different legal 
status, even if there is a general tendency for them to enjoy a certain degree of 
independence from the general administration. The specificity of the rules on 
competition and their complexity has often recommended such separation and 
the establishment of specific institutions with their own administrative 
procedures.325
120. Regulatory authorities. The first regulatory authorities appeared in 
the US by the turn of the century. Their raison d’etre was the development of 
regulatory intervention in markets of general interest. In the framework of the 
extension of public intervention in the economic activity during the New Deal
322 See EHLERMANN, C. D. (1996): “Implementation of EC Competition Law by national antitrust 
authorities”, in European Competition Law Review, no. 2, p. 88.
323 See EHLERMANN, C. D. and LAUDATI, L. Ed. (1997): “Annual on European Competition Law 
1996”, Kluwer, The Hague.
324 EHLERMANN, C. D. (1995): “Reflections on a European Cartel office”, in Common Market Law 
Review, voL 32, p. 471.
325 For the Spanish experience see BAÑO LEÓN, J. (1996): “El Servicio de Defensa de la Competencia 
y el Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia: funciones y procedimiento”, in uLa intervención 
administrativa en la economía”, CGPJ, Madrid, pp. 213-248.
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period, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was created.326 The 
establishment of the FCC was the culmination of the process of monopolisation 
of the American telecommunications markets. It developed a market 
substitutive intervention for decades, until the process of deregulation was 
initiated in the 70’s.327
The recent creation of the regulatory authorities in the European Union, 
on the contrary, can only be understood in the framework of the process of 
liberalisation of the markets. Since the first steps of such process, it appeared 
indispensable to separate the management of the services by the 
Telecommunications Organisations (often in hands of the State), from the 
regulation of such markets, through the creation of regulatory authorities, 
independent from the Telecommunications Organisation328.
The Community legislative framework contains numerous provisions in 
relation to the separation between management and regulation. The first 
reference was included in Article 6 of the Terminals Directive, which imposes 
upon Member States the obligation to ensure that the responsibility for drawing 
up technical specifications and granting type-approval would be entrusted to a 
body independent from public or private undertakings offering goods or 
services in the telecommunications sector. Such provision was later developed 
so as to ensure that national regulatory authorities would be legally distinct 
from and functionally independent from all organisations providing 
telecommunications networks, equipment or services.329 The new directives
326 Vide supra Chapter 2.1. Origins and Evolution of Economic Regulation, and Chapter 2.4.2. The 
Regulated Monopoly, as well as MONTERO PASCUAL, J. J. (1996): ‘Titularidad privada de los 
servicios de interés general”, in Revista Española de Derecho Administrativo, voL 92, p. 590.
327 See BROCK, G. (1981): "The Telecommunications Industry. The Dynamics of Market Structure”, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.
328 See, for instance, COM(87) 290 final. Green paper on Telecommunications, p. 15.
329 Article 5a Directive 90/387/EEC as modified by Directive 97/51/EC, Article 7 Directive 
90/388/EEC as amended by Directive 96/19/EC, and Article 2 Directive 97/13/EC.
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proposed by the Commission as a result of the 99 Review reinforce the 
independence of the NRAs.330
The Community legal framework imposed as obligation ensuring the 
formal and substantive independence of the regulators from the operators. As 
most of the incumbent operators were directly or indirectly controlled by the 
public authorities, Member States had to develop mechanisms to ensure the 
independence of the regulator from other public authorities. As a result, most of 
the Member States created sector specific institutions independent from the rest 
of the executive branch.
Independent agencies had a long tradition in the US, as most regulatory 
agencies had this legal status. Nevertheless, independent agencies were not 
unknown in Europe, since a numerous of Member States had in the last decades 
developed a number of independent administrations aimed at excluding 
partisan decision-making in relation to delicate issues.331 The list of European 
independent administrations, initially including administration with a guarantee 
function, has been increased with a new set of administrations with a regulatory 
function.
Just as independent agencies have created a long-lasting constitutional 
debate in the US, independent administrations have raised an interesting debate 
in the Member States, particularly in those States with a parliamentary system
3» was general support for the Review Communication’s proposals to strengthen die
independence of NRAs and to improve transparency of their decision-making. As has already been 
mentioned, many commentators called for increased co-operation with competition authorities and with 
the Commission.”, in COM(2000) 239 final. Communication from the Commission, The results of the 
public consultation on the 1999 Communications Review anH Orientations for the new Regulatory 
Framework, Brussels. The particular measures can be found in COM(2000) 393, Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for 
electronic communications networks and services, 12.7.2000, Brussels.
331 The best example of this policy was the creation of independent administrations in France, Italy and 
other Member States for the control of broadcasting.
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following Rousseau’s model,332 and a strong centralised administration as 
France or Spain.333 Many European constitutions explicitly state that the 
Administration is under the control of the Government, which is directly 
responsible under the Legislative power Therefore, the creation of an 
independent administration, out-side the direct control of the Government and 
the indirect control of the Parliament supposes a radical exception to the 
general principles established in the constitution.334
Regulation by independent adm in istration favours both specialisation and 
the full exploitation of the new mechanisms of public intervention offered by 
economic regulation. This is because a new administration can more easily 
adapt the traditional rules on administrative procedure to the new requirements 
of regulatory intervention, and in general to the new challenges of this new 
instrument of public intervention. Nevertheless, regulation by independent 
administration and not by the traditional administration has also disadvantages. 
The introduction of partisan politics in the functioning of the regulators would 
easily produce unbalances as power would be exercised with less rigid controls 
than usual, as political control would mostly be eliminated in favour of a
332 As it has been appointed by different authorors, independent administrations are closer to flic Anglo- 
Saxon constitutional tradition derived from Locke*s construction, that in the continental tradition of 
centralist napoleonic administration in the framework of Rousseaus’s division of powers. See 
AMATO, G. (1997): “Autorità semi-independenti ed autorità di gaianzia”, en Rivista Trimestrale di 
Diritto PubbiicOy no. 3, pp. 645-664.
333 The French experience can be studied in COLLIARD and TIMSIT (1988): “Les autorités 
administratives indépendantes”, PUF, Paris; and GUEDON, M. J. (1991): “Les autorités 
administratives indépendantes”, LGDJ, Paris. Such experience had a strong influence in Italy and 
Spain. For the Italian case see PASSARO, M. (1996): “Le Amministrazioni independentf\ 
Giappichelli, Torino. For the Spanish experience, see BETANCOR RODRÍGUEZ, A. (1995): “Las 
Administraciones independientes”, Tecnos, Madrid; FERNANDEZ RODRÍGUEZ, T. (1994): 
“Reflexiones sobre las llamadas autoridades administrativas independientes”, en “Libro homenaje a 
Manuel Clavero Arévalo”, Cívitas, Madrid, pp. 427-439; and PARADA VÁZQUEZ, J. R. (1994): “Las 
administraciones independientes”, in “Libro homenaje a Manuel Clavero Arévalo”, Cívitas, Madrid, 
pp. 653-689.
334 It is for this reason that in France, the competent Ministry has to confirm most of the decisions 
adopted by the regulatory authority in the telecoms sector (ART) following the Decision of the Conseil 
d'État n 88-248 DC January 17, 1989. In Spain such a solution has not been implemented, but the 
national regulatory authority (CMT) is formally attached to the Ministry of public works, even if there 
is no hierarchical relation between both institutions.
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necessarily limited judicial review. At the same time, the regulatory 
administration could also be “captured” more easily by the industry, due to the 
closeness and even potential identification between the specialised 
administration and the regulated companies, particularly the new entrants.
As the process of liberalisation of the telecommunications operators 
reaches its conclusion, the need for independent regulatory administrations will 
be reduced. The obligation imposed on the Member States to separate formally 
the regulator from the rest of the administration will disappear as Member 
States complete the privatisation of the telecom operators. A tendency for 
regulatory mechanisms to become more and more common con be envisaged, 
in such a way that the traditional administration might tend to reduce its 
opposition to use them, and, furthermore, as effective competition emerges in 
the telecoms markets, regulatory intervention for the promotion of competition 
will be unnecessary.
The structure, competencies and powers of the national regulatory 
authorities are very different in the Member States, even if a few common 
characteristics can be defined. With regard to the structure of the regulatory 
adm in istrations, most of the Member States have a dual structure, with a 
division of regulatory competencies between an independent regulatory 
administration and the competent Ministry. The degree of independence of the 
regulatory administration and the competencies bestowed to it vary from 
country to country. The very same structure of the independent administration 
varies, as some of them are unipersonal (UK and Sweden, for example) and 
other are collegiate (the number of members is also very variable). Even if it is 
common to have a reduced number of members in the executive council, 
(around 5), a number of examples of bodies with more members can be found.
The methods of the appointment of members are also different. Most of 
the Member States have balanced the lack of control by the Legislative by
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ensuring an important role to the parliament in the appointment of the 
members. Nevertheless, this is not always the case, and sometimes the 
appointment is made by the Executive with little or no intervention by the 
Legislative (this is the case of Spain, for example). A fundamental mechanism 
for ensuring independence is the lack of a hierarchical relation between the 
independent regulatory administration and the government. Other mechanisms 
are the limitations to dismiss the members of the NRA, the limitations to re­
eligibility, and the provision of sufficient economic and personal resources to 
the NRA.
With regard to the competencies of the independent regulatory authorities, 
it is common for them to enjoy competencies in relation to interconnection, 
numbering and universal service. In some cases, the competent Ministry 
maintains important competencies in the licensing procedures (this is the case 
of France and Spain, for instance). The same can be said about the management 
of radiolectric frequencies.
Powers are also unevenly distributed among the different national 
independent regulatory authorities. They usually enjoy executive powers for 
the application of the relevant legislation through legal measures affecting 
individual operators, as well as competencies for the resolution of conflicts 
between operators, with regards to, for instance, interconnection, the 
imposition of financial penalties and the withdrawal of licenses. Many of these 
powers involve a distributory activity of a quasi-judicial character, but the 
implementation of the procedures defined in the community directives has led 
Member States to grant such powers to the NRA.
More complicated has been the granting of normative powers to some of 
the national independent regulatory authorities. The power of implementing 
existing legislation through administrative acts of a general nature is usually 
reserved for the government under the control of Parliament. The exercise of
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normative powers by the independent regulatory administrations, often 
appointed exclusively by Government, creates a constitutional conflict which is 
difficult to solve in favour of the NRAs. The limitation of such normative 
powers to the adoption of regulatory provisions, that is, of provisions of a 
general nature which merely implement existing rules adopted by the 
Legislator or by government, adapting its content to the specific conditions in 
the market of a specific category of operators could solve the conflict.335
Most of the competencies and powers granted to the NRAs are directly 
connected to what is defined as their main objective and the reason for their 
existence: the promotion of effective competition in the telecommunications 
markets. Even if this is the raisson d ’être of most of the NRAs, it is not 
common for them to enjoy the competence to enforce the rules on competition, 
neither the community rules, nor the national rules.334 On the contrary, different 
regulatory mechanisms have been defined (often by the Community Directives) 
for the attainment of such a result.
In some countries, important conflicts are arising in respect of the 
distribution of the competencies for the application of the rules on competition 
between the NCAs and the NRAs. Nevertheless, it is more common a conflict 
between authorities with regard to the co-ordination of the rules on competition 
applied by the NCAs and the regulatory mechanisms implemented by the 
NRAs.
335 See MONTERO, J. J. and BROKELMANN, H. (1999): “Telecomunicaciones y televisión. La nueva 
regulación en España”, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, pp. 143-146.
336 The British and the Greek cases are the most relevant exceptions to this general tendency.
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6.1.2. The European Regulatory Authority.
121. The need for a European Authority. The proposals for the creation 
of a European Regulatory Authority337 are as old as the involvement of the EC 
authorities in the telecommunications sector. As early as 1983 the Commission 
proposed the gradual transfer of national competencies on telecommunications 
to the European Community, and the creation of a European 
telecommunications agency.338 The same proposal was launched in the 
Bangemann Report,339 received by the Commission340, and commented by 
different institutions and actors in the market.341 As established in recital 25 of 
Directive 97/33/EC, in the framework of the 1999 Review it would be 
evaluated “the case for the establishment of a European Regulatory Authority, 
taking into account inter alia the preparatory work undertaken by the 
Commission”.
The preparatory work by the Commission342 showed some support for the 
assignation of some competencies to a European institution, mostly in relation 
to certain aspects of interconnection, numbering and licensing with a 
supranational content. Another issue was the specific articulation of the 
institutional solution for the development of such competencies. It was pointed
337 See SAUTER, W. (1994): “The ONP Framework: Towards s European Telecommunications 
Agency”, in Utilities Law Review, vol. 5, pp. 140-146.
338 COM(83) 329 final Communication from the Commission to the Council on Telecommunications, 
of 9 June 1983, p. 12.
339 “Europe and the global information society”. Recommendations to the European Council”, 26 may, 
1994.
340 COM(95) 158 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. 
The Consultation on the Green Paper on the Liberalisation of telecommunications Infrastructure and 
Cable Television networks, 3 May 1995.
341 See Forrester Norall & Sutton (1996): "The Institutional Framework for the Regulation of 
telecommunications and the Application of the EC Competition Rules”, Report for the European 
Commission, Brussels, pp. 51 82.
342 See NERA (1997): “Issues Associated with the Creation of a European Regulatory Authority for 
Telecommunications”, Report for DG Xm European Commission, Brussels; and CULLEN & 
EUROSTRATEGIES (1999): "The Possible Added Value of European Regulatory Authority for 
Telecommunications”, Report for DG Xm European Commission, Btussels.
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out that the exercise of such competencies at an European level would not 
require the creation of an specific independent agency in the framework of the 
European Union, but a mere assignation of competencies to the existing 
services of the Commission, or even the recognition of a role of co-ordination 
of the different NRAs could be enough. In the case where it was considered 
that an independent agency was necessary, one of the main debates would be 
the transfer or the delegation of the Commission’s power to apply the 
community rules on competition to such agency.
122. The new institutional framework. As a result of the broad 
consultation, the Commission decided not to propose the creation of an 
European Regulatory Authority, but rather to strengthen the actual framework: 
“The Commission considers at this stage that the creation of an European 
Regulatory Authority would not provide sufficient added value to justify likely 
costs. In addition, it could lead to duplication of responsibilities, resulting in 
more rather than less regulation. The issues identified that might be better dealt 
with at EU level can be addressed through adaptation and improvement of 
existing structures”.343
As a matter of fact, the Commission has finally proposed the substitution 
of the ONP Committee and the Licensing Committee by the COCOM, the 
Communication C om m ission- This new entity should provide a framework 
both for operators and other private entities and Member States, to collaborate 
with the Commission.344
343 COM(1999) 539, Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions reviews recent developments in the market for 
electronic communications services within the EU and provides a number of proposals for possible 
future regulatory measures specific to this sector, Brussels.
344 See the specific proposal in CC)M(2000) 393, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and 
services, 12.7.2000, Brussels.
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6.2. CONCENTRATED STRUCTURES.
123. General. The coexistence of two different instruments of public 
intervention in de-monopolised markets does not necessarily mean the 
attribution of the competence to develop each different instrument by different 
institutions, and therefore the coexistence of two different institutions. On the 
contrary, different actors have pled for the convergence of the different 
instruments of intervention in a single institution.
The concentration of both instruments of public intervention in a single 
institution can have beneficial effects. It ensures a better co-ordination of the 
different mechanisms of public intervention, their complementarity and an 
increase in the efficiency of the intervention. On the contrary, it also entails 
risks. One of the instruments could remain underdeveloped in favour of the 
other one, and both could be de-naturalised, as the influence of the other could 
loose the perspective of the basic objectives and principles ruling each kind of 
intervention.
Two different models of concentration have been proposed. On the one 
hand, regulatory powers can be granted to the competition authorities, 
expanding their traditional power to apply the rules on competition in order to 
allow them to promote the very same creation of such competition in the de­
monopolised markets, and to control the potential abusive behaviours during 
the transition from monopoly to competition. On the other hand, it has been 
proposed to grant powers for the application of the rules on competition to the 
sector specific regulatory authorities. In such a way, Competition Law would 
become another mechanism at the disposal of the regulatory authorities for the 
promotion of competition in the liberalised markets.
124. Concentration of powers in the hands of the NCAs. The most 
successful attempts to concentrate diverse powers of intervention in a single
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authority have consisted in the assignation to the competition authorities of 
regulatory powers. It is widely understood that most of the regulatory 
mechanisms of intervention have a transitory nature, as they are designed for 
the period of transition from monopoly to competition.345 Therefore, it can be 
considered more reasonable to bestow such transitory powers to the institution 
which will survive the transitory period, than to create a specific institution 
(taking into account the tendency of any institution to survive and expand its 
role). At the same time, competition authorities have a tradition of pro- 
competitive intervention which regulators have to build. The attribution of 
regulatory powers to the competition authority reduces the risk of capture of a 
sector specific regulator by the regulated industry, as the competition 
authorities would not have the tendency to assimilate itself with the industry, as 
it usually happens with the sector specific regulators.
The attribution of regulatory powers to the competition authorities could 
also have negative effects. Firstly, a horizontal institution could not develop a 
profound knowledge about a specific sector, knowledge that is necessary in 
order to develop a more intrusive intervention than antitrust in sectors 
characterised by their complexity. Secondly, there is the risk of an under­
development of the regulatory mechanisms in States with little indirect 
intervention tradition. Regulatory instruments are foreign mostly to States with 
an interventionist tradition of direct provision of services through public 
companies.
As a result, in such countries, competition authorities could be tempted to 
renounce to the employment of their limited resources for the development of 
the regulatory mechanisms, and to expand the role of the antitrust mechanisms.
345 Even a partly as little suspectful as the French Secretary of Industry has recognised that the NCAs 
will survive the NRAs, even if he has pointed that the question is when such concentration will take 
place, see LASSERRE, B. (2000): “Competition or Regulatory Authorities? European or national
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Lastly, such a solution could not only suppose the use of competition Law in 
order to obtain objectives which are foreign to its scope, but also to introduce 
some regulatory elements in the application of the rules on competition. In both 
cases, there is a high risk of de-naturalisation of the rules on competition.
The best example of the attribution of regulatory powers to a competition 
authority can be found in the Australian experience.346 In this country, a 
strategy to expand the competencies of the competition authority from the 
narrow application of the rules on competition to the development of a much 
wider competition policy, has been pursued. This strategy has supposed the 
attribution of regulatory competencies to the competition authority, and the 
limitation of the development of sector specific regulatory authorities, which 
are limited to strictly technical intervention (management of radioelectric 
frequencies, etc.).347
In Australia, the regulatory competencies already granted to a sector 
specific regulator, Austel, for the promotion of competition, were taken over by 
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission by the beginning of
1997. The remaining technical competencies were absorbed by a wider body 
covering telecommunications and broadcasting.
The main regulatory competencies of the competition authority are the 
review" and reform of anticompetitive provisions adopted by the federal or the 
state governments, the review and reform of public monopolies, the restriction 
of monopoly pricing behaviour, the promotion of neutrality in the allocation of 
scarce resources, and the provision of third party access to essential facilities.
Level?”, in “European Competition Law Annual 1998. Regulating Communications Markets”, 
Ehlermann and Gossling Ed., Hart, pp. 629-636.
346 The D anish institutional solution is also interesting.
347 For an analysis of the Australian experience see FELS, A. (1997): “Decision making at the centre”, 
in Annual on European Competition Law 1996”, Ehlermann and Laudaty coord., Kluwer, The Hague.
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Specific rules on access to essential facilities of a regulatory nature were 
adopted in order to complement the weaknesses of the rules on competition.348 
These rules contain provisions concerning the administrative procedures for the 
declaration of a facility as essential, for the arbitration in case of lack of 
agreement on the terms of access, and for the appeals. At the same time, the 
basic principles ruling the decision making are also defined. The introduction 
of substantial as well as procedural rules enhances legal certainty in the public 
intervention, what improves the solution of conflicts and obstructs the mixture 
between competition and regulatory intervention.
125. Concentration of powers in the hands of the NRAs. Less 
successful, but also active, have been the defendants of the concentration of 
both regulatory and competition powers in the hands of the regulatory 
authorities.
Their main argument is that die application of the rules on competition in 
such a complex sector requires a very detailed knowledge of the technicalities 
and the specific market structure and tendencies of the telecommunications 
sector. At the same time, co-ordination between regulatory and competition 
intervention would be enhanced by such an institutional solution. On the other 
hand, it has been sustained that it is just as difficult for the sector specific 
authorities to get acquainted with the complex rules on competition as it is for 
competition authorities to get acquainted with the telecommunications sector. 
Even more, this institutional solution would facilitate the development of a 
different application of the rules on competition, a sector specific competition 
Law, which would first of all complicate the future convergence with the 
general application of such rules once the transitory period is finished, and in 
any case, damage legal certainty.
348 See PENGILLEY, W. (1998): “Access to essential facilities: a unique antitrust experiment in 
Australia”, in The Antitrust Bulletin, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 519-545.
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National Regulatory Authorities have been actively trying to have these 
competencies granted by the national Legislators. In the case of Spain, for 
instance, different proposals were launched by minority parties in the 
parliamentary procedure for the adoption of the General Telecommunications 
Act, but such proposals were never successful. Nevertheless, the Spanish NRA 
has pursued a very aggressive policy, based on a doubtful interpretation of the 
existing legislation, consisting in the gradual adoption of such powers through 
case-by-case decision. For instance, they created a conflict with the European 
Commission when they publicly demanded to be informed of the competition 
procedures developed by DG IV according to the rights recognised to national 
competition authorities by Regulation 17/62.349
The option to grant powers for the application of the rules on competition 
to the National Regulatory Authorities was initially successful in Italy. The 
Italian Antitrust Act of 1990 expressly excluded the application of such rules 
by the antitrust authority it created in some specific sectors, including 
broadcasting.350 Nevertheless, the application of the rules on competition was 
returned to the competition authority both in the Act which defined the general 
principles ruling public utilities (Act 481/1995) and the specific act which 
governs telecommunications and the Italian NRA (Act 249/1997).3SI
349 Vide MONTERO and BROKELMANN (1999), pp. 156-168 (supra footnote 335).
350 See an analysis of the provision which established such a regime (Article 20 Act 287/90) in 
GHEZ23, F. and MARCHETTI, P. (1993): “I rapporti dell’Autorità garante della concorrenza e del 
mercato con le autorità di vigilanza settoriale”, in Concorrenza e Mercato, p. 205.
351 See FATTORI, P. (1998): “Brevi notte sulla ripartizione di competenze fra Autorità Garante della 
Concorrenza e del Mercato e Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Commumcazioni , in Concorrenza e 
Mercato, no. 6, pp. 483-497.
215
ü. Intervention in Liberalised Markets.
6.3. DUAL STRUCTURES.
6.3.1. General.
126. General. Both in the US352 and in the Member States of the European 
Union a common tendency to provide an institutional reflect to the duality of 
mechanisms of intervention has imposed itself. Competition authorities usually 
have kept the competence to apply the rules on competition in the de­
monopolised sectors, included the telecommunications sector. At the same 
time, sector specific regulatory authorities have been maintained (in the case of 
the US) or created (EU) for the regulation of the liberalised markets.
This structure allows a clear differentiation between competition Law and 
the regulatory mechanisms of intervention. Such a differentiation avoids the 
risk of denaturalisation of both kinds of instruments. On the one hand, the 
enforcement of the rules on competition is not de-naturalised by the influence 
of more interventionist mechanisms closely related to sector specific 
objectives. On the other hand, regulatory mechanisms (with a very limited 
tradition in most of the European States) have a better chance to be fully 
implemented if they are the only ones at the disposal of the regulatory 
institution.
Besjdes, the institutional differentiation in relation to the instruments of 
intervention allows the introduction or development of beneficial relationships
352 The American institutional structure is characterised by its complexity. Antitrust authorities coexist 
with the powerful Federal Communication Commission (FCC), the most traditional sector specific 
regulator in the world. The American experience cannot be considered an inspiring model, as the dual 
jurisdiction for the consideration of the behaviour of the undertakings in the telecommunications 
markets introduces an excessive burden on them, at the same time that increases legal uncertainty, as 
the standards for the consideration of the operation by the FCC is not only different from the antitrust 
authorities (see US v. FCC, 652 F.2d D.C. Cir 1980), but also rather vague. See RILL, J. (2000): 
“Institutional Responsibilities Affecting Competition in the telecommunications Industry”, in 
“European Competition Law Annual 1998. Regulating Communications Markets”, Ehlermann and 
Gosslmg Ed., Hart, pp. 667-691; WEISS, J. and STEM, M. (1998): “Serving Two Masters: The Dual 
Jurisdiction of the FCC and the Justice Department Over Telecommunications Transaction”, in 
Common Law Conspectus, voL 6, p. 195.
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between both the instruments of intervention and the institutions implementing 
them. Firstly, competition between institutions for the development of more 
efficient solutions to conflicts can arise.353 The tendency of every institution to 
increase its influence can be guided, if forced to compete with another 
institution for the solution of problems and conflicts, to improve its functioning 
through the development of more efficient procedures (both in effectiveness 
and in terms of time). Secondly, the dual structure of the institutional 
framework counter-balances their intervention. In such a way, possible risks 
related to public intervention by an institution, due “regulatory capture”, 
misuse of power or simply mistakes, can be overcome.
At the same time, the dual structure entails some risks. The most obvious 
one is the lack of co-ordination between both authorities. Authorities 
implement different solutions for a single conflict or, even worse, adopt 
different over-all strategies. Besides, competition between authorities might 
lead undertakings to try to obtain illegitimate benefits from forum shopping. 
Lastly, counter-balances between the institutions can delay and even obstruct 
procedures if they are not well designed.
The balance between the positive and the negative effects of dual 
structures is determined by the constructive or destructive relation who 
emerges between them. It can be advanced that a healthy coexistence requires a 
strong political leadership by the political authorities which the over-all 
framework, in such a way that both institutions have a clear and compatible 
view of their objectives and the strategies to reach them. At the same time, a 
very clear distribution of competencies between the institutions is also 
necessary, in order not to concentrate the competition on the obtention of 
competencies, but on the best use of such competencies.
353 See McCAHERY, BRATTON, PICCIOTTO & SCOTT (1996): “International Regulatory 
Competition and Coordination”, Claredon Press, Oxford.
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Important differences can be identified, though, among the institutional 
solutions implemented in the different States. Some States define very little 
mechanisms of formal interaction between both authorities, in such a way that 
the co-ordination between their strategies takes place through informal co­
operation or simple formal mechanisms of co-operation between the NCA and 
the NRA in order to facilitate the co-ordinated character of the public 
intervention in the sector. Other States have developed a more complex 
structure in order to ensure such co-ordination and, furthermore, some kind of 
counter-balance between them.
6.3.2. Parallel Structures.
127. General. The most common position among the Member States of 
the European Union has been the implementation of a dual institutional 
structure in which each institution has its own competencies but not formal 
power to counter-balance the intervention of the other authority. The 
mechanisms of formal co-operation between the authorities vary among the 
different States. In any case, the existing formal mechanisms tend to establish 
mere channels of vague co-operation and not to determine the action of the 
other authority.
Such a solution not only despises the potential benefits of a more 
articulated relation between both institutions, but it is also prone to conflict. In 
some Member States, the lack of a clear political leadership in favour of 
liberalisation at the highest political levels is allowing NRAs to develop 
policies that diverge from the more orthodox pro-competitive intervention of 
the NCAs. At the same time, in some Member States unclear distributions of 
competencies between both authorities can be identified. As a result, the 
unavoidable conflicts between the institution are not of a creative character 
(foster efficiency in the solution of problems) but of a destructive character, as 
both institutions try to expand their competencies to the detriment of the other.
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Furthermore, efficient formal co-operation mechanisms are lacking in many 
Member States. As a result, forum shopping is favoured, a discrepancy in 
specific issues is probable, and the already mentioned tendency to divergence 
in policies is facilitated.
128. The Spanish case. A very clear example of these circumstances can 
be found in Spain. Firstly, very little tradition of pro-competition policy exists 
in a State historically characterised by its interventionist tendencies. The 
regulatory competencies are divided between a Ministry with a strong 
interventionist tradition, and a powerful independent authority that is 
considered to be more pro-competition, even if its strategy to promote 
competition is characterised by its interventionist approach.354 At the same time, 
the distribution of competencies between the NCA (Servicio de la Competencia 
and Tribunal de la Competencia), and the NRA (Comisión del Mercado de las 
Telecomunicaciones?*5) is prone to conflict particularly over the application of 
the national rules on competition. Lastly, formal mechanisms of co-operation 
between both authorities are limited to the application of national competition 
Law, but for the rest are non existent.
The relation between the NCA and the NRA is of a destructive nature. 
Very little co-operation exists between the institutions, as little formal 
mechanisms exist, and informal collaboration is complicated by the existing 
conflict for competencies. The lack of co-operation strengthens the tendency 
for their policies to diverge. While the NCA develops an orthodox antitrust 
policy in the sector, the NRA is more ambitious and is developing an 
interventionist strategy in order to benefit certain operators against others, not
354 See MONTERO PASCUAL, J. J. (1999): “¿Salvaguardia de la competencia o de los competidores? 
Otra visión de la política española de telecomunicaciones”, in Revista de Derecho de las 
Telecomunicaciones e Industrias en Red, vol 5, pp. 145-162.
355 Por an analysis of the Spanish NRA see MONTERO PASCUAL, J. J. (1998): “Naturaleza, 
estructura y funciones de la Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones”, in Revista General del 
Derecho, pp. 12305-12318.
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only against the operator with significant market power, but also against the 
new comers which do not invest significantly in the installation of 
infrastructures.
The most important conflict, nevertheless, is centred on the dispute over 
the competencies for the application of the national rules on competition (as it 
seems clear that the NCA have the monopoly over the national application of 
the Community rules on competition).356
The Seventh Additional Provision of the Spanish General 
Telecommunications Act is clear when it states that the exercise of its powers 
by the CMT will in any case be respectful for the competencies enjoyed by the 
national competition authorities. Nevertheless, it follows that this has to be 
understood within the framework of the functions granted to the CMT by 
Article l.Two.2.f of the Liberalisation of Telecommunications Act of 1997. 
Such provision allows the CMT to adopt general measures for the protection of 
competition in the markets regulated by the NRA. With regard to 
concentrations, Article 17.2 LGT is more clear, for it states that the CMT will 
necessarily provide its non-biding position on any concentrative measure which 
is to be referred to the Government for its approval.
It thus seems clear that the Spanish regulatory authority is not competent 
to enforce the national rules on competition, even though it has a small role in 
the procedure for its application by the national competition authorities. 
Nevertheless, the CMT is making a very broad interpretation of its power to 
protect the competitive nature of the telecommunications market and is issuing 
decisions which develop a reasoning very similar to the decisions applying 
competition Law, with quotations from the practice of the European Court of
356 See MARTÍNEZ LAGE, S. (1998): “La Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones y el 
Derecho de la Competencia”, in Gaceta Jurídica de la C.E. y de la Competencia, no. 136, pp. 1-4, and 
no. 137, pp. 1-4.
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Justice and the European Commission in the application of the Community 
rules on competition. It has even stated that it is competent to study the 
potential anticompetitive effects of particular behaviours. It would seem that 
the CMT considers itself competent to apply the rules on competition, or at 
least, that it pretends to develop a very similar intervention based on its own 
competencies.
129. The French case. The French legislation creates more formal 
mechanisms of co-operation between the NCA (Conseil de la Concurrence) 
and the NRA (Autorité de Regulations des Telecommunications).357 These 
mechanisms respect the parallel character of the their intervention in the 
telecommunications markets, but facilitates the co-ordination of such parallel 
interventions.
Firstly, the NCA is bound to allow the NRA to communicate its non- 
binding position before adopting any decision on a competition matter 
regarding telecommunications markets. Secondly, the NRA can formally 
require the position of the NCA on any point regarding the effects on 
competition of any measure or action. At the same time the NRA must seek the 
opinion of the NCA for the definition of the list of operators with significant 
market power, even if the opinion of the NCA is not binding.358 Thirdly, the 
NRA, when acting as a conciliator, must inform the NCA. If a referral to the 
NCA on the same issue is pending, the NCA can stay its investigation until the 
end of the conciliation procedures, while the NRA must make a referral to the 
NCA if conciliation fails. Finally, the NRA must refer to the NCA any
357 See JENNY, F. (2000): “Safeguarding Conditions for Fair and Efficient Competition in Complex 
Network Markets: Institutional Issues”, in “European Competition Law Annual 1998. Regulating 
Communications Markets”, Ehlennann and Gosling Ed., Hart, pp. 624-628.
35* The German legislation requires the approval by the NCA of the list prepared by the NRA, see 
WOLF, D. (2000): “Institutional Issues of telecoms Regulation: Discussion Points”, in “European 
Competition Law Annual 1998. Regulating Communications Markets”, Ehlennann and Gosling Ed., 
Hait, pp. 741-748.
221
ü. Intervention in Liberalised Markets.
potential anticompetitive practice, and can even require the NCA to make its 
decision within a thirty days term.
It seems that the clear distribution of competencies has avoided conflicts 
such as the ones that emerged at an early stage in Spain. Both authorities 
respect each other’s position and have formally consulted each other even if it 
was not required by Law. The divergence of the policies of both institutions is 
obstructed by the fact that the decision of both authorities are subject to judicial 
review in front of the same body: the Court of Appeals of Paris. Nevertheless 
no real competition between the institutions seems to emerge from this 
framework.
6.3.3. Counter-Balanced Structures.
130. General. The co-existence of a competition authority and a 
regulatory authority can be structured in such a way as to provide a counter­
balance not only between both institutions but also between both instruments of 
intervention.
The introduction of formal mechanisms for counter-balancing the actions 
of the institution can have positive effects. Firstly, “regulatory capture” is 
obstructed, as market players have to capture more than one institution, which 
is always more difficult. Besides, granting powers to the competition 
authorities to counter-balance the actions of the regulatory authorities obstructs 
capture since a non-specialised institution is more difficult to be captured than 
a sector specific institution. Secondly, such counter-balance tends to ensure a 
better co-ordination of the intervention of both kinds of institutions, as an 
overall agreement between them is necessary for the development of their 
activity, as one institution can block the actions of the other. Third, such 
mechanisms can directly enhance the efficiency of public intervention. The 
assignation of the role of arbitrator to one of the institutions in a case of 
conflict between the other institution and a regulated company allows a simple
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and time-efficient resolution of the conflict by an institution that is close to the 
sector and understands its problems. In such a way, the authoritarian tendency 
of the public institutions is obstructed, and judicial review -time-consuming 
and risky- is not encouraged.
Counter-balancing mechanisms can have beneficial effects not only from 
an institutional perspective, but also from the perspective of the instruments of 
intervention used by the different institutions. The risk of over-regulation and 
the risk of de-naturalisation of competition Law can be minimised if each kind 
of intervention is counter-balanced by a review from the institution competent 
for the application of the other instrument of public intervention.
Counter-balanced models can have, at the same time, negative effects. 
The most important one is the tendency to complicate the administrative 
procedures with endless administrative reviews, which in any case can be 
subject to a final judicial review. There is then the risk of making 
administrative procedures complicated, time-consuming and cumbersome for 
the industry. In order to avoid such a risk, political leadership and a precise 
distribution of competencies are, once more, necessary. At the same time, a 
sound design of the counter-balancing mechanisms is required, in order to 
allow for the solution of institutional conflicts and avoid mutual blockage. In 
this sense, pre-eminence might be granted to one of the institutions, and a 
common, specialised and time-efficient judicial institution for appeal can 
ensure solutions for situations of blockage.
131. “Sun-set clauses”. The most radical example of counter-balancing 
m ech an ism s is the power granted in certain Member States to specific bodies to 
determine the end of the transitory period from monopoly to effective 
competition and, therefore, the validity of the asymmetric regulatory 
mechanisms bestowed on the regulatory authorities. Such powers are usually 
denominated “sunset clauses”.
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In Germany, for instance, an independent body of experts, the 
Monopolies Commission, asses the conditions of competition in the 
telecommunications market at regular intervals and issues recommendations as 
to whether sector-specific regulation is still necessary.359 In the Netherlands, a 
clause was introduced according to which four years after the implementation 
of the new regulatory framework, it will be assessed whether transitional 
regulation is still necessary.
132. The British case. The UK was the first Member State to abolish the 
exclusive right enjoyed by the public authorities for the provision of 
telecommunications services, the first Member States to fully privatise the 
incumbent operator, and the first Member State to establish a regulatory 
authority, the Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL).360 At the same time, 
competition Law has not been particularly strict, and only the adoption of the 
1998 Competition Act has created a regime assimilable to the existing regimes 
in the other Member States.
The British institutional scheme has been characterised by its complexity, 
with a number of institutions empowered to intervene in the 
telecommunications markets, including OFTEL, the Secretary of State, the 
Director General for Fair Trading and the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission. Counter-balancing mechanisms have always existed. Amongst 
them, the regime for the modification of licence conditions, and the concurrent 
applications of Competition Law are particularly interesting.
The centres of the British regime on telecommunications are the licences 
granted to the operators. Following the Common Law tradition, and as a result 
of the lack of pressure from Community Directives, as the sector was already 
de-monopolised in the UK, very few general provisions rule the provision of
359 Vide WOLF (2000) (supra footnote 358).
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telecommunications services in the UK. It is for the licences (individual, 
general or class licences) to define the conditions for the provision of such 
services.361 As a result, the granting of the licences, and therefore the definition 
of the conditions contained in the licences, and the modification of such 
conditions after the granting of the licence are the most important regulatory 
mechanisms in the UK.
Licences are granted by the Secretary of State after consultation with the 
Director General of OFTEL. As a result, it is the Government the body which 
directly defines the policy through the adoption of the conditions included in 
the licences, even if the regulatory independent agency has the prerogative to 
be consulted. With regard to modifications, initially, it could be sustained that 
modifications resulting in a radical transformation of the licence should be 
implemented through the adoption of a new individual licence by the Secretary 
of State, as it is the body that defined policies. On the contrary, modifications 
which merely adapt the existing policies to new circumstances (even if the 
borderline between these and the last modifications is difficult to define) do not 
require the intervention of the Secretary of State. Two different procedures 
were established by the 1984 telecommunications Act.
On the one hand, the modification can be agreed by OFTEL’s Director 
General with the holder of the individual licence, following the procedure 
defined in section 12 of the 1984 Act. OFTEL’s Director General can make a 
proposal to the licensee. The Secretary of State has the power to force the 
Director General to withdraw the proposal of modification. If it is not the case, 
and the licensee accepts the modification, it is introduced. On the other hand, in 
case the modification proposed by the Director General is not accepted by the
360 See LONG, C. (1995): “Telecommunications Law and Practice", Sweet & Maxwell.
361 Most of the Member States have granted a central role to the licences for the definition of die 
conditions ruling the provision of services, but the UK experience is unique, as very few general 
provisions exist even as regards the ruling of the granting of the licences themselves.
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licensee, he might make a referral for the Monopolies and Merger Commission 
(MMC), in order for it to study the effects on the public interest. With the 
approval of the MMC, the Director General can then modify the licence.342
Such a process is extremely interesting, as it fosters a non-authoritarian 
intervention by the Director General, the time-efficient arbitration of an 
administrative body (6 months), and the control of the regulatory intervention 
by a competition authority, which studies the modification from a pro­
competition perspective. At the same time, the political leadership of the 
political authorities is ensured by the possibility of the Secretary of State to 
adopt a new licence, as well as by his power to withdraw the proposals of 
modification from the Director General.
With regard to the application of the national rules on competition,343 it is 
interesting to note that the British regulatory authorities are the only ones in the 
EU to clearly enjoy the competencies to apply such rules, even if concurrently, 
with the competition authorities. The 1998 Competition Act has introduced 
new mechanisms of co-ordination for such concurrent application.
As it is described in the Guidelines issued by the Office of Fair Trading 
and all the sector specific regulators, including OFTEL,36* with a few 
exceptions345 the Director General of OFTEL has all the powers of the Director 
General of Fair Trading to apply and enforce the 1998 Competition Act to deal 
with anti-competitive agreements or abuse of market dominance relating to the 
telecommunications markets. Furthermore, it has been agreed that in general, it
342 Vide LONG, pp. 54-56 (supra footnote 360).
343 Substantive as well as procedural issues are studied in the Draft Guidelines on the application of the 
Competition Act in the telecommunications Sector published in January 1999 by OFTEL and the 
Office of Fair Trading. See also LANDAU, J. (1997): “Fair Trading in Telecommunications”, in 
European Competition Law Review, no. 7, pp. 446-450.
344 Office of Fair Trading (1998): “Concurrent Application to Regulated Industries”, London.
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will be for the regulator to handle the investigation, adopt a decision and 
enforce it.346 The Director of Fair Trading is, in any case, consulted by the 
regulator in all the cases, and receives a copy of all the notifications for 
guidance, the notifications of agreements or conduct for clearance and 
complaint.
The Director General of Fair Trading might require dealing with a case if 
it is better placed to do so. Different factors have been agreed in order to 
determine who is better placed to deal with a case. Among those factors, the 
previous contacts with the parties or complainants, and the recent experience as 
regards the issue are appreciated. In 1997 the Concurrency Working Party was 
created for the resolution of the conflicts regarding concurrency. This body is 
formed by a representative of the seven regulatory bodies existent at that 
moment in the UK (among them OFTEL) and is chaired by a representative of 
the Office of Fair Trading. The Concurrency Working Party defines general 
principles in relation to concurrency and is the forum of the exchange of 
information about the cases being handled by each authority. At the same time, 
it is the body which decides which authority is better suited for handling a case 
if the Director General of Fair Trading and the Director General of one of the 
regulatory authorities do not reach an agreement about it.
The British legislation contains other provisions in order to increase the 
transparency and effectivity of such a framework. Firstly, the 1984 Act has 
been amended so as to establish that in those cases in which the Director 
General applies the rules on competition, he will not make use of his regulatory 
powers. Secondly, it has been agreed that the licence conditions which imposed
365 Such exceptions are mostly related to the definition of procedures and the issue of guidance on 
penalties, even if in such occasion, the Director General of fair Trading has to consult with the 
regulators.
366 The Advisory Body on Fair Trading in Telecommunications was created in December 1996 in order 
to advise OFTEL’s Director general on the enforcement of the Fair Trading condition included in all 
the individual licences.
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the obligations not to engage in anticompetitive practices will be eliminated. 
Third, the amended 1984 Act foresees that in a case where it is considered that 
it is more appropriated to proceed under the 1998 Competition Act, he will not 
take licence enforcement action. Finally, common appeal bodies, both for 
administrative and for judicial review are established.
As a conclusion, the British system fosters the application of the rules on 
competition over the sector specific rules contained in the licences, but at the 
same time, the application of the rules on competition is bestowed rather in the 
regulatory authorities than in the competition authorities. Flexible mechanisms 
have been informally introduced in order to ensure the resolution of conflicts 
derived from the concurrent competence for the application of the rules on 
competition. All these mechanisms tend to ensure the distinction between 
regulatory and antitrust intervention.
133. Counter-balancing intervention of the EC authorities. It cannot be 
forgotten that the Member States’ measures of intervention in the 
telecommunications markets are subject to the scrutiny of the European 
Community authorities. As stated by the Commission “[a]t Community level, it 
is also important to ensure that Member States do not implement different 
patterns of regulation which lead to market variation, increasing cost to end- 
users and a fragmentation of the single market.”367
European authorities enjoy various mechanisms to control and balance the 
intervention of the national authorities in the telecommunications markets.36*
367 CC)M(2000) 395, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access 
to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, 12.7.2000, 
Brussels.
368 For an extremely interesting analysis of the relation between the NRAs and the European 
Commission, see TEMPLE LANG (1998): “Community Antitrust and National Regulatory 
Procedures”, in MFordham Corporate Law Institute” pp. 297-334.
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The European Commission can initiate infringement procedures against 
Member States following the procedure defined in Article 169 EC Treaty, in 
case Member States do not implement the relevant directives, or do not 
implement them completely or faithfully. It is an open debate whether 
Community harmonising Directives are exhaustive or not, but it can at least be 
claimed that Member States cannot expand the obligations on the operators 
established in the Directives (mostly in the 97/33/EC Directive) as such 
behaviour might amount to a barrier to market access to new entrants. Article 
169 EC Treaty might become an instrument against over-regulation by the 
Member States.369
At the same time, it is possible for the European Commission to intervene 
against the Member States for the breachment of the rules of the Treaty, and 
particularly the rules on competition, with regard to their relation with their 
public undertakings, the undertakings with special or exclusive rights and the 
undertakings vested with the management of a service of general economic 
interest, as established in Article 86 (former 90) EC Treaty. With regard to the 
immediate protection of the general interest, national measures must not restrict 
competition any more than is necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose in the 
general interest.370
Moreover, the Community authorities can intervene in case of breachment 
by the Member States of the effet outil of the EC Treaty rules on competition. 
Even if Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty apply only to undertakings, the obligation 
for Member States to ensure the application of the rules contained in the Treaty 
(defined in Article 5) have been interpreted as to force Member States not to
349 Vide infra Chapter 10.3.2. Antitrust Counter-Balances Regulation.
370 See BLUM, F. and LOGUE, A. (1998): “State Monopolies under EC Law", John Wiley & Sons, 
Chichester.
229
ü. Intervention in Liberalised Markets.
impose or favour anticompetitive practices.371 For instance, NRAs must not 
authorise or approve any behaviour that breaches the treaty. Therefore, the 
European authorities can obstruct the implementation by the NRAs of measures 
that constitute a clear breach of Articles 81 or 82 EC Treaty.
134. New mechanisms of control. The reform of the legislative 
framework proposed by the Commission as a result of the 99 Review 
strengthens the role of the European Commission.
The Commission proposal introduces a great deal of flexibility in the 
regulatory framework. As competition emerges at different rhythms in the 
more traditional telecommunications product markets (fixed telephony 
infrastructures and services), and as new bottlenecks in different segments 
appear (mobile telephony, set-top boxes etc.) a more flexible framework was 
required.
The Commission proposed a framework that would depart from the 
definition at a centralised level of the market segments to be scrutinised by 
NRAs in order to be regulated. The Commission would produce an annual list 
of segments. NRAs would only be in the position to analyse other markets with 
the explicit permission from the Commission.
In case an NRA would find market distortions in one of the segments in 
the annual list published by the Commission, it could impose regulatory 
obligations, but only those included in a closed list in the directive. A specific 
permission from the Commission is to be obtained by an NRA in order to 
introduce a different regulatory obligation.372
371 See VICIANO PASTOR, J. (1995): “Libre competencia e intervención pública en la economía. 
Acuerdos restrictivos de la competencia de origen legaT, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia.
372 See COM(2(XX)) 393, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 12.7.2000, 
Brussels; and CQM(2000) 395 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
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Therefore, Community institutions can play an important counter­
balancing role, as they can limit the over-regulation of the national regulatory 
authorities with different mechanisms, most of them related to their role as 
competition watchdogs, but also of a regulatory nature if the proposal of the 
Commission is successful.
6.4. CONCLUSIONS.
135. Institutional frameworks. Despite the proposals to concentrate the 
competencies for the application of competition Law and sector specific 
regulation in a single institution, Member States have mostly opted to maintain 
the competence of the NCAs for the application of the rules on competition to 
the telecommunications undertakings and to create sector specific regulators 
for the application of the sector specific regulation.
Two kinds of relations between the NCAs and the NRAs can be 
distinguished. On the one hand, both kinds of institutions can intervene in 
parallel according to their competencies, without a direct interaction between 
them. Different degrees of co-operation between the authorities can be found in 
this kind of relation. In some cases, only informal co-operation exists. In other 
cases, some formal channels of co-operation for the co-ordination of policies or 
the exchange of information have been established. Finally, some examples of 
a tighter formal co-operation can be found, with the intervention of the other 
authority for the adoption of certain decisions. In all these cases, each 
institution behaves largely independently from the other, as no effective 
limitations are imposed on them by the other institution.
on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities,
12.7.2000, Brussels.
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On the other hand, a more complex relation can be established through 
formal mechanisms of counter-balance of the actions of both kinds of 
institutions. According to this model, the action of one institution depends, to a 
certain extent, on the previous action of the other, or on the co-ordinated 
intervention between them. Indeed, in some cases, one of the institutions is 
competent to review the actions of the other one.
136. Evaluation. The existence of a different set of institutions for the 
application of competition Law and for the regulation of the liberalised markets 
can have beneficial effects, at least during the period of transition from 
monopolies to effective competition. Such a separation stresses the different 
nature of both kinds of intervention, what allows the full development of both 
of them (particularly in those States with little tradition of indirect intervention) 
and obstructs the denaturalisation of each instrument (particularly of the rules 
on competition).
Institutional differentiation can have other beneficial effects. It can 
promote competition between administrations for the efficient solution of the 
problems and conflicts between the operators. At the same time each institution 
can counter-balance the excesses of the other, excesses derived from mistakes, 
regulatory capture, or phenomena as over-regulation or the application of the 
rules on competition for the solution of conflict out-side of their scope.
In any case, certain requirements have to be met for the obtention of such 
benefits. Firstly, a clear liberalising strategy established by the Legislator and 
the highest political authorities is necessary in order to avoid divergences in the 
strategy of the different institutions. Secondly, a clear-cut distribution of 
competencies is necessary in order to avoid destructive conflicts between 
institutions for the mere obtention of new powers. Third, formal mechanisms of 
collaboration enhance co-ordination of policies and actions. Finally, formal
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mechanisms of interaction have to be balanced and provide solutions for 
institutional conflicts so that no blockage exists.
If these requirements are not met, there is a high risk of conflict between 
the NCAs and the NRAs. Firstly, divergent policies could arise. Secondly, lack 
of co-ordination in specific cases could produce legal uncertainty in the sector. 
Third, competition between institutions could become destructive, as only 
centred in the obtention of new competencies, promoting forum shopping from 
the operators. Finally, the complexity of the institutional framework could 
produce time-consuming administrative procedures, situations of blockage of 
institutional conflicts and un-necessary intervention of the judicial authorities.
In any case, as the period of transition reaches its end, the institutional 
framework should be reconsidered. It is widely shared that independent 
regulators will have a very technical and reduced role once competition arises 
and the asymmetric regulation disappears, while competition authorities will 
take the lead on the public intervention in such markets. As a result, 
concentration of activities in the NCAs, following the Australian example 
could be considered. Otherwise, formal mechanisms ensuring the pre-eminence 
of the NCAs could be granted, in order to maintain a mere technical role for the 
regulatory authorities.
The co-existence of competition and regulatory authorities both at a 
national and at a Community level could also have another interesting 
beneficial effect in relation to the end of the transitional period. Competition 
authorities could be bestowed with the power to determine the end of the 
transitional period, as such authorities have the tools to certify the existence of 
effective competition. Nevertheless, it has to be taken into account that such 
authorities would benefit from the elimination of the transitional sector specific 
regulation, as it would mean the attainment of the central role in public
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intervention in the market. It is for these reasons that a more balanced solution 
is necessary.
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CHAPTER 7 
NETWORK ACCESS: NOTION AND RELEVANCE
SUMMARY: 7.1. The notion o f network access. 
7.2. The relevance o f network access. 7.3. 
Conclusions.
7.1. THE NOTION OF NETWORK ACCESS.
137. Introduction. Public intervention on network access acquired a 
central role in the European telecommunications arena when value-added 
services were de-monopolised.373 No competitive constraint existed on the 
operators enjoying the legal monopoly over the telecommunications 
infrastructures to provide access to their networks to the new service providers 
or final users. The lack even of potential competition in the legally 
monopolised infrastructure markets excluded the definition of access
373 Vide supra Chapter 3.4.3. Liberalisation of the Telecoms Markets (1987-1999).
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conditions by supply and demand mechanisms. Public intervention 
mechanisms to ensure network access at fair conditions were developed in 
order to ensure that refusals to grant access to monopolised infrastructures 
would not exclude new comers from the services markets.
Full liberalisation of the European telecommunications markets 
eliminated all the legal barriers to competition, but technical and mostly 
economic barriers still allowed the incumbents to abuse the power derived from 
the control over the only existing universal telecommunications network in 
each Member State. Public intervention devoted to ensure network access at 
fair conditions has been perceived as necessary in order to accelerate the 
process of reform of the markets while ensuring the protection of the general 
interest.
Intervention on network access is supposed to allow the development of 
alternative networks, to obstruct exclusionary practices in the services markets 
and to guarantee the universal availability of telecommunications services. 
Nevertheless, it has also been perceived that imposing compulsory access as 
well as access conditions entails risks. The emergence of competition can not 
only not be accelerated but indeed prevented if the incentives for the 
development of alternative infrastructures are significantly reduced and 
competition is distorted. It is widely agreed that the “need to strike a balance so 
as to encourage efficient investment in alternative infrastructure and enable the 
development of service competition at the retail level”.374
Mechanisms derived from the application of the rules on competition 
(essential facilities doctrine) and of a regulatory character (Open Network 
Provision framework) have been developed in order to obstruct the negative 
effects of refusal to grant access. Nevertheless, competition Law, on the one
374 LEWIN and ROGERSON (1999): "A Review of the Interconnect Directive. Initial Proposals for 
Discussion”, European Commission, Brussels, p. IS.
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hand, shows important limitations with regard to the imposition of compulsory 
access and furthermore the definition of access conditions. Sector specific 
regulation, on the other, risks introducing obstacles to competition. However, a 
balanced approach with the continuous interrelation between regulation and 
competition Law might ensure an efficient intervention for the emergence of 
effective competition. Sector specific regulation can complement the rules on 
competition in order to develop a more aggressive strategy, while the rules on 
competition can limit the risks of over-regulation.
138. The notion of network access. No definition of the notion of 
network access can be found in the community directives. However, it could be 
broadly defined as the use of the facilities that conform a network by an entity 
different from the owner.375
The new legislative framework proposed by the Commission as a result of 
the 99 Review contains a definition of network access along such line: “Access 
means the making available of facilities and/or services, to another 
undertaking, under defined conditions, on either an exclusive or non-exclusive 
basis, for the purpose of providing electronic communications services. It 
covers, inter alia: access to network elements and associated facilities and 
services, [...] access to physical infrastructures [...] access to software systems 
[...]. Interconnection is a specific king of access implemented between public 
network operators [...].'”37S
Community directives have developed a special regime for 
interconnection, where access adopts the form of the connection between two 
networks, or as it is defined by the directives, interconnection is the “physical
375 COM(1999) 539, The 1999 Communications Review , of 10 November 1999, in page 25 states that 
“access is a generic concept covering all forms of access to publicly available network and services, 
whereas interconnection refers to the physical and logical linking of networks”.
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and logical linking of telecommunications networks used by the same or a 
different organisation in order to allow the users of one organisation to 
communicate with users of the same or another organisation or to access 
services provided by another organisation”.377
139. Categories. From an abstract point of view, it is possible to 
differentiate three different kinds of access: access for mere interoperability, 
access to market presence, and access by final users.
Firstly, access can be required merely to ensure interoperability between 
different operators. Even if an operator disposes of a fully operative 
telecommunications network which allows a client to communicate with other 
clients and satisfy in this way the most basic demands, it is clear that such 
clients will only be able to communicate with users contracting with another 
operator if both operators connect their facilities. This is the case, for instance, 
of international interconnection, or peering agreements between ISPs.
In an equilibrated market, most operators would be interested in 
connecting their networks in order to provide universal connectivity for the 
benefit of their clients.
Secondly, access can be required to complement the facilities at the 
disposal of a particular operator in order to be able to commercialise its service. 
This is the case of a service provider with no infrastructures, or the case of a 
new comer that disposes of a backbone network, but needs access to the local 
loop which serves its clients. Special access, as defined in the directives, fits 
under this category, as well as some kind of “asymmetric” interconnection.
376 Com(2000) 384, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access 
to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, Article 2,
12.07.2000, Brussels.
377 Article 2(7) of Directive 90/387/EEC as amended by Directive 97/51/EC.
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Operators in control of wide networks might not have the incentives to 
provide such access, as it might allow new comers to provide services while 
developing alternative infrastructures which in the future will compete, or 
provide services in competition with those of the operator providing the 
facility.
Finally, access can be required by final users in order to benefit from a 
connection that allows them to receive the different telecommunications 
services. It is the very same essence of competition in the market for operators 
to try to maximise their profits by providing their services to a significant share 
of potential clients. Nevertheless, it might be the case that some clients might 
not be profitable for the operators. Providing access to clients in scarcely 
populated areas can be too expensive, and at the same time, some clients might 
not have the necessary income to pay the reasonable prices offered by the 
operators.
7.2. THE RELEVANCE OF NETWORK ACCESS.
7.2.1. Promotion of Competition.
140. De-monopolisation and access. Two well-known characteristics of 
the network industries, the economies of scale and the network externality, 
introduce significant barriers to entry to the de-monopolised 
telecommunications markets. The sector presents major economies of scale, as 
it is widely accepted that the unit costs faced by a new entrant are higher for the 
provision of capacity in the long distance segment and particularly exorbitant 
in the local loop.378 Besides, as a result of the some how obvious network
378 Some data suggest that the unit cost might be even eight times bigger for an access provider in 
suburban areas with a market share bellow 10% than for an access provider in the same area with a 
market share of 100%, see LEWIN, David and MATHEWS, John (1998): “Access networks and 
Regulatory Meassures”, OVUM for DG Xm, European Commission, Luxembourg, pp. 23-25.
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externality effect, a network increases its value exponentially as it increases its 
reach.379 Furthermore, the exclusive rights enjoyed for decades by national 
monopolies have allowed them to develop infrastructures that conform the only 
universal telecommunications network in each country. The former 
monopolies, therefore, benefit from all the existing economies of scale as well 
as from the network externality effect.
The barriers derived from the network character of the 
telecommunications industry and the traditional exclusive rights become 
particularly important if combined with sunk costs which reduce entry as well 
as exit freedom. Predominance of sunk costs imposes a further burden on new 
comers, at the same time that it creates scope for strategic behaviour by the 
former monopolies.380 As a consequence, effective competition and even 
potential competition might be excluded from some telecommunications 
markets.
Sunk costs are not predominant in telecommunications services markets, 
nor are economies of scale so decisive. What reduces barriers to new comers in 
such a way that effective competition can emerge without major obstacles in 
such markets. Sunk costs have a relevant weight in telecommunications 
infrastructures markets, and therefore such markets might have a stronger 
tendency to monopolisation. However, it has to be taken into account that 
economies of scale might become exhausted, so they do not necessarily reach 
the whole market. This seems the case of long-distance telecommunications 
infrastructures which, despite of their sunk costs, are open to competition. As 
regards local infrastructures, technological progress is creating alternative
379 A network with only one point of contact has a value of zero, and reaches its maximum value when 
all the potential parties are connected to it
380 KNTEPS, Gunter (1999): “Access to networks and interconnection: A disaggregated approach”, in 
“European Competition Law Annual 1998. Regulating Communications Markets", Ehleimann and 
GossUng Ed., Hart, p. 152.
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infrastructures that significantly reduce the costs of developing comprehensive 
networks. Therefore, real bottlenecks in the telecommunications industries 
seem exceptional, even if they certainly exist particularly in some elements of 
local loop infrastructures. It has been pointed that it is not simple to clearly 
identify the limits of effective and sustainable infrastructure competition, and 
that it would be wrong for regulator to attempt to fix such limits without 
flexibility.381
Competition might reach most of the telecommunications markets, but it 
is clear that time is necessary for the emergence of effective competition, 
particularly in those markets which require the installation of comprehensive 
infrastructures. As a result, effective competition did not appear 
instantaneously after de-monopolisation in markets without decisive barriers to 
entry.
The control by the former monopolists over bottlenecks not only provides 
a monopolistic position in such markets. Moreover, such market power could 
be used by the incumbents to strengthen their dominance in neighbouring 
markets in which the bottleneck is essential. This is the case, firstly, of the 
general market of telecommunications infrastructures, as new comers with their 
own infrastructures need to interconnect them to the incumbent’s 
infrastructures, and in particular to the bottleneck elements. Secondly, new 
comers to the services markets need to reach their potential users through 
installed infrastructures. They might decide to install them themselves, but it is 
obvious that it is not viable for each one of the hundreds of service providers to 
install their own network. It is therefore necessary for them to contract the 
provision of access to users with an operator that exploits existing 
in frastructures. The control over a bottleneck, in such a situation, grants market
381 Vide LEWIN and ROGERSON (1999) p. 16 (supra footnote 374).
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power also in the downstream service market for which the bottleneck is 
essential.
Furthermore, even if the segments in which there is very limited scope for 
competition are exceptional, it seems clear that they will survive the 
liberalisation process. As a consequence, some kind of public intervention, 
subsidiary, limited and compatible with competition, should also survive the 
transitory period from monopolies to effective competition, in order to govern 
the nowadays unavoidable market failure.
141. Oligopolies and access. As the process of transition from 
monopolies to effective competition evolves, and as new electronic 
communications networks and services appear, the focus of the debate on 
access is changing.
The monopolistic position of the incumbents is being challenged in most 
product markets all over Europe. For instance, a significant amount of 
European backbone networks are being deployed and already offer services in 
Europe. Competition is also emerging, albeit at a much slower pace, in the 
local loop, through the installation of cable networks and wireless local loop 
networks all over Europe.
In any case, it seems clear that only major routes (for instance London- 
Paris-Frankfurt) might attract an important number of network operators. Most 
of the routes, as well as the local loop, will only attract a reduced number of 
operators. Concentration, as well as other relevant features of the 
telecommunications markets such as the relevance of sunk costs and the lower 
variable costs, lead to a oligopolistic market structure.
At the same time, new electronic communications networks such as 
mobile telephony networks or digital television networks (whether satellite, 
terrestrial or cable networks) due to the economies of scale and scope, the 
network externality effect, the relevance of sunk costs and other reasons, have
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also proven to have a strong tendency to oligopoly. Particularly relevant is the 
case of networks based on the use of radioelectric frequencies. The scarcity of 
such a resource lead unavoidably to the concentration of the market, as the 
number of players is necessarily limited due to physical limitations.
Both tendencies are shifting the focus of the debate from the issue of 
access to the incumbents’ networks, to the issue of access to oligopolistic 
networks.
142. The relevance of network access. Access to the 
telecommunications networks at determined conditions can eliminate or at least 
reduce the baniers to entry derived from the network externality as well as 
from the economies of scale of the network.
Access allows, first of all, the network externality effect to be overcome, 
as it allows all users to intercommunicate despite contracting with different 
providers.3*2 Secondly, access to the incumbent’s networks at prices oriented to 
costs would allow for the distribution of the benefits of economies of scale 
among all the market participants. This would mean the elimination of another 
barrier in the infrastructures markets. Finally, network access would eliminate 
the barrier created by the vertical integration of the incumbent. Access to the 
network in the same conditions for all the service providers, including the 
incumbent, would eliminate the exclusionary effects derived from the 
discrimination in its own favour exercise by the incumbent.3*3
182 For the effects of lack of interoperability in the early period of US telecommunications history vide 
supra Chapter 2.4.1. Origins and Free Competition in the US Telecom Markets (1876-1921).
383 See DEB AILLE, REPIQUET, CARTWRIGHT and DUNKLEY (1997): “Equal Access and 
Interconnection”, European Commission, Brussels; LEWIN and KITCHEN (1994):44Interconnect: The 
Key to Effective competition”, OVUM, London; LONG, VAN LIEDEKERKE and RYAN (1995): 
“ Competition Aspects of Interconnection Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector”, European 
Commission, Brussels; WTK (1994): MNetwork Interconnection in the Domain of ONP\ European 
Commission, Brussels.
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Network access and its conditions were the centre of the liberalisation 
debate. Network access played a fundamental role in the strategy aimed at 
eliminating and reducing the barriers to entry that complicate the emergence of 
effective competition in the telecommunications sector after de- 
monopolisation. Public intervention on network access was perceived a 
necessary for the reduction of the incumbent’s market power and the 
emergence of effective competition in the market.
It is important to point out, though, that public intervention on network 
access might also be relevant after the period of transition after de- 
monopolisation. The oligopolistic tendency of most network industries, not 
only the traditional public telephony, but also new industries such as mobile 
communications or digital television might also require some kind of public 
intervention in order to obstruct attempts to monopolise.
7.2.2. Immediate Protection of the General Interest.
143. Universal access. Network access not only benefits new operators, 
but also final users. Citizens’ access to the most basic telecommunications 
services is increasingly considered as a fundamental instrument for the 
participation of individuals in economic, social and even political activities,3*4 
and as a result, public authorities have considered the need to ensure the 
universal availability of such access, so that every citizen can benefit from it
Universalisation covers two different issues. Firstly, universal geographic 
availability, as universalisation would only be possible if access was possible to 
all users independently of their geographical location. Secondly, access should 
take place at reasonable conditions. Affordability, in particular is considered 
relevant in order to guarantee access to the services. Access to networks or
** See GRAHAM, CORNFORD and MARVIN (1996): “ The Socio-economic Benefits of a Universal 
Telephone Network. A Demand-side View of Universal Service”, in Telecommunications Policy, vol. 
20, no. 1, pp. 3-10.
248
Chapter 7. Network Access: Notion and Relevance.
services at similar conditions independently of the location is usually connected 
to this point.
Traditionally, the mere presence of public authorities in the 
telecommunications sector in the form of the national public monopolies was 
supposed to ensure the satisfaction of the general interest. Even if the 
geographic expansion of the telephony network took place usually behind 
demand,585 universal coverage was reached in most of the member States, even 
if only recently in some of them.
No particular effort was devoted to ensure the affordability of the service 
to the most disfavoured groups as very few specific programs for such groups 
were implemented. On the contrary, a general policy to provide services of a 
minimum quality for similar prices in all the territory was undertaken by the 
national monopolies. Cross-subsidies were frequent not only from urban to 
rural areas, but also from long-distance to local services and from business 
users to residential users. Such cross-subsidies undoubtedly improved the 
affordable character of the services. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether such a 
strategy was always conscious nor efficient.
On the one hand, it can be argued that some of the cross-subsidies were 
not the result of a conscious strategy but the mere result of the evolution of the 
sector. The lack of a sound cost accounting methodology might have made 
possible the divergence between costs and prices. As long-distance 
communications costs were reduced, the mere maintenance of the price 
structure would over the years produce a cross-subsidy from such services to 
the local services. Political pressure not to raise residential users’ bills 
reinforced such a tendency. On the other hand, such policy was criticised 
because of its inefficiency. The generalised cross-subsidies introduced major
385 For an overview of the delays in the development of the French network vide supra Chapter 3.4.4. 
Public Monopolies (1900-1987).
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distortions in the sector which benefited some groups without an objective 
necessity (high income residential users), and imposed an excessive burden on 
other groups (low-income residential users making use of long-distance 
communications), without ensuring effectively the universal affordability of the 
services.
The reform of the European telecommunications markets was intended to 
increase the satisfaction of the consumers, as competition was expected to 
increase efficiency and therefore reduce costs and prices for better quality 
products. In this way, universalitation of the services would be facilitated. 
Nevertheless, those Member States with a tradition of distrust on the 
interrelation of private interests as generator of the general interest and a more 
interventionist approach, required the introduction of mechanisms of public 
intervention devoted to immediately ensure the satisfaction of the general 
interest, that is, to ensure the universality of the basic services.
144. Universal access and liberalisation. The process of reform of the 
European telecommunications markets required the elimination of the 
traditional mechanism of intervention for the increase of access to the network. 
Competition excluded internal cross-subsidies due to the well-known 
phenomenon of screaming.3®6 Some actors tried to obstruct the liberalisation 
process by connecting the elimination of the exclusive right and the elimination 
of public intervention for the protection of the general interest. Access to the 
telecommunications networks by citizens became then one of the fundamental 
issues in the liberalisation debate, and specific mechanisms were required in 
order to ensure such a general interest objective.3*7
386 See OECD (1991): “Universal Service and Rate Restructuring in Telecommunications"OECD, 
Paris.
317 See Analysis (1997): “The Future of Universal Service in telecommunications in Europe”, 
Analysys, Cambridge; GRAHAM, CORNFORD and MARVIN (1996): “The Socio-economic Benefits
250
Chapter 7. Network Access: Notion and Relevance.
It was argued that technological progress had reduced the costs of the 
provision of the most traditional telecommunications services,3“ and that the 
maturity of the traditional telecommunications markets had ensured the virtual 
universalitation of the service.389 It was pointed that the introduction of 
competition would foster a further reduction on costs and prices and therefore 
beneficial effects on the affordability of the service. Nevertheless, the 
defendants of the traditional mechanism of intervention for the protection of 
the public interest forced the introduction of mechanisms devoted to ensure the 
universality of access to the most basic telecommunications services.
7.3. CONCLUSIONS.
145. Final. Public intervention in relation to network access has become 
the fundamental mechanism of intervention in the liberalised 
telecommunications markets.
Compulsory access and the definition of compulsory access conditions 
has been imposed on operators with significant market power in order to 
promote the emergence of competition, in the transitory period from 
monopolies to effective competition.
It has to be pointed that as the incumbents’ market power diminishes, and 
as new electronic communications services are introduced, the focus of the 
debate is shifting from the need to counter-balance the market power of the 
incumbents, to the need to avoid the anticompetitive effects of oligopolistic
of a Universal Telephone Network. A Demand-side View of Universal Service”, in 
Telecommunications Policy, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 3-10
388 See BERNT, KRUSE and LANDSBERGEN (1993): “Impact of Alternative Technologies on 
Universal Service and Competition in the Local Loop”, in Telematics and Informatics, vol. 10, no. 4, 
pp. 359-377.
3,9 See Analysys (1997): “The Future o f Universal Service in Telecommunications in Europe", 
Analysys, Cambridge, p. 63.
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structures both in the more traditional markets such as fixed telephony and in 
new markets such as mobile communications and digital television.
In parallel, general interest objectives recommend that public authorities 
guarantee access for all consumers to some electronic communications 
networks and services.
Two are the main instruments of public intervention at the disposal of the 
Community and national authorities for imposing network access and the 
condition of such access. Both of them suffer limitations and entail risks, but 
they complement each other and can even mutually restrict their most negative 
tendencies.
On the one hand, refusals to deal were often considered abusive under 
Article 82 EC Treaty (former 86). The transplantation of the American 
essential facilities doctrine was supposed to strengthen the European refusals to 
deal principle. The European Court of Justice, however, does not seem to back 
an enthusiastic application of Article 82 to refusals to grant network access.
On the other hand, sector specific regulation was adopted by the 
community directives under the name Open Network Provision. These rules 
can provide a legal base for a more aggressive intervention, and for this reason 
entail also the risk of over-regulation.
It has to be noticed at this point that network access entails at the same 
time dangerous risks. The imposition on the incumbent of the obligation to 
provide access to his competitors could amount to a confiscation of its assets. 
This is particularly important if it is taken into account that most Member 
States have privatised the former monopolist and have received a significant 
income precisely because investors paid for the control of the public switched 
network. It would distort the market to impose ex post excessive obligations on 
such shareholders. Furthermore, the excessive facilities granted to the new 
comers for the access to the incumbent’s network could create a new barrier to
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entry to such markets, as it would eliminate the incentives for the installation of 
alternative infrastructures. As a result no effective competition could arise in 
such markets and the barriers to entry both to the infrastructures and services 
markets would never disappear.
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CHAPTER 8 
COMPETITION LAW AND NETWORK ACCESS
SUMMARY: 8.1. Introduction. 8.2. The US 
origin o f the essential facilities doctrine. 8.3. The 
adoption of the essential facilities doctrine in 
Europe. 8.4. The limitations o f the essential 
facilities doctrine. 8.5. Refusals to grant network 
access. 8.6. Conclusions.
8.1. INTRODUCTION.
146. Competition Law and network access. The innovative 
interpretation of the EC Treaty by the Community competition authorities has 
often allowed them to lead the process of liberalisation of the European 
markets. Such was the case with the elimination of the exclusive rights in the 
telecommunications sector through Directives based on Article 86 EC Treaty 
(former 90). In parallel, Community competition authorities have been
DDL Network Access.
developing for a decade mechanisms against refusals to grant access to the 
liberalised networks based on the Community rules on competition.390
Such mechanisms departed from the traditional competition principle 
according to which a refusal to deal by a dominant undertaking would in 
certain conditions amount to an abuse of dominance prohibited by Article 82 
EC Treaty (former Article 86). The transplant of the American essential 
facilities doctrine tried to strengthen the application of Article 82 to the refusals 
to grant network access. Nevertheless, these tendencies underline the 
contradictory nature of the Community rules on competition, as entail a 
regulatory approach to market power rather than an approach based on the 
mechanisms which differentiate competition Law.
8.2. THE US ORIGIN OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE.
147. Refusals to deal in the US. “In the absence of any purpose to create 
or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman Act] does not restrict the long- 
recognised right of a trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private 
business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with 
whom he will deal”.391 Such a statement in United States v. Colgate at the 
beginning of the century summarises the key points of the approach to refusals 
to deal in American antitrust. Section 2 of the Sherman Act does not have the 
scope of directly protecting the monopolists’ clients or competitors through the 
definition of an obligation to deal, or the consequent prescriptive obligation to 
deal in fair conditions, imposed on the operators with market power. On the 
contrary, antitrust is limited to proscribe only behaviours that restrict
j90 This approach has led some authors even to refer to a “new competition Law”, see LAROUCHE, P. 
(2000): “Competition Law and Regulation in European Telecommunications”, Hart, Oxford.
391 United States v. Colgate 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
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competition, understood not as mere rivalry, but as the mechanism which 
promotes the reduction of prices and the increase of output for the benefit of 
consumers
At the very same core of American antitrust is a determination not to 
regulate the exercise of market power but to introduce barriers to the creation 
of such power. This is based on the assumption that once market power is 
reached, it is difficult to directly control it, and that exploitation opens space 
for new competitors to enter the market. As a result, the damage caused by a 
monopolist to a traditional client by its refusal to deal is not considered itself 
contrary to the Sherman Act. More willingly, such an abuse might facilitate the 
emergence of competition and therefore promotes the erosion of market power 
without requiring a complicated public intervention.392
Furthermore, American Courts have been increasingly reluctant to certify 
the exclusionary effects of refusals to deal. Firstly, it has been commonly 
accepted that “it is difficult to see how denying a facility to one who [...] is not 
an actual or potential competitor could enhance or reinforce the monopolist’s 
market power”.393 Secondly, and as a result of the influence of the Chicago 
School doctrine394, it has been widely recognise that refusals to deal, even if 
they damage competitors, might prove pro-competitive if they increase 
efficiency. The elimination of competitprs, particularly in the case of internal 
vertical integration, does not necessarily suppose the elimination of 
competition and might on the contrary enhance efficiency, which benefits 
consumers. For this reason, undertakings accused of monopolising markets
392 “Every time the monopolist asserts its market dominance by refusing to supply a firm with some 
good or service, that firm has more incentive to find an alternative supplier, which in turn gives 
alternate suppliers more reason to think that they can compete with the monopolist”, Alaska Air lanes v. 
United Airlanes, 948 F.2d 536, 549 (9th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 503 U.S. 977 (1992). See also 
GLAZER, K. and LIPSKY, A. (1995): “Unilateral Refusals to Deal Under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act”, m Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 63, p. 783.
393 Interface Group Inc. v. Massachussets Port Authority, 816 F.2d 9,12 (1st Cir. 1987).
394 Vide supra Chapter 2.2. Origins and Evolution of Antitrust
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through refusals to deal should always have the opportunity to allege objective 
justification to their behaviour. Objective justification do not only comprise 
situations in which dealing with a competitor might cause direct harm to the 
undertaking (as is the case with credit-risk companies), but also situations in 
which dealing with a competitor excludes the efficiency gains derived, for 
example, from economies of scale or scope.
As a conclusion, refusals to deal are considered contrary to Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act when such a behaviour despises profit opportunities and 
imposes costs on the monopolist in order to impose greater costs on the 
competitors with the result of reducing competition and allowing the 
monopolist to raise prices and diminish output.395
148. The essential facilities doctrine. It has been observed that in some 
exceptional cases, physical, legal or economic barriers exclude the existence of 
competition for the production of certain assets. What is more, the 
monopolistic providers of such assets might have the occasion to expand 
vertically their position by their refusal to deal with the upstream or 
downstream competitors that have a vital need for the monopolised asset.
The basic antitrust assumption that competition will erode market power 
if it is abused is not valid in these cases, as different barriers obstruct the 
emergence of competition. Therefore, the traditional antitrust approach to 
refusals to deal does not provide an effective solution to these situations. The 
essential facilities doctrine appears in this environment in order to impose on 
the monopolist the prescriptive obligation to provide access to the essential
395 See FOX, E. (1982): “Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the European 
Community: Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness”, in Notre Dame Law Review, vol. 61, pp. 1000- 
1001. Leading cases as regards refusals to deal are Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials 
Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); Lorain Journal Co. v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., A ll U.S. 585 (1985); 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services Inc., 112 S. Ct 2072 (1992).
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asset in order to make competition possible at least in the vertically connected 
markets.
The first precedent of the essential facilities doctrine might be traced to a 
case at the beginning of the century, Terminal Railroad?96 which involved the 
control by a consortium of railroad operators of a vital junction point in Saint 
Louis. The Court imposed on the Consortium the obligation to admit rivals to 
the combination. A similar solution was provided in a case involving a 
combination for the exchange of information between newspapers, Associated 
Press,397 even if the lower court had opted to rely on the traditional Common 
Law obligation to serve everyone imposed on public callings. However, it is 
Otter TaiP98 the first case in which the essential facilities doctrine was applied 
to a unilateral refusal to deal. The monopolistic provider of electric 
transmission lines refused to supply power to municipalities developing their 
own retail distribution networks, and was subsequently condemned for the use 
of its strategic dominance for maintaining its monopoly by shutting out 
potential competition.
The expression “essential facilities” was not explicitly used by a court 
until 1978,399 and has never been backed by the Supreme Court. However, in 
the last decades, a substantial case law has developed. The lack of a clear 
positioji by the Supreme Court has allowed the coexistence of judgements
396 United Stares v. Terminal Railroad Association, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). See, nevertheless, a 
challenging view in REEF FEN, D. and KLEIT, A.N. (1990): “Terminal Railroad Revisited: 
Foreclosure of an Essential Facility or simple horizontal M o n o p o ly in Journal of Law &. 
Economics, vol. 33, p. 419.
397 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
398 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). See an analysis in WERDEN, G.J. 
(1987): “The Law and Economics of the Essential Facilities Doctrine”, in Saint Louis University Law 
Journal, vol. 32, p. 461.
399 Hecht v. Pro-Football Inc., 570 F2d. 982 U.S. 956 (1978). In this case the essential facility was a 
football stadium.
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which have stressed the exceptionality of the doctrine as MCI v. A T & T with 
judgements which seem to adopt a more flexible approach, such as Aspen 
Skiing«'
In any case, some fundamental lines seem to emerge with regard to the 
applicability of the essential facilities doctrine. Firstly the facility (understood 
in a very broad sense as any resource, physical or immaterial) must be 
essential. That means that the resource is vital for the downstream competitor 
in the sense that the competitor cannot integrate vertically itself and produce 
the asset, or expect that another undertaking will provide the asset, as it is not 
possible to duplicate it, and also in the sense that it would not be possible to 
produce its product without it. Secondly, the obligation to provide the facility 
should be able to introduce effective competition in the downstream market, 
what excludes discriminations that lead to such effect. Finally, access to the 
facility by the downstream competitors has to be physically and economically 
possible, and competitors have to pay for such access.402
149. The exceptional character of the essential facilities doctrine.
Different authors have underlined the exceptional character of the essential 
facilities doctrine in the American antitrust system, and some of them have 
even expressed the opinion that it should be eliminated.403 The fundamental 
criticism is that “since the only qualifying exclusionary practice is the refusal to 
share itself, the doctrine comes about as close as antitrust ever does to
400 MCI Communications v. American Telephone & Telegraph, 609 F2d 843 (6th Cir 1979). Also 
Mckenzie v. Mercy Hospital, 854 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1988); or City o f Anaheim v. Southern California 
Edison Co., 955 FJ2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1992).
401 Vide supra footnote 395.
402 See VENTT, J. and KALLAUGHER, J. (1994): “Essential Facilities: A Comparative Law 
Approach”, in “Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate Law Institute", pp. 322-324.
403 See AREEDA, P. (1990): “Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles”, in 
Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 58, pp. 852-853; AREEDA, P. and HOVENKAMP, H. (1996): “Antitrust 
Law. An Analysis o f Antitrust Principles and Their Application", vol. ULI, Little Brown, Boston, p. 
172; WERDEN (1987), p. 480 (supra footnote 398).
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condemning ‘no fault’ monopolisation”.404 That is, the essential facilities 
doctrine focuses the attention not in the process of development of the 
monopolistic position, but in the fairness of behaviour of the monopolist itself, 
without considering the objective justification which could be provided by the 
monopolist. The essential facilities doctrine acquires therefore a regulatory 
nature that seems incompatible with the principles of American antitrust.
The essential facilities doctrine has a close connection with the Common 
Law tradition of the common calling, and the connected obligation to serve all 
at a reasonable rate with no discrimination derived from the public interest of 
certain activities.405 As a matter of fact, it has been pointed that in Associated 
Press the lower court based its decision on the traditional Common Law 
obligations which informed an activity clothed with a public interest as 
journalism. Even if the Supreme Court stated expressly that it was not applying 
a public utility concept, a member of the Supreme Court recognised that the 
judgement would not decide the considerable question on whether compulsory 
dealing would be an appropriate Sherman Act remedy or should await further 
legislative action.406
Rather than preventing monopolisation through the proscription of 
exclusionary practices, the essential facilities doctrine regulates the behaviour 
of the .monopolist through the prescription of the rules governing its relation 
with the downstream competitors. In the original cases of collective refusals to 
deal, antitrust intervention required no more than a prohibition of the refusal to 
put an end to the anticompetitive behaviour.
The expansion of the figure to unilateral refusals to provide access to an 
essential facility modifies the nature of the intervention from proscriptive to
404 Ibid. AREEDA and HOVENKAMP (1996), p. 176: “the ‘essential facility’ doctrine is both harmful 
and unnecessary and should be abandoned”.
403 Vide supra Chapter 2.1. Origins and Evolution of Economic Regulation.
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prescriptive, as the permanence of the market power of the monopolist requires 
antitrust authorities to define all the conditions of the provision and particularly 
the pricing and the non-discrimination in the provision.
It has already been pointed out that antitrust authorities lack the 
mechanisms to undertake such a task. It is for this reason that a number of 
authors have proposed to apply the essential facilities doctrine exclusively in 
those cases in which a regulatory framework is in place and where it defines 
the prescriptive rules governing the monopolised activity.407 Such was the case 
for instance in Otter Tail or MCI v. AT&T. The essential facilities doctrine 
would then play a mere complementary role.
As a conclusion, the essential facilities doctrine, even if limited to the 
clearest cases of unavoidable vertically integrated monopoly, supposes the 
introduction of a regulatory figure in the American antitrust system. Such a 
figure is incompatible with the general principles which inform antitrust, as 
well as with the mechanisms provided for ensuring the effectivity of such 
principles, unless applied in close co-ordination with the existing regulatory 
framework.
8.3. THÉ ADOPTION OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE IN 
EUROPE.
150. Essential facilities in Europe. The essential facilities doctrine has 
been transplanted from American antitrust to European competition Law by the
406 Vide Associated Press v. United States, p. 25 (supra footnote 397).
407 Vide AREEDA and HOVENKAMP (1996) p. 201 (supra footnote 403), and EDGARD, F. (1993): 
“The Essential Facilities Doctrine and Public Utilities: Another Layer of regulation?”, in Idaho Law 
Review, vol. 29, no. 2, p. 311.
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European competition authorities (initially by the Community authorities but 
followed early by the national counterparts).408
It is evident that the situation that has given rise to the development of the 
doctrine in the US was also faced in Europe, and that American antitrust has 
always been the model of reference for European competition Law. It might 
not be so evident, but it seems to be the case that the essential facilities doctrine 
is far more compatible with the European antitrust tradition than with the 
American tradition. The former has been always characterised by an approach 
based on the fairness of the monopolist behaviour and the regulatory character 
of the intervention against monopolists’ abuses.409 Maybe for this reason it has 
been repeatedly argued that the doctrine does not introduce a significant 
novelty in the European system. What has not been commonly recognised, 
however, is that the transplant of the doctrine underlines the most basic 
inconsistencies of the policy towards market power.
151. A doctrine compatible with the traditional approach. The
regulatory approach of the European rules on abuse of dominant position 
decisively influenced the early development of the refusals to deal category. 
Even if this behaviour is not explicitly defined in Article 82 EC Treaty, the
408 Sec different commentaries on refusals to deal and essential facilities in BROKELMANN, H. 
(1997): “Las negativas de suministro en el Derecho de la com petencia comunitario y español”, in 
Gaceta Jurídica de la C.E. y  déla Competencia, B-125, pp. 5-26; CAZZOLA, C. (1999): “La dottrina 
dell’essential facilities e la politica antitrust”, in “La disciplina giuridica della telecomunicazioni”, 
Giuffre, Milano, pp. 219-259; FURSE, M. (1995): ‘The ‘Essential Facilities’ Doctrine in Community 
Law”, in European Competition Law Review, voL 8, pp. 469-473; GLASL, D. (1994): “Essential 
Facilities Doctrine in EC Anti-trust Law: A Contribution to the Current Debate”, in European 
Competition Law Review, vol. 15, no. 6, pp. 306-314; LAROUCHE, P. (2000): “Competition Law and 
Regulation in European Telecommunications”, Hart, Oxford, 179-217; RIDYARD, D. (1996): 
“Essential Facilities and the Obligation to Supply Competitors under UK and EC Competition Law”, in 
European Competition Law Review, vol. 17, no. 8, pp. 438-452; SUBIOTTO, R. (1992): ‘The Right to 
Deal with Whom One Pleases under EEC Competition Law: A Small Contribution to a Necessary 
Debate”, in European Competition Law Review, vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 234-244; TEMPLE LANG, J. 
(1989): “Defining Legitimate Competition: Companies’ Duties to Supply Competitors, and Access to 
Essential Facilities”, in “Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate Law Institute”, pp. 245-313; 
VENIT, J. and KALLAUGHER, J. (1994): “Essential Facilities: A Comparative Law Approach”, in 
“Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate Law Institute”, pp. 315-343.
409 Vide supra Chapter 3.2. Competition Law in Europe.
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Community competition authorities judged that refusals to deal were implicitly 
included under the abusive behaviours prohibited generically by Article 82 or 
even expressly under letters a), b) and even c). It was particularly the American 
authors410 who pointed out that refusals to deal were not prohibited because of 
their effect on competition, but rather because of the lack of fairness with 
regard to the relationship between the undertaking in a dominant position and 
its clients and competitors.
The main concern of the European Court of Justice in early cases of 
refusal to deal such as United Brands *n was the unfairness for the traditional 
distributors of the unilateral refusal to deal by the dominant undertakings due to 
the exploitative nature of such a behaviour. As a matter of fact, the ECJ stated 
that the lack of a consolidated relationship excluded the abusive character of 
the refusal of BP to provide its services to ABG during a petrol shortage.412 It 
was absolutely irrelevant whether there was a competitive relation between the 
undertakings, as the unfairness had its origin in the betrayed trust of a 
traditional customer, and not in the anticompetitive nature of the behaviour. In 
this way, it became a principle of competition policy that the refusal to deal to a 
traditional customer by a dominant undertaking would amount to an abusive 
behaviour.
The expansion in the application of Article 82 from exploitative 
behaviours to also include exclusionary behaviours increased the initially timid 
intervention against market power. Nevertheless, the regulatory nature of the 
control of the fairness of the dominant undertaking’s behaviour predominated 
over efficiency considerations, sometimes due to parallel objectives on the
410 See KAUPER, T. (1989): “Whither Article 82? Observations on Excessive Prices and Refusals to 
Deal”, in “Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate Law Institute", pp. 651-682; and FOX, E. 
(1982): “Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the European Community. 
Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness”, in Notre Dame Law Review, vol. 61, pp. 981-1020.
411 United Brands v. Commission, Case 27/76,1978 ECR 207.
412 British Petroleum v. Commission, Case 77/77,1978 ECR 1513.
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rules on competition such as market integration. As a result, the inconsistencies 
which had little effect under a little applied provision produced major 
interferences when they were expanded to a much broader set of situations.
A good example of this phenomenon can be appreciated with regard to 
refusals to deal. Cases such as Commercial Solvents413 show that the European 
competition authorities were more focused on the unfair effects of refusals to 
deal on the competitor eliminated from the market due to the vertical 
integration of Commercial Solvents than on the effects on competition and 
consumer welfare. Actually, Commercial Solvents’ refusal to deal probably did 
not reduce competition, but merely substituted one competitor for another 
involved in a process of vertical integration which could have been proved 
more efficient and beneficial for the consumers thanks to the integration. The 
Court, however, never balanced such effects, as it only focused on the 
unfairness for the competitor.
Furthermore, in Telemarketing14 and GB-Inno-BM,*li the Court refused to 
accept the defendant’s argument that the refusal to deal would only be abusive 
if it threatened harm to consumers through increases of prices or other negative 
effects.416 On the contrary, the principle was established that “an abuse within 
the meaning of Article 86 [now 82] is committed where, without any objective 
necessity, an undertaking holding a dominant position on a particular market 
reserves for itself an ancillary activity which might be earned out by another 
undertaking as part of its activities on a neighbouring but separate market, with 
the possibility of eliminating all competition from such undertaking”.417
413 Commercial Solvents v. Commission, Cases 6 and 7/73, 1974 ECR 223.
4,4 CBEMv. CLT, Case 311/84,1985 ECR 3261.
415 GB-Inno-BM, Case C-18/88,1991 ECR 1-5941.
416 Vide FOX (1982), p. 998 {supra footnote 410).
417 Vide GB-Inno-BM, para. 18 (supra footnote 415).
265
DI. Network Access.
152. Exploitation, exclusion, efficiency and uncertainty. As the
application of Article 82 EC Treaty to the obstruction of exclusionary abuses 
was confirmed, a new strand of Commission decisions on refusals to deal 
appeared, more focused on the effects on competition of such refusal than on 
the effects on the competitors. Some signs of such a shift can be identified in 
Boosey and Hawkes.418
More clearly, the Commission stated in British Midland/Aer Lingus that 
“Aer Lingus has not been able to point to efficiencies created by a refusal to 
interline nor to advance any other persuasive and legitimate business 
justification for its conduct”,419 and for this reason declared anticompetitive the 
refusal to reach an interlining agreement with the new comer and it therefore 
was excluded from the market. In a similar way, the Commission in London 
European/Sabena420 stressed the fact that the dominant carrier’s refusal to grant 
access to the leading computerised reservation system not only excluded 
London European from the market, but also allowed the dominant carrier to 
keep prices up, causing harm to the consumer.
An evolution of the Community institutions from a purely exploitative 
approach to a cumulative exclusionary approach and later to an evaluation of 
the exclusionary effects in line with American Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
can therefore be identified. The result was an extremely confusing mixture of 
exploitative and exclusionary abuses, complicated by the introduction of the 
efficiency argument. As an example, the three well known behaviours defined 
by the Court in Volvo/Veng42' as abuses of a dominant position derived from an 
intellectual property right, mixed all these elements as it defined at the same
4W Bookey and Hawkes, Commission Decision 87/500/EEC, OJ L 282/36 of 29.7.87. For an analysis on 
these lines vide KAUPER (1982), pp. 678-679 (supra footnote 410).
415 British Midland/Aer Lingus, Commission Decision 92/213/EEC, OJ L 96/32, OJ 1992
420 London European/Sabena, Commission Decision 88/589/EEC, OJ L 317/47 of 24.11.88.
421AB Volvo v. Erik Veng UK Ltd., Case 238/87, 1988 ERC 6211.
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level unfair practices related to excessive pricing, absolute refusals to deal and 
anticompetitive behaviours affecting efficiency.
The essential facilities, easily adaptable to the European approach to 
market power, was introduced by the European Commission at that moment in 
order to face the lack of coherent rules for the treatment of refusals to deal, and 
in particular to obstruct refusals to deal to new customers. The requirements 
developed by the lower American courts for the application of the doctrine, 
particularly in MCI v. AT&T,422 provided the necessary instruments for 
analysing refusals and to limit the application of a figure which obviously 
required precise limits in order to avoid the excessive intervention imposing 
access to existing facilities.
153. Early cases. The very first case in which European institutions 
expressly mentioned the doctrine of the essential facilities was in the granting 
of interim measures by the Commission in the case B&I/Sealink.*32 In a very 
similar case related also to the exploitation of ports, Sea Continers/Stena 
Sealink,424 the Commission stated that “an undertaking which occupies a 
dominant position in the provision of an essential facility and itself uses that 
facility (i.e., a facility or infrastructure., without access to which competitors 
cannot provide services to their customers), and which refuses other companies 
access, to that facility without objective justification or grants access to 
competitors only in terms less favourable than those which it gives to its own 
services, infringes Article 86 [now 82] if the other conditions of that Article are 
met”.425
422 Vide supra footnote 400.
423 B&l Line pic v. Siena Sea Link, Commission Decision of 11 June 1992.
424 Sea Continers/Stena Sea Link, Commission Decision 94/19/EC OJ L 15/8 of 18.1.94.
423 Ibid. para. 66.
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Even if the Commission transplanted the expression “essential facilities” 
and most of the requirements defined by American courts (vertical integration, 
essentiality and the refusal of discriminatory contracting), the decision lacked a 
clear delimitation of the conditions that define a facility as essential. In the US 
the essential facilities doctrine has been widely recognised as an exceptional 
solution for very exceptional situations in which competition, for some reason 
is excluded from a particular market. The first decisions of the Commission 
under the cover of the essential facilities, on the contrary, failed to identify the 
exceptional conditions that made the port of Holyhead an essential facility
As a result, a dangerous precedent was opened both at the Community 
level and at a national level allowing a flow of requirements by undertakings to 
have access to the facilities of their competitors, as they understood that a 
refusal would amount to an abusive exclusionary behaviour prohibited by 
Article 82 EC Treaty. For instance, the requirement of small competitors to 
have access to the distribution channels of competitors enjoying a dominant 
position became common, as it was argued that small competitors would 
otherwise have no place on the market426
The Court’s decision in MagiW27 increased the uncertainty due to the fact 
that for the first time, the obligation to renounce to the exclusivity it entails was 
imposed*on the holder of an intellectual right At the same time, the case 
introduced the novelty of imposing the obligation to deal with an undertaking 
that had never been a client of the holders of the exclusive right
The legal certainty which emerged from the clear separation between the 
antitrust and the regulatory intervention was also damaged by the tendency of 
the Commission to introduce regulatory obligations in the exercise of its
426 See for instance the case Tabacalera under the Spanish competition authorities, commented in 
BROKELMAN (1997), pp. 24-26 (vide supra footnote 408).
427 RTEandlTP v. Commission, Case 242/91,1995 ECR1-743.
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antitrust competencies. It became increasingly common to impose regulatory 
obligations on the undertakings notifying concentrative or co-operative joint- 
ventures in relation to access to essential facilities as conditions for the 
approval of the operation under the merger regulation or under Article 81(3). 
Such a practice has been common not only in the telecommunications 
industry,428 but also in other network industries as air transportation429 or 
railroads.430
In conclusion, the introduction of the essential facilities doctrine by the 
European Commission without a clear definition of the conditions required to 
apply such an exceptional intervention, caused legal uncertainty. The reason 
was that undertakings heavily investing in R&D, in the installation of 
infrastructures, or in general, in the development of assets which would provide 
a competitive advantage as a result of the more efficient response to the 
consumer’s demands, were menace to share with their competitors their 
competitive advantage.
154. Latest case law. The dangerous door opened by the Commission by 
an insufficiently precise transplant of the American essential facilities doctrine 
has been recently closed (even if not locked) by the Community courts. A 
number of decisive judgements have established strict requirements for the 
definition of a facility as essential, and have limited the role of the Commission 
as a regulator.
The first important judgement was delivered by the Court of First 
Instance in Ladbroke v. Commission.43‘ The Court stated that the refusal by the 
holder of the exclusive rights for television images on French horse racing to
428 Worldcom/MCI, Commission Decision Case IV/M.1069, of 8.7.98.
429 Swssair/Sabena Z7, Commission Decision Case IV/M.616 of20.7.95.
430 European Night Services, Commission Decision 94/663/EC, OJ L 259/10, of 21.9.94.
431 Tiercé Ladbroke v. Commission, Case T-504/93, 1997 ECR11-923.
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grant access to such images to an undertaking running betting shops in Belgium 
was not contrary to Article 82 EC Treaty. The main reason was that the French 
undertaking was not present in the Belgium market, and since no competition 
existed between them, no exclusionary practice was possible. This judgement 
can be interpreted along the lines of separating exploitative from exclusionary 
abuses with regard to refusals to deal.
Another interesting judgement was delivered by the Court of First 
Instance in the case European Night Services.*1 The Court annulled a 
Commission Decision relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC 
Treaty. It was considered, among other grounds, that the Commission had 
failed to demonstrate the necessity of imposing on the parties involved in a co­
operative joint venture for the running of a night railroad service across the 
Channel, the obligation to supply train paths, locomotives and crews to third 
parties on the same terms as to the joint-venture company. The Court 
considered that, as train paths are concerned, an existing Directive already 
imposed such an obligation, in such a way that the agreement could not, by 
definition, restrict it. Thus, it was restricted the regulatory character of the 
Commission intervention in application of the rules on competition in favour of 
the regular regulatory channels. As regards locomotives and crews, the Court 
stated that the essentiality of the facilities was never demonstrated. 
Furthermore, the Court stated that the fact that the notifying parties were the 
first ones to acquire such facilities, and for a period the only ones, did not 
imply that they are alone in being able to do so.
Finally, it is decisive the judgement of the European Court of Justice in 
Oscar Bronner433 following the lines of a detailed reasoned opinion of
432 European Night Services v. Commission, Joint Cases T-374, 375, 384 and 288/94, 1998 ECR II- 
3141.
433 Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, Case C-7/97, 1998 ECR 1-7791. Comments in LAROUCHE (2000), 
pp. 193-196 (vide supra footnote 408);
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Advocate General Jacobs. The ECJ established the requirements for 
considering a refusal to grant access to an essential facility contrary to Article 
82 EC Treaty. In so doing, the exceptional character of the American doctrine 
was also introduced in European competition Law.
The first requirement for the consideration of the obligation to grant 
access is the finding of the essential character of a facility. Such essentiality, as 
in the American case, has a double sense. On the one hand, and this is the 
centre of the doctrine, there has to be an insurmountable barrier to duplicate the 
facility. “That might be the case for example where duplication of the facility is 
impossible or extremely difficult owing to physical, geographical or legal 
constraints or is highly undesirable for reasons of public policy”.434 It might 
also be the case, as the Advocate General Jacobs points out, due to economic 
reasons, and the fact that the facility was developed under no-competitive 
reasons or that the economies of scale make the development of an alternative 
facility uneconomic. In any case, the impossibility to duplicate the facility has 
to be objective. Therefore, it is not limited to the impossibility for a specific 
downstream competitor to integrate vertically due to its small size, but to the 
impossibility faced by any potential competitor to introduce effective 
competition in the upstream market. On the other hand, the facility has to be 
“indispensable to carrying on that person’s [the downstream operator] 
business”.435
Secondly, in order to dictate a breach of Article 82 EC Treaty, the refusal 
has to be “incapable of being objectively justified”.436 The Court does not 
elaborate more on this point, but it is clear that such circumstances as the 
credit-risk character of the potential client justify the refusal to deal. The key 
point is whether objective justifications based on grounds of efficiency could
434 Ibid. Opinion of the Advocate General, para. 64.
435 Ibid. para. 41.
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be accepted. Advocate General Jacobs points out that it may be the case in the 
US, but it seems that is in the very same essence of the doctrine in the US that 
the monopolistic nature of the market of the facility excludes the possibility of 
considering efficiency justifications, as the consumer would never benefit from 
them due to the lack even of potential competition on the monopolist. The same 
reasoning could be applied in Europe. Actually, this might be the centre of the 
essential facilities doctrine and the difference against the regular refusal to deal, 
where objective justifications based on efficiency have to be considered.
Finally, the Court required that the refusal of the service be likely to 
eliminate all competition in the downstream market. In the case of essential 
facilities, as they have been qualified by the court, this will unavoidably be the 
case, and for this reason they are an abuse of Article 82 EC Treaty per se. 
Some American authors have proposed to strengthen this requirement so that 
access is provided not only when refusal eliminates all competition, but also 
when such access would substantially improve competition in the downstream 
market.437
8.4. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE.
155. Conclusions regarding access to essential facilities. The
judgements of the Community courts on essential facilities have clarified the 
role of the American doctrine in European competition Law. The European 
Court of Justice has imposed a more restrictive approach to essential facilities 
than the European Commission. In this way, the exceptional character of the 
treatment reserved for those markets in which no competition is possible and 
the monopoly could be expanded to vertically related markets, has been
436 Ibid. Judgement of the Court, para. 41
437 Vide AREEDA and HOVEMLAMP (1996) p. 200 (supra footnote 403).
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transplanted to Europe. As a result and, it has to be stressed again, 
exceptionally, “a dominant undertaking must not merely refrain from anti­
competitive action but must actively promote competition by allowing potential 
competitors access to the facilities which it has developed”.438
Furthermore, the Court of First Instance has also limited the regulatory 
intervention of the Commission in the application of the rules on competition. 
As a matter of fact, it has underlined the lack of necessity of conditioning to the 
provision of access to a facility in the necessary approval of joint ventures 
under Article 81(3) if such obligation has already been introduced by a 
Community Directive. At the same time, it has also imposed exceptional 
standards to the introduction of such conditions in case no regulatory obligation 
exists.
The courts, nevertheless, have not yet stated their position regarding the 
conditions in which access to essential facilities has to be granted. American 
literature has pointed out the regulatory character of the essential facilities 
doctrine, and the inconsistencies of besting on the competition authorities the 
definition of the conditions of access without the attribution of the necessary 
mechanisms.439 Such problems are even more relevant in the European case due 
to the traditional regulatory character of Article 82 EC Treaty and the mixture 
between exploitative, exclusionary and efficiency considerations in the 
application of such provision to refusals to deal.
Deriving from the very same nature of the essential facilities doctrine is 
the notion that access by third parties to such facilities has to be granted at the 
same conditions at which the vertically integrated monopolist enjoys them.440
438 Vide Oscar Bronner, Resorted Opinion of die Advocate General, para. 34 (supra footnote 433). This 
has been also pointed in LAROUCHE (2000) p. 209 (vide supra footnote 408).
439 Vide ARREDA and HOVENKAMP (1996), pp. 166-172 (supra footnote 403); and LAROUCHE 
(2000), p. 210 (supra footnote 408).
440 Vide analysis in LAROUCHE (2000), pp. 218-231 (supra footnote 408).
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Otherwise, downstream competitors would never be in the position to compete 
and the discriminatory conditions would amount to a refusal to deal that is 
considered unlawful. This is shared by American antitrust and European 
competition Law. In the simplest cases the mere obligation to provide non- 
discriminatory access might be enough to regulate access conditions. Vertical 
integration, particularly in industries with a predominance of the common 
versus the specific costs, however, might often complicate the comparison of 
the conditions, particularly the price, at which access is provided to all the 
undertakings active in the downstream market
A further problem in Europe derives from the possible interference of the 
traditional fairness approach regarding market power in the definition of access 
conditions. As a matter of fact, the Commission made clear its intentions to 
link access to essential facilities to traditional case law, for instance on 
production limitation and even on excessive pricing.441 This approach would 
definitely take the essential facilities doctrine to a clearly regulatory field that is 
excluded in the US.442 Competition is not necessarily limited in the downstream 
market if both competitors and the vertically integrated division of the 
monopolist suffer the same prices for the utilisation of the essential facility, 
even if such prices are definitely over the cost of production. In any event, such 
a regulatory intervention would risk lack of effectivity, due to the lack of 
adaptation of the mechanisms provided by the rules on competition.
441 Notice o q  the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications 
sector. Framework, relevant markets and principles, OJ C 265/2 of 22.8.98, para. 105-109.
442 Advocate General Jacobs in his brilliant reasoned opinion in Oscar Bronner, para. 47 (vide supra 
footnote 433) relies on one of the earliest American precedent on refusals to deal, Eastman Kodak v. 
Southern Photo Materials (vide supra footnote 395) in order to suggest that in the US the essential 
facilities doctrine would include the obligation to contract on reasonable terms. Nevertheless, such 
position seems incompatible with the evolution of American antitrust particularly after the influence of 
the Chicago School, as it is underlined for instance by ARREDA and HOVEMKAMP (1996) pp. 167- 
228 (vide supra footnote 403) and GLAZER and LIP SKY (1995), pp. 749-800 (vide supra footnote 
392). Advocate General Jacobs seems to suggest the convenience to allow the monopolist producer of 
an essential facility to recover the heavy investments through temporary monopolistic pricing. This 
option would force competition authorities to adopt a complicated ‘rate of return’ regulation.
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For all these reasons, the essential facilities doctrine, both in the US, but 
particularly in Europe, requires the co-ordination with other public intervention 
instruments, and particularly economic regulation, as the latest instrument 
disposes of mechanisms such as the imposition of specific proscriptive 
obligations which allow firstly for the clarification of the conditions of access 
to the facility by the vertically integrated division of the monopolist (through 
accounts separation, for instance) and secondly for setting out the specific 
conditions under which access should take place.
156. Conclusion as regards access to non-essential facilities. The 
debate on the introduction of the essential facilities doctrine and the position of 
the European Courts not only have clarified the principles ruling access to these 
facilities, but also have developed the reflection on the general category of 
refusals to deal and might force competition authorities to adopt a stricter 
approach regarding access to non-essential facilities.
The reflections of Advocate General Jacobs confirm the introduction in 
the European debate about refusal to deal of a series of principles that have not 
always led the application of Article 82 by the European competition 
authorities. It is now firmly established not only that “the right to chose one’s 
trading partner and freely to dispose of one’s property are generally recognised 
principles in the laws of the Member States”,443 but also that “in the long term is 
generally pro-competitive and in the interest of consumers to allow a company 
to retain for its own use facilities which it has developed for the purposes of its 
business. [...] Thus the mere fact that by retaining a facility for its own use a 
dominant undertaking retains an advantage over a competitor cannot justify 
requiring access to it”.444
443 Advocate General reasoned opinion in Oscar Bronner, para. 56 (vide supra footnote 433).
444 Ibid. para. 57.
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Advocate General Jacobs states with absolute clarity the main principles 
which should rule refusals to deal: “the primary purpose of Article 86 [now 
Article 82] is to prevent distortion of competition [...] rather than to protect the 
position of particular competitors. It may therefore [...] be unsatisfactory, in a 
case in which a competitor demands access to a raw material in order to be able 
to compete with the dominant undertaking on a downstream market in a final 
product, to focus solely on the latter’s market power on the upstream market 
power and conclude that its conduct in reserving to itself the downstream 
market is automatically an abuse. Such conduct will not have an adverse 
impact on consumers unless the dominant undertaking’s final product is 
sufficiently insulated from competition to give it market power”.445
Only in the case of essential facilities does the mere refusal to deal per se 
excludes the existence of competition in the downstream market due to the 
exceptional vital character of these facilities. For the rest of facilities, as a 
result, it will be necessary to identify circumstances which, in parallel to the 
refusal to deal exclude competition in the downstream market and therefor 
damage competition for the final product.
The test should not be centred on the existence of a mere refusal but 
whether such refusal despises profit opportunities and imposes costs on the 
monopolist in order to impose greater costs on the competitors with the result 
of reducing competition and allowing the monopolist to raise prices and 
diminish output.
In case the refusal to deal affects a competitor in a vertically related 
market, the interest of the consumer should be protected over the interest of the 
competitors. Mere damage to the competitors, even the elimination of a 
particular competitor, should not be considered itself an abuse. It should be as
445 Ibid. para. 58.
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well necessary to determine whether damage to downstream competitors is 
balanced by increases in efficiency by the vertically integrated undertaking and 
by the benefits obtained by consumers out of this efficiency. This balance 
should not be contaminated by fairness considerations leading to regulatory 
interventions supposed to benefit consumers in the long run. At the same time, 
it seems clear that a refusal to deal by an undertaking which is not a competitor 
in the downstream market cannot be considered exclusionary.446
Exploitative abuses should be restricted as much as possible, as they 
entail a heavy regulatory intervention outside of the scope of the rules on 
competition. This is particularly true for the refusals to deal with new 
customers. In the case of traditional customers, the rules on competition can 
provide a simple solution by forcing the dominant operator to restore the 
traditional conditions of access. In the case of new customers such a solution is 
more complicated, particularly if no other undertaking has access to the facility 
and it is necessary not only to require access but unavoidably also access 
conditions.
8.5. REFUSALS TO GRANT NETWORK ACCESS.
8.5.1. General Considerations.
157. Introduction. It is not simple to adapt the analysed approach to 
refusals to deal to the specific circumstances of the telecommunications sector. 
It is not simple firstly because the approach itself is far from being clear, as it is 
evolving in part due to the pressure to find effective solutions for access in
446 Of course, a refusal to deal with an undertaking in a downstream market where the provider is not 
present could have the purpose of excluding from the market a direct competitor in the upstream 
market with whom the dominant undertaking does not want its client to deal. In this case a horizontal 
exclusionary effect can be identified even if the direct effects are suffered by the company in the 
downstream market. This was the case in Loraine {vide supra footnote 395) and also in United Brands 
(vide supra footnote 411).
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liberalised network industries. Furthermore, the character of industry in 
transition complicates the definition of relevant markets and the evaluation of 
the economic characteristics of such markets.
The Notice on the application of the competition rules to access 
agreements in the telecommunications sector447 was supposed to set out the 
principles stemming from Community competition Law regarding access in the 
telecommunications sector, in order to introduce legal certainty and stable 
conditions for investment. The Commission elaborated on the traditional 
judgements of the CFI and the ECJ on refusals to deal as well as on the more 
abundant and aggressive Commission decisions, particularly on those that had 
introduced the essential facilities doctrine. Besides this, the Commission 
advanced some of the new principles that would rule its intervention in the 
telecommunications sector.
The essential facilities doctrine, as it had been developed by the 
Commission throughout its case law, played a decisive role in the whole 
system. However, the posterior intervention of the European Courts has 
introduced an element of doubt about the validity of certain assumptions of the 
Commission reflected in the Access Notice.
8.5.2. The Access Notice.
158. The Access Notice. The Commission’s analysis departed from the 
recognition of the relevance of access in the telecommunications sector. The 
double factual monopoly enjoyed by the vertically integrated incumbents, both 
in the infrastructures markets and in the services markets, grants them a
447 Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications 
sector. Framework, relevant markets and principles, OJ 1998 C 265/2, of 22.8.98. For comments on it 
see COATES, K. (1997): “EU Competition Rules and Access Problems in the Telecoms Sector”, in 
International Business Lawyer, pp. 310-317; VAN T.IF.DEKERKE, D. (1997): “European 
Commission’s Draft Notice on Access in the Telecommunications Sector”, in International Business 
Lawyer, pp. 318-328.
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particularly strong market power. Relying on the traditional Hoffman-La Roche 
formula, the Commission based the potential abusive character of the refusals 
to give access to the monopolised facilities on the effect of hindering the 
maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the 
growth of that competition.
The Commission’s position in the Access Notice, however, might not 
always be compatible with the case law of the European courts, particularly 
with the judgements on the essential facility doctrine. On the one hand, the 
Commission seems to adopt an excessively wide view of the application of the 
general category of refusals to deal, which has not always been backed by the 
ECJ. On the other hand, the category of essential facilities, even if more 
restricted than in some of the early Commission decisions, might still be wider 
than defined by the ECJ.
It seems to be the case that the Commission., in the Access Notice, 
diminish the potential role of the essential facilities doctrine and foster the 
application of the more traditional principles on abusive behaviour, maybe as a 
result of the criticisms raised by early Commission decisions on essential 
facilities. The result, though, is an under-utilisation of a doctrine which might 
be helpful to tackle some issues faced in liberalised network industries, and an 
over-stretch of the traditional principles on refusal to deal.
159. Withdrawal of access. Three different scenarios are distinguished in 
the Access Notice in order to evaluate the exploitative or exclusionary effects 
of the refusals to deal. The simplest scenario is the withdrawal of access from 
an existing customer.448 There is substantial case law both from the 
Commission and from the ECJ which confirms the abusive nature of such 
behaviour.449 Simplicity derives also from the fact that this abuse entails
448 Ibid. para. 99-100.
449 Vide supra Chapter 8.3. The Adoption of the Essential Facilities Doctrine in Europe.
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predominantly exploitative effects and, therefore, the difficulties originated by 
the mixture of exploitative and exclusionary effects are avoided, as well as the 
reflections on the effect on efficiency.
160. Discriminatory refusal to grant access. A second scenario is the 
refusal to grant access where another operator has been already given access to 
the same facility. The Commission considers that “it is clear that a refusal to 
supply a new customer in circumstances where a dominant facilities owner is 
already supplying one or more customer operating in the same downstream 
market would constitute discriminatory treatment which, if it would restrict 
competition on that downstream market, would be an abuse”.450 The 
Commission considers that this is particularly the case if discrimination 
benefits the downstream arm of the facilities owner.
What is supposed to be the most common abusive refusal to deal in the 
telecommunications sector receives little attention in the Access Notice. The 
Commission merely states that discrimination is abusive if it restricts 
competition in the downstream market, and that the vertically integrated 
incumbents have both the opportunity and the incentive to restrict competition. 
The Commission seems to suggest that all refusals to deal to downstream 
competitors are abusive unless an objective justification exists, and only quotes 
credit-risk as an objective justification.
The Commission does not determine under which circumstances 
discrimination will lead to abuse. Furthermore, the Commission seems to 
undermine what Advocate General Jacobs, in Oscar Bronner, defines as the 
central element of the whole construction, that is efficiency.451
450 Vide Access Notice para. 85 (supra footnote 447).
451 Vide supra Chapter 8.3. The Adoption of the Essential Facilities Doctrine in Europe.
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Article 82(c) EC Treaty states that abuses of dominant position might 
consist in “applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading partners, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage”. Such a 
provision has traditionally been interpreted as a limitation to introduce 
discriminations between clients, not between the dominant operator and its 
competitors.412
This is a very good example of the vagueness and confusion introduced 
by the connection between exploitative practices (discrimination) and 
exclusionary practices (foreclosure). The strategy reflected in the Access 
Notice relies, once more, on the dangerous combination of exploitative and the 
exclusionary effects, which usually leads to the reduction of the efficiency 
considerations.
Concluding, the Commission tries to avoid the most delicate point that is 
why the mere refusal to deal can be considered abusive even if the facility 
cannot be considered essential. The reasoning in this point of the Access Notice 
seems only applicable to essential facilities, but not to non-essential facilities, 
as in the latest case efficiency consideration should be included among the list 
of objective justification not to deal
161. Essential facilities. The most elaborated reasoning, based on the 
essential facilities doctrine, is reserved for the a third scenario, characterised by 
the refusal to grant access for the purpose of a service where no other operator 
has been given access by the access provider, not even a downstream arm of 
the monopolist.453 The Commission advances five requirements for the 
imposition of the obligation to grant access.
452 Vide the analysis in LAROUCHE (2000), p.218-231 (supra footnote 408).
413 Vide Access Notice, para. 87-98 (supra footnote 447).
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Firstly, the facility has to be essential for companies to compete on the 
related market. The Commission does not elaborate too much on this 
fundamental point. It states that it is not enough for compulsory access to 
improve the position of the company. Rather, the proposed activities are made 
impossible or seriously and unavoidably uneconomic. The Commission 
recognises that it is not enough to demonstrate that access is necessary for a 
particular competitor. Nevertheless the Commission approach does not seem to 
be as objective as the approach of the ECJ in Oscar Bronner. While the ECJ 
seems to impose an absolute impossibility for any competitor, the Commission 
seems to think that it is enough to “demonstrate that access is necessaiy for all 
except for exceptional competitors in order for access to be made 
compulsory”.454
Secondly, there has to be enough spare capacity available to provide 
access. This condition puts an end to the debate generated by the Commission 
decision in Port of Rodby,*ss which allowed certain doctrine to suggest that 
saturated facilities could be shared in order to introduce some competition in 
the downstream market.
Thirdly, and this is the other key point of the Commission’s construction, 
the owner of the facility has to fail to satisfy demand, to block the emergence 
of a potential new service or impede competition on an existing or potential 
service. As it is put by the Commission “unless access is granted, the party 
requesting would not be able to operate in the service market. Refusals in this
454 At this point, it is very interesting to remind ourselves of what is the main criticism of the essential 
facilities doctrine in LAROUCHE (2000), p. 212 (supra footnote 408): the dominance analysis is 
substituted by the essentiality analysis, an analysis whose conclusion depends strongly on the market 
definition, what can lead to baseless intervention.
455 Port of Rodby, Commission Decision 94/119/EEC, OJ L 55/52, of 26J2.94.
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case would therefore limit the development of new markets, or new products 
on those markets, contrary to Article 82(b)”/ 56
Finally, the Commission requires two more conditions. On the one hand, 
the company requesting access has to be prepared to pay for such access. On 
the other, no objective justification for the refusal exists. The Commission 
refers to justifications such as the technical difficulty of providing access. It 
seems clear after the analysis of the judgements of the ECJ, that in this case 
objective justifications are reduced, as no efficiency argument can be used in 
case of essential facilities.
This might be an unnecessarily complex approach. According to the 
position of the ECJ, the mere refusal to grant access to an essential facility is 
abusive as it forecloses competition in the downstream market. It seems 
unnecessary to link the exclusionary effect to one of the traditional exploitative 
effects, mostly when there is no case law supporting the application of such an 
approach.
8.5.3. A Different Scheme.
162. Essential telecommunications facilities. It seems absolutely 
necessary, first of all, to consider whether certain telecommunications 
infrastructures can be considered essential, in order that the essential facilities 
doctrine can be applied. For the application of the rules on competition, the 
only valid definition of essential facilities is the developed by the ECJ. Other 
definitions can have effect in other ambits, for instance the regulatory.457 
Besides, the consideration of a facility as essential can only be undertook case-
♦
by-case, as the rules on competition do not provide a mechanism for the
456 Vide Access Notice para. 88 (supra footnote 447).
457 This is the case, for instance, with the definition contained in the Additional commitment on 
regulatory principles by the European Communities and their Member States in the framework of the 
WTO negotiations, which seems wider than the definition of the ECJ, as it includes markets where 
competition exists, even if weak or between a very limited number of players.
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consideration ex ante and in general terms of a particular infrastructure and, 
furthermore, as the specific conditions of specific markets have to be evaluated 
for the application of the rules on competition.
The application of the strict criteria defined by the ECJ in Oscar Bronner 
limits the telecommunications infrastructures that can be considered essential.458 
On the one hand, the duplication of the facilities has to be impossible or 
“extremely difficult owing to physical, geographical or legal constraints or is 
highly undesirable for reasons of public policy”.459 On the other hand, the 
facilities have to be vital for the development of the downstream competitor.
The traditional exclusive rights introduced a legal barrier to duplication 
that was eliminated by Directive 96/19/EC. Physical or geographical barriers 
do not seem to totally exclude competition from the most relevant 
telecommunications markets. Even if the scarcity of frequencies or rights of 
way for the installation of networks might limit competition, it cannot be held 
that it generally excludes it. The effect of the economic barriers, on the 
contrary, might prove more real. The already described economies of scale in 
the network industries, and also in the telecommunications industry, 
complicates market entry.
Reality is proving that economies of scale do not make the duplication of 
the incumbent’s network impossible, as new infrastructures are being installed 
all over Europe.460 All kinds of infrastructures are being duplicated, from dark
454 In this way, it seems rather clear that the Commission, after Oscar Bronner, would not make such a
clear statement on the nature of a facility as essential as in Atlas: “However, even when all
telecommunications facilities and services are non-reserved, FT and DT will at least for a number of 
years remain indispensable suppliers of building blocks for the relevant services in Fiance and
Germany [...] such facilities and services which remind an essential facility after full and effective
liberalization [...]”.
459 Ibid. Opinion of the Advocate General, para. 64.
460 The Commission bases its approach on the Access Notice on this feet, para. 53.
284
Chapter 8. Competition Law and Network Access.
fiber to the local loop, so it cannot be sustained that duplication, in general, is 
not possible.
Even if most of telecommunications infrastructures are capable of 
duplication, or unless efficient substitutives can be developed,441 and therefore, 
they should not be considered essential facilities by the ECJ, it is also clear that 
duplication of the development of substitutes will take a significant amount of 
time, and at least during such a period, the double monopoly will be 
unavoidable unless access is imposed on the monopolist.
A fundamental question therefore arises as to whether facilities that can 
be duplicated but not in a short period of time, are to be considered essential 
facilities. The Commission’s Access Notice points in continuation the fact that 
building alternative infrastructures takes time, and as a consequence seems to 
adopt the position that during the transitional period, even facilities which are 
duplicable can be considered essential facilities. The judgement of the CFI in 
Night European Services, when analysing the vital character of certain facilities 
under the essential facilities doctrine, introduces a reference to “the time 
reasonably required for reproducing them” as one of the special characteristics 
which preclude the disponibility of alternative available for potential 
competitors.462
Nevertheless, Advocate General Jacobs in Oscar Bronner, when 
considering the very same practice of the Commission, points to the permanent 
character of the unavoidable monopoly, against its temporary character, as the 
main element to consider a facility essential.443 Actually, the exceptional
461 This seems to be the assumption of the Commission, as it is continuously repeated in the Access 
Notice, for instance in para. 52.
462 Vide Night European Services para 209 (supra footnote 430).
463 The Advocate General even quotes Temple Lang, who pointed out that the test consists in checking 
“whether the handicap resulting from the denial of access is one that can reasonable be expected to 
make competitors* activities in the market in question either impossible or permanently, seriously and 
unavoidably uneconomic”, in TEMPLE LANG, J. (1994): “Defining Legitimate Competition:
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character of the essential facilities doctrine, derived from the unavoidable 
monopolisation of a vertically integrated market, does not seem compatible 
with the more relaxed view that would extend such an exceptional intervention 
to a market in which competition is developing. Moreover, the introduction of 
the compulsory granting of access would diminish the incentives for the 
investment in alternative infrastructures and obstruct the development of 
competition by the new comers.
In any case, it is possible to envisage the existence of specific 
infrastructures for which duplication is not viable. This is the case of the local 
loop in rural areas, where high costs and reduced traffic sometime excludes 
even the viability of a single network, and might be the case of other 
infrastructures which meet a very specific demand. In any event, the 
impossibility to duplicate the facility will have to be decided case by case, 
attending to the specific economic circumstances.
The second requirement, the facilities’ character of “indispensable to 
carrying on that person’s [the downstream operator] business”,4" is generally 
met in most of the cases of network access. It is clearly met in the case of 
service providers requesting network access for the provision of their services 
to consumers. It is also met by network operators requesting access for the 
completion of the communications initiated in their networks. In both cases, 
refusal of access to a network would definitely block their activity.
The refusal to grant access to such essential facilities necessarily excludes 
competition from the downstream markets, and as a conclusion, it seems to be 
the case that certain telecommunications infrastructures meet all the
Companies’ Duties to Supply Competitors, and Access to Essential Facilities”, in “Annual Proceedings 
of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute”, pp. 284-285.
464 Ibid para. 41.
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requirements in order to apply the essential facilities doctrine for the 
compulsory provision of access to the facilities.
163. Access to essential telecommunications facilities. Despite the 
efforts of the Commission to limit the essential facilities doctrine to the 
exceptional cases in which no competition exists between the monopolistic 
provider of an essential facility and the new comers to a downstream market 
where the incumbent is not present, the essential facilities doctrine is to play a 
far more important role, particularly after the clarification of the doctrine by the 
ECJ.
Essential facility have been defined by the ECJ as the resource which 
objectively cannot be duplicated (and therefore is necessarily monopolised) and 
which is absolutely necessary for a downstream competitor for the 
development of its activity. This exceptional circumstance justifies the almost 
automatic abusive character of the refusal to grant access to essential facilities, 
as it will always have an exclusionary effect Only allegations based on the 
potential harm for the monopolist could justify the refusal to deal, but never 
allegations based on efficiency, as potential benefits would never be passed to 
consumers due to the lack of even potential competition. It is not relevant 
whether competition exists or not in the vertically integrated market, whether 
accesses required for the provision of a service already being provided by the 
monopolist or by a third company or whether it is required for the provision of 
a new service. The refusal to grant access to an essential facility will always 
have exclusionary effects.
However, imposing the obligation to grant access is only the point of 
departure, as the necessary consequence is that the lack of competition requires 
public authorities to regulate the conditions of such access. Obviously, the most
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important access condition is price.465 Different pricing practices are considered 
by the Access Notice as potentially anticompetitive. Excessive pricing, 
predatory pricing, price squeezes or discriminatory pricing are among them.
The frontier between proscribing an anticompetitive price, and regulating 
prices is easily passed, particularly under the regulatory tradition of Article 82 
EC Treaty. Competition authorities can determine the anticompetitive character 
of a specific pricing policy, but cannot prescribe the pricing policy of a 
dominant operator, as it lacks the mechanisms of intervention for a continued 
control and the definition of comprehensive ex ante obligations. It is for this 
reason that competition authorities, in case competition is excluded, have to 
rely on the intervention of the regulatory authorities. It does not mean that 
competition authorities have no role to play. On the contrary, competition 
authorities can obstruct and fine anticompetitive behaviours when existing, and 
rely on the subsequent intervention of the regulatory authorities for the control 
prescription of a pro-competitive pricing policy.
In those cases in which the undertaking controlling the essential facility is 
vertically integrated, non-discrimination is the basic principle that should rule 
the pricing policy of the monopolist. As the principle ruling the essential 
facilities doctrine is to ensure that the control of an essential facility does not 
expand the monopoly power to a vertically related market, the simplest way to 
impede anticompetitive effects of the monopolist’s pricing policy is to impose 
on it the obligation to provide the essential facilities at the same conditions 
enjoyed by the vertically integrated division. Comparisons nevertheless, are not 
always simple. Transparent cost accounting, with clear cost allocation 
principles and separation between different activities becomes a fundamental 
instrument for the analysis of pricing policies. Only a regulatory approach can
465 See CAVE, CROWTHER and HANCHER (1995): “Compétition Aspects of Access Pricing", 
European Commission, Luxembourg.
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prescribe ex ante the implementation of such measures by the incumbent 
operators. Competition authorities thus, will often need to rely on the cost 
accounting principles defined by the regulatory authorities.
The Commission’s Access Notice seems to imply that an access price 
clearly above costs is contrary to the rules on competition even if non- 
discriminatory as applied to the vertically integrated division of the monopolist. 
It seems difficult to identify exclusionary effects on such a pricing strategy. 
Nevertheless, such a policy might, however be considered unfair for the clients 
and therefore suppose an exploitative abuse. Advocate General Jacobs in 
Sacem sustained that in cases of absolute economic dependence, it would 
probably be an abuse to “charge what the market can bear”.466
Even if the ECJ has recognised the unlawful character of excessive 
pricing and has even established parameters in order to determine when a price 
is excessive, it has never managed to identify a specific price as excessive. The 
reason might be that it entails a complicated and intrusive intervention which 
competition authorities cannot easily develop themselves. The coexistence of 
regulatory authorities with powers to determine prices might facilitate the 
intervention of the competition authorities, as stated in Ahmed Saeed.*61 
Nevertheless, it has always to be taken into account that regulatory authorities 
consider a broader set of considerations when fixing prices, and as a result 
competition authorities cannot always rely on the prices fixed by them. For 
instance, it seems to be the case that competition authorities cannot rely on 
Long-run Average Incremental Costs accounting due to the uncertainties it 
entails as it focuses more on estimations of future costs than of historic costs.468
446Sace, Cases C-110/88, 241/88 and242/88,1989 ECR2811.
447 Ahmed Saeed, Case 66/82, 1989 ECR 838, para. 43.
448 See TEMPLE LANG, J. (1998): “Community Antitrust Law and national Regulatory Procedures”, 
in “Fordham Corporate Law Institute”, pp. 297-331.
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Predatory pricing, despite the considerations in the Access Notice, does 
not seem a possible practice regarding essential facilities. Since the only 
facilities which are considered essential by the ECJ are those which cannot be 
duplicated, that is, those which are intrinsically monopolistic, it is in every case 
unnecessary for the monopolist which does not face even potential competition 
in such market to lower its prices to exclude a competitor from such market. It 
has to be considered, on the contrary, the possibility of a price squeeze through 
a combination of high prices for access to the essential facility and low prices 
for the provision of the vertically integrated service.
As regards non-economic conditions of access,469 and particularly the 
point of interconnection, the Commission has adopted a very aggressive 
approach as the Access Notice states that “in principle, competition rules 
require that the party requesting access must be granted access at the most 
suitable for the requesting party, provided that this point is technically feasible 
for the access provider”. The basic principle, however, should be once again 
that access has to ensure the possibility of effective competition in the 
vertically related market and therefore every discrimination between the 
vertically integrated monopolist and the downstream competitors has to be 
excluded. As a consequence, access should be provided at a point that allows 
the new comer to compete in equal terms, which is not necessarily any point he 
might require.
164. Access to non-essential telecommunications facilities. No general 
obligation to provide access to non-essential facilities exists. On the contrary, it 
has been sustained that such an obligation would not only be unworkable but 
would also be anti-competitive in the longer term.470 Nevertheless, a dominant
469 Sec WATERS, P. and WATTS, K. (1997): “Non-Price Terms of Interconnection”, in Computers 
and Telecommunication Law Review, no. 2, pp. 61-65
470 Oscar Bronner, para. 69.
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undertaking’s refusal to grant access can be considered abusive in certain 
occasions, particularly if linked to other conditions. This seems to be the case 
of cut off of supply to existing customers or the elimination of competition in a 
related market by tying separate goods or services. The structure of the 
European telecommunications markets fosters the development of these 
practices directed to exploit existing clients or to exclude new comers and 
potential competitors from the de-monopolised markets.
In any case, objective considerations could always legitimate the refusal 
to deal. Such justifications do not only comprise the situations in which a direct 
harm could be produced for the undertaking (i.e. credit risk) as in the essentials 
facilities doctrine. The effects on efficiency should also be considered, as long 
as the refusal would not exclude competition and therefore the pressure on the 
dominant firm to pass the benefits to the consumers. It has to be recognised, 
that this might be often the case in the telecommunications markets due to the 
lack of effective competition in most of the market segments due to decades of 
exclusive rights
As regards access conditions, it would seem that the rules on competition 
should not impose conditions as restrictive as in the case of essential facilities. 
Particularly, the automatic application of the non-discrimination rule should be 
excluded. Since competition, unless potential, is possible, it should be lefi for 
the dominant undertaking to freely contract with the operators requiring access. 
The application of the rules on competition should be restricted to exceptional 
exclusionary or exploitative practices. On the one hand, the rules against 
exploitative abuses would apply as regularly. As a consequence, excessive 
pricing could be considered exploitative but only in exceptional circumstances, 
and certainly should not lead competition authorities to fix prices exclusively 
connected with efficient costs. On the other hand, it seems clear that those 
conditions which would in practice entail the same exclusionary effects as the 
very same refusal should be proscribed. At the same time, practices such as
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predatory pricing should be watched, in order to avoid the foreclosure of the 
very same infrastructures markets.
In any case, it seems clear that the rules on competition cannot be over­
stretched in order to accelerate the emergence of competition. Compulsory 
access should not be imposed on the owners of facilities which duplication is 
possible even if complicated or time-consuming. On the contrary, compulsory 
access might have anticompetitive effects as it deters entry in such markets as 
both vertical integration by the new comers and the development of alternative 
infrastructures by independent operators would be obstructed. It is not for the 
competition authorities but for legislative or regulatory authorities to consider 
the need of further measures, due the exceptionality of the origin of the 
incumbents’ market power, in order to accelerate the modification of the 
telecommunications market structure.
8.6. CONCLUSIONS.
165. Final. The rules on competition provide useful mechanisms for 
public intervention regarding network access but, at the same time, face 
important limitations. The most important limitations are derived from the very 
same purpose for which the rules were adopted. The rules on competition were 
not designed to immediately ensure the satisfaction of the consumers, but to 
protect such satisfaction indirectly, through the protection of the competition 
mechanisms that should lead to such satisfaction. Furthermore, the rules on 
competition were not designed to actively promote competition but rather to 
obstruct behaviours that would restrict existing or potential competition. 
Finally, the rules on competition were not adopted to prescribe the conditions 
in substitution of the competitive process.
From the analysis of the application of the Community rules on 
competition to network access conflicts, it can be derived that the figure of
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refusal to deal as well as the essential facilities doctrine do not provide 
effective mechanisms for the immediate protection of the general interest. 
Article 82 EC Treaty cannot ensure universal access to the basic 
telecommunications networks and services at an affordable price to all the 
European citizens.
The rules on competition protect the competitive process that is supposed 
to promote efficiency. As a result, it is ensured the production of the optimum 
quantity of output as well as the reasonability of prices, as the competitive 
pressure promoted the reduction of costs and in parallel of prices. Nevertheless, 
the rules on competition do not ensure the availability of access to all citizens 
at an affordable price, as prices adapted to decreasing cost might not ensure 
affordability, and the provision of access in particular areas or to particular 
final users could not be profitable. Competition Law does not provide 
mechanisms to immediately intervene in order to ensure the satisfaction of the 
general interest as regards access. Therefore, the universality of access to 
telecommunications services and networks has to be ensured through different 
instruments of public intervention.
Nevertheless, the traditional approach to exploitative abuses of dominant 
position, and in particular excessive pricing, might prove useful to obstruct 
particular practices governing access. The rules on competition do not provide 
mechanisms to implement a pricing policy as regards access, but do provide 
mechanisms to intervene in particular situations against specific behaviours.
Even if the rules on competition were designed in order to ensure the 
efficiency of the competitive process, such rules face important limitations in 
markets in transition to competition. The rules on competition provide effective 
m ech anism s to obstruct the refusals of access which entail exclusionary 
practices, but cannot, in principle, impose access in order to promote the 
creation of competition. Competition Law protects competition but was not 
designed to create it.
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The transplant of the essential facilities doctrine from American antitrust 
provides an exception to the principle just stated that competition Law protects 
but does not create competition. In those exceptional cases in which 
competition is not viable in a particular market for physical, economic or legal 
reasons, and access to the products of service generated by such market is 
essential for the development of an activity in a vertically connected market, 
the rules on competition have been applied in order to impose access to the 
facility. This seems to be the case in some telecommunications network 
markets. Nevertheless, such an approach stretches dangerously the application 
of the rules on abuse of dominant position, as it scope is not to ensure the 
effectivity of the mechanisms of competition in such markets but to substitute 
the inexistant market constraints by legal constraints. Such an intervention does 
not seem fully compatible with the philosophy behind the rules on competition 
and certainly no effective m echanism s for such substitution are made available 
by the rules on competition.
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SECTOR SPECIFIC REGULATION ON NETWORK ACCESS
SUMMARY: 9.1. General principles. 9.2.
Regulating access by other operators. 9.3.
Regulating access by consumers. 9.4.
Conclusions.
9.1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES.
166. The origins of the ONP policy. Community authorities were always 
conscious of the central role of network access in the process of the reform of 
the European telecommunications markets. Such a role, nevertheless, has 
evolved significantly as de-monopolisation has reached more and more 
segments of such markets.471
The proposal launched in the Green Book of 1987 to eliminate the 
exclusive rights on terminal equipment and value-added services raised the first
471 See ALABAU, A. (1998): “La Unión Europea y su política de telecomunicaciones”, Airtel móvil, 
Madrid, pp. 135-190.
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concerns regarding network access. It was feared that the incumbents’ 
exclusive rights over the networks and their vertical integration in the 
liberalised markets would allow them to obstruct access to their networks and 
in this way exclude the emergence of competition in the de-monopolised 
markets. It seems clear that the Community rules on competition would have 
enforced access to the monopolised networks, but long and burdensome 
procedures would have been necessary.
An agreement between the Commission and the Council for the co­
ordination of the adoption of a Commission liberalising Directive and a 
Council harmonising Directive was only reached on 7 December 1989.472 As a 
result, the very same day the Commission adopted the liberalising Directive 
90/388/EEC,473 (the Services Directive) it was adopted the legislation devoted 
to rule access to the networks: Directive 90/387/EEC,474 so-called the 
“Framework Directive”.
The Framework Directive was based on two basic concepts. Firstly, “the 
conditions of open network provision must be consistent with certain 
principles”.473 Article 3(1) of the Directive established that access must be 
based on objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria. Secondly, “[the 
conditions] must not restrict access to networks and services except for reasons 
of general public interest, hereinafter referred to as ‘essential requirements’”.476 
The essential requirements were initially restricted by Article 3(2) to security
472 Press Release of the Council of 7 December 1989, 479/89. See MONTERO and BROKELMANN 
(1999): “Telecomunicaciones y televisiónLa nueva regulación en España”, Tirant lo Blanch, 
Valencia, p. 77.
473 Commission Directive 90/388/EEC, of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for 
telecommunications services, OJ L192/10, of 27.4.90.
474 Council Directive 90/387/EEC, of 28 June 1990, on the establishment of the internal market for
telecommunications services through the implementation of open network provision, OJ L 192/1, of 
27.4.90.
m  Ibid. p. 1.
™ Ibid. p. 1.
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of the network, network integrity, interoperability of services and protection of 
data. These concepts were developed by the ONP Committee and resulted in 
the adoption of a number of Directives477 and Recommendations47® ruling access 
to particular types of monopolised infrastructures and services, and the 
periodical publication of lists of standards.
The ONP framework was originally introduced to permanently regulate 
access conditions to legally monopolised facilities so that competition would be 
possible in the vertically connected services markets which had been de­
monopolised. The legal monopolies permanently excluded the effectivity of the 
constraints introduced even by potential competition, so public intervention 
was required in order to ensure that the control of bottlenecks by the 
incumbents would not exclude the emergence of competition in the de­
monopolised markets. The rules on competition could proscribe abusive 
refusals to grant access, but could not effectively prescribe access conditions. 
For this reason sector specific regulation was introduced.
167. ONP and the promotion of competition. The decisions to fully 
liberalise fully all the European telecommunications markets, including voice 
telephony and infrastructures required a major modification of the ONP 
policy479 and legislation.480 The elimination of the exclusive rights put an end to
477 Directive 92/44/EEC, of 5 June 1992, on the application of open network provision to leased lines, 
OJ L 165/27 of 19.6.92; and Directive 95/62/EC, of 13 December 1995, on the application of open 
network provision (ONP) to voice telephony, OJ L 321/6 of 30.12.95.
478 Council Recommendation of 5 June 1992, on the harmonised provision of a minimum set of packet- 
switched data services (PSDS) in accordance with open network provision (ONP) principles, OJ L 
200/1 of 18.7.92, Council Recommendation of 5 June 1992, on the provision of harmonised integrated 
services digital network (ISDN) access arrangements and a minimum of ISDN offerings in accordance 
with open network provision (ONP) principles, OJ L 200/10 of 18.7.92
479 See COM(94) 513 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament Present Status and Future Approach for Open Access to Telecommunications Networks 
and Services (Open Network Provision), Brussels, 29.11.94.
480 Directive 97/33/EC, of 30 June 1997, on interconnection in telecommunications regarding to 
ensuring universal service and interoperability through application of the principles of open network 
provision (ONP), OJ L 199/32 of 26.7.97; Directive 97/51/EC, of 6 October 1997, amending council 
directive 90/387/EEC and Council Directive 92/44/EEC for the purpose of adaptation to a competitive 
environment in telecommunications, OJ L 295/23 of 29.10.97; and Directive 98/10/EC. of 26 February
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the barrier which excluded competition in the upstream markets, and therefore, 
put an end to the reason that, at least initially, justified pervasive access 
regulation.
In theory competition could be used in order to force the incumbents to 
provide access at reasonable conditions. Community authorities, nevertheless, 
considered that de-monopolisation would not automatically eliminate the 
market power enjoyed by the former monopolies. Potential competition was 
not considered enough to exclude abuses by the former monopolists, as 
effective constraints would only exist once alternative networks were be 
operative. As it was stated by the Commission “even when all 
telecommunications facilities and services are non-reserved, FT and DT will at 
least for a number of years remain indispensable suppliers of building blocks 
for the relevant services in France and Germany”.481
The incumbents were in the position to abuse their market power. Abuses 
might have an exploitative nature, but also an exclusionary effect. Service 
providers could be excluded from the market and the development of network 
access services could be also hindered, as the development of alternative 
infrastructures heavily depends on the possibility to interconnect with the 
incumbent’s network. Public intervention seemed necessary to ensure the 
emergence of effective competition as well as to avoid exploitation in the 
transitory period
The rules on competition did not seem fully appropriate as they were not 
designed for the exceptional circumstances of transitional markets and for this 
reason would not always provide efficient solutions. The basic principles of the 
ONP, access at objective, transparent and non-discriminatory conditions,
1998, on the application of the open network provision to voice telephony and on universal service for 
telecommunications in a competitive environment, OJ L 101/24 of 1.4.98, which repealed Directive 
95/62/EC.
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seemed adaptable to the new situation, regarding both strictly network 
interconnection and access to the networks for the provision of services.
The adaptation required to take always into account that the instruments 
of permanent intervention under the ONP framework would play a subsidiary 
role after de-monopolisation. In case competition would exercise an effective 
pressure on the incumbent regarding the provision of network access, 
regulation would disappear.
However, the evolution of the traditional telephony market as well as the 
structure of new electronic communications markets such as mobile 
communications or digital television might challenge the transitory character of 
sector specific regulation on network access. Electronic communications 
markets, both the more traditional and the new markets, have a strong tendency 
to adopt a oligopololistic structure. The characteristics of network industries, 
already analysed, tend to reduce the number of operators in the market and to 
foster strategic behaviours which reduce competition. The rules on competition 
might not be sufficient to guarantee the effectiveness of competition so sector 
specific legislation might be necessary in the future.
168. ONP and the immediate protection of the general interest. Full 
liberalisation raised a different concern. The traditional market structure of the 
sector/the public national monopolies, allowed public authorities to develop a 
policy of cross-subsidiarisation between different market segments aimed at 
ensuring the universal availability of the basic telecommunications networks 
and services. Full liberalisation excluded such cross-subsidies in such a way 
that a different mechanism was required for the satisfaction of the general 
interest objective of the universal provision of the services.
481 Atlas/Global One, Commission Decision 96/546, OJ 1998 L 239/23, para. 34.
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The rules on competition did not provide the necessary mechanisms to 
ensure universality.4*2 Therefore, the regulatory mechanisms of indirect 
intervention were required. The ONP principles, introduced at the beginning of 
the process of reform of the European telecommunications markets, provided 
the necessary framework for the development of the policy of universal service. 
Universal service policies respond to different principles (immediate 
intervention, non structural) and different necessities (final consumers versus 
operators). In any case, access to telecommunications networks was the issue, 
and the principles of the ONP policy were fully compatible with the objectives 
and requirements of such a policy.
169. The leading assumptions. The application of the ONP framework 
after full liberalisation is based on two leading assumptions. The first one is 
that regulation is a subsidiary instrument introduced to eliminate market 
failures. The second one is that such intervention should always be 
characterised by its pro-competitive results. In other words, it should never 
obstruct the effectiveness of the mechanism s of competition which are 
supposed to govern the sector after liberalisation.
The basic scope of the process of reform of the European 
telecommunications sector is the substitution of the public leadership for the 
mechanisms of supply and demand in the market. It is assumed that private 
contracting between the operators, on the one hand, and between operators and 
consumers on the other, will be increasingly sufficient to ensure access at fair 
conditions. Public intervention should be limited to facilitate and promote 
private contracting, and pervasive regulation in substitution of the will of the 
actors in the market should be restricted to those exceptional cases in which it 
is the only mechanisms for ensuring the satisfaction of the general interest.
4,2 Vide supra Chapter 8. Competition Law and Network Access.
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This assumption can be abstracted for a number of provisions in the ONP 
directives. The most clear example is the content of Article 5(1) of Directive 
98/ 10/EC, which restricts the implementation of universal service schemes only 
“if necessary”. Article 3 of Directive 97/33/EC according to which ‘Technical 
and commercial arrangements for interconnection shall be a matter for 
agreement between the parties involved, subject to the provisions of this 
Directive and the competition rules of the Treaty”. The same reasoning informs 
the definition of conditions of access and use of public telephone networks, and 
leased lines.
The most important consequence of such a principle is the transitory 
character of an important share of the regulatory framework in the ONP 
directives. Community authorities opted for the adaptation of the old ONP 
framework in order to accelerate the development of alternative infrastructures 
and to ensure service providers access to the existing infrastructures.4*3 
Compulsory interconnection would ensure the developers of alternative 
infrastructures the benefits of the network externality effects, while compulsory 
access would ensure service providers the disposal of a network to reach 
consumers. The emergence of competition, nevertheless, is supposed to erode 
the incumbents’ market power in such a way that fair trading conditions will be 
ensured by the very same constraints of competition rather than by public 
intervention.
On the contrary, it seems clear that in certain exceptional circumstances 
competition might not appear. Certain telecommunications markets do not offer 
the necessary profitability for private operators to provide network access. It 
m igh t equally be the case that market conditions could exclude the presence of
483 This was a political option subject to criticisms both by those who considered that market 
mechanisms should have played a more decisive role in the period of transition, and by those who 
consider transitory public intervention timid.
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more than one network provider in a particular area. In such situations the ONP 
principles could acquire a permanent role in the telecommunications markets.
The other relevant assumption is that in any case, regulatory intervention 
as regards access should neither obstruct nor distort competition. Since 
competition is supposed to govern the sector after liberalisation, public 
intervention should not interfere in the competitive process, as other wise the 
constraints imposed by competition would be distorted and unable to ensure the 
satisfaction of the general interest. It is common in the harmonising directives, 
for this reason, to find references of the following kind: “national regulatory 
authorities shall ensure that such [interventions] do not result in distortion of 
competition”.4*4
The basic principles of the ONP framework as defined in Article 3(1) of 
Directive 90/387/EEC but also in all the other directives on network access, 
seem useful in order to avoid distortions. They have to be based on objective 
criteria, defined in a transparent way and published, in such a way that they 
must guarantee equality of access and must be non-discriminatory.
170. Potential regulatory failures. Regulatory failures can be classified 
into two different categories. On the one hand, regulation can fail if it does not 
provide a solution for an existing problem. This would be the case of lack of 
intervention due to “regulatory capture”, loopholes in the legislation etc. On the 
other hand, regulation can fail if it provides a solution for a problem which 
does not exist. This would be the case of the imposition of regulatory 
obligations regarding access to operators with no market power, or excessive 
obligations on operators which enjoy it Over-regulation would also exist if 
unjustified regulatory obligations were to survive the transitory period and 
were to be applied after the emergence of effective competition in the market.
*** Article 7(3) Directive 97/33/EC.
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The regulatory framework on network access might fail to provide an 
effective solution to an existing conflict for different reasons. It might be due to 
the well-studied phenomenon of the “regulatory capture”. The regulatory 
authority might protect the interest of one of the regulated undertakings rather 
than the general interest in a particular access conflict as a result of the more 
effective pressure of that company. The regulatory authority in charge of 
determining the content of a specific obligation might not do so in an efficient 
period of time, or might impose non-reasonable conditions in favour of one of 
the parties involved in an access conflict The lack of independence of some of 
the national regulatory authorities might in particular benefit their national 
champion. It might also be the case that the lack of an effective intervention 
had an objective reason such as the lack of the appropriate legislative basis. 
This might be particularly the case of access conflicts related to convergence, 
as national legislation might not foresee all the implications of this process.485
In case regulation fails to protect the rights of an undertaking in an access 
dispute, competition Law might prove useful to act as a safety network and 
might provide a solution to the conflict. The Commission, in the Access 
Notice, made clear its intention to intervene, upon request of the complainant, 
through the application of the Community rules on competition in case an NRA 
would not provide a solution within a six month period.486
More complex, but equally a potential regulatory failure, is the case of 
over-regulation. Such would be the case of the imposition of certain regulatory 
obligations regarding access to operators with no market power.487 Such
485 UNGERJER, H. (2000): “The Case of Telecommunications in the E.U.", in “European Competition 
Law Annual 1998. Regulating Communications Markets", Ehlermann and Gossling Ed., Hart, pp. 211- 
236.
486 See Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector. Framework, relevant markets and principles, OJ 1998 C 265/2, of 22.8.98 
para. 30.
487 As it is recognised by Directive 97/51/EC in paragraph 3: “in moving to a competitive market, there 
are certain obligations which should apply to all organisations providing telephone services over fixed
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operators suffer not only the regular constraints of competition but furthermore 
the potential abuses of the former monopolists. Imposing regulatory obligations 
on these operators might create an unnecessary burden on the new comers 
which would obstruct the emergence of competition in the sector.
A similar situation would be the imposition of unproportionate 
obligations on operators which do have market power, but which, in any case, 
start to face competition from the new comers. A regulatory framework which 
imposes too heavy conditions on the incumbents could be anticompetitive as it 
might not promote efficiency among the new comers, which would be in grade 
to be profitable without beating the efficiency levels of the incumbent. 
Furthermore, such a situation could deter investments in particular segments 
for the development of alternatives to the new comer. Such a policy would 
have a similar effect than a predatory pricing strategy by the incumbent. It 
might ensure the monopolistic position of the incumbents in important market 
segments as the local-loop infrastructures.
The Community rules on competition might, once again, be used by the 
Commission in order to eliminate such anticompetitive intervention of the 
regulatory authorities. The Access Notice has made clear that the national 
regulatory authorities have a duty not to approve any practice or agreement 
contrary to Community competition Law and must ensure that action taken by 
them are consistent with Community competition Law.4®*
Finally, the maintenance of the access regulatory framework after the 
emergence of effective competition in the telecommunications markets would 
amount to over-regulation. Even if the Directive foresees the elimination of the 
regulatory obligations in such a case, it might easily be the case that the NRA
networks and [...] here are others which should apply only to organisations enjoying significant market 
power”.
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refuse to give up their regulatory powers regarding network access and 
continue to impose what then would clearly be unproportionate obligations on 
the operators. Such obligations would distort the markets, as they would 
impose a burden on certain categories of operators and would discourage 
investments and innovations.
9.2. REGULATING ACCESS BY OTHER OPERATORS.
9.2.1. General Considerations.
171. Introduction. Private contracting is recognised both by Community 
and national legislation as the basic mechanism ruling network access, 
particularly when access is negotiated between operators. However, 
negotiations for the conclusion of network access agreements face important 
barriers. On the one hand access is technically and economically complex. On 
the other hand, some operators might not have the necessary incentives to 
conclude such agreements as they strengthen the position of actual or potential 
competitors. For these reasons, regulation has been introduced in order to 
ensure access to the networks.
On the one hand, a set of regulatory obligations has been introduced in 
order to facilitate the conclusion of private agreements. Different mechanisms 
have been designed to reduce the burden of the technical and economic 
complexity of the agreements as well as asymmetry in the negotiations. These 
regulatory obligations do not intend to impose access or the conditions in 
which it should take place. On the contrary, they merely intend to promote the 
conclusion of private agreements, as it is understood that private contracting 
should be the regular m echanism s governing access in a liberalised market,
w  Vide Access Notice para. 13 and 19 (supra footnote 486). This point is further elaborated in Chapter 
1022. Antitrust Complements Regulation.
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while regulatory intervention should be restricted to those cases in which an 
agreement defining fair access conditions cannot be reached.
On the other hand, regulatory mechanisms have also been developed in 
order to ensure that in case access agreements are not reached, public 
authorities can impose them. Such an intervention has a subsidiary character, as 
it only takes place once operators have been unable to reach an agreement 
despite the regulatory measures introduced to facilitate such agreements.
Compulsory access is complemented by regulatory mechanisms whose 
purpose it is to define access conditions, otherwise the mere obligation to 
provide access would be insufficient. Pricing as well as technical conditions of 
access might have to be defined by the public authorities. Such an aggressive 
intervention should always respect the basic ONP principles of proportionality, 
non-discrimination and transparency, in order to avoid over-regulation and the 
obstructions of the emergence of effective competition in the 
telecommunications markets.
9.2.2. Regulation Facilitating Private Agreements.
172. In general. The regulatory framework created by the Community 
authorities and implemented by the Member States contains a number of 
obligations aimed at facilitating the conclusion of private agreements 
governing network access, in particular network interconnection. The necessary 
inclusion of certain issues in the contract, the definition of deadlines in the 
negotiation and obligations about transparency as the communication of the 
agreements to the NRAs and the availability of such contracts to the 
competitors, the account separation and publicity and the existence of a 
Reference Interconnection Offer facilitate the negotiations. They allow for the 
overcoming the asym m etry  of the bargaining power in the benefit of the 
weaker operators. Most of these obligations could be denominated mere formal
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obligations, as they do not impose the conclusion of the contract nor any of the 
access conditions.
173. Basic content and deadlines. Article 9(2) of Directive 97/33/EC 
imposes on the Member States the obligation to promote the introduction in the 
interconnection agreements of the questions enumerated in part 2 of Annex VII 
of the Directive.489 Member States have implemented such obligation which 
does not require them to impose the content of the agreements, but rather to 
determine the issues to be agreed by the operators. In this way, the negotiating 
power of the new comers is strengthened, as the incumbent cannot refuse to 
negotiate specific issues which are definitely relevant for interconnection. 
Nevertheless, the content imposed ex ante by the public authorities should be 
kept limited, as other wise the contracting freedom of the parties could be 
obstructed and market distortions could be introduced.
Another interesting mechanisms for the promotion of contracting is the 
definition of deadlines for the signing of the contract. Article 9(3) of Directive 
97/33/EC allows NRA to define such deadlines at the request of a negotiating 
party or at their own initiative.490 In Belgium, for instance, a six months term 
has been fixed and Belgacom’s reference interconnection offer reduced such a 
term to five months, even if such term was often missed.491 The parties can 
usually agree to extend the deadlines, but such extension cannot be imposed 
unilaterally. Once the deadline is over, any of the parties can claim the 
intervention of the regulatory authority. These deadlines strengthen the weakest
489 As regards particularly obligations related to content, see for instance Article 22(2) of the Spanish 
General Telecommunications Act implemented by Article 8(1) of the Regulation on Interconnection, 
Access and Numbering (RIAN), analysed in MONTERO and BROKELMANN (1999): 
44Telecomunicaciones y televisión. La nueva regulación en España”, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, pp. 
303-357; and VÁZQUEZ LÉPINETTE, T. (1999): “La obligación de interconexión de redes de 
telecomunicaciones”, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia.
490 See PEREZ, R. (1999): “La negoziazione dell ’interconnessione”, in “La disciplina giuridica deüe 
telecommunicazionf\ Giuffre, Milano, pp. 169-179.
491 In Spain, for instance, a four months deadline has been established for the completion of 
interconnection agreements and a deadline of three months has been established for access agreements. 
In Austria the deadline is of six weeks, and in Italy of 45 days.
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negotiating party, as the menace of the NRA intervention avoids the 
introduction of unnecessary delays.
The lack of a similar provision in New Zealand forced CLEAR, the 
main new comer, to negotiate with the incumbent operator for four years before 
reaching a local network interconnection agreement. Even if forcing 
unnecessary delays in the negotiation could amount to an abuse of dominant 
position contrary to the rules on competition, a complicated and lengthy 
procedure would be necessary in order to obtain the declaration of illegality.
174. Transparency. Another set of regulatory obligations devoted to 
increase the success of private access negotiations tries to overcome the 
information asymmetry which benefits the incumbents both against the new 
competitors and even against the regulatory authorities. Specific obligations are 
imposed on the operators, and particularly on those with market power, in order 
to ensure that all the actors in the market have access to a sufficient amount of 
information. In this way, the benefits enjoyed by the former monopolists 
because of access to more information about the market and even about the 
competitors (through access agreements) can be distributed among all the 
actors. These obligations reduce the asymmetric negotiating position, as they 
allow new comers to increase their expertise as regards access agreements, 
even if they have never participated in such kind of negotiations.
Article 6 of Directive 97/33/EC imposes on Member States the obligation 
to ensure that operators with significant market power provide all the necessary 
information to those operators considering the possibility of requiring access to 
their networks. Furthermore, the existing interconnection agreements in which 
an operator with significant market power is involved should be made available 
to the new comers, excluding the commercial secrets but never the terms and 
conditions of interconnection nor the interconnection quotas. Article 16(9) of
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directive 98/19/EC allows NRA to request details on the agreements for special 
network access.
It is interesting to note how some Member States such as Spain have 
expanded the reach of the Directives and have imposed such obligations not 
only on operators with significant market power but to all the operators in the 
market, even though the NRA could decide to exclude the agreements between 
operators which individually have a market share below 5%. In any case, 
operators only have access to the access agreements concluded by an operator 
with significant market power.492
Transparency is also promoted by the set of regulatory obligations 
imposed on operators as regards accounting.493 Accounting separation is 
imposed by Article 8(2) of Directive 97/33/EEC on operators with significant 
market power which provide at the same time public telecommunications 
services and interconnection services. In these cases the operators are required 
to separate the accounting of the interconnection services (including those 
services provided internally) from the accounting of the rest of their services, in 
such a way that both costs and revenues of the interconnection services 
attributed according to defined criteria can be identified. Similar obligations are 
imposed by Article 18 Directive 98/10/EC regarding access to telephone 
networks and services. Accounting separation is also required by directives 
97/33/EEC and 98/10/EC to those operators in the telecommunications services 
which enjoy special or exclusive rights in other sectors, such as electricity for 
instance.
The implementation of the relevant provisions by some Member States 
has, once more, expanded the obligations foreseen by the Directives from
492 Article 22(6) LGT and Article 2(7) RIAN. For the practice of the NRA on the issue vide 
MONTERO and BROKELMANN (1999), pp. 334-335 {supra footnote 489).
493 See Arthur Andersen (1997): “Accounting Separation in the Context of Open Network Provision”, 
European Commission, Brussels.
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operators with significant market power to other operators active in the market. 
Such is the case of Finland, France, Luxembourg, the UK and Spain. In most 
cases, accounting separation applies to all operators with the exception of 
operators with a small turn over.494 Such an expansion seems inconsistent with 
the explicitly recognised scope of the obligation, that is, to ensure non­
discrimination in the provision of interconnection to third parties and to the 
vertically integrated division of the operator, and to make evident potential 
cross-subsidies. Both behaviours are forbidden to operators with significant 
market power but not to new comers without market power, so such formal 
obligations are unnecessary.495
Even the light-handed regulation introduced in New Zealand imposes 
obligations related to transparency496 in order to over-come the information 
asymmetry between the incumbent and the rest of actors (including competitors 
but also public authorities).
175. Reference interconnection offer. Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 
92/44/EEC as reformed by Directive 97/51/EC create the obligation for 
operators with significant m arket power in the leased lines markets to make 
public the technical and econom ic conditions of access to their facilities with 
an important level of detail. In such a way, operators requiring access can 
initiate negotiations for contracting access with a sufficient level of 
information.
494 Article 15(1) RIAN imposes such obligations on all operators with an annual turnover in the 
Spanish telecommunications markets of more than 3.340 m illions of pesetas (around 20 million Euros).
495 As a matter of fact, the Commission in Directive 97/51/EC para. 14 has recognised that “certain 
obligations concerning [...] cost accounting systems will no longer be appropriate once competition is 
introduced and [...] others can be relaxed by the competent national regulatory authority as soon as 
competition achieves the desired objectives”.
496 Telecommunications regulation of 1990, amended in 1993, imposes on the incumbent the obligation 
to disclosing accounting information, interconnection agreements and standard contracts. See WEBB 
and LATTERY (1999): “New Zealand”, in International Telecommunications Law, pp. 23-24, BNA, 
London.
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Article 7(3) of Directive 97/33/EC elaborated on this basis and reinforced 
the intervention in interconnection negotiations. A reference interconnection 
offer which includes a description of the unbundled elements of the network 
and the terms and conditions of interconnection has to be published by the 
operators with significant market power in the fixed telephony network and 
service markets as well as in the leased lines markets.
Even if Directive 97/33/EC allows NRA the power to impose 
modifications in the RIO when justified, it is not explicitly stated that NRA 
have to approve the RIO proposed by the operators with significant market 
power. Nevertheless, directly or indirectly, this is the way it works in most of 
the Member States.497 As a result, the standard terms and conditions of 
interconnection are negotiated between the dominant operators and the public 
authorities, in a framework significantly more balanced than the existing in the 
market. It is for this reason that RIOs became one of the most conflictive 
elements in the process of reform of the sector. The Commission was forced to 
initiate infringement procedures against a significant amount of Member States 
for delays in the publication of RIOs by the former monopolies. Furthermore, 
the former monopolists have often challenged the modifications of their RIOs 
by the NRA before the Courts.
RIOs strongly facilitate interconnection. The RIO provides a precise 
description of all the facilities provided by the operator with significant market 
power as well as the mfnrmirm terms and conditions which are in any case 
enforceable on the operator. New comers disfavoured by the bargaining 
asym m etry  have at their disposal all the relevant information they need, so they 
do not have to negotiate to get it. At the same time, the RIO provides a “floor” 
for the conditions of interconnection., as new comers can always improve the 
conditions in the RIO, but in any case the conditions contained there are
497 This is clearly the case of Belgium, France or Spain or Italy.
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assured to them. It is interesting to note that such a framework does not exclude 
the definition of a different structure by the operators.
176. Evaluation. These formal obligations introduce transparency in the 
market and reduce the asymmetry in the bargain ing power in the negotiations 
for the conclusion of access agreements. It is obvious that most of the 
obligations suppose a burden on the operator which suffers them. Nevertheless, 
such a burden rarely limits the competitive ability of the operators with 
significant market power, as the financial burden is certainly reduced in 
relation to their turn over. At the same time, as long as they do not impose the 
specific conditions at which access is to be granted, they do not distort directly 
the market.
The extension of the formal obligations to operators without significant 
market power, as it has been done in a number of Member States, raises a 
series of questions. In the first place, it is necessary to evaluate the 
appropriateness of such an extension. In general, it is difficult to justify the 
imposition of these obligations to operators without market power. The lack of 
such power makes any abuse impossible. As new comers do not enjoy the 
control over an extensive network, it seems unnecessary to introduce formal 
obligations directed to ensure that such power is not used to obstruct the 
entrance to the markets of new operators.
Nevertheless, there are cases in which such an extension might be 
justified. The C om m u n ity  framework limits the application of most of these 
formal obligations to operators dominant in the basic fixed telephony markets, 
both network and service markets. In those markets where it is considered that 
enough competition exists, these obligations are not applied. This is the case of 
mobile telephony. As the mobile telephony markets are supposed to be 
competitive, the Community regulatory framework has excluded the 
application of most of the formal obligations to these operators, despite the fact
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their reduced number allows the existence of market failures which might 
reduce the effective competition in the market. The Community framework, 
implemented by the Member States, allows for the extension of most of these 
obligations to the mobile operators exclusively if they enjoy significant market 
power in the national interconnection market.49®
The extension of some of the formal obligations, and particularly of those 
directed to increase the transparency in the market, to the operators with 
significant market power in the mobile markets would allow NRAs to control 
the evolution of the markets and the significance of the market failures. At the 
same time, such extension would not directly distort the market, as the formal 
obligations do not entail the imposition of particular access conditions on the 
operators.
Finally, one has to consider the effect of the extension of the formal 
obligations to small new comers to the basic fixed telephony markets, as has 
been done in some Member States. Even if the burden imposed on operators 
with significant market power does not limit its competitive ability, it might be 
the case that the imposition of some of the obligations to very small operators 
could suppose a decisive burden to their small administrative resources. As a 
result, a rule excluding very small operators from the obligations should be in 
any case considered.
9.2.3. Compulsory Access.
177. Compulsory access. The ONP framework, even after full 
liberalisation, is based on the assum ption that major market failures can be 
identified in the European telecommunications sector. The existing ONP
498 NRAs have been reluctant to declare mobile operators as SMP holders. This was particularly the 
case for mobile operators with a market share under 25%. Despite the pressure by fixed operators to 
have them declared as SMP operators due to the important distortions found in the mobile market, 
NRAs were reluctant to intervene due to political pressure, the legal uncertainty and even the lack of 
faith in the SMP scheme, as the very same Commission proposed to modify it in November 1999, 
when the declaration was to take place in many Member States.
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framework pays particular attention to the market failures that seem to derive 
from the market power inherited by the incumbents after decades of 
monopolisation.
All the relevant directives contain explicit provisions which impose on 
incumbent operators the obligation to grant access to their networks or services. 
Particularly clear is Directive 97/33/EC regarding interconnection: 
“Organisations authorised to provide public telecommunications networks and 
publicly available telecommunications services [...] which have significant 
market power shall meet all reasonable requests for access to the network 
including access at points other than the network termination points offered to 
the majority of end-users”.499
The Community Directives have always paid particular attention to the 
objective justifications which could legitimise the refusal to grant access to the 
networks. A closed list of the so called essential requirements which would 
legitimise the refusal has been developed by the Community authorities. The 
list of essential requirements comprises justifications based on the security of 
network operations (in order to ensure the availability of the services even in 
cases of force majeure), on the maintenance of network integrity, on 
interoperability of services, on protection of data and on the effective use of 
frequency spectrum.500 C om m unity  legislation excludes any objective reason 
based on the efficiency derived from the refusal to grant access.
178. Transitory character. The generalised application to the 
incumbents of the ONP framework after the full liberalisation of the sector can
499 This is the case of Article 3 Directive 90/387/EEC, as amended by Directive 97/51/EC; Article 6 of 
Directive 92/44/EEC as amended by Directive 97/51/EC; Articles 13 and 16 of Directive 98/10/EC.
500 See Article 3(2) of Directive 90/387/EEC as amended by Directive 97/51/EC, Article 6 of Directive 
94/44/EEC as amended by Directive 97/51/EC, Article 10 of Directive 97/33/EC, and Article 13 of 
Directive 98/10/EC.
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only be understood as an exceptional policy for the period of transition, in 
order to accelerate the emergence of effective competition in the sector.
As a matter of fact, the ONP Directives contain numerous references 
regarding the reconsideration of the application of the ONP principles in 
markets where effective competition exists. For instance, recital 15 of directive 
97/51/EC states: “it is appropriate to allow the requirements for cost orientation 
and transparency in specific markets to be set aside where [...] effective 
competition ensures that tariffs for leased lines are reasonable”. In the same 
line, recital 14 of Directive 9 8/ 10/EC goes further and states that the 
compulsory access and ONP principles “will no longer be appropriate once 
competition is introduced”.
The transitory character of the ONP regime is implicitly recognised by the 
introduction of a process of review of the ONP directives whose beginning was 
fixed for 31 December 1999. The review was suppose to examine “the removal 
of obligation no longer needed in a market where there is effective 
competition”.501
179. Access conditions. The open network provision policy not only 
imposes access to the networks, but also tries to harmonised access condition in 
the European Union. The basic principles were already defined in Article 3(1) 
of Directive 90/387/EEC. Network access should always be based on objective 
criteria, be transparent and published, and guarantee equality of access and 
non-discrimination. These principles have always informed the harmonisation 
of the access conditions by the Directives which have developed the ONP 
framework. Particularly interesting has been the application of the non­
discrimination principle, as it has required vertically integrated incumbents to
501 Recital 17 of Directive 98/10/EC. Sim ilar considerations can be found in Article 14 of Directive 
92/44/EEC as amended by directive 97/51/EC: and recital 25 of Directive 97/33/EC.
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grant third parties access to their facilities at the same conditions at which their 
vertically integrated divisions or partners have access.5“
Full liberalisation has forced the modification of the conditions for the 
application of the ONP framework. However, such a relevant reform of the 
sector has not significantly modified the fundamental principles of the ONP 
policy, particularly the non-discrimination principle. The reason seems to be 
that the elimination of the exclusive rights does not automatically eliminate 
market power, and that the control over the only existing universal network by 
an incumbent can distort competition in the period of transition to effective 
competition.
180. Access pricing. Tariff principles were always considered among the 
access conditions which required harmonisation in order to “ensure fair and 
transparent conditions for all users”.503 Tariffs should then be based on 
objective principles, be transparent and non-discriminatory. These general 
principles determined the basic rule which has governed access pricing in the 
ONP framework: prices should be cost oriented.
The lack of competition in the access market due to the exclusive rights 
over infrastructures and the telephony service excluded supply and demand 
mechanisms for the definition of access prices. Price determination could not 
be left to the monopolist, as they could try to exclude new comers to the 
services market and to obtain monopoly rents. It was necessary to harmonise at 
a Community level the basic principles ruling access pricing. Objectivity, 
transparency and non-discrimination were the general principles defined for 
access conditions. Efficiency was another important requirement, as well as the 
financial stability of the monopolists. Cost orientation provided a valid 
mechanism in order to meet all these requirements. “Cost orientation implies
502 Article 6 of Directive 97/33/EC; and Article 16(7) of Directive 98/10/EC
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that the price charged for provision of a service should reflect the underlying 
cost incurred in providing that service”.504 Annex II of Directive 90/387/EEC 
established the basic lines for price regulation by the national authorities.
Cost orientation was supposed to introduce not only objectivity but also 
fairness and efficiency in access pricing. Since exclusive rights excluded 
competition as the force defining prices, it was for public authorities to 
determine access pricing, in a way which would substitute as closely as 
possible market pressures. Directive 92/44/EEC was the first one to introduce 
cost oriented pricing in the European telecommunications markets. Article 10 
not only determined that prices should be cost oriented but also transparent, 
and in order to ensure this, introduced the obligation to develop cost accounting 
systems suitable to ensure the effectivity of the pricing policy. Community 
authorities were fully aware of the difficulties of determining prices in the 
telecommunications industry, and for this reason, determined some basic 
principles for cost allocation according to the direct or indirect relation between 
costs and a particular service. Nevertheless, at that initial point no guideline 
was developed as regards the criteria for cost analysis.
Full liberalisation has not eliminated the principles of non-discrimination 
and cost oriented pricing, even if such principles have been restricted to access 
to certain facilities of operators with significant market power. Article 17 of 
Directive 98/10/EC confirms the application of the principles defined in Annex 
II of Directive 90/387/EEC, as amended by directive 97/51/EC, to access to 
telephony networks and services. The same principles apply to interconnection 
to networks of operators with significant market power according to Article 
7(2) of Directive 97/33/EC, which explicitly imposes on such operators the 
burden to prove that their access prices are determined by their real costs.
503 Directive 90/387/EEC, p. 1.
504 See Commission Recommendation 98/195/EC of 3 January 1998, on interconnection in a liberalised 
telecommunications market (Part 1 -Interconnection pricing), OJ L 73/42 of 12.3.98.
319
ID. Network Access.
181. Cost analysis. Cost accounting, nevertheless, is not a very precise 
science. Different costing methodologies coexist in the market in order to give 
responses to different situations and also to different interests.505 The adoption 
of the accounting methodology was left for the national authorities, even if the 
Commission has expressed its preference for the application as regards 
interconnection of the Forward Looking Long Run Average Incremental Cost 
approach, both in the Directives506 and in specific Recommendation on the 
subject.507
Fully Distributed Historic Costs, the traditional accounting methodology 
of the national monopolists, lacks the required objectivity, as the distribution of 
costs is rather random. At the same time, historic costs do not seem compatible 
with a competitive environment where the firms price their assets according to 
their value in the market rather than according to the investment they undertook 
to develop the asset. This methodology determines very high access costs and 
does not promote increases in the efficiency of the dominant operator.5“
Methodologies exclusively based on Marginal Costs, even if they better 
reflect the logic of competitive markets, do not seem the most appropriate for 
network industries, as they ignore the com m on and joint costs which are the
505 See BAUMOL, W. (1970): “Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost pricing”, in American 
Economic Review, voL 60, p. 265; CAVE, CROWTHER and HANCHER (1995): “Competition 
Aspects o f Access Pricing”, European Commission, Brussels; KAHN, A. (1993): “The Economics o f 
Regulation: Principles and Institutions” MIT, Cambridge MA; LAHN and SHEW (1987): “Current 
Issues in Telecommunications Regulation: Pricing”, in Yale Journal on Regulation, voL 4, no. 2, pp. 
191-256; MITCHEL and VOGELSANG (1991): “Telecommunications pricing: Theory and practice", 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
506 See recital 10 of Directive 97/33/EC which states that “the level of charges [...] should not be below 
a limit calculated by the use of long-run incremental cost and cost allocation and attribution methods 
based on actual cost causation, nor above a limit set by the stand-alone cost of providing the 
interconnection in question; whereas charges for interconnection based on a price level closely linked 
to the long-run incremental cost for providing access to interconnection are appropriate for encouraging 
the rapid development of an open and competitive m arket”
507 Vide Commission Recommendation 98/195/EC (supra footnote 504); amended by Commission 
Recommendation 98/511/EC of 29 July 1998, OJ L 228/30 of 15.8.98.
508 See BRAEUTIGAM, R. (1980): “An Analysis of Fully Distributed Cost Pricing in Regulated 
Industries”, in Bell journal o f Economics, vol. 11, no. l,pp. 182-196.
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most relevant in industries such as the telecommunications, and therefore 
determine very low interconnection prices, which deter investments in 
alternative infrastructures.509
Forward Looking Long Run Average Incremental Costs avoids the 
pitfalls of the latest methodologies. On the one hand, this methodology focuses 
on the costs of the provision of extra units of a service, rather than on the 
historic investments of an operator. On the other hand, the consideration of the 
long run allows one to take into consideration not only the variable costs but 
also the fixed costs, which in the long run also become variable as they can be 
adapted to the supply.
The latest methodology even if theoretically sound, is not simple to apply 
in practice and introduces a high degree of uncertainty, as many of the 
parameters under consideration are mere estimations of the future development 
of the market. In any case, the definition by the NRA of the basic 
methodological assumptions introduced certainty and ensures the objectivity as 
well as the fairness of the system.510 In any case, the implementation of such 
accounting systems by the operators with significant market power requires a 
considerable period of time (around 24 months), and for this reason the 
Commission has recommended the transitional adoption of a benchmarking 
approach.
Any cost accounting methodology requires a reliable cost accounting by 
the operators. In particular, cost accounting has to be transparent and allow 
regulatory authorities as well as competitors to confirm that the dominant 
operator’s prices are related to objectively defined costs.511 This can only be
509 See for instance BOS, D. (1994): “Pricing and price Regulation. An Economic Theory for Public 
Enterprises and Public utilities’', Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 119-129.
510 See ERGAS, H. (2000): “TSLRICTELRJC, and other Forms of Forward looking Cost Models in 
Telecommunications: A Cunungeons Guide”, in “European Competition Law Annual 1998. Regulating 
Communications Markets”, Ehlermann and Gossling Ed., Hart, pp. 105-130.
5,1 Vide Arthur Andersen (supra footnote 493).
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ensured if the distribution of common costs is objectively developed following 
the criteria defined by the regulatory authorities and if cross-subsidies inside 
the dominant operator are excluded.
182. Technical conditions. The principles of objectivity, transparency 
and non-discrimination govern not only the economic but also the technical 
conditions at which access is provided. Regulatory authorities not only have 
competencies to adopt standards in order to ensure interoperability and 
transparent access conditions, but already in Directive 90/387/EEC it was 
pointed out that other conditions such as quality of service, provision time 
(delivery period), fair distribution of capacity in case of scarcity, repair time, 
availability of network information and customer proprietary information, were 
to be harmonised. The ONP directives contain a substantial number of 
references to such conditions.
The most relevant technical condition, however, has been the unbundling 
of the networks. Directive 90/387/EEC already required to leave for users a 
choice between the individual service elements.112 All the ONP directives 
contain references to these basic principle in order to ensure that “the applicant 
is not required to pay for anything not strictly related to the service 
requested”.513 Nevertheless, Community directives do not specify up to what 
level the-incumbents ’ networks have to be unbundled. As a consequence one of 
the most important debates, the one on the unbundling of the local loop, was 
initially left for the national authorities. Member States were divided on this 
debate,514 so finally the Commission had to intervene.
512 See Annex II of Directive 90/387/EEC.
5U Article 7(4) of directive 97/33/EC.
514 See a table with the different option in LEWIN, D. and MATHEWS, J. (1998): “Access Networks 
and Regulatory Meassures”, OVUM for DG XM, European Commission, Luxembourg, p. 60.
322
Chapter 9. Sector Specific Regulation on Network Access.
Local loop access at prices related to cost might allow new comers to 
benefit from the economies of scale enjoyed by the incumbent and would lower 
the risk for entering the access network market, which would accelerate local 
competition. On the contrary, it removes incentives for building alternative 
networks, complicates the modernisation of the incumbent’s network and 
requires significant regulatory intervention.
183. Interconnection discrimination. Despite the fact the most 
established principle governing network access is non-discrimination, pressure 
by some Member States forced the introduction in Directive 97/33/EC of the 
following statement “different tariffs, terms and conditions for interconnection 
may be set for different categories of organisations which are authorised to 
provide networks and services, where such differences can be objectively 
justified on the basis of [...] the relevant national licensing conditions”.515
Directive 97/33/EC states that “National regulatory authorities shall 
ensure that such differences do not result in distortion of competition”. The 
potential effects on competition have been considered by the Commission in its 
Recommendation on interconnection pricing,516 as well as in the Access 
Notice.517 In the latest document the Commission considers that such a 
discrimination could never be the result of the application of Article 82 EC 
Treaty, and furthermore, analysis in the specific case could lead to the 
consideration of such an action as anticompetitive.
184. Enforcement The ONP framework not only has established the 
basic lines governing access, based on the principles of objectivity, 
transparency  and non-discrimination, but has also created a set of regulatory 
m echanism s to ensure the effectivity of such principles. Even if private
515 Article 7(3) Directive 97/33ÆC.
516 Vide Recommendation on interconnection pricing, point 5.1 (supra footnote 504).
517 Vide Access Notice para. 123-125 (supra footnote 486).
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negotiations are to determine initially the access conditions, a set of generic 
obligations are imposed ex ante on operators with significant market power. 
Furthermore, ex post mechanisms allow public authorities to intervene in case 
negotiations do not provide fair access terms and conditions.
On the one hand, a set of mechanisms can be identified by their conflict 
resolution nature. Regulatory authorities intervene to determine the conditions 
which cannot be agreed by private parties. On the other hand, mechanisms have 
been developed in order to impose fairness and avoid anticompetitive effects 
despite the lack of apparent conflict between he parties.
185. Conflict resolution. All the ONP Directives foresee procedures 
under the national regulatory authorities for the cases in which no agreement 
can be reached between the operators negotiating an access agreement. As it is 
stated in Article 16(4) of Directive 98/10/EC “National regulatory authorities 
shall [intervene] if requested by either party in order to set conditions which are 
non-discrimmatory, fair and reasonable for both parties and offer the greatest 
benefit to all users”.
Particularly detailed is Directive 97/33/EC on interconnection, as not only 
can operators require the intervention of the NRA, but the NRA is forced to 
provide a solution for the conflict in a six months period after the request of 
one of the parties. Furthermore, the NRA has the obligation to publish the 
motivated decision.51*
Member States have implemented such obligations and as a result specific 
procedures for conflict resolution on access and interconnection are at the 
disposal of the operators for the fast and efficient solution of their conflicts.
5,1 Article 9(2)(5) and (6) of Directive 97/33/EC.
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186. Own-motion intervention. The ONP Directives do not only foresee 
the intervention of the NRA at the request of the operators. Intervention at the 
NRA motion is also envisaged by the Community directives.
Firstly, national regulatory authorities can intervene in order to ensure 
that access agreements include conditions which respect the principles of 
objectivity, transparency and non-discrimination, and that such agreements are 
implemented in an efficient and timely manner. Secondly, national regulatory 
authorities may intervene at their own initiative at any time where justified in 
order to ensure affective competition and/or interoperability.519 In the case of 
interconnection agreements, the possibility for the NRA to impose the 
modification of a concluded agreement if it is justified in order to ensure 
effective competition or interoperability is foreseen.520
Finally, Article 9(6) of Directive 97/33/EC foresees that “in cases where 
organisations which are authorised to provide public telecommunications 
networks and/or publicly available telecommunications services have not 
interconnected their facilities, national regulatory authorities, in compliance 
with the principle of proportionality and in the interest of users, shall be able, 
as a last resort, to require the organisations concerned to interconnect their 
facilities in order to protect essential public interests and, where appropriate, 
shall b.e able to set terms of interconnection”.
9.2.4. Evaluation.
187. ONP and essential facilities. The ONP framework was designed 
mostly to erode the market power of the incumbents derived from the control 
of the traditional fixed telephony network. In this way, new comers would have 
a chance to enter the market and compete with the incumbent. It is interesting
519 See Article 16(4) and (5) Directive 98/10/EC.
520 See Article 9(3) of Directive 97/33/EC.
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to note that the ONP principles were built by the Commission on the principles 
ruling the essential facilities doctrine as understood by the Commission.
Firstly, obligations were imposed mainly on the incumbents due to their 
market power. Secondly, non-discrimination was in both cases the leading 
principle governing network access. Non-discrimination together with 
objectivity, transparency and proportionality were to ensure that the control of 
an asset by the former monopolies did not exclude new competitors from 
vertically connected markets, so that competition in equal terms between the 
incumbents and the new comers would be possible.
However the most relevant point is that the full liberalisation of the 
telecommunications markets modified the application of the essential facilities 
doctrine, but did not substantially affect the ONP framework. The application 
of competition Law, and in particular of the figure of refusals to deal and the 
essential facilities doctrine after the Oscar Bronner judgement, is determined 
by the market structure. Compulsory access is not automatically imposed by 
the rules on competition anymore in those markets in which duplication of the 
facility, and therefore some competition, is viable.
The ONP framework as it is designed nowadays, on the contrary, ignores 
the differences in market structure which clearly appear in the European 
telecommunications markets. No differentiation has been introduced in order to 
distinguish the regulation of markets which can be governed by competition 
and those where competition will necessarily be limited as a result of the 
existence of a market failure. The ONP directives maintain the obligation on 
the incumbents to provide access at non-discriminatory conditions, no matter
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ehether actual or potential competition exists for the provision of a particular 
access.”1
The lack of attention to market structure in the actual regime presupposes 
the application of the same regulatory intervention in very different situations. 
On the one hand, network access regulation tries to overcome the obstacle to 
the emergence of effective competition caused by decades of monopolisation 
and the presence in the markets of the traditional monopolists with all their 
market power. On the other hand, network access regulation imposes a market 
substitutive regime for those markets (very limited, but existing) in which 
effective competition is not possible as a result of the market structure (natural 
monopoly, low demand, inadequate technology etc.).
At the same time, the rigidity of the ONP framework, focused on a 
limited number of electronic communications networks markets (mostly fixed 
telephony networks and leased lines), prevents public intervention in new 
markets were market failures might be developing. This might be the case of 
mobile communications and digital television networks.
188. Transitory period. Regulatory intervention on network access has 
been confused by the contradictory mixture of objectives. It was usually 
considered necessary to foster the development of service competition by 
reducing obstacles to access including prices. At the same time, it was usually 
argued that very aggressive policies for access would deter investments in 
network development by new comers and as a result would obstruct network 
competition.
521 DGXffl of the European Commission published a document on 21 May 1999 “DGXlU Discussion 
document on the 1999 Review: regulatory principles”, in which it was recognised that the regulatory 
framework serves two purposes. Firstly, the setting out of measures to liberalise a former monopoly 
sector. Secondly, providing a harmonised framework for national legislation to ensure that the 
liberalised marketplace functions effectively. (See page S).
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Nevertheless, it seems clear that in case network competition would be 
discarded in some network markets, price regulation would have been different, 
as the elements to balance would have been the promotion of service 
competition on the one hand, and the mere financial equilibrium and efficiency 
promotion for the network monopolist on the other. As a result, more 
aggressive policies could have been implemented directly to foster access to 
necessarily monopolised networks by new comers to services markets. These 
considerations should have led price regulation for those network markets 
where competition was not feasible, but the inclusion of all network markets in 
the same debate has excluded a particular policy for non-competitive market 
segments.
The mixture of both objectives in the determination of access conditions 
and prices has introduced significant confusion. As NRAs have been forced to 
fix a unique access price independently of the market structure, their 
perspective on the possibilities for the emergence of effective competition in a 
smaller or larger portion of the network markets has influenced their network 
access policies.
In some countries where confidence in the emergence of effective 
competition has been reduced, an interventionist policy aimed at ensuring 
(somehow artificially) the attractiveness for new comers of the network 
markets has been pursued. This is a very distorted policy, as it fosters (and 
often it imposes) investments which might not be economically justified but are 
merely based on a distortion which does not foster efficiency and does not 
benefit consumers. Such a policy does not effectively foster network 
competition, as new comers are aware of the risks of this policy in the long-run 
and do not invest, and it certainly obstructs the emergence of competition in the 
service markets, due to the restriction to access, to the benefit of the incumbent.
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An open acceptance of the limitations of the liberalisation process, and 
the instauration of a double policy according to market structures, would have 
avoided the divergent and often distortive policies on network access which 
have been identified in the Member States based on the different faith on the 
process. In any case, the actual system has to be complemented with explicit 
and enforceable mechanisms devoted to ensure that as soon as a market reaches 
an acceptable degree of competition, the regulatory intervention has to be 
eliminated.
189. Mature markets. The imposition of a common regulatory regime on 
network access despite the structure of the network market would increase its 
distortive character as competition emerges on those markets where it is 
feasible. As competition emerges, the criterion which should rule public 
intervention on the market should not merely be the market share of an 
operator, even the incumbent, and in particular the inclusion in the category of 
operator with significant market power. On the contrary, the criteria should be 
the feasibility of the emergence of effective competition in the market
The permanence over time of operators with important market shares 
could be the result of the competitive process which recognised the most 
efficient provision of the service, or the result of a market failure which 
obstructs the effective constraints of competition. In the first case, it is for the 
rules on competition to obstruct abuses of such a dominance. In case there is a 
market failure, it is for regulation to govern the provision of the service by the 
dominant operator.
The extension over time of the framework designed to foster the 
emergence of competition would distort competition in those markets where it 
will emerge, as it would allow weak operators to survive as a result of the 
benefits introduced by the regulator. Such a situation would not benefit 
consumers, as efficiency would not be rewarded and income would be 
transferred from the users to the inefficient operators.
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Over time, regulation on access should be limited to network markets 
with some kind of market failure. It could be argued that market share is the 
simplest mechanism to ascertain the lack of competition and therefore the 
existence of a market failure. Even if it is true that market share is a significant 
tool for the evaluation of a market, the application of the rules on competition 
has shown that many other factors have to be evaluated in order to determine 
the characteristics of a market. Moreover, a 25% market share is extremely low 
in order to ascertain the existence of a market failure.
A mere market share of 25% might justify the inclusion of an operator in 
the category of operators with significant market power. Nevertheless, it might 
easily be the case that an operator and particularly the incumbent, could have a 
25% share in a network market, and a very reduced market power, due to the 
existence of a significant number of competitors, some of them with a similar 
market share, and vigorous competition in the market.
As a consequence, it seems that inclusion in the category of operators 
with significant market share should not be the leading criterion for the 
imposition of the regulatory obligations on access in the future. On the 
contrary, the evaluation of the characteristics of a market and the identification 
of a market failure should be the main criterion.
190. New markets. At the same time, the liberalisation regulatory 
framework was focused on the control of incumbents regarding the most 
traditional telecommunications markets: voice telephony services and 
infrastructures. However, recent years have witnessed the development of new 
network and services, particularly mobile communications and digital 
television. The regulatory framework paid very little attention to the first and 
none to the second.
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The basic assumption was that since no exclusive rights existed in these 
" markets, there was no need for a major intervention regarding access to these 
networks.
Nevertheless, the evolution of these market has proven that the 
oligopolistic tendency of network industries, reinforced by the distorsive 
effects of frequency scarcity, might produce important market failures which 
could require a regulatory intervention.522
Such intervention cannot be based on simplistic features like the market 
share or the number of operators active on the market. On the contrary, it is 
necessary to undertake a solid market analysis in order to evaluate whether 
market players suffer sufficient pressure in order to fulfil consumer demands.
191. Difficulties. It is clear that certainty has to be introduced in the 
evaluation of the structure of the market before deciding to apply the regulatory 
framework on network access. Such a decision is subject to pressure from the 
operators, and important risks of capture by the incumbent as well as by the 
new comers obviously exist.
This difficulty can be overcome by the participation of different 
institutions in the adoption of the decision. European institutions could draw 
the basic picture and define wide limits for the inclusion of certain markets in 
the regulatory framework. Such limits would be the object of periodical review 
in order to adapt the legislation to technical and economic evolution.
192. The 99 Review. As a matter of fact, as a result of the Review of the 
telecommunications legal framework, the Commission has proposed major 
reforms in the ONP regime.
522 See MONTERO, J. J. (2000): “Competencia en las comunicaciones móviles. De la telefonia a 
InternetTirant lo Blanch, Valencia.
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The Directive proposal523 introduces a deep reform in the access and 
interconnection regime. Firstly, the proposal is more flexible than the regime in 
force nowadays. It does not impose obligations on specific categories of 
operators based on an implicit identification of a market failure. On the 
contrary, it merely provides the mechanisms and procedures to identify market 
failures and provides instruments to solve such failures.
The new directive would not be centred in the regulation of access and 
interconnection to specific networks owned by specific categories of operators. 
On the contrary, it is applicable to all electronic communications networks, 
those existing at the moment (mobile communications, internet, digital 
television etc.), and which might develop in the future. It would even reach 
very specific network elements (set-top boxes, APIs etc.) in case it can be 
demonstrated that a market failure exists.
The intervention of the NRAs is not based on the prior identification in 
the Directive of a market failure. On the contrary, a flexible procedure for the 
identification of market failures is proposed. The Commission will publish 
regularly a list of markets in which market failures might exist, It will then be 
compulsory for the NRAs to analyse such markets (in collaboration with all 
market actors) in order to conclude whether a market failure can be identified 
in the national market. Any attempt to analyse markets outside of the list 
proposed by the Commission would have to be approved by the Commission.
A major reform proposed by the Commission affects the Relevant Market 
Power category. The Commission intended to maintain the category as it is, but 
many operators sustained that a 25% market share was too low for the NRAs to 
intervene. The Commission has finally proposed to consider an operator as
523 COM(2000) 384, “Proposed for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities'’, 
Brussels, 12.7.2000.
332
Chapter 9. Sector Specific Regulation on Network Access.
having Significant Market Power if “ either individually or jointly with others, 
it enjoys a position of economic strength affording it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of competitors, consumers and ultimately 
consumers”.524
This reform is of major importance. It seems that the Commission 
proposes to limit the application of the regulatory framework to those operators 
which can be considered as dominant according to the rules on competition. At 
the same time, it seems to shift the focus from individual dominance to 
collective dominance, as many telecommunications markets are adopting an 
oligopolisitic structure.
Finally, the Commission proposes a closed list of obligations which might 
be imposed on operators with significant market power in markets with a 
failure. These obligations are basically the same as in the regime in force 
nowadays. It is for the NRAs to decide which obligations are necessary in order 
to overcome the failure. In case an NRA intends to impose a different 
obligation, it needs the approval of the Commission.
The new regulatory framework recognises the need for a more flexible 
approach based not in the mere existence of a high market share, but on the 
identification of a market failure. Even further, the new regime recognises that 
such failure will not be caused only by the market strength of the incumbents, 
but also by the oligopolistic structure of the electronic communications 
markets.
524 See CC>M(2000) 393,, “Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services”, Brussels, 
12.7.2000.
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9.3. REGULATING ACCESS BY CONSUMERS.
9.3.1. The Notion of Universal Service.
193. Universal service. The most important concern of the Community 
authorities has been the structural reform of the telecommunications markets. 
Both regulatory and antitrust mechanisms were developed in order to guarantee 
the competitive nature of the markets so that the constraints of competition 
would ensure the satisfaction of the general interest. Nevertheless, some 
Member States (in particular France and Belgium) imposed the adoption of 
further mechanisms for the immediate satisfaction of the general interest in the 
telecommunications sector. This was the origin of the universal service scheme.
Universal service is defined in the Community directives as “a defined 
minimum set of services of specified quality which is available to all users 
independent of their geographical location and, in the light of specific national 
conditions, at an affordable price”.525
The notion of universal service has a long history in the US, where such a 
term, even if with different meanings, has always been present in the 
telecommunications sector.5“ Within the framework of the European Union the 
term was officially introduced in 1992, at a relatively late stage, when the 
debate for the full liberalisation was initiated.527 Once the decision to fully de­
monopolised the European telecommunications markets was adopted, the 
universal service scheme became one of the priorities of the Community
525 Sec Article 2(2Xf) Directive 98/10/EC.
126 See BORROWS, BERNT and LAWTON (1991): “Universal Service in the United States: 
Dimensions o f the Debate”, WIK, Discussion paper no. 124; and MUELLER, M. (1993): “Universal 
Service in Telephone History”, in Telecommunications Policy, voL 17, no. 5, pp. 352-375.
527 See SEC(92) 1048, of 21 October 1992.
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harmonising policy and one of the leading mechanisms of public intervention 
in the sector.528
194. Universal service scheme. The universal service scheme provided 
mechanisms to substitute the traditional policy of universalisation of the 
telecommunications services by the public national monopolies. Traditionally, 
public monopolies had a mere political responsibility for the provision of the 
services and no objective control existed to ensure the proportionate and 
efficient character of the intervention. The elimination of exclusive right and 
the direct provision of the services by the public authorities led to the lack of 
the traditional mechanisms to ensure universality, such as cross-subsidies.529
The universal service scheme provides an alternative model of public 
intervention. Intervention is subsidiary to competition in the market, as 
intervention is only supposed to take place when operators do not satisfy the 
general interest. It is indirect, as public authorities do not directly provide the 
services considered of general interest, but imposes on the operators regulatory 
obligations to ensure such satisfaction. The intervention is objectively based, as 
it is limited to ensure goals specifically designed as of general interest. 
Intervention is proportionate, as there is a necessary connection between the 
general interest objectives and the public intervention implemented to ensure 
them. Finally, regulatory intervention to ensure the universality of the services 
is supposed to be non-discriminatory and, therefore, it should not distort the 
competitive process which has been appointed to govern the sector.
195. Universal access. Article 5 of Directive 98/10/EC states that 
“Member States shall ensure that all reasonable requests for connection to the
528 See for instance COM(96) 73 ftnal Universal Service for Telecommunications in the Perspective of 
a Fully Liberalised Environment. An Essential Element of the Information Society, 13.3.96, Brussels, 
p. 1.
529 See CAVE, MILNE and SCANLAN (1994): “Meeting Universal Service Obligations in a 
Competitive Telecommunications S e c to rEuropean Commission, Brussels, p. 11.
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fixed public telephone network at a fixed location [...] are met by at least one 
operator and may, if necessary to this end, designate one or more operators so 
that the whole of their territory is covered”. Not only access for consumers has 
to be ensured, but minimum standards of quality are imposed by the 
directive,530 and access has to be provided at an affordable price.531 At the same 
time recital 11 of Directive 97/51/EC states that “in order to guarantee the 
provision of leased lines throughout the Community, member States should 
ensure that at every point in their territories users have access to a minimum set 
of leased lines from at least one organisation”.
It is important to stress that for the first time, universality is not only a 
political goal but a legal obligation imposed on the Member States by the 
Community authorities. Furthermore, “Community law [...] not only imposes 
obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which 
become part of their legal heritage”.532 Even if it seems clear that the mere 
wording of the Directives does not create the right for consumers to require 
operators to provide them access, it creates the right for consumers to claim 
liability to the State for the lack of implementation of the content of the 
Directive. With regard to the implementation by the Member States, many of 
them foresee the imposition of obligations on certain operators for the 
provision of access in certain areas. Such an obligation does not necessarily 
grant to consumers a remedy against such operators, but it certainly imposes 
upon them a liability in case such an obligation is not respected.
530 Article 5(1) of Directive 98/10/EC establishes that “the connection provided shall be capable of 
allowing users to make and receive national and international calls, supporting speech, facsimile and/or 
data communications”.
531 Article 3(1) of Directive 98/10/EC states that ‘‘Member States shall ensure that the services 
[including access to the fixed network] are made available to all users [...] in the light of specific 
national conditions, at an affordable price”.
532 See Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administrate der Belanstingen, Case 26/62, 1963 ECR 1, p. 
12.
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9.3.2. Principles of the Intervention.
196. Subsidiary intervention. It has to be pointed that regulatory 
intervention through the distribution of obligations among the operators can be 
implemented exclusively “if necessary” to the end of ensuring universal access 
to the networks. Article 5(1) of Directive 98/10/EC stresses clearly the 
subsidiary role of public intervention regarding universal access. Such an 
intervention can only take place if operators active in the market do not provide 
such access to all citizens requiring it. If competition in the market ensures the 
satisfaction of the general interest, then public intervention is to be excluded. 
As a matter of fact, a significant number of Member States have considered the 
adoption of a universal service scheme as unnecessary.533
A clear case of over-regulation could be found if a Member State would 
impose on operators obligations regarding access by consumers in a situation in 
which such access was already universally provided by the operators. Such an 
intervention would be contrary to the Directive and therefore an infringement 
procedure could be initiated by the Commission against the Member State.534
Member States have introduced different mechanisms in order to ensure 
the subsidiarity of the intervention. For instance, Spanish legislation foresees 
that the universal service scheme will only be implemented in case the 
competent ministry considers that operators active in the market do not ensure 
the universal provision of access to the network at affordable prices.535 
Furthermore, the ministry will be able to determine the suspension of the 
universal access scheme if it is considered that access is being provided in
533 This was the case of 9 out of the 15 Member States by February 1998, see COM (1998) 101 final, 
First Monitoring Report on Universal Service, 25.2.98.
534 Nevertheless, it has been commonly pointed out that Member States suffer pressures to implement 
universal service schemes for the benefit of particular actors in the market See for instance KELLY, T. 
(1995): “Universal Service -An Instrument for regulatory Capture?”, in “Universal Service Obligations 
in a Competitive Telecoms Environment’, Analysis, Cambridge, pp. 33-44.
535 See Article 20 ROSP.
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competition by operators under similar conditions as those imposed on the 
operator appointed for the provision of access.536
197. Indirect intervention. An other novelty of the new model of public 
intervention introduced by the Community authorities is the indirect character 
of the intervention. Public authorities no longer provide themselves the services 
traditionally considered of public interest. On the contrary, operators in the 
market are in charge of the provision of such services. Initially, operators 
provide access to their networks to consumers as their regular activity in the 
market, following the mechanisms of supply and demand. It has been 
considered that in principle, such mechanisms should ensure the generalised 
provision of access to consumers. In the case where operators refuse to grant 
access to certain consumers due to the lack of economic incentive for such 
provision, the subsidiary mechanism is implemented.
The universal service scheme does not outlaw the direct provision of the 
services considered by the public authorities. Nevertheless such a solution is 
generally discarded for two main reasons. On the one hand, the Directives 
define a complete scheme for the provision of access by the operators. On the 
other hand, even if public authorities would directly provide access, they would 
be subject to all the principles and requirements established by the Community 
legal frameworks, and in particular to the principle of non-discrimination, in 
such a way that no particular advantage could be introduced in favour of the 
public authorities.
The implementation of the universal service scheme in the different 
Member States foresees different procedures for the designation of the 
operators in charge of the provision of the uneconomic access services. Such 
procedures have, in any case, to respect the principles of transparency and non­
536 See Article 3(2) ROSP.
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discrimination. Obligations on access should not distorte the competitive 
process.
On the one hand, universal service obligations should never become an 
excessive burden on an operator which then disadvantages it in the competitive 
process. Therefore, obligations for the uneconomic provision of access should 
not be imposed on new comers struggling to initiate their activities, but on 
established operators for which such an obligation does not impede the regular 
development of their activities. That is why the C om m unity  directives make 
continuous references to the provision of this kind of services by operators with 
significant market power.537 As a matter of fact, most of the Member States 
which have implemented a universal service scheme have opted for the initial 
designation of the incumbent operator for the universal provision of access in 
all the national territory.538
On the other hand, and this might not be so evident, the designation of an 
operator for the provision of uneconomic access services should not benefit 
such an operator and grant it a privileged position in the competitive market.539 
The beneficial effects of the provision of universal services has been widely 
studied.540 Corporate reputation benefits from the provision of uneconomic 
access, as well as brand recognition and marketing, due to ubiquity. Finally, the
537 See for instance Article 13(1) of directive 98/10/EC.
538 This is the case of Spain, where Telefonica was designed by the third Transitory Provision of the 
General Telecommunications Act of 1998 for the universal provision of access to consumers until 
December 31 2005. France Telecom was also charged with this obligation by Article 35(1) of the Act 
on the regulation of telecommunications of 1996. Furthermore, in Denmark Article 6 of the Act on 
Universal Service Obligations requires a nation-wide market share over 50% in a particular market in 
order to impose universal service obligations, and in Austria the operator with a higher market share 
will be the one the one which will suffer the burden if no other operator is interested.
539 See for instance BLACKMAN, C. (1995): “Universal Service: Obligation or Opportunity?”, in 
“Universal Service Obligations in a Competitive Telecoms Environment, Analysis, Cambridge, pp. 1- 
8.
540 Particularly interesting are the studies undertaken in the UK. See Analysys (1995): “'The Cost, 
benefits and Funding of Universal Service in the UK”, OFTEL, London, pp. 8-16; and OFTEL (1995): 
“Universal Telecommunications Services. A Consultative Document on Universal Service in the UK 
from 1997”, OFTEL, London.
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provider has a more complete knowledge of consumers patterns. More decisive 
might be the fact that being designated as universal access provider increases 
the market share of the operator, often at the expense of the other operators 
which finance the provision. This market share might decisively increase the 
efficiency of the operator as it could benefit from the important economies of 
scale which the sector presents. As a result, once new operators acquired a 
more stable position in the market, they could be willing to increase their 
market share through the provision of uneconomic access under the universal 
service scheme.
The automatic designation of the incumbent as the access provider might 
be discriminatory in the sense that it could ensure for it a market share financed 
by the competitors. A sim ilar effect might be the restriction contained in the 
French legislation according to which only those operators who can provide 
universal service throughout the entire territory of the nation can be designated 
for the provision.
The Legislation in some Member States foresees the implementation of 
competitive mechanisms for the designation of the operator in charge of the 
provision of uneconomic access services. In Spain and Germany, for instance, 
tenders will be organised for die designation of the provider.541 In such a way, 
not only* the procedure will be transparent and non-discriminatory as required 
by Directive 98/10/EC, but at the same time the cost of the provision of the 
service is expected to be reduced by the competitive bidding. In case no 
operator shows interest in the provision of the service, the competent ministry 
will impose the obligation on an operator with significant market power in the 
market under consideration.
541 For an evaluation of the use of tenders for the determination of the universal service provider vide 
CAVE, MILNE and SCANLAN (1994) p. 59 {supra footnote 529).
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198. Objective and proportionate intervention. The new model of 
public intervention for the protection of the general interest introduces 
objectivity. The traditional model of direct intervention often did not 
differentiate the mere managing of the service from the measures driven by 
general interest objectives. As a result, it was not necessary to justify the 
general interest involved in a particular action. Broad definitions of the general 
interest were common and no objectively connected schemes were usually 
associated to them.
The indirect intervention of the public authorities required a radical 
reform of the relation between the general interest declarations and the 
measures implemented to protect it. Indirect intervention has forced, on the one 
hand, the precise definition of the objectives considered to be of general 
interest. On the other hand, the measures implemented to ensure the 
satisfaction of the general interest have to be directly linked to the objectives 
promoted and objectively justified.
Even if in the last decades universalisation of the telecommunications 
networks was a common general interest objective in all the Member States, a 
clear definition of the objective was usually lacking. The network standards to 
be ensured in all the territory were not clear, nor the reasonability of the 
demands for access in remote areas. The universal service scheme, on the 
contrary, required the precise definition of the general interest objectives 
regarding access to the network by consumers. Only such definition would 
legitimate the imposition of legal obligations on operators to ensure the 
satisfaction of the general interest.
Which services were to be included under the universal service scheme 
generated one of the most important debates in the process of reform of the 
sector. One party defended that access should only be ensured to a network 
capable of providing the most basic services, those services already mature and 
with a high degree of penetration (around 75%) that is basic telephony and the
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most basic data services such as facsimile.542 The other party advocated for 
ensuring access to a network with broader capabilities in order to promote the 
fast development of the new services of the information society. In such a way, 
network development would proceed ahead of demand.543
Community authorities finally adopted the most restrictive position and 
included under the universal service scheme the obligation for the Member 
States to ensure access to a fixed public telephone network infrastructure of a 
quality which supports in addition to speech, data communications at rates 
suitable for access to on-line information services.544 Nevertheless, the 
Community Directive recognises that “the concept of universal service must 
evolve to keep pace with advances in technology, market developments and 
changes in user demand”, and it was foreseen that a first review of the services 
included under the scheme would take place in 1999.545
Article 4 of Directive 9 8/10/EC established the prohibition for Member 
States to include under the universal service scheme other services considered 
of general interest.544 It did not exclude, however, the creation of parallel 
schemes for those services, as long as in accordance with community Law. 
Some Member States as France or Spain have reacted to the narrow definition 
of the Community authorities by creating such parallel categories and schemes 
of indirect intervention. In this way, services not included in the Community 
category of universal service, can be the objet of a similar parallel regime.
542 This was the position of most of the operators and some Member States, led by the UK. See for 
instance Analysys (1997): “The future of Universal Service in telecommunications in Europe”, 
European Commission, Brussels.
543 Some Member States led by France as well as the trade unions promoted the inclusion of ISDN 
networks or access to Internet under the universal service scheme.
544 See recital 4 and Article 5(2) of Directive 98/10/EC.
545 See recital 1 and Article 31 of Directive 98/10/EC.
546 Some Member States, however, have included other services. This is the case of Belgium, where
tariff discounts granted to journalists and the Belgium agency have been pointed out by the Fourth
Report on implementation as being not in conformity with the EU framework In Italy, financing for
research might also be included.
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Regarding the obligations imposed on the operators, they have to be 
objectively linked to the satisfaction of the general interest objective precisely 
defined by the public authorities. Furthermore, the obligations imposed on the 
operators have to be proportionate to the general interest objectives pursued by 
the public authorities.
One of the most important novelties introduced by indirect intervention is 
the need to evaluate the cost for the operator of the obligations related to the 
general interest objectives. As it happened with interconnection, the cost 
allocation is particularly difficult in the telecommunications industry.547 As it is 
stated by Article 4 of Directive 98/10/EC, operators have to specify the 
elements for which funding is requested. Directive 97/33/EC further develops 
the mechanisms established to ensure the proportionality of the obligations 
imposed on the operators and the costs of such obligations. Annex III of the 
latest directive states that “the cost of universal service obligations shall be 
calculated as the difference between the net cost for an organisation of 
operating with the universal service obligations and operating without the 
universal service obligations”.54*
Important divergences can be observed in those Member States where the 
costs of the provision of universal services has been evaluated.545 Even if in 
every case the cost was below 6% of the revenues of the incumbent operator 
(usually in charge of the provision of the service), some Member States like 
France or the Netherlands fixed the cost at around 5.5% of the revenues of the
547 For an analysis of the difficulties faced regarding the determination of the costs of universal service 
obligations vide CAVE, MILNE and SCANLAN (1994), pp. 27-43 (supra footnote 529); and NEU, 
STUMPF, NETT and SCHMIDT (1997): “Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations in a 
Competitive Telecommunications Environment in the European Union”, European Commission, 
Brussels.
548 The Commission provided some guidelines to the Member States in COM(96) 608, Commission 
Communication on Assessment Criteria for National Schemes for the Costing and Financing of 
Universal Service in Telecommunications and Guidelines for the Member States on Operation of such 
Schemes, 27.11.96, Brussels.
549 See First Monitoring Report p. 32
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incumbent, while the UK fixed it at around 1% and Spain at around 3%. It is 
hard to understand how the universal service costs are higher in the 
Netherlands, with its very propitious geography and high penetration values, 
than they are in Spain where important geographic difficulties are faced, and 
the penetration rate is significantly under the EU average.
In the French case, the financial burden impose on the new comers might 
become a substantial barrier to entry according to the Commission,550 which 
initiated a formal procedure against France in the Autumn of 1997 regarding 
the universal service scheme. New comers criticised the methodology used to 
calculate the net cost, as the market benefits which accrue to FT as the 
universal service operator might have not been fully taken into account. As a 
result, the costs for the provision of universal service by France Telecom were 
fixed in FF 4,8 billion for 1997 (5.5% of FT revenues on fixed telephony) and 
FF 6 billion for 1998 (7.3% of FT revenues). Despite the fact that measures on 
tariff re-balancing reduced the cost for 1999 to FF 3 billion, the Commission 
continued the procedure and sent a reasoned opinion.551
199. Non-discrimination. A further requirement of the regulatory 
intervention for the protection of the general interest, and in particular with 
regard to the promotion of universal access to the telecommunications 
networks by consumers, is the non-discrimination between operators. Such a 
requirements is defined by Article 5(1) of Directive 97/33/EC and Article 3(1) 
of Directive 98/10/EC. Furthermore, non-discrimination includes also 
neutrality between technologies.
Discrimination can take place through different mechanisms such as the 
designation of the operator in charge of providing the service, which can 
benefit certain operators against other, or impose an excessive burden on a
550 Sec fourth Report, p. 85.
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competitor. In any case, the most delicate issue in the universal service scheme 
is the distribution of the obligations for the financing of the provision of the 
service.
Firstly, the obligation to provide universal access in a particular area can 
impose a burden on the designed operator and hinder its competitiveness. This 
will not always be the case, as the provision of universal access might have a 
very reduced cost and, as it was shown earlier, the provider of such an access 
obtains intangible benefits which might counterbalance the costs faced. In any 
case, if the provision of the service is an excessive burden which distorts 
competition in the market, the Community Directives require the introduction 
of measures devoted to the elimination of the distortion
Community directives consider appropriate the distribution of the 
economic burden among the competitors, in such a way that none of them is 
benefited or damaged by the public intervention. This is not the only solution, 
as it might also be possible for the public authority to provide directly the 
financing for the provision of the uneconomic service. Such a solution, 
nevertheless, is incompatible with the actual trend of reduction in public 
expenditure and with the traditional consideration of the telecommunications 
sector as a revenue making.
In any case, the distribution of the economic burden among the 
competitors has to be non-discriminatory. The Community directives foresee 
two different schemes for the distribution of the burden among competitors. On 
the one hand, it was foresaw the possibility of introducing a supplementary 
charge added to the interconnection charge. Such a possibility seemed better 
adapted to a situation in which the incumbent not only maintains a high market 
share, but also is the main (or even only) provider of universal access. The 
implementation of the system would be more difficult as the market would be
551 See Press release IP/99/494,13.7.99.
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more fragmented as well as the provision of universal access is the 
responsibility of more operators. As a matter of fact, most Member States have 
opted for the second possibility, which consists in the establishment of a 
specific mechanism run by an entity independent from the beneficiaries, which 
would determine the costs of the provision of the service and distribute it 
among the operators, creating a universal service fund.
The first element to determine is the identity of the operators required to 
share the economic burden of universal access. Article of Directive 98/10/EC 
restricts the ambit of the obligation to the “organisations operating public 
telecommunications networks and/or publicly available voice telephony 
services”. The Commission stressed the need to exclude such a burden to 
operators running private networks, or value-added services. Some Member 
States foresee the possibility of temporally excluding some operators from 
contributing in order to promote the introduction of innovative services as well 
as to ensure the promotion of competition.552
The second important element is the determination of the share of the 
burden to be faced by each operator. The Commission has stressed that such 
distribution should not distort investment initiatives and economic efficiency, 
nor impose “double contributions”.553 Furthermore, it has been stated that 
national-schemes should ensure that the criteria chosen to determine the burden 
share of eligible organisations does not have a disproportionate or 
discriminatory effect on particular players”.554 As a result, the burden should be 
distributed according to objective criteria based on the position in the market of
552 In Austria, operators with an annual turnover under ATS 250 million will not be required to 
contribute and a similar rule applies in Belgium. In Germany, only operators with a national market 
share over 4% are bound. In Italy, for instance, only the most successful new comers to the fixed 
telephony market have been forced to participate in the financing of the universal service.
553 See COM (96) 608, p. 17. Double contributions exist when operators contribute directly for the 
services they provide and indirectly through the payments made for services provided to them (such as 
leased limes).
iS* Ibid.
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the operators. Indicators such as revenues, call minutes, number of subscribers- 
or market share were proposed by the Commission.555
200. Transparency. The latest requirement imposed by the Community 
directives on the universal service schemes implemented by the Member States 
is transparency. Such a requirement is introduced in order to ensure the 
efficacity of the other requirements such as objectivity, proportionality and 
non-discrimination. Since most of the decisions regarding the scheme are 
highly discretionary, it is necessary to allow operators, as well as consumers, to 
control that soundness of the decision-making process. Community directives 
impose not only the principle,554 but also specific obligations related to 
transparency.
Firstly, even if the cost of the provision of universal access is to be 
calculated by each operator suffering it, the calculation has to be audited by an 
independent body, approved by the national regulatory authority, and made 
available to interested parties.557 Secondly, when such costs are to be shared, the 
principles governing the distribution of the burden and the details of the 
mechanism used are also to be made available to the interested parties.558 
Finally, an annual report has to be published by the national regulatory 
authorities giving the calculated cost of universal service obligations and 
identifying the contributions made by all the parties involved.559
The national universal services schemes had to be communicated to the 
Commission according to Article 3 of Directive 96/19/EC, so that Community
555 In Austria, for instance, the criteria is the market share, in Belgium the operators’ turnover in the 
particular market
556 See Article 5(1) of Directive 97/33/EC and Article 3(1) of Directive 98/10/EC.
557 See Articles5(3) and 14(2) of Directive 98/10/EC.
558 See Articles 5(5) and 14(2) of Directive 98/10/EC.
559 See Article 5(5) of Directive 98/10/EC.
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authorities would have the chance to verify the compatibility of the drafts with 
the Treaty.
9.4. CONCLUSIONS.
201. Different market structures. Public intervention regarding network 
access has necessarily to take into account that such access might take place in 
markets with decisive structural differences. Public intervention should be 
adapted to such differences in order to avoid distortive results which not only 
do not effectively ensure the satisfaction of the general interest but actually 
obstruct its obtention.
The process of the liberalisation of the European telecommunications 
markets consists in the substitution of the traditionally publicly ruled activities 
by private initiative governed by the mechanisms of competition. This is the 
leading principle of the reform and it should always inform public intervention 
in the market. Nevertheless, it has to be taken into account that the particular 
characteristics of the telecommunications sector do not always ensure the 
efficacity of the constraints of competition.
Firstly, on certain occasions effective competition is excluded from the 
market. Two are the fundamental cases in which this happens. On the one hand, 
it has been analysed that the provision of access in some remote areas might 
not be economically interesting for any operator. In this case, no market exists, 
and public intervention has to ensure the availability of the most basic 
telecommunications services. On the other hand, it is sometimes the case that in 
a particular market segment a very reduced number of operators might provide 
network access to consumers, maybe only one, as the traffic generated by the 
consumers does not ensure the recovery of the costs generated to a significant 
number of operators. In such a case, no effective competition is possible, or 
even potential. Public intervention might be then necessary in order to exclude
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exploitative practices against consumers, but also exclusionary practices 
against competitors requiring access to the network for the provision of their 
services.
Secondly, in some markets there is room for competition and in fact the 
elimination of the exclusive rights has allowed new comers to start developing 
their networks. Nevertheless, it has already been pointed that the installation of 
networks with full coverage requires time. So effective competition will only 
be present in some markets after a period of a number of years. In the 
meantime, the incumbent can abuse its market power and impose exploitative 
as well as exclusionary practices. Public authorities have to take into account 
that this is supposed to be a temporary situation and that intervention 
implemented to speed up the emergence of competition should never obstruct 
the development of competition in the market.
Finally, in some network markets effective competition appeared as soon 
as exclusive rights were banned. Public intervention has to be then conscious of 
its subsidiary role, avoid pervasive intervention, and limit itself to the regular 
intervention devoted to obstruct behaviours aimed at eliminating competition 
from the market.
202. No competitive markets. Regulation seems particularly necessary in 
order -to ensure the universal availability of network access in the whole 
territory of the Union at an affordable price. As it has been shown, it might not 
always be necessary to implement the scheme foreseen by the Community 
directives, for it might be the case that in a particular moment operators are in 
the position to provide universally access to the networks considered of general 
interest under the constraints of competition. In any case, such schemes have to 
be maintained, even if not implemented, as modifications in market conditions 
which occur or the evaluation of services considered of general interest might 
change.
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The ONP framework provides a scheme which ensures on the one hand 
effectivity and on the other guarantees its procompetitive character. The 
scheme provides enough mechanisms so that Member States can ensure the 
universality of access. Such is the case of the possibility of imposing on the 
operators as obligation to provide access in uneconomic conditions. At the 
same time, the leading principles of the ONP framework, proportionality, non­
discrimination and transparency, obstruct the implementation of policies which 
distort the competitive process.
203. ONP and permanent regulation. Just as there are situations in 
which no operator might be interested in the provision of access given how 
uneconomic it would be, there are situations in which only one operator might 
provide such an access. This is the situation of those network elements which 
are to be considered essential facilities by the rules on competition, that is, 
those facilities for which duplication is not considered viable due to legal, 
physical or economic conditions.
In any case, the network elements for which duplication, and therefore 
competition is not possible are nowadays exceptional, due to de- 
monopolisation, technical evolution, and the eclosion of traffic generated by 
the Information Society. As a result, any public intervention devoted to impose 
constraints regarding access to such network elements should be based in a 
fnmly justified determination of the lack of potential competition in the market.
One again, the ONP framework provides mechanisms in order to 
substitute the constraints of competition by constraints imposed by public 
authorities. As in the case of creation of the market, the ONP framework has 
the tendency to be at the same time effective and procompetitive. Once again, 
public intervention might not always be necessary under these conditions, as 
operators might, by different reasons, not abuse of it  Nevertheless, 
mechanisms of subsidiary intervention will be necessary in order to ensure that
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factual monopolist do not implement exploitative practices nor exclusionary 
strategies. Furthermore, such mechanisms should be of a permanent character, 
as the market structure cannot be expected to evolve over time.
204. Competitive markets. The elimination of the exclusive right for 
the installation of telecommunications infrastructures has allowed hundreds of 
new operators all over Europe to initiate the installation of their own 
infrastructures. Most network segments are being duplicated and in the most 
interesting market segments a significant number of parallel networks is being 
developed. As a result, it is difficult to argue that, in general, 
telecommunications infrastructures are essential facilities or, in other words, 
markets in which there is no room for effective competition.
Due to the subsidiary character of the regulatory framework on network 
access, the application of such rules in competitive markets should be 
excluded, as the regular mechanisms of competition should already impose the 
necessary constraints on the operators for the provision of access at fair 
conditions.
Nevertheless, the development of competition in most of the 
infrastructures markets will take time, as the installation of comprehensive 
networks requires a significant amount of time. In this situation public 
intervention might not be indispensable, as the regular mechanisms of the 
market would ensure the emergence of effective competition. However, it has 
been considered that public intervention would accelerate the emergence of 
competition and at the same time ensure the immediate protection of the 
general interest in the transitory period.
205. ONP and effective competition. As it has been studied, the 
regulatory framework on network access has as its main objective the 
imposition on operators of the constraints which effective competition would 
impose on them. Nevertheless, in some network markets effective competition
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appeared as soon as the exclusive rights were eliminated, as they were 
particularly profitable and the infrastructures could be easily installed (I some 
cases alternative infrastructures existed even before liberalisation). This is the 
case of the main segments of the backbone networks.
In those markets, the constraints imposed by public authorities are 
redundant and therefore unnecessary. Furthermore, such constraints easily 
distort competition in the market, as they impose burdens on certain categories 
of operators to the benefit of those operators who do not suffer the intervention. 
In this way efficiency is not always rewarded and inefficient operators might 
survive in the market
The Community regulatory framework foresees the possibility for the 
Member States to exclude the application of the regulatory obligation in those 
markets were effective competition exists, as well as the appropriateness of 
such exclusion. Nevertheless, no regulatory mechanisms are imposed by the 
directives on the Member States to ensure that such exclusion takes place as 
competition emerges. As a conclusion, the Community regulatory framework 
lacks an efficient mechanism for the elimination of unnecessary regulation on 
network access and to ensure the innexistence of over-regulation.
206. Transitory regulation. More complicated is the situation in those 
markets in which even if there is space for network competition, it will take a 
significant period to emerge as the installation faces difficulties for different 
reasons (significant investments, access to rights of way etc.) or just requires 
time in order to become comprehensive.
Regulation in these markets has faced a complicated option. On the one 
hand, access could be facilitated in order to promote the provision of services 
by operators without infrastructures. In this way, consumers would promptly 
notice the reform of the sector as they would have a significant number of 
service providers at their disposal. Nevertheless, in such a way network
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competition would be disadvantaged as investments in the installation of 
networks would not be as profitable. As a consequence, effective competition 
in the network markets could be delayed and even obstructed by the regulatory 
obligations on access.
On the other hand, the option could have been not to excessively facilitate 
access by competitors in order to promote investments in infrastructures. 
Effective competition in such markets would have ensured competition also in 
the service markets. In this case, however, the effects of competition would 
have been delayed in time, as consumers would have only noticed the effects of 
the reform years after the de-monopolisation.
The Community authorities, followed later by the national authorities, 
opted for an intermediate approach. Even if access by services providers was 
facilitated, the objective has been to leave enough space for the investment in 
parallel infrastructures.
In any case, the Commission’s proposals for the reform of the 
telecommunications directives foresees specific mechanisms for elimination of 
regulation on access as competition emerges and imposes effective pressure on 
all the operators. NRAs would be forced to analyse the markets and in case 
such effective competition is identified, regulatory obligations should be lifted.

CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSIONS: FROM REGULATION TO 
COMPETITION?
SUMMARY: 10.1. Introduction. 10.2.
Complementarity relationships. 10.3. Counter­
balance relationships. 10.4. Conclusions.
10.1. INTRODUCTION.
207. Public intervention in liberalised markets. The process of 
liberalisation has put an end to the public monopoly, the traditional instrument 
of public intervention in general interest sectors. De-monopolisation and 
privatisation, \ nevertheless, do not eliminate the relevance of 
telecommunications and other network industries for the general well-being 
and the economic development of modem societies.
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As a consequence, it has been necessary to substitute direct intervention 
by new instruments of public intervention compatible with the competition in 
the market whilst at the same time being effective in the protection of the 
general interest.
From this perspective, the rules on competition provided mechanisms to 
ensure consumer welfare as well as the protection of the competitive character 
of the markets. However, such rules do not seem fitted to ensure the 
satisfaction of those general interest objectives which go further than mere 
efficiency in the provision of products or services. At the same time, the rules 
on competition have been designed to protect competition, but not to create it.
As a consequence, other instruments of public intervention were needed. 
Economic regulation was the answer. Economic regulation can be understood 
as the continuous and concentrated control of the market by public authorities 
through the imposition of legal obligations on the private operators, according 
to their position in the market, in adaptation of the abstract obligations defined 
by the Legislator, with the objective of ensuring the adaptation of the 
functioning of the markets to the general interest objectives.
It has been shown that both the rules on competition and sector specific 
regulation provide mechanisms for public intervention to ensure access to the 
telecommunications networks to promote competition as well as to ensure the 
universal provision of the most basic telecommunications services. It has been 
shown at the same time, though, that the application of both instruments 
involves limitations as well as risks. The adequate and balanced co-ordination 
of both mechanisms could, on the one hand, overcome the limitations of each 
instrument, and in this way ensure the effectivity of public intervention, and, on 
the other hand, elude the risks derived from failures in the enforcement of each 
instrument of intervention.
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208. Complementarity. Competition Law and sector specific regulation 
can complement each other in order to ensure the effectivity of public 
intervention as regards network access. Such complementarity derives from the 
different nature of both instruments, which entails different mechanisms of 
intervention. At the same time, complementarity is favoured by the fact that 
sector specific regulation on access was somehow inspired by the structure and 
the principles of the rules on competition regarding abuses of dominant 
position.560
On the one hand, the ONP framework complements the rules on 
competition dealing with network access. Firstly, the ONP framework expands 
the obligations defined by the essential facilities doctrine to situations in which 
such doctrine cannot be applied as some competition, even if not effective 
competition, is possible in the market. It even expands the application of such 
principles to operators that cannot even be considered in a dominant position. 
Secondly, the ONP framework provides regulatory mechanisms of intervention 
which go further than the competition Law mechanisms. Such mechanisms not 
only ensure the efficacity of the regulatory framework, they also ensure the 
efficacity of the rules on competition, as they provide the necessary tools and 
information in order to apply it.
On the other hand, the rules on competition complement the ONP 
framework. The nature of regulatory intervention generates the apparition of 
loopholes in the intervention. Firstly, the ex ante definition of the broad 
regulatory obligations makes possible the existence of conflicts that were never 
foreseen by the regulators. Secondly, the adaptation of the broad obligations to 
the specific conditions of each operator can be obstructed by different reasons 
(capture of the regulator, lack of resources etc.). As a result, the regulatory 
framework on network access might not provide a precise solution in a
560 Vide supra Chapter 9.2.3. Compulsory Access.
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particular conflict. The different nature of the rules on competition, based on 
horizontal, very broad prohibitions, ensure the existence of a “safety network” 
for those occasions in which regulation fails to obstruct anticompetitive 
behaviours.
209. Counter balance. The interaction between the rules on competition 
and the sector specific regulation not only ensures that they complement each 
other, but also allows them to counterbalance some of the negative tendencies 
that can be identified in their application to network access conflicts.
The very same existence of the sector specific regulation on network 
access counterbalances the already discussed regulatory tendency of the 
European rules on competition. The ONP framework provides mechanisms to 
ensure access that avoid the need for the rules on refusal to deal to be over­
stretched and denaturalised.
As the ONP framework has taken the lead as the main instrument of 
intervention regarding network access, and given that it is well known the 
tendency of regulation to expand, the most important counterbalance role is for 
the rules on competition. Competition Law, particularly Community 
competition Law, provides mechanisms for the obstruction of public measures 
which obstruct competition in the market. Article 86 of the EC Treaty (former 
art. 90) and the effet util doctrine developed by the Commission and the ECJ 
allow the Commission to intervene against State measures of a regulatory 
character which obstruct competition.
10.2. COMPLEMENTARITY RELATIONSHIPS.
10.2.1. Regulation complements antitrust.
210. GeneraL As it has been pointed out, the ONP framework was 
launched by the European Commission following the principles embedded in
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the essential facilities doctrine as originally received in Europe, and in 
particular, non-discrimination. It is interesting to note how the most important 
regulatory intervention in the telecoms industry, network access, has been 
somehow transplanted from the US through the irregular path of competition 
Law. This fact determines the relation between both instruments of 
intervention.
The ONP framework has been developed as a complement to the rules on 
competition, in order to ensure mechanisms of intervention for those cases in 
which competition Law was not applicable and, furthermore, in order to 
provide more powerful mechanisms even for those cases in which the rules on 
competition were applicable. The structure of the antitrust figure of abuse of 
dominant position has been transplanted to the regulatory framework through 
the definition of the category of operator with significant market power, and 
the imposition of asymmetric regulatory obligations as regards access to the 
operators with such power. The Commission’s proposals after the 99 Review 
confirm this analysis.
As a result, the ONP framework has advanced the line of intervention 
with regard to network access, but in general, such a line runs in parallel to the 
line drawn by the rules on competition. The regulatory obligations on network 
access expand the obligations imposed by the rules on competition as 
interpreted by the Commission to a wider category of operators. At the same 
time., the regulatory framework defines with more detail the content of such 
obligations. In such a way, the efficiency not only of the regulatory framework, 
but also of the antitrust rules, has been increased.
211. Access to essential facilities. The essential facilities doctrine, as 
interpreted by the ECJ, provides a mechanism for imposing the obligation on 
an operator to provide access to its network with no-discriminatory
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conditions.561 The exceptional character of such an obligation, however, 
required a regulatory complement.
Firstly, the complexity of the network industries complicates the 
comparison of the access conditions and, therefore, the evaluation of their non- 
discriminatory character. Regulatory obligations imposed ex ante can facilitate 
such an evaluation. This is the case of the obligation to implement accounting 
separation between different activities, as well as the obligation to respect 
certain accounting principles that ensure the transparency of the accounting. As 
a conclusion, the application of the essential facility doctrine would be 
obstacled without these regulatory obligations. As a matter of fact, the 
Commission stated in the Access Notice that it would apply the competition 
rules building on the ONP directives,562 and that the Commission 
recommendations concerning accounting requirements and transparency will 
help to ensure the effective application of Article 86 [now article 82]”.563
Secondly, the mere proscription of the refusal to grant access is not 
sufficient, as the lack of competition does not allow the market mechanisms 
subsequently to determine the access conditions. As a result, further 
mechanisms of intervention are necessary in order to ensure network access. 
The rules on competition do not provide mechanisms for the prescription, in 
case of' lack of agreement, of the access conditions. Competition Law 
proscribes anticompetitive behaviours, but is not supposed to prescribe the 
behaviour of the operators in the market. Furthermore, even in case a 
competition authority would be tempted to adopt such a regulatory role, it 
would face the difficulties derived from the lack of mechanisms for the
561 Vide supra Chapter 8.5. Refusals to Grant Network Access.
562 See Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector. Framework, relevant markets and principles, OJ 1998 C 26512, of 22.8.98, 
para. 24.
563 Ibid Access Notice, para. 116.
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continuous control of the markets and the adaptation of the conditions to the 
new circumstances.
As a consequence, the essential facilities doctrine provides an antitrust 
mechanism to obstruct an anticompetitive behaviour, but it cannot by itself 
resolve all the potential conflicts on network access, and for this reason, a 
complement of the regulatory framework is necessary.
212. Access to non-essential facilities. The complementative role of the 
regulatory framework on network access is even more important with regard to 
non-essential facilities. Regulatory obligations on access can be imposed in 
relation to bottlenecks which cannot be considered essential facilities and, 
furthermore, on non-dominant operators.
As was shown following the most recent decisions of the Community 
Courts, the most aggressive intervention on network access based on the 
essential facilities doctrine is restricted to very exceptional cases. Access to the 
telecommunications networks can not be granted as a general competition rule 
to the non-essential telecommunications facilities.564 Regulation, nevertheless, 
is more flexible and the ONP framework foresees the expansion of the 
interconnection and access obligations to network facilities that under no 
concept can be considered essential, that is, unavoidably monopolised. At the 
same time, access obligations are imposed not only on dominant operators, but 
also on operators with significant market power, a category that includes 
operators that under no circumstance could ever be considered dominant under 
the rules on competition. The new regulatory framework proposed by the 
Commission eliminates this category but, somehow, opens the door for a 
regulatory strategy against oligopolistic structures in the telecommunications 
markets.
564 Vide supra Chapter 8.4. The Limitations of Essential Facilities Doctrine.
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The wider ambit of application of the regulatory obligations allows to 
make use of such mechanisms for intervening in situations out-side of the 
scope of the rules on competition. In this way, it is possible for public 
authorities to face the particular challenges of the exceptional transition from 
monopoly to competition. It has been sustained that compulsory access to non- 
essential telecommunications facilities could foster the emergence of 
competition in the services markets.
At the same time, regulatory intervention might be necessary to face the 
oligopolistic market structures which are being created, slowly though, in the 
traditional fixed telephony markets or the new electronic communications 
markets of mobile communications and digital television.
The flexibility of the regulatory mechanisms could allow public 
authorities to intervene in access conflicts related to the existence of 
bottlenecks which might not be essential facilities, or even might not grant a 
dominance according to competition Law standards, but which certainly grant a 
market power which could determine the evolution of the telecommunications 
markets.
213. The case of mobile communications. This is the case, for instance, 
of the market power of the mobile operators against the biggest number of 
fixed operators regarding call termination in mobile networks, particularly in 
the framework of convergence between fixed and mobile communications. 
Even if the rules on competition provide mechanisms to obstruct collusive 
agreements and foresee the existence of collective dominance, regulatory 
mechanisms have proved more effective in order to obstruct distorsive 
behaviours of mobile operators.
Article 7(2) of Directive 97/33/EC allows NRAs to declare mobile 
network operators as with Significant Market Power in the national 
interconnection markets, and as a consequence, be covered by the regulatory
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obligations on cost-orientation and cost accounting.565 NRAs such as the Italian 
AGCOM566 and the French ART567 declared with Significant Market Power in 
the interconnection market not only the leader (which in the Italian case would 
clearly have been considered dominant under the antitrust standards) but also 
the second mobile operator (which in the Italian case had a mere 18% market 
share in the interconnection market and around 25% in the mobile market).
The Italian case is particularly interesting, as the intervention of the NRA 
was followed days later by the intervention of the Italian competition authority 
(AGCM) in order to put an end to a collusive agreement between TIM and 
Omnitel for the price-fixing of termination prices.56® A very important sanction 
was imposed as a result of the anticompetitive behaviour, but the competition 
authority refrained from adopting a regulatory approach and no obligation to 
follow determined prices was adopted. The determination of the pricing criteria 
was left for the NRA, which had adopted the decision to impose cost-oriented 
prices just some weeks before.
The new regulatory framework proposed by the Commission allows for 
the adaptation of the regulatory intervention to the specific characteristics of 
each product and geographic market. In case a market analysis leads to the 
individuation of a market failure in a specific market, regulatory intervention 
will be possible. This flexibility avoids some of the problems of the 
liberalisation regulatory framework, which was rather rigid, as it was mostly 
designed for the regulation of access to the incumbent’s fixed telephony 
network.
565 See the document published by DGXQI on 1“ March 1999, “Determination of Organisations with 
Significant Market Power (SMP) for implementation of ONP Directives”, as well as the considerations 
of OFTEL (1998): “Identification of Significant Market Power for the Purposes of the Interconnection 
Directive”.
566 Decision no. 197/99 of AGCOM of 7 September 1999.
567 Decision no. 99-823 of the ART of 30 September 1999.
564 Decision in die case 1372, TIM-OMNITEL Tariffe fisso-mobile, of 28 September 1999.
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214. Universal service. The rules on competition provide mechanisms for 
the protection of the competitive process in the market, and in Europe, even for 
the imposition of certain positive behaviours in the market. Nevertheless, it has 
been pointed out that competition Law lacks the mechanisms to impose the 
provision of a service in case such service is not profitable for the provider. 
The rules on competition do not create markets where there are no conditions 
for their existence. As a result, such rules cannot ensure all citizens access to 
the most basic services.
This does not mean that such an objective is incompatible with the rules 
on competition. On the contrary, the protection of the competitive process has 
as its ultimate goal the promotion of consumer welfare, as competition lowers 
prices and fosters the providers’ efforts to meet the consumers’ demands. 
Furthermore, some of the mechanisms established by the rules on competition 
(such as excessive pricing) directly protect consumer welfare. As a 
consequence, whilst the rules on competition do not ensure access to 
telecommunications networks and services, they do promote it.
The ONP framework has introduced a complement to the rules on 
competition in order to provide mechanisms which give this further step and 
not only foster but ensure citizens access to the network through the direct 
imposition of obligations. It is important to note, though, that these obligations 
create a market which otherwise would not exist, and respect the fundamental 
rules governing supply and demand in the market. The universal service 
scheme, in principle, is not an exception to the market, but an intervention to 
complement it, respecting its basic laws.
10.2.2. Antitrust complements regulation.
215. The role of antitrust The Access Notice recognises that the 
application of the regulatory mechanisms established by the ONP framework
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would often exclude the need to apply the competition rules on refusal to deal. 
The more detailed content of the regulatory framework on network access and 
the more powerful mechanisms of intervention established by the Directives 
should initially be enough to ensure the satisfaction of the general interest. As 
stated by the Commission “the proper application of these rules should often 
avoid the need for the application of the competition rules”.569
Nevertheless, the rules on competition might play an important role in 
relation to network access as a “safety network” for thoSe occasions where the 
regulatory framework does not ensure the obstruction of anticompetitive 
refusals to grant access.
216. Filling loopholes. The very same nature of regulation favours the 
existence of loopholes. There are two main reasons for this. On the one hand, 
regulatory obligations are defined ex ante (it can be the case that the regulatory 
intervention takes place as a conflict resolution, that is, ex post, but the 
attribution of the competence to solve the conflict as well as the criteria to 
solve the conflict have to be established ex ante). As a result, there might be 
conflicts which are not foreseen and for which no solution is provided. On the 
other hand, regulatory obligations often have to be adapted to the specific 
circumstances of each operator in the market. Different reasons might obstruct 
such an adaptation and therefore eliminate the efficacity of the general 
regulatory framework.
Loopholes in the regulatory framework are particularly probable in the 
telecommunications regulatory framework, and particularly with regard to 
network access.570 The high complexity of the market and the lack of 
experience in de-monopolised markets causes uncertainty. Furthermore, the
569Vide Access Notice, para. 58 (supra footnote 562).
570 See MARTÍNEZ LAGE, and BROKELMANN (2000): “The Respective Roles of Sector Specific 
Regulation and Competition Law and the Institutional Implications”, in “European Competition Law 
Annual 1998. Regulating Communications Markets”, Ehlermann and Gossling Ed., Hart, pp. 637-665.
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telecommunications market is characterised by its fast evolution. The 
regulatory framework might become outdated at a fast speed as technologic 
progress and market evolution modify the reality under regulation.
This seems to be the case in relation to the tendency towards 
convergence. Technological evolution is creating new requirements of access 
firstly between different telecommunications networks (fixed and mobile, for 
example) and secondly between telecommunications, broadcasting and 
computer networks.
As a matter of fact, one of the leading principles of the reform of the ONP 
framework in the 99 Review process was the desire to establish wide principles 
in order to avoid being outdated in the short term. The Commission proposal to 
establish regular mechanisms of definition of the markets in which intervention 
is necessary will reduce the loopholes. In any case, there will always be new 
conflicts not foreseen by the regulatory framework.
In many occasions, the regulatory framework requires an active 
intervention of the public authorities in order to ensure its efficacity. Such is 
the case, for instance, of the intervention to solve access disputes. Even if the 
ONP framework foresees a solution to a particular conflict, it might be the case 
that the implementation of the solution faces obstacles that finally exclude the 
efficacity of the solution foreseen. The complexity of the conflicts, or the mere 
lack of resources of the national authorities in charge of the implementation of 
the ONP framework, might lead to a mistaken application of the regulatory 
rules on access, or even to no intervention from the national authorities.571
571 In some Member States market players have denounced that the NRA have insufficient powers 
(such seems to be the case of Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Germany, Denmark, Austria or Portugal), 
while in other States it has been common the criticism that NRAs do not make the most of its ability in 
exercising all fee powers assigned to them (for instance in the UK, Sweden or Spain). See COM(99) 
537, of 11 November 1999, “Fifth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Package”, p. 15.
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Furthermore, the phenomenon of regulatory capture has been well 
studied. Regulatory authorities suffer necessarily major pressures from the 
actors involved in the regulatory process. As regulatory authorities are usually 
independent authorities in close connection to the regulated industry, they are 
particularly prone to be “captured” by certain factions of the industry and might 
be forced to ignore the regulatory framework. The political weakness of most 
of the NRAs often allows the national champions to obstruct the activity of the 
regulators even through pressures by other governmental bodies such as the 
competent Ministries or directly by the political parties which often have a 
closed control of the NRAs.
217. Antitrust as a “safety network”. The rules on competition can 
complement the regulatory framework on network access filling the loopholes 
that might exist. The horizontal and general nature of the rules on competition 
allow public authorities to intervene even against anticompetitive behaviours 
which had been never foreseen by the authorities. At the same time, the 
different level of government reduces the possibilities of capture both of the 
national regulatory authorities and the competition authorities at a national and 
at a Community level.
As a matter of fact, the Commission, in the Access Notice foresees 
expressly the possibility of the application of the Community competition rules 
to network access conflicts in case national regulatory authorities cannot ensure 
a satisfactory solution in a six months period.
For instance, in 1998 the Commission launched an investigation on the 
interconnection prices between fixed and mobile networks based on the 
Community rules on competition.572 The Commission was particularly concern 
with the high rates for the call termination by mobile operators. Such operators 
are not bound by most of the regulatory obligations unless the National
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Regulatory Authorities declared them with significant market power in their 
national interconnection markets. Without such a declaration or a parallel 
intervention, mobile operators do not have the obligation to adapt prices to 
costs but only not to discriminate.573
The action by the Commission, even if in itself it did not lead to any final 
decision, forced the mobile operators to reduce their termination prices, but 
also the NRAs to initiate investigations for the establishment of more 
permanent solutions. In the same way one can understand the much studied 
intervention of the Italian Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato,574 
which imposed a major sanction on the two leading mobile operators in Italy 
for the collusive agreement co-ordinating mobile telephony prices as well as 
access prices to the their networks.
It has to be pointed out, though, that as it has been shown, the scope of the 
rules on competition is not as wide as the regulatory rules on access. As a 
result, the rules on competition will not always provide an efficient mechanism 
for governing network access in case regulation fails.
10.3. COUNTER-BALANCED RELATIONSHIPS.
10.3.1. Regulation counterbalances antitrust.
218. Denaturalisation of antitrust. The major risk derived from the 
application of the rules on competition to network access conflicts is, as it has
572 See Press release IP/98/707, of 27.7.98.
573 For an analysis of the potential anticompetitive effects in the framework of the fixed-mobile 
convergence see Analysys (1999): “Consumer Demand for Telecommunications Sendees and the 
Implications of the Convergence of Fixed and Mobile Networks for the Regulatory Framework for a 
Liberalised EU Market”, Brussels.
574 Vide supra Chapter 10.2.1 Regulation Complements Antitrust
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been shown, the risk of denaturalisation of such rules.575 European competition 
Law has traditionally tended to adopt a regulatory role against market power. 
Network access issues stress this tendency, as market failures (both permanent 
and transitory) require not only the proscription of anticompetitive refusals to 
deal but also the prescription of access conditions when market mechanisms 
are weak or non existent. The denaturalisation of the rules on competition 
entails important risks, as the solutions for network access conflicts could be 
expanded to other situations of market power based in market driven evolution 
due to the efficiency produced by legitimate competitive advantages.
The very same existence of the ONP regulatory framework reduces the 
risk of denaturalisation. The introduction of specific regulatory mechanisms for 
the solution of the access conflicts eliminates the pressure on competition 
authorities to over-stretch their competencies in order to provide solutions to 
the existing conflicts. As the regulatory framework provides more efficient 
mechanisms for the protection of the general interest, earlier regulatory 
intervention excludes in most of the cases the intervention of the competition 
authorities.
The risk of denaturalisation is not completely eliminated, though, as 
competition authorities might still be tempted to over-stretch the rules they are 
charged with applying in order to expand the reach of their competencies 
against the regulatory authorities or in order to provide solutions to conflicts 
unresolved by the regulatory authorities. Nevertheless, the more efficient the 
regulatory intervention, the smaller the room to manoeuvre left to competition 
authorities will be. As a result, efficient intervention is incentived.
Particularly risky is the early elimination of the existing regulatory 
framework on network access, as well as the lack of regulatory obligations on 
operators of new electronic communications networks which do not suffer the
575 Vide supra Chapter 83 The Adoption of the Essential Facilities Doctrine in Europe.
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pressures of effective competition. In case there is no regulatory framework nor 
effective competition due to the existence of a market failure, the rales on 
competition will be denaturalised in order to face the demand for public 
intervention.
10.3.2. Antitrust counter-balances regulation.
219. Over-regulation. Regulation offers flexible mechanisms for public 
intervention. Such flexibility, nevertheless, entails the risk of over-stretching 
the use of such mechanisms by public authorities in order to ensure the active 
presence of the State in the liberalised markets even if the market failure which 
generated the need to intervene disappeared over the time. The phenomenon of 
over-regulation has been too common in the telecommunications sector/76 and 
has not disappeared after liberalisation. As a matter of fact, the 99 Review of 
the Community regulatory framework is aimed to a great extent at preventing 
the cases of over-regulation detected in some Member States.577
The regulatory framework on network access contains various references 
to the elimination of the superfluous regulation.57* Nevertheless, it is for the 
National Regulatory Authorities to decide whether to eliminate their 
intervention. It seems evident that the regulatory authorities are not the better 
suited to-evaluate the need for their intervention.
The rules on competition apply initially to undertakings active in the 
market and not to public authorities. Nevertheless, different mechanisms have 
evolved which allow the Community competition authorities to evaluate and
576 Vide supra Chapter 2.4.2. The Regulated Monopoly (1921-2000).
577 The proposal to reduce the intervention as regards access to the market through the elimination of 
die Individual License category can only be understood as a reaction against the excesses in some 
Member States where as France, Italy or Spain where complex schemes have been introduced in order 
to main tain certain public control over the operators.
578 Vide supra Chapter 9.1. General Principles.
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obstruct the anticompetitive effects of public measures. As a result, such 
mechanisms are at the disposal of the Commission to counter-balance the 
tendency to over-regulation. The application of Article 82 EC Treaty, through 
the effet util doctrine, as well as Article 86 EC Treaty, allows the Commission 
to initiate procedures against Member States in order to obstruct public 
measures with anticompetitive effects. The Commission has announced its 
intention to apply such mechanisms in case NRA regulate on network access 
with anticompetitive effects.
220. Access Notice. The Access Notice clearly states that “under 
Community Law, national authorities, including regulatory authorities and 
competition authorities, have a duty not to approve any practice or agreement 
contrary to Community competition Law”.579 Furthermore, “the NRAs must 
ensure that actions taken by them are consistent with community competition 
Law. This duty requires them to refrain from action that would undermine the 
effective protection of Community law rights under competition rules. If the 
national authorities act so as to undermine those rights, the Member State may 
itself be liable for damages to those harmed by its action”.580
The Access Notice refers to the competition Law mechanisms in the 
hands of the Commission against anticompetitive practices by the NRAs: “if a 
National Regulatory Authority were to require terms which are contrary to the 
competition rules, [...] the member State itself would be in breach of Article 
3(g) and Article 5 [now Article 10] of the Treaty and therefore, subject to 
challenge by the Commission under Article 169 [now Article 226]. 
Additionally, if an undertaking were required or authorised by a national 
regulator to engage in behaviour constituting an abuse of its dominant position, 
the member State would also be in breach of Article 90(1) [now article 86(1)],
579 Vide Access Notice, para. 13 (supra footnote 562).
580 Vide Access Notice, paia. 19 (supra footnote 562).
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and the Commission could adopt a decision requiring the termination of the 
infringement”.581
221. Article 86. Article 86(1) EC Treaty582 is addressed to the Member 
States and requires them not to adopt any measure contrary to the Treaty rules, 
and in particular to the rules on competition, in favour of public undertakings 
or undertakings with special or exclusive rights.583 Article 86 not only confirms 
the applicability of the rules on competition to public undertakings, but it also 
provides a procedure for the Commission to declare the incompatibility of a 
state measure with the rules on competition, through a Decision or even 
through a Directive.
Article 86 EC Treaty outlaws public intervention in support of 
anticompetitive behaviours of a public undertaking. Such support can take the 
form of a mere assistance for the infringement, or it can encourage the 
anticompetitive behaviour or it can even impose it on the undertaking.
More frequent has been the Commission intervention against State 
measures contrary to Article 86 in relation to Article 82, as the public nature of 
the special or exclusive right often ensured a dominant position to the 
undertaking and the possibility of abusing that position. Particularly interesting 
are the measures related to discriminatory treatment,584 illegitimate extension of
5,1 Vide Access Notice, para. 61 (supra footnote 562).
582 “In die case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or 
exclusive rights, member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the 
rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to those rules provided for in Article 6 and Articles 85 to 
94”.
583 For an evaluation of Article 90 see BLUM and LOGUE (1997): “State Monopolies under EC LaV, 
Wiley, Chichester; BRIGHT, C. (1993): “Article 90, economic policy and the duties of member states”, 
in European Competition Law Review, voL 14, no. 6, pp. 263-272; GARDNER, A. (1995): “The 
Velvet Revolution: Article 90 and the triumph of the Free Market in Europe’s Regulated Sectors”, in 
European Competition Law Review, vol. 16, no. 2, pp 78-86; RODRIGUES, S. (1995): “Comment 
intégrer les principes du service public Hans le droit positif communautaire: quelques propositions”, in 
Revue Française de Droit Administratif, no. 2, pp. 335-342.
584 “A system of undistorted competition, as laid down in the Treaty, can be guaranteed only if 
equallity of opportunity is secured as between the various economic operators”, C-202/88, France v.
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a dominant position,585 cross-subsidies,586 and inability to meet demand.587 
Nevertheless, intervention is also possible with regard to the infraction of 
Article 86 in relation to Article 81, in cases where public undertakings were 
engaged in collusive agreements.588
In such a way, regulatory intervention affecting the telecom operators 
controlled by public authorities (and it is the case of some of the leading 
operators in Europe, such as France Telecom and Deutsche Telekom), as well 
as those operators which still enjoy exclusive or special rights (for instance the 
case of Telefonica, which has an special right for the provision of cable 
television services), are bound to the scrutiny of the Commission, which can 
adopt a Decision or a Directive in order to obstruct the anticompetitive 
measure.
222. Effet util. The EC Treaty does not contain a parallel provision to 
Article 86 imposing on Member States the obligation not to adopt 
anticompetitive measures in favour of private undertakings without exclusive 
or special rights. Nevertheless, the ECJ and the Commission have developed 
the effet util doctrine589 that imposes a similar obligation. Member States 
contravene the general obligation not to obstruct the fulfilment of the 
objectives defined in the EC Treaty defined in Article 10(2) EC Treaty if they 
adopt measures which obstruct the effectiveness of Articles 3(g), 81 and 82, 
which contain the rules on competition. As a result, the Commission can 
initiate an infringement procedure (Article 226 EC Treaty).
Commission, [1991] ECR 1-1223, para 51; and Commission Decision of 18 December 1996, GSM 
Spain, OJ 1997 L .76/19, para. 19.
585 See C-18/88 RTTv. GB, [1991] ECR 1-5941.
586 SeeT-77/95, French delivery services, [1997] ECRII-1.
587 See C-41/90, Hofner, [1991] ECR 1-1979.
588 This was the case in C-393/92, Almelo, [1994] ECR 1477, and Commission Decision of 16 January 
1991, IJsselcentrale, OJ 1991 L28/32.
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As it was stated by the ECJ: “[...] Member States may not enact measures 
enabling private undertakings to escape from the constraints imposed by 
articles 85 to 94 of the Treaty. At all events, Article 86 [now art. 82] prohibits 
any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position, even if such 
abuse is encouraged by a national legislative provision. In any case, a national 
measure which has the effect of facilitating the abuse of a dominant position 
capable of affecting trade between member states will generally be 
incompatible with articles 30 and 34, which prohibit quantitative restrictions on 
imports and exports and all measures having equivalent effect .590
The application of the effet util doctrine in relation to Article 82 EC 
Treaty has not been common. This is not difficult to understand, as it has been 
usually the case that dominant undertakings benefiting from public support for 
the abuse of their position were public undertakings or undertakings with 
special or exclusive rights. In such cases Article 86 EC Treaty provides a more 
efficient procedure. Nevertheless, some precedents exist, as the very same Inno 
v. ATAB.
On the contrary, the application of the effet util doctrine in relation to 
Article 81 EC Treaty has been more common. The ECJ, through its extensive 
case law, has made clear that public administrations cannot impose, reinforce, 
extend or favour collusive agreements,551 nor delegate public functions to 
private operators which allow them to reach the same scope as with a collusive 
agreement.592
589 See GYSELEN, L. (1989): “State action and tfae effectiveiiess of the EEC Treaty’s competítion 
provisions”, in Common Market Law Review, vol. 26, pp. 33-60; V1CIANO, J. (1995): “Libre 
competencia e intervención pública en la economía”, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia.
590 C-13/77, Inno v. ATAB, [1977] ECR 2115, para 33-35.
591 See C-229/83, Au ble vert, [1985] ECR 1; C-231/83 Cullet v. Leclerc, [1985] ECR 305; C-123/85, 
BNIC v. Clair, [1985] ECR 391; and C-254/87, L 'aigle distnbution, [1988] ECR 4457.
592 See C-267/86, Van Eycke v. ASPA, [1988] ECR 4769.
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The obligation imposed on Member States to ensure the effectiveness of 
the rules on competition contained in the EC Treaty is also applicable to the 
National Regulatory Authorities. The NRAs measures impose, reinforce, 
extend or favour anticompetitve behaviours by the telecommunications 
operators can, therefore, be subject of an Article 226 infringement procedure.
223. Article 82. Both Article 86 and the effet util doctrine provide the 
legal basis for the Commission intervention against measures adopted by the 
National Regulatory Authorities in relation to network access which might be 
contrary to the effectiveness of Article 82 EC Treaty. A tendency for some 
NRAs to protect the national champion, the former monopolist, against 
competition by foreign operators installed in a Member State, can be identified. 
Often, the protection of the incumbent’s interests ensure a better price in the 
privatisation and, therefore, a direct economic benefit for public authorities. In 
many instances such intervention will also be contrary to Article 30 and 59 of 
the EC Treaty.593
The universal service scheme implemented by the NRAs is prone to 
conflict. Universal service has traditionally been the burden that legitimated the 
existence of the exclusive rights. After the de-monopolisation, universal service 
might legitimate discriminatory measures for the benefit of the incumbent. 
Even if initially it might seem that universal service is a burden, it might not be 
so if regulatory authorities ensure a sufficient level of finance by competitors. 
At the same time, the provision of universal service provides certain benefits 
such as the obtention of economies of scale, brand recognition ubiquity etc.
The automatic appointment of the incumbent as the operator in charge of 
the universal provision of the basic services594 might not be justified when new
593 Vide supra MARTÍNEZ LAGE and BROKELMANN (footnote 570) for the conflicts on digital 
satellite television.
594 Vide supra Chapter 9.1. General Principles.
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comers reach a certain point of maturity and are in the position to provide such 
services. At the same time, the provision of an excessive burden of new comers 
for the financing of the service395 might obstruct their development at the same 
time that it might provide an exaggerated income to the operator in charge of 
the provision of the services. In such cases, Article 82 EC Treaty in relation to 
Article 86 or to Articles 5(2) and 3(g), could be breached as a state measure 
would distort the necessary equality of opportunity for all the operators. As a 
result, the incumbent dominant position would be strengthened.596 As a matter 
of fact, the Commission initiated a procedure against the French Republic for 
the excessive burden imposed by the universal service scheme.
The definition by NRAs of network access condition for bilateral 
contracts between operators might also breach Article 82. The different 
regulatory mechanisms in the hands of the NRAs allow them to determine 
important elements of network access contracts such as price and technical 
conditions, particularly in case of lack of agreement between the operators.597 
The conditions defined by the NRA might benefit the dominant operator, as 
they might impose, reinforce, extend or favour abusive behaviours of the 
operator as exclusionary practices which would strengthen the dominant 
position and therefore obstruct the technical evolution and the future quality 
and price of the telecommunications services. For instance, access prices could 
be fixed at a very high level and they could be combined with poor technical 
conditions which would ensure the incumbent the control over the whole 
management of the process (location of the interconnection points, for 
instance). Such measures could be challenged in front of the Commission, as 
they would be contrary to the effectiveness of Article 82 in relation to Article 
86 or Article 5(2) and 3(g).
595 Ibid. for die French case.
596 Vide Commission Decision GSM Spain, p. 26 (supra footnote 584).
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224. Article 81. Equally interesting are the State measures potentially 
incompatible with Article 81 EC Treaty. Liberalisation should lead to the 
gradual disparition of the dominant positions in the telecom markets. 
Nevertheless, regulatory authorities could be tempted to extend the application 
of the regulatory framework on network access. Such intervention could entail 
anticompetitive effects as it might foster collusive agreements between the 
operators.
On the one hand, public intervention on network access might foster 
collusive agreements between the incumbent and the category of new comers 
which has appeared following the traditional structure of the telecom operators, 
in order to obstruct more aggressive competitors.
Many of the new comers share with the incumbent a common network 
architecture and a very similar market philosophy. On the contrary, there are 
other operators, usually smaller, which are following different models for the 
provision of the service. These operators might use a different technology 
(wireless local access or IP technologies, for instance) or more aggressive 
pricing based on access to the most efficient network elements at each segment, 
or simply are centred on the most profitable niche markets.
New comers which are rather following the incumbent philosophy and 
building comprehensive networks with similar technologies might succeed in 
making profits in some niche markets but it seems to be the case that they do 
not seriously menace the position of the incumbent in the overall 
telecommunications market The aggressive operators, on the contrary, are a 
serious menace, even if potential, for the incumbent, as the aggressive 
technological options might provide a decisive competitive advantage in the 
future. At the same time, they are a menace for the rest of new comers, as their
597 Vide supra Chapter 9.2.3 Compulsory Access.
EEL Network Access.
competitiveness might ensure them the control of the most profitable niche 
markets.
As a consequence, there is a common interest for the incumbent and the 
more conventional new comers to introduce barriers to the more aggressive 
new comers. Such barriers can be introduced in the access contracts, and can be 
protected by the regulatory authorities. The similar structure of the networks 
ensures a simpler interconnection of the incumbents and the conventional new 
comers. The application of the same conditions to the more aggressive new 
comers might obstruct them, as they might be forced to adapt their more 
sophisticated networks to the traditional structure of the incumbent’s network. 
In this way, the competitive advantage of the innovative new comer could be 
eliminated or at least reduced. The intervention of the NRA might confirm such 
access conditions or even impose them on the operators. In such a way, a 
public measure could strengthen or even impose the anticompetitive result of a 
collusive agreement among a certain category of operators against their 
competitors.
Furthermore, public intervention could even foster more open 
discriminations against certain categories of new comers. This might be the 
case in certain Member States where access can be granted for different prices 
according to the nature of the operator requiring i t  In Spain, following the 
French example, price differences of 30% on interconnection of Type B and 
Type A operators with Telefonica were approved by the public authorities as 
foreseen in the legislation.598 As a result, Type B operators, those ready to 
accept the access network conditions of the regulatory authorities, benefit 
against those competitors with more heterodox strategies. Such a 
discrimination might be contrary to the rules on competition, not only because
598 See MONTERO, J. J. (1999): “¿Salvaguardia de la competencia o de los competidores? Otra visión 
de la política española de telecomunicaciones”, in Revista de Derecho de las Telecomunicaciones e 
Industrias en Red, vol 5, pp. 145-162.
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it might benefit the incumbent and therefore protect its dominant position while 
existing, but also might be contrary to Article 81 in relation with Articles 86 or 
5(2) and 3(g), as they might impose the same result as a collusive agreement 
between Type B operators against Type A operators. As a matter of fact, the 
Commission in the Access Notice has put forward the view that such 
discriminations could amount to an anticompetitive behaviour contrary to 
Article 82 EC Treaty.599
On the other hand, another type of collusive behaviour could be fostered 
by the regulatory authorities. The imposition of extremely low access prices to 
the incumbent could provide the same effects as a collusive agreement among 
the new comers in order to impose prices on the incumbent. This could be 
particularly the case at the moment the incumbent loses its dominance of the 
market but the regulatory authorities still impose asymmetric access obligations 
on the former monopoly. Such an example of over-regulation could be 
obstructed by the Community competition authorities as it would amount to a 
collusion between the new comers backed or even imposed by the regulatory 
authorities. Such a situation would harm consumers as it would foster the 
permanence in the market of no efficient operators subsidised by the incumbent 
that would not be in the position to lower its rates for the benefit of consumers.
225. Other mechanisms. The rules on competition are not the only 
mechanism in the hands of the Community authorities which enable them to 
block the adoption of anticompetitive measures by the NRAs. Certain measures 
can be obstructed by the Commission through Article 226 infringement 
procedures based on the incompatibility of the measures with the 
Telecommunications Directives. An Article 226 infringement procedure could 
be the more efficient mechanism for the Commission to block discriminatory
599 Vide supra Chapter 9.2.3. Compulsory Access, and Access Notice, paia. 123-125 (supra footnote 
562).
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access conditions such as the one studied in Spain, as paragraph 5(1) of 
Directive 97/33/EC states that such differences should never distort 
competition.600
At the same time, the regulatory framework on network access contains 
certain provisions that grant power to the Commission to obstruct the 
regulatory intervention of the NRAs. This is the case for instance, of the 
provision which allows the Commission to request NRAs to justify the 
classification of certain operators as having or not having significant market 
power.401 In this way, the classification which allows the asymmetric 
distribution of obligations is subject to the scrutiny of a different institution.
10.4. CONCLUSIONS.
226. Final. Throughout this thesis it has been argued that the rules on 
competition and the regulatory framework not only do not necessarily conflict 
with each other, but beneficial effects can be derived from their co-ordination. 
Network access, the most delicate issue in the liberalised telecommunications 
markets, can be better approached by public authorities with the right 
combination of both instruments. Antitrust and regulation complement each 
other and, at the same time counter-balance the negative tendencies of each 
instrument when dealing with access issues.
The regulatory framework on access developed by the Community 
institutions and implemented by the Member States complements the 
competition rules of abuse of dominant position, and in particular the refusal to 
deal and the essential facilities doctrines. The regulatory framework is the best-
600 Vide supra Chapter 9.23. Compulsory Access.
401 See Article 25(2) of Directive 98/10/EC and Article 18(2) of Directive 97/33/EC.
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suited instrument to substitute the constraints of competition which lack due to 
different market failures and ensure the satisfaction of the general interest 
objectives. At the same time, the rules on competition complement the 
regulatory framework, as they provide a safety network for those cases in 
which, for a variety of reasons (loopholes, capture etc.), the regulatory 
framework does not provide an efficient solution against an anticompetitive 
refusal to grant access.
If both instruments complement each other, they also counterbalance 
themselves. The very same existence of the regulatory framework on network 
access eliminates the need for the competition rules to be stretched and 
denaturalised in order to provide mechanisms for public intervention on the 
matter. At the same time, the rules on competition counter-balance some of the 
excesses of the regulatory intervention, the leading mechanism of intervention 
in the period of transition to full competition in the market.
The rules on competition, and in particular Article 86 and Articles 5(2) in 
relation to Article 3(g), allow to impose controls on the measures adopted by 
the national regulatory authorities. Nevertheless, such control is limited, as it is 
only effective with regard to the anticompetitive effects of the regulatory 
intervention. Furthermore, the rules on competition are very strictly defined, 
particularly with regard to their indirect application to state measures.
As a result, the rules on competition counter-balance the most clear 
examples of anticompetitive state intervention, but do not ensure the 
elimination of all the distortions of the market without a legitimate justification.
The most efficient counter-balance mechanisms are the ones created by 
the very same regulatory framework but bestowed not to the regulatory 
authorities but to different entities and in particular to the Commission. The 
Commission is particularly well suited to review the validity of the regulatory 
intervention. As a competition authority it has the know-how to evaluate
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markets and the effects on such markets of State measures. At the same time, 
the Commission constitutes a different layer of intervention, and as a result, is 
usually outside of the reach of some of the forces that could capture a National 
Regulatory Authority.
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